Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“A spouse can become a creditor of the other spouse.  In Stone v. Stone, 2001 CanLII 24110 (C.A.), Feldman J.A. rejects the proposition that spouses are in a constant debtor-creditor relationship but instead, sets out at para. 26 five triggering events where one spouse becomes a creditor when that spouse has the lesser net family property and is entitled to one-half the difference: “(1) the date of separation with no reasonable prospect of resuming co-habitation; (2) the date of divorce; (3) the date of declaration of nullity; (4) the date one of the spouses commences an application under s. 5(3) of the Family Law Act for improvident depletion of net family property, if the application is granted; and (5) the date before the death of the spouse with the greater net family property.”

“A spouse has standing to allege a fraudulent conveyance where they had an existing claim at the time of the impugned transaction” and “the spouse can initiate a claim after the fact where the transfers were kept secret from them” (Kimmel, J. in Habibi v. Aarabi, 2021 ONSC 5574 at para. 55, leave to appeal dismissed: 2021 ONSC 6586).

The legal framework of fraudulent conveyances was explained by Myers J. in Purcaru v. Seliverstova et al., 2015 ONSC 6679 at para. 10, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 2016 ONCA 610,

…the Fraudulent Conveyances Act provides that the court can declare a transfer of property void if the intention of the person who made the transfer was to defeat or delay his or her creditors.  The statute is designed to stop a debtor from hiding assets from creditors by fraudulently transferring the assets to another person.  If it is applicable, an order under the statute makes property that was fraudulently conveyed available for execution on behalf of the creditors of the transferor.  In addition, if the transferred property has been disposed of prior to the transaction being declared void, s. 12 of the Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.A-33 allows the creditors to execute against proceeds received by the transferee.

The Fraudulent Conveyances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 29, sections 2, 3, and 4 provide,

Where conveyances void as against creditors

1. 1. 1. 1. 2. Every conveyance of real property or personal property and every bond, suit, judgment and execution heretofore or hereafter made with intent to defeat, hinder, delay or defraud creditors or others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties or forfeitures are void as against such persons and their assigns.

Where s. 2 does not apply

1. 1. 1. 1. 3. Section 2 does not apply to an estate or interest in real property or personal property conveyed upon good consideration and in good faith to a person not having at the time of the conveyance to the person notice or knowledge of the intent set forth in that section.

Where s. 2 applies

1. 1. 1. 1. 4. Section 2 applies to every conveyance executed with the intent set forth in that section despite the fact that it was executed upon a valuable consideration and with the intention, as between the parties to it, of actually transferring to and for the benefit of the transferee the interest expressed to be thereby transferred, unless it is protected under section 3 by reason of good faith and want of notice or knowledge on the part of the purchaser.

Myers J. further explains at paras. 11 and 12,

…Therefore, the law provides that the court can infer the existence of a transferor’s fraudulent intention to defeat or delay creditors where there are recognized “badges of fraud” associated with a transaction.  The badges of fraud are facts or fact patterns that courts have held to be indicative of fraudulent transactions.  Facts such as: secrecy, transfer of property when an action or execution is pending, transfer of property to non-arm’s-length parties, transfers made with undue haste, and transfers for a conspicuously insufficient price, are all recognized examples of badges of fraud.  There are others such as the breach of family law orders requiring a party to preserve his or her assets pending a trial.  If the court draws the inference of fraudulent intent due to the existence of badges of fraud, then an evidentiary burden will fall to the respondents to explain their conduct to try to rebut the inference of fraudulent intent.  Of course, the ultimate persuasive burden remains on the applicant throughout.  A&B Landscaping & Interlocking Ltd. v. Bradsil, 1993 CarswellOnt 664 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) at para 69.  Business Development Bank of Canada v. Samarsky, [2012] ONSC 3002 at para 15.  Conte Estate v. Allessandro, [2002] O.J. No. 5080 at para 21 and 22.

The statute and the case law interpreting it also provide that where a purchaser or transferee has paid for property, it is not enough to prove that the seller had a fraudulent intention.  Rather, to set aside a transaction where a buyer has paid for property, the applicant must also prove that by participating in the transaction the buyer too intended to defeat or delay the creditors of the seller.

