Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“In 2008, the authors of the SSAG, Professors Rogerson and Thompson, noted that cases involving disability are “hard” cases because “need” looms large. “Disability will be an important factor in locating the amount and duration within the ranges in these cases”: SSAG, s. 12.4. They said:

Faced with a recipient with a long-term disability, Canadian courts have responded with one of three approaches, here stated in declining order of frequency.

(i) Lower Amount, Extend Duration: most courts will extend duration, even to be “indefinite”, while keeping the amount within the range, at or near the low end;

(ii) No Exception: a slightly smaller number of courts will fix an amount in the range, often towards the upper end, and use the maximum duration, even though that means support will end while need continues;

(iii) Increase Amount, Extend Duration: a much smaller group of courts will respond to the greater need in disability cases by increasing amount and extending duration.

In the SSAG Revised User’s Guide, 2016, Professors Rogerson and Thompson noted that courts continued to struggle with cases involving the disability of a spouse. They said, at s. 12(d), p. 62:

The law in these cases is particularly uncertain and confused, as the courts have not yet been able to work out a consistent approach. …

Cases involving permanent illness or disability in short and medium length marriages are “hard” cases and they are often litigated because they are difficult to settle. We thus have many reported decisions, but even with some appellate court rulings on the issue no clear approach has developed. … to a large degree the cases involve competing ideas about entitlement that are still being worked out in the courts.

These 2016 remarks continue to be applicable. In the same document, at p. 64, Rogerson and Thompson also said:

Until appellate courts provide further guidance, these divergent approaches towards illness and disability will continue. As for us, we stated in the SSAG, “Our preference would be the … ‘no exception’ approach, which seems more consistent with the modern limits of spousal support as a remedy.” We will have to await further developments in the law. [Emphasis added.]

          W.G. v. K.G., 2024 ONSC 5716 (CanLII) at 32-34

“In order to succeed in a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that:

a.   That the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person,

b.   That the words in fact referred to the plaintiff, and

c.   That the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the Plaintiff.

If these elements are proven, then falsity and damage are presumed.  The Plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant intended to do harm, or even that the defendant was careless.  This tort is one of strict liability (See Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 (CanLII), [2009] S.C.J. No. 61 at paragraph 28).”

Belliveau v Quinlan, 2025 CanLII 110494 (ON SCSM) at 14-15

“The case law establishes that the threshold to prove that an agreement was made under duress is high.   In Ludmer v. Ludmer, 2013 ONSC 784, 33 R.F.L. (7th) 331, Penny J. states at para. 53:

Duress involves a coercion of the will or a situation in which one party has no realistic alternative but to submit to pressure.  There can be no duress without evidence of an attempt by one party to dominate the will of the other at the time of the execution of the contract.  To prove duress, the applicant must show that she was compelled to enter into the marriage contract out of fear of actual or threatened harm of some kind.  There must be something more than stress associated with a potential breakdown in familial relations.  There must be credible evidence demonstrating that the complaining party was subject to intimidation or illegitimate pressure to sign the agreement.”

            Widdifield v. Hunter, 2023 ONSC 6522 (CanLII) at 116

“Partial summary judgment “should be granted only in the clearest of cases and only if doing so does not give rise to any of the associated risks of delay, expense, inefficiency, and inconsistent findings”: Truscott v. Co-Operators General Insurance Company, 2023 ONCA 267, 428 D.L.R. (4th) 113, at para. 54. Further, partial summary judgment should not be granted where there is a real risk of inconsistent or duplicative facts in the context of the litigation as a whole: Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Deloitte & Touche, 2016 ONCA 922, 133 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 38.

That does not mean, however, that partial summary judgment should never be granted. It is appropriate to grant partial summary judgment where three conditions are established:

(i)           The determination of the case in several parts will prove cheaper for the parties;

(ii)         Partial summary judgment will get the parties’ case in and out of the court system more quickly; and

(iii)        Partial summary judgment will not result in inconsistent findings by the multiple judges who will touch the divided case.

