Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“Court orders are not optional.  Non-compliance must have consequences: Gordon v. Starr, 2007 CanLII 35527 (ONSC), at para 23; Taylor v. Taylor, 2005 CanLII 63820 (ONSC), at para 3; Levely v. Levely, 2013 ONSC 1026, at paras. 12 and 13.

Faced with a party’s failure to respect court processes, judicial responses should be “strong and decisive”: Levely, supra.

The Court must be alive to the risk that proceedings can be “hijacked by a party and transformed into a process for further victimizing the other party and the children in their care”: Levely, supra.

Rule 1(8) of the Rules states that where a party has failed to comply with a Court Order, the Court may make any Order it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including an Order striking a party’s pleadings pursuant to Rule 1(8)(c).

The Court also has inherent jurisdiction to make an order that it considers appropriate to address a party’s failure to respect the Court process, including breach of an order.  This authority includes the jurisdiction to strike pleadings: Hughes v Hughes, 2007 CanLII 10905 (ON SC), [2007] OJ No 1282 (QL); CanLII 10905 (ON SC) at para 27.

Under Rule 1(8.4), the striking of a party’s pleadings denies the party any further notice of the steps in the case (except service of an Order), disentitles them to participate in a case, the case may be dealt with in the party’s absence, and the matter may proceed to an uncontested trial. These consequences are automatic unless the Court orders otherwise.

The Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld striking pleadings in cases of a “consistent and unyielding pattern of noncompliance with court orders and a total disregard for the process of the court”: Hill v Gregory, 2018 ONSC 6847 at paras 69-70; Ablett v Horzempa, 2011 ONCA 633 at para 7.

Courts are rightly cautious about striking pleadings in family matters involving parenting. Nevertheless, such a remedy may be appropriate: Purcaru v Purcaru, 2010 ONCA 92.  Where a parent is unlikely to contribute in a productive manner to the trial and their past behaviour warrants striking their pleadings, that may justify a loss of the right to participate: Kim v McIntosh, 2023 ONSC 356; Holden v Ploj, 2023 ONSC 1287.

When considering Rule 1(8), courts often apply a three-stage process:

a.   First, ask whether there is a triggering event that allows the Court to consider the wording of Rule 1(8);

b.   Second, if the answer to (a) is yes, consider whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion to not sanction a non-complying party; the onus is on the non-complying party to persuade the Court why it should escape a sanction;

c.   Third, if the Court decides against exercising the discretion noted in (b), it retains very broad discretion as to the appropriate remedy.

Ferguson v Charlton, 2008 ONCJ 1 at para. 64

When deciding whether to strike pleadings, a court must consider if there are other remedies in lieu of striking pleadings that would suffice: Van v Palombi, 2017 ONSC 2492 at para. 30; Giavon v Giavon, 2020 ONSC 21 at para 69.”

Allard v. Cho, 2025 ONSC 5719 (CanLII) at 11-20

“Duress is the “coercion of a person’s will through illegitimate pressure, with one party dominating the will of another at the time that a contract is executed.” See Ramdial v Davis, 2015 ONCA 726, at para 42. Duress can include “coercion, intimidation or the application of illegitimate pressure”. See Albaum v Albaum, 2024 ONSC 1595, at para 76.”

          Zunnurain v. Chowdhury, 2024 ONSC 5552 (CanLII) at 66

“At trial, the father sought to lead evidence about how the child support term in the Joint Agreement was negotiated, and what the parties intended. Although he gave evidence that was relevant to the interpretation of the terms of the agreement which was admitted for the purpose of explaining the surrounding circumstances to the agreement, his subjective evidence of the parties intentions in negotiations was contrary to the parol evidence rule and inadmissible for this purpose: Sattva at paras 59-61; 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2022 ONSC 7318 at para 53. The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to achieve finality and certainty in contractual obligations, and to hamper a party’s ability to use fabricated or unreliable evidence to attack a written contract: Sattva at para 59, citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd., 1993 CanLII 88 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 316 at 341-42.  Applying the parol evidence rule, the father’s evidence of the surrounding circumstances could not add to, subtract from, vary, or contradict the words of the written agreement: Ibid; 235 Ontario Corp. at para 53.”

          McPherson v. McPherson, 2023 ONSC 5643 (CanLII) at 67

“There is no disagreement about the applicable test. In order to obtain a certificate of pending litigation, the requesting party must have a triable claim to an interest in the land.  He does not have to show that he will succeed. Certain equitable considerations also apply.

In this matter, they are:

a.   whether the property is unique;

b.   the ease or difficulty in calculating damages;

c.   whether damages would be satisfactory compensation;

d.   the presence or absence of a willing purchaser; and

e.   the harm to both parties if the certificate is or is not granted.

The onus is on the respondent to show that there is no triable issue.”

Ahmad v. Marques, 2023 ONSC 6007 (CanLII) at 2-4

“A parent who faces criminal charges in a parenting dispute faces a very difficult conundrum: while the complainant parent may provide a detailed account of alleged events which resulted in charges being laid, the accused parent in a criminal trial has an ongoing right to silence. The accused parent is also presumed innocent, and it is the Crown who bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused parent often cannot fully respond to (or even address) the allegations in the family law context without potentially compromising their defence in the criminal matter. This Catch-22 situation for the accused parent is one that must be considered when assessing the evidence of the criminal allegation in the family law dispute (see C. v. C., 2024 ONSC 4319, at paras 65-78).