B.W. Miller, J.A. for the Court of Appeal confirmed that that the evidential burden first falls on the challenger and then those defending the transaction.  B.W. Miller, J.A. held at para. 5,

If a challenger raises evidence of one or more ‘badges of fraud’ that can give rise to an inference of an intent to defraud, the evidential burden then falls on those defending the transaction to adduce evidence showing the absence of fraudulent intent (Re Fancy, (1984), 1984 CanLII 2031 (ON SC), 46 O.R. (2d) 153 (H.C.J.)), Nuove Ceramiche Ricchetti S.p.A. v. Mastrogiovanni, [1988] O.J. No. 2569 (H.C.J.), pp. 4, 5).

also prove that by participating in the transaction the buyer too intended to defeat or delay the creditors of the seller.

Where there is a fraudulent conveyance that is void against a creditor, the transferee of the property becomes a trustee for the creditor and the property may be traced in a subsequent transfer and proceeds of sale.  Wilson J. explained in Tsui-Wong v. Xiao, 2018 ONSC 3315 at paras. 252 to 254, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 2019 ONCA 756,

A fraudulent conveyance is void against creditors of the debtor. The transferee of the property becomes a trustee for the creditor, and the creditor can remain entitled to the property. Where the transferee has sold the property to a bona fide purchaser, the creditor’s remedy is the proceeds of the sale.

As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in Allen v. Hennessey (1997), 1997 CanLII 1182 (ON CA), 107 O.A.C. 69, at para. 5:

…A creditor is entitled to invoke the Fraudulent Conveyances Act to recover the proceeds of a conveyance void under the statute from a fraudulent transferee. The fraudulent transferee is and bears all the liability of a trustee of the property or its proceeds for the benefit of creditors. As this court stated in Westinghouse Canada Ltd. v. Buchar (1975), 1975 CanLII 638 (ON CA), 9 O.R. (2d) 137 (Ont. C.A.), at 141:

A remedial statute for the protection of creditors’ rights should receive a fair, large and liberal interpretation to ensure the attainment of its objects; the plain intention of the statutes [the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and Assignments and Preferences Act] to be read together is to constitute the fraudulent transferee a trustee of the proceeds replacing the land, for the benefit of the defrauded creditors.

With respect to tracing, when a conveyance is void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, the Court of Appeal held in Westinghouse Canada Ltd. v. Buchar (1975), 1975 CanLII 638 (ON CA), 9 O.R. (2d) 137 (C.A.), that the tracing provisions in s. 12 of the Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.33 are available.

The Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 33, s. 12 (1) and (2) provide that if the transferred property has been disposed of prior to the transaction being declared void, a creditor may seize the proceeds:

Following proceeds of property fraudulently transferred

12 (1) In the case of a gift, conveyance, assignment or transfer of any property, real or personal, that is invalid against creditors, if the person to whom the gift, conveyance, assignment or transfer was made has sold or disposed of, realized or collected the property or any part thereof, the money or other proceeds may be seized or recovered in an action by a person who would be entitled to seize and recover the property if it had remained in the possession or control of the debtor or of the person to whom the gift, conveyance, transfer, delivery or payment was made, and such right to seize and recover belongs not only to an assignee for the general benefit of the creditors of the debtor but, where there is no such assignment, to all creditors of the debtor.

Taking proceeds under execution

(2) Where there is no assignment for the benefit of creditors and the proceeds are of such a character as to be sizeable under execution, they may be seized under the execution of any creditor and are subject to the Creditors’ Relief Act, 2010.  R.S.O. 1990, c. A.33, s. 12 (2); 2010, c. 16, Sched. 4, s. 23 (1).

Furthermore, the Family Law Act, s.12 gives the court authority to make an order for the possession, delivering up, safekeeping, and preservation of property if the court considers it necessary to protect the other spouse’s interest.  In Bronfman v. Bronfman (2000) 2000 CanLII 22710 (ON SC), 51 O.R. (3d) 336, Sachs J. explained the provision at paras. 18 and 19,

[18] Section 12 has been used by the courts in two ways:

(a) to place an onus on a spouse who has been required to preserve assets, to account for his or her assets at the date of trial, and

(b) to restrain a person’s conduct with respect to his or her property.

