“On the proper test for unconscionability I refer to the words of Schroeder J.A. in Mundinger v. Mundinger, 1968 CanLII 250 (ON CA), [1969] 1 O.R. 606 at pp. 609-10, 3 D.L.R. (3d) 338 (C.A.):
The governing principle applicable here was laid down by this Court in the oft-cited case of Vanzant v. Coates (1917), 1917 CanLII 573 (ON CA), 40 O.L.R. 556, 39 D.L.R. 485. It was there held that the equitable rule is that if the donor is in a situation in which he is not a free agent and is not equal to protecting himself, a Court of Equity will protect him, not against his own folly or carelessness, but against his being taken advantage of by those in a position to do so because of their position. In that case the circumstances were the advanced age of the donor, her infirmity, her dependence on the donee; the position of influence occupied by the donee, her acts in procuring the drawing and execution of the deed; and the consequent complete change of a well-understood and defined purpose in reference to the disposition of the donor’s property. It was held that in those circumstances the onus was on the plaintiff to prove by satisfactory evidence that the gift was a voluntary and deliberate act by a person mentally competent to know, and who did know, the nature and effect of the deed, and that it was not the result of undue influence. That onus had not been discharged; and it was therefore held to be unnecessary for the defendant to prove affirmatively that the influence possessed by the plaintiff had been unduly exercised.
The principle enunciated in Vanzant v. Coates, supra, has been consistently followed and applied by the Courts of this Province and the other common law Provinces of Canada. The effect of the relevant decisions was neatly stated by Professor Bradley E. Crawford in a commentary written by him and appearing in 44 Can. Bar Rev. 142 (1966) at p. 143, from which I quote the following extract:
If the bargain is fair the fact that the parties were not equally vigilant of their interest is immaterial. Likewise if one was not preyed upon by the other, an improvident or even grossly inadequate consideration is no ground upon which to set aside a contract freely entered into. It is the combination of inequality and improvidence which alone may invoke this jurisdiction. Then the onus is placed upon the party seeking to uphold the contract to show that his conduct throughout was scrupulously considerate of the other’s interests.
This is slightly different from the test set forth by the trial judge in the case at bar. It is, however, the basis of our modern law of unconscionability and I would unhesitatingly follow it. The question therefore becomes was there an inequality between the parties, a preying of one upon the other which, combined with improvidence, cast the onus upon the husband of acting with scrupulous care for the welfare and interests of the wife. I think not.
We must always remember that it is not the ability of one party to make a better bargain that counts. Seldom are contracting parties equal. It is the taking advantage of that ability to prey upon the other party that produces the unconscionability. I can find nothing in the reasons for judgment quoted above to denote that advantage taken.”