(Malik v. Attia, 2020 ONCA 787, 29 R.P.R. (6th) 215, at para. 62)

Appellate courts must be cautious in reviewing orders for partial summary judgment. In Malik, for example, it was likely that the claims involved in the partial summary judgment motion would not result in inconsistent findings, but the motion would increase both costs and delay. However, at para. 67, the court noted that setting aside partial summary judgment for adding cost and delay would only add further cost and delay, and dismissed the appeal. Additionally, in VP Auto Sales & Service Ltd. v. Ahmed Inc., 2024 ONCA 507, at para. 26, this court has previously found no error in granting partial summary judgment where the adjudicator instructed himself properly on the principles of trial efficiency and proportionality.

Motion judges in family law matters must consider the factors that weigh for and against granting partial summary judgment. As a matter of best practices, they should explain why they find it appropriate.

I would also note that when unrepresented parties are involved, as in this case, concerns about the efficiency of the process may take on particular importance. In such matters, however, it may be particularly important to narrow the issues for trial, particularly where one or more parties are self-represented.”

          Le v. Norris, 2024 ONCA 741 (CanLII) at 22-26

“Court orders are not optional.  Non-compliance must have consequences: Gordon v. Starr, 2007 CanLII 35527 (ONSC), at para 23; Taylor v. Taylor, 2005 CanLII 63820 (ONSC), at para 3; Levely v. Levely, 2013 ONSC 1026, at paras. 12 and 13.

Faced with a party’s failure to respect court processes, judicial responses should be “strong and decisive”: Levely, supra.

The Court must be alive to the risk that proceedings can be “hijacked by a party and transformed into a process for further victimizing the other party and the children in their care”: Levely, supra.

Rule 1(8) of the Rules states that where a party has failed to comply with a Court Order, the Court may make any Order it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including an Order striking a party’s pleadings pursuant to Rule 1(8)(c).

The Court also has inherent jurisdiction to make an order that it considers appropriate to address a party’s failure to respect the Court process, including breach of an order.  This authority includes the jurisdiction to strike pleadings: Hughes v Hughes, 2007 CanLII 10905 (ON SC), [2007] OJ No 1282 (QL); CanLII 10905 (ON SC) at para 27.

Under Rule 1(8.4), the striking of a party’s pleadings denies the party any further notice of the steps in the case (except service of an Order), disentitles them to participate in a case, the case may be dealt with in the party’s absence, and the matter may proceed to an uncontested trial. These consequences are automatic unless the Court orders otherwise.

The Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld striking pleadings in cases of a “consistent and unyielding pattern of noncompliance with court orders and a total disregard for the process of the court”: Hill v Gregory, 2018 ONSC 6847 at paras 69-70; Ablett v Horzempa, 2011 ONCA 633 at para 7.

Courts are rightly cautious about striking pleadings in family matters involving parenting. Nevertheless, such a remedy may be appropriate: Purcaru v Purcaru, 2010 ONCA 92.  Where a parent is unlikely to contribute in a productive manner to the trial and their past behaviour warrants striking their pleadings, that may justify a loss of the right to participate: Kim v McIntosh, 2023 ONSC 356; Holden v Ploj, 2023 ONSC 1287.

When considering Rule 1(8), courts often apply a three-stage process:

a.   First, ask whether there is a triggering event that allows the Court to consider the wording of Rule 1(8);

b.   Second, if the answer to (a) is yes, consider whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion to not sanction a non-complying party; the onus is on the non-complying party to persuade the Court why it should escape a sanction;

c.   Third, if the Court decides against exercising the discretion noted in (b), it retains very broad discretion as to the appropriate remedy.

Ferguson v Charlton, 2008 ONCJ 1 at para. 64

When deciding whether to strike pleadings, a court must consider if there are other remedies in lieu of striking pleadings that would suffice: Van v Palombi, 2017 ONSC 2492 at para. 30; Giavon v Giavon, 2020 ONSC 21 at para 69.”