[19] The purpose of s. 12 is to ensure that if the court does determine that an equalization payment is owing, there are sufficient assets available to satisfy that payment (Lasch v. Lasch (1988), 1988 CanLII 4581 (ON SC), 64 O.R. (2d) 464, 13 R.F.L. (3d) 434 (H.C.J.)). While preservation orders are frequently made, the reported case law that discusses what criteria must be satisfied before they are granted is limited.

Sachs J. at para. 28 then set out the factors that courts consider in dealing with an interim order,

(a) The relative strength of the plaintiff’s case;

(b) The balance of convenience (or inconvenience); and

(c) Irreparable harm.”

Farwa v. Syed, 2025 ONSC 2865 (CanLII) at 20-29

“A resulting trust arises when title to property is in one party’s name, but that party, because he or she is a fiduciary or gave no value for the property, is under an obligation to return it to the original title owner” (Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795 at para 20, cited in Andrade v. Andrade, 2016 ONCA 368 at para 57).  Sanfilippo J. in Bradshaw v. Hougassian, 2023 ONSC 3266 sets out the principles as follows,

A resulting trust arises where the property is in one party’s name, but impressed with an obligation to return the property either because the holder is a fiduciary or because the transferee gave no value for the property: Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795, at para. 20. To determine whether the transfer of property was made for no value, the actual intention of the transferor at the time of the transfer is the governing consideration: Nishi v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2013 SCC 33 [2013] 2 S.C.R. 438, at para. 2. Where a gratuitous transfer is made, there is a rebuttable presumption that the transferor intended to create a trust rather than to make a gift, on the principle that “equity presumes bargains and not gifts”: Kerr, at para. 19, citing Pecore, at para. 24. See also, Belokon v. Kyrgyz Republic, 2016 ONCA 981, 136 O.R. (3d) 39 (C.A.), at paras. 54-58. The onus is on the person receiving the transfer to demonstrate that a gift was intended, failing which the transferee holds the property in trust for the transferor: Kerr, at para. 19, citing Pecore, at para. 24.”

Tzouanakis v. Tzouanakis, 2024 ONSC 2734 (CanLII) at 17

“Mr. Maxwell takes issue with the Arbitrator’s imputation of corporate pre-tax income to him pursuant to s. 18, from corporations of which he was not the sole shareholder.  In L.M.P v. M.D.P., 2021 ONSC 3577, 56 R.F.L. (8th) 381, at para. 58, the court summarized the considerations and questions it needs to consider when determining whether to exercise its discretion to attribute corporate pre-tax income: (1) does the payor have control over dividend declarations; (2) is there a business reason for retaining the earnings; and (3) should the court exercise its discretion and attribute corporate pre-tax income.

The attribution of corporate pre-tax income may be appropriate even where the party does not control the corporation but where, for example, the party is the controlling mind of the corporation or where control is held by a cooperative relative, and there is a past practice of the party receiving compensation: Leitch v. Novac, 2020 ONCA 257, 150 O.R. (3d) 587, leave to appeal refused, [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 194,  at para. 36.  To interpret the Guidelines otherwise would allow the payor to avoid their obligations by employing a corporate structure to deprive the children of the support to which they are entitled: Goett v. Goett, 2013 ABCA 216, 33 R.F.L. (7th) 301, at para. 20.”

            La Fontaine v. Maxwell, 2025 ONSC 2440 (CanLII) at 20-21

“So while the proper interpretive framework for assessing a domestic contract is statute-specific, useful principles emerge from Miglin and this Court’s subsequent jurisprudence that aid in this judicial assessment. As a starting point, domestic contracts should generally be encouraged and supported by courts, within the bounds permitted by the legislature, absent a compelling reason to discount the agreement (Miglin, at para. 46; D.B.S., at para. 76; Rick, at para. 45). This deference flows from the recognition that self-sufficiency, autonomy and finality are important objectives in the family law context (Miglin, at para. 28). Not only are parties better placed than courts to understand what is fair within the context of their relationship, but the private resolution of family affairs outside the adversarial process avoids the cost and tumult of protracted litigation (paras. 45-46; see also Association de médiation familiale du Québec v. Bouvier, 2021 SCC 54, at paras. 44 and 134).

