“The CYFSA was enacted to replace the CFSA. The new Act raised the age for protection and changed what was considered archaic and stigmatizing language. For example, “Crown ward” was replaced with “extended society care”. Most importantly for this case, the new Act changed the criteria for access to children in extended care by removing the presumption against access, making the child’s “best interests” predominant in determining access, and emphasizing the importance of preserving Indigenous children’s cultural identity and connection to community.
A transitional regulation, O. Reg. 157/18, was enacted to provide guidance on transitional matters. That regulation provides at s. 11(1) that “A proceeding commenced under Part III of the old Act but not concluded before the day this section comes into force is continued as a proceeding commenced under Part V of the Act.”
The Society submits that the transitional regulation does not apply here. Thus, it submits, the Divisional Court did not err by applying the old Act. It takes the position that “but not concluded” means that the evidence is not concluded. Under this interpretation, if the evidence was concluded before April 30, 2018, the old Act applies.
The Society relies on Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. N.K., 2018 ONCJ 696. There, submissions were completed on April 13, 2018, prior to the new Act coming into effect on April 30, 2018, and the court rendered its decision on October 3, 2018 after the new Act came into effect. Oldham J. analyzed the transitional provisions as follows at paras. 14-16:
[Section11(1)] does not provide a definition of ‘concluded’. Therefore, it is not clear whether a matter is considered to be concluded if evidence and submissions are complete, but the decision is on reserve at the time that the CYFSA comes into force.
Subsections 11(2) and (3) of the Regulations provide some context for interpretation. These subsections address the issue of parties in proceedings relating to a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child. The subsections specifically distinguish the treatment of a case where a proceeding is not concluded (subsection 11(2)) as contrasted with cases where the hearing is completed, but the court reserved its decision (subsection 11(3)). The clarification under subsection 11(3) supports the interpretation that a decision under reserve does not fall within the definition of ‘not concluded’ under subsection 11(1) of the Regulations.
Given the language of the Regulations and the fact that all parties concluded their evidence and submissions under the CFSA, I conclude that the determination of the issues before me are to be decided under the CFSA.
I do not accept this interpretation of the transitional regulation. The subsections in the transitional regulation referred to by Oldham J., ss. 11(2) and 11(3), read as follows:
(2) Despite subsection (1), in the case of a proceeding relating to a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, paragraph 4 of subsection 79 (1) of the Act does not apply if the court is satisfied that it would not be in the child’s best interests for that provision to apply and makes an order stating that the parties to the proceeding are those who were parties immediately before this section comes into force.
(3) Despite subsection (2), if a court has completed its hearing of a proceeding in respect of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child before the day this section comes into force but reserved its decision, the parties to the proceeding are those who were parties immediately before this section comes into force unless the court is satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the child for paragraph 4 of subsection 79 (1) of the Act to apply and makes an order to that effect.
The ordinary sense of the word “concluded” is “finished”, “completed”, “decided” or “over”. A decision under reserve means the case is not concluded.
Had the Legislature intended to capture only proceedings in which the hearing of a proceeding had not concluded, it would have said so. The use of the phrase “hearing of a proceeding” in s. 11(3) but not in s. 11(1) makes this abundantly clear.
The scheme of the Act as a whole also supports this interpretation. First, the Act is remedial legislation and so should be interpreted liberally. It would be inconsistent with the paramount purpose of the Act “to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children” not to permit all children to benefit from what the Legislature had clearly decided was a preferable approach.
Second, the Act is particularly remedial for Indigenous children. As will be set out in more detail below, it seeks to remedy past injustices and address the special significance of Indigenous children’s connection to their community.
Third, the April 30, 2018 proclamation date for the new Act was the same date that the previous definition of “Indian” and “native person/child” under the CFSA were deemed to be invalid due to a suspended declaration of invalidity issued by the court: G. H. By applying the transitional provisions to cases under reserve, these children would not be caught in a legislative void.
Finally, the regulation clarifies that a proceeding is not concluded until a decision is rendered. It does so in two ways: (i) it states that a “proceeding” is not concluded when a decision is on reserve, except in relation to the name of a party; and (ii) it distinguishes between the conclusion of a hearing and the conclusion of the proceeding which only occurs when the decision is rendered. These provisions support the plain wording and purpose of the regulation.
Therefore the transitional provisions applied to this case and the incorrect statute was applied by the Divisional Court.”
Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316 (CanLII) at 31-42