Allard v. Cho, 2025 ONSC 5719 (CanLII) at 11-20

“Duress is the “coercion of a person’s will through illegitimate pressure, with one party dominating the will of another at the time that a contract is executed.” See Ramdial v Davis, 2015 ONCA 726, at para 42. Duress can include “coercion, intimidation or the application of illegitimate pressure”. See Albaum v Albaum, 2024 ONSC 1595, at para 76.”

          Zunnurain v. Chowdhury, 2024 ONSC 5552 (CanLII) at 66

“At trial, the father sought to lead evidence about how the child support term in the Joint Agreement was negotiated, and what the parties intended. Although he gave evidence that was relevant to the interpretation of the terms of the agreement which was admitted for the purpose of explaining the surrounding circumstances to the agreement, his subjective evidence of the parties intentions in negotiations was contrary to the parol evidence rule and inadmissible for this purpose: Sattva at paras 59-61; 2356802 Ontario Corp. v. 285 Spadina SPV Inc., 2022 ONSC 7318 at para 53. The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to achieve finality and certainty in contractual obligations, and to hamper a party’s ability to use fabricated or unreliable evidence to attack a written contract: Sattva at para 59, citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd., 1993 CanLII 88 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 316 at 341-42.  Applying the parol evidence rule, the father’s evidence of the surrounding circumstances could not add to, subtract from, vary, or contradict the words of the written agreement: Ibid; 235 Ontario Corp. at para 53.”

          McPherson v. McPherson, 2023 ONSC 5643 (CanLII) at 67

“There is no disagreement about the applicable test. In order to obtain a certificate of pending litigation, the requesting party must have a triable claim to an interest in the land.  He does not have to show that he will succeed. Certain equitable considerations also apply.

In this matter, they are:

a.   whether the property is unique;

b.   the ease or difficulty in calculating damages;

c.   whether damages would be satisfactory compensation;

d.   the presence or absence of a willing purchaser; and

e.   the harm to both parties if the certificate is or is not granted.

The onus is on the respondent to show that there is no triable issue.”

Ahmad v. Marques, 2023 ONSC 6007 (CanLII) at 2-4

“A parent who faces criminal charges in a parenting dispute faces a very difficult conundrum: while the complainant parent may provide a detailed account of alleged events which resulted in charges being laid, the accused parent in a criminal trial has an ongoing right to silence. The accused parent is also presumed innocent, and it is the Crown who bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused parent often cannot fully respond to (or even address) the allegations in the family law context without potentially compromising their defence in the criminal matter. This Catch-22 situation for the accused parent is one that must be considered when assessing the evidence of the criminal allegation in the family law dispute (see C. v. C., 2024 ONSC 4319, at paras 65-78).

          Piaskoski v. Piaskoski, 2024 ONSC 5474 (CanLII) at 29

“The mother argues that this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the Vaccination Order was made under the Divorce Act and because its effect is final. She submits that vaccinating a child is an irreversible act.

Based on the Form 8 Application, I accept that this aspect of the order was made under the federal Divorce Act. As such, it would not be caught by s. 19(1)(a.1) of the CJA, which gives the Divisional Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from final orders of the Family Court that were made only under provincial legislation. An appeal from a final order under the federal Divorce Act lies to this court: Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONSC 1569, 11 R.F.L. (8th) 69, at para. 33. However, this does not end the inquiry. Contrary to the mother’s submission, this court does not have jurisdiction over all appeals arising from the Divorce Act. This court only has jurisdiction if the order appealed from is also final and therefore not captured by s. 19(1)(b) of the CJA: Goldberg v. Goldberg (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 124 (H.C.); see also Elgner v. Elgner, 2011 ONCA 483, 105 O.R. (3d) 721, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 341. In my view, the decision in this case was interlocutory and this court therefore does not have jurisdiction.

The motion judge made the order in the context of a motion to decide various issues between the parties on an interim basis. This is evident from the notice of motion, which seeks interim relief. This is also evident from the disposition paragraph in the motion judge’s decision that states that the orders are made on a temporary basis. Finally, while the parties have not yet obtained an issued order from the court, the form approved between them is for a temporary order.”

          J.M. v. B.S., 2024 ONCA 727 (CanLII) at 6-8