At the same time, negotiations over domestic contracts take place in a singularly challenging environment, often at a time of acute emotional stress, “in which one or both of the parties may be particularly vulnerable” (Miglin, at para. 74; see also Rick, at para. 47; C. Rogerson, “Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24: ‘They are Agreements Nonetheless’” (2003), 20 Can. J. Fam. L. 197, at p. 225). In this context, the simple application of ordinary principles of contractual validity may be inadequate to quiet concerns of imbalance and exploitation (Miglin, at para. 77; M. Shaffer, “Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne” (2004), 20 Can. J. Fam. L. 261, at p. 286). Rather, judges must approach family law settlements with a view to balancing the values of contractual autonomy and certainty with concerns of fairness. In essence, judges are to review domestic contracts with particular sensitivity to the vulnerabilities that can arise in the family law context, without presuming that spouses lack the agency to contract simply because the agreement was negotiated in an emotionally stressful context (Miglin, at para. 82; see also R. Leckey, “Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds” (2007), 57 U.T.L.J. 1, at p. 14; Bailey, at p. 102 (citing the gendered unfairness that may arise from presuming incapacity to contract where a bargain is struck in an emotional context)).

Concern about vulnerabilities may be countered by the presence of procedural safeguards. For example, full and frank disclosure of all relevant financial information between the parties can go far to assuage concerns of informational asymmetry (Rick, at para. 47; Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, at para. 51). Similarly, professional assistance, such as independent legal advice, can serve as a hallmark of a fair bargaining process (Miglin, at para. 82; Rick, at paras. 60-61), although the curative impact of legal advice in the negotiation of domestic contracts should not be taken as given. As La Forest J. recognized, dissenting in Richardson v. Richardson, 1987 CanLII 58 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857, divorce is one of the most stressful periods in an individual’s life and many people do “very unwise things, things that are anything but mature and sensible, even when they consult legal counsel” (p. 883). Courts must have careful regard to the financial and emotional pressures that characterized the relationship, and not simply presume that legal advice immunizes a contract from unfairness.

The rigour of a court’s review of a domestic contract depends on the authorizing statute. Some statutes provide that a domestic contract may only be set aside where it is unconscionable, for example (see Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 33(4)), while others use the measures of “inequitable” or “undue influence” (see Marital Property Act, R.S.N.B. 2012, c. 107, s. 43; Family Property and Support Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 83, s. 2(4)). In any case, however, fairness review of a domestic contract typically looks both to the circumstances surrounding the contract’s execution and to the substance of the agreement, where such a review is authorized by governing legislation. As Abella J. stated in Rick, at para. 50: “. . . the best way to protect the finality of any negotiated agreement in family law is to ensure both its procedural and substantive integrity in accordance with the relevant legislative scheme”.

An assessment of the substance of the agreement is generally determined by reference to the governing legislative regime. The purposes and criteria of the statute provide an objective yardstick against which to assess the parties’ subjective understanding of what is fair, and limit the risk that parties will depart significantly from public policy goals expressed by the legislature. Measuring the substance of the agreement against the legislation also helps to promote greater certainty for parties, who may rely on their statutory entitlements as a reference point in organizing their personal affairs (M. Shaffer and C. Rogerson, “Contracting Spousal Support: Thinking Through Miglin” (2003), 21 C.F.L.Q. 49, at p. 61).

In sum, our jurisprudence on domestic contracts, beginning with Miglin, values the principles of autonomy and certainty by encouraging parties to arrange their intimate affairs outside the court system. But the emotional complexities of family dynamics make contracting over domestic affairs unlike regular arm’s length transactions. The unique context out of which these agreements arise requires courts to approach them with keen awareness of their potential frailties to ensure fairness, having regard for the integrity of the bargaining process and the substance of the agreement.”