          Piaskoski v. Piaskoski, 2024 ONSC 5474 (CanLII) at 29

“The mother argues that this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the Vaccination Order was made under the Divorce Act and because its effect is final. She submits that vaccinating a child is an irreversible act.

Based on the Form 8 Application, I accept that this aspect of the order was made under the federal Divorce Act. As such, it would not be caught by s. 19(1)(a.1) of the CJA, which gives the Divisional Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from final orders of the Family Court that were made only under provincial legislation. An appeal from a final order under the federal Divorce Act lies to this court: Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONSC 1569, 11 R.F.L. (8th) 69, at para. 33. However, this does not end the inquiry. Contrary to the mother’s submission, this court does not have jurisdiction over all appeals arising from the Divorce Act. This court only has jurisdiction if the order appealed from is also final and therefore not captured by s. 19(1)(b) of the CJA: Goldberg v. Goldberg (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 124 (H.C.); see also Elgner v. Elgner, 2011 ONCA 483, 105 O.R. (3d) 721, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 341. In my view, the decision in this case was interlocutory and this court therefore does not have jurisdiction.

The motion judge made the order in the context of a motion to decide various issues between the parties on an interim basis. This is evident from the notice of motion, which seeks interim relief. This is also evident from the disposition paragraph in the motion judge’s decision that states that the orders are made on a temporary basis. Finally, while the parties have not yet obtained an issued order from the court, the form approved between them is for a temporary order.”

          J.M. v. B.S., 2024 ONCA 727 (CanLII) at 6-8

“Assessing costs is “not simply a mechanical exercise”. See: Delellis v. Delellis and Delellis, 2005 CanLII 36447 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 4345. In that case, Justice Aston indicated as follows at para 9:

Costs must be proportional to the amount in issue and the outcome. The overall objective is to fix an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the particular circumstances of the case, rather than an amount fixed by the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant.”

Jumale v. Mahamed, 2022 ONSC 5571 (CanLII) at 28

“Under part 1 of the SDA, both the grantor and attorney for property must be 18 years of age. The grantor must have the mental capacity to give a power of attorney at the time of execution (s. 8(1))

Under s. 8(1), a person is capable of giving a continuing power of attorney if he or she:

(a) knows what kind of property he or she has and its approximate value;

(b) is aware of obligations owed to his or her dependants;

(c)  knows that the attorney will be able to do on the person’s behalf anything in respect of property that the person could do if capable, except make a will, subject to the conditions and restrictions set out in the power of attorney;

(d) knows that the attorney must account for his or her dealings with the person’s property;

(e) knows that he or she may, if capable, revoke the continuing power of attorney;

(f)  appreciates that unless the attorney manages the property prudently its value may decline; and

(g) appreciates the possibility that the attorney could misuse the authority given to him or her.

Formally, the power of attorney form must be signed by the grantor in presence of two witnesses, both of whom must also sign (s. 10(1)). The witnesses to the grantor’s signature may not include the attorney, the attorney’s spouse or partner, the grantor’s spouse or partner, child or any person under guardianship or under the age of eighteen years old: s. 19(2).”

McDonald v. McDonald, 2025 ONSC 5536 (CanLII) at 12-14

“The proper approach to determining support for an adult child who is attending school away from home was set out by Wright J. in Coghill v. Coghill, 2006 CanLII 28734 (Ont. S.C.). It was summarized succinctly by Price J. in Liscio v. Avram, 2009 CanLII 43640 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 36:

The proper approach, in these circumstances, is the one taken by this Court in Coghill v. Coghill, at paras. 44 to 53. In that case, Justice Wright calculated the child’s expenses during the eight months the child was at university, deducted the contribution the child was able to make from summer earnings, apportioned the net expenses between the parents in proportion to their respective incomes and required them to pay their respective shares directly to the child. He then calculated the table amount of the non-residential parent’s obligation to pay child support for the four summer months, when the child was living with the residential parent, as if the child were a minor, based on the income imputed to the non-residential parent and required him to pay that amount to the residential parent. He then required the non-residential parent to pay one third of the table amount to the residential parent for the eight months when the child was at university to help defray that parent’s costs of maintaining a home for the child to return to on holidays and during the summer. [Citations omitted.]”

            Craig v. Niro, 2022 ONSC 5178 (CanLII) at 54

“The parties have several frozen embryos kept in storage at a facility operated by Boston Reproductive Medicine, PLLC, also referred to as “CCRM Fertility” or “CCRM Boston”. This facility is located in the area of Boston, Massachusetts. It is not disputed that CCRM Fertility requires both parties to consent, or a Court Order, before embryos can be destroyed or otherwise dealt with.

The father seeks an order for the destruction of the frozen embryos. The mother does not want the embryos to be destroyed, citing moral and religious concerns. Instead, she wishes to relocate the embryos to a more economically efficient facility for indefinite storage at her cost (it currently costs $1,000 U.S. to keep them stored at CCRM Fertility). After the deaths of one or both of the parties, the mother wishes to have the embryos donated to a credible facility to assist a family in reproduction.

The parties’ rights and obligations in relation to the embryos are governed by the detailed contract that they signed with CCRM Fertility. The law applicable to this contract is that applicable in the State of Massachusetts, not the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2. In my view, this Court does not have jurisdiction to make an order related to embryos that are located outside of Canada.

Therefore, I decline making any order in relation to the parties’ embryos.”

          Malone v. Cappon, 2023 ONSC 5365 (CanLII) at 2-5