            Anderson v. Anderson, 2023 SCC 13 (CanLII) at 33-38

“This Court has held that orders making findings of contempt are final orders: Bush v. Mereshensky, 2007 ONCA 679, 229 O.A.C. 200, at paras. 9-10; Mantella v. Mantella, 2009 ONCA 194, 246 O.A.C. 386, at para. 17; see also Leeming v. Leeming, 2016 ONSC 1835, 78 R.F.L. (7th) 120 (Div. Ct.), at para. 16.

However, an order dismissing a contempt motion is not necessarily a final order. This is because not all orders which dismiss contempt motions finally determine the rights of the parties. Whether an order dismissing a contempt motion is a final or an interlocutory order must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Orders dismissing a contempt motion are final only where there are no ongoing proceedings and the party seeking the order has no other means of obtaining relief arising out of the failure to abide by the terms of the order: Wang v. Li, 2023 ONCA 119, at paras. 15-16; Chirico v. Szalas, 2016 ONCA 586, 132 O.R. (3d) 738, at paras. 36-49; Overtveld v. Overtveld, 2022 ONCA 269, at para. 7.”

Gueye v. DiNino, 2023 ONCA 342 (CanLII) at 7-8

“I am aware of the Parenting Plan Guide (“PPG” or “Guide”) published by the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts – Ontario (AFCC-O) which provides a good up-to-date summary of the social science research.

The Guide has some useful comments regarding children Spencer’s age, keeping in mind that she is currently age 9 and will be 10 in November.

Regarding ‘Early School Age Children: 6 to 9 Years’, the Guide says that “Children of this age can more easily understand and manage differences in parenting styles and blocks of time away from each parent due to their more developed understanding of time.”  This is relevant because it is clear from the SASAC notes that the child felt she had to choose between her mother and the father in absolute terms, and when the Family Monitor tried to explain to Spencer that a proposed visit was only 1 hour with her father and she would be with the mother for the rest of the week, Spencer struggled.  She was 6 years old at that time and at the early stage of this age category.  The Guide further notes that “Children of this age often feel they need a parent’s “permission” to see the other parent.  They have developed an appreciation for others’ points of view; if they believe that a parent is unsettled or anxious about their spending time away, the child may have feelings of guilt, anxiety, or even anger.”  This was certainly seen at the SASAC visits.  It is possible that now, approaching the end of this age category, these feelings have waned, although there are further concerns noted in the next age category.  The Guide says that “at this age, children should have very significant involvement with both parents.”

Regarding ‘Later School Age Children: 10 to 12 Years’, a grouping Spencer will soon join, the Guide comments that “If there is a high level of conflict, and one or both parents are undermining the child’s relations with the other parent, this is an age where some children may strongly identify with one parent.  It is not unusual for children of high conflict parents in this age range to align with one parent and start resisting contact with the other parent.  In extreme cases, one parent may intentionally engage in a pattern of behaviour intended to alienate the child from the other parent.”  The Guide says that “Children of this age group can do well with a range of different [parenting] plans, but should have frequent contact with both parents.”  The Guide adds regarding this older group “Resistance to contact is usually best understood as a “family systems problem” that should be addressed by the child and both parents, if possible, through discussion and perhaps voluntary therapeutic involvement for all family members, but if necessary through the legal process. The support of a favoured parent for a strong relationship with the other parent is very important, and, unless there are serious issues of poor parenting, is usually in the long-term interests of the child.”

Hutchings v. Hutchings, 2025 ONSC 7327 (CanLII) at 54-57

“That finding then brings me to a consideration of the decision of Ducharme J. (as he then was) in Shepley v. Shepley, 2006 CanLII 1924 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 293, 24 R.F.L. (6th) 422 (S.C.J.).

In Shepley – a case that I consider to be quite similar in various material respects to the case at bar – at the date of separation, the applicant husband earned approximately $50,000 per annum as a bank manager. Shortly before the parties’ separation, the husband inherited approximately $900,000 from his parents, comprised primarily of stocks. On the strength of this inheritance from his parents (which the parties agreed was excluded property under s. 4(2) of the Family Law Act), the husband agreed to pay spousal support of $3,000 per month to the respondent wife. However, following separation, the husband incurred a loss of more than $480,000 in his portfolio by reason of a devaluation of his principal stock. Further, when targeted for replacement at his employing bank by a younger employee, the husband accepted a termination package. As a result, the applicant husband’s income from all sources fell to $1,325 per month, comprised of $100 per month in dividends, generated from capital and the remainder in pension income. The husband then brought a motion to terminate his $3,000 spousal support obligation.

In allowing the husband’s application, Ducharme J. reasoned as follows:

Under the Divorce Act, the court in appropriate circumstances may regard the income from capital assets as available for the purpose of determining whether spousal support is payable. In the same way, the court may deem particular assets to be income-producing. But for good or ill the (Ontario) Family Law Act considers inherited property to be exempt from sharing upon the breakdown of the marriage. It is silent on the issue of whether income from such property after breakdown should be exempt. Accordingly, under the provincial legislation, as the cases to which I have referred make clear, such income, as with all other kinds, is to be considered in any child or spousal support matter: Ibid, at 59.

In the result, Ducharme J. concluded as follows:

Painful as the result must surely be for Mrs. Shepley, I conclude on the facts of this case that Mr. Shepley retired from his employment position for valid reasons, that he made the decision out of concern for his health, not to evade his support obligation, and that as a result of his retirement he no longer has the means or the ability to pay spousal support to Mrs. Shepley from his income and no obligation in law to share in property that Ontario law exempts from sharing at the time of separation. It would be unjust, and, indeed, unconstitutional to share as “support” that which the law has exempted from sharing as property. In other facts and circumstances, where, say, exempt property is intact and generating income — for example, rental property or a family business — the result may well be different.

In all the circumstances, I find that Mr. Shepley had no obligation in law to preserve his exempt property, or to maximize his future income, to ensure an ongoing spousal support obligation: Ibid, at paras. 72-73. [Emphasis supplied.]

In my view, for the same reasons given by Ducharme J. in Shepley, the respondent husband here is not required to share with the applicant wife by way of a lump sum interim spousal support award those same capital assets that Ontario law considers to be exempt or excluded property for the purposes of net family property sharing.

That said, the respondent husband here acknowledges that, for spousal support purposes, as the Supreme Court of Canada held in Leskun v. Leskun, a capital asset is part of a support payor’s “means” and, as our court held in Laurain v. Clarke:

The court may therefore base the amount of support which a payor must pay on the income that an asset, such as money in the bank, a pension, trust, or annuity, is capable of generating.

I interpret the Court’s decision in Leskun to mean that a capital asset that a person receives in the form of periodic payments should not itself be treated as income for the purpose of calculating support, but should be treated as part of his means, so that the income which it is reasonably capable of generating should be included in his income for the purpose of calculating his support obligation. [Emphasis added.] Laurain v. Clarke, 2011 ONSC 7195, 16 R.F.L. (7th) 316 (S.C.J.), at paras. 44-45.

Casier v. Casier, 2021 ONSC 3407 (CanLII) at 112-118

“A parent seeking supervised parenting time for the other parent bears the burden of establishing that supervision is necessary: W.H.C. v. W.C.M.C., 2021 ONCJ 308, Klymenko v. Klymenko, 2020 ONSC 5451.

In Stec v. Blair, 2021 ONSC 6212, at paras. 22-24, Fowler Byrne J. reviewed the law related to supervised access and explained the reason that it is not automatically granted:

a.   Supervised access is a great intrusion into the relationship between a child and parent and its continued imposition must be justified: Young v. Hanson, 2019 ONSC 1245, at para. 32, also cited in G. v. F., 2021 ONSC 1362 at para. 47.

b.   The intrusion is less striking when supervision is by a family member in a home setting, but nonetheless, it is not a long-term solution. Supervised access is designed to provide a temporary and time-limited measure, to resolve a parental impasse over access, rather than provide a long [term] solution: M. (B.P.) v. M. (B.L.D.E.) 1992 CanLII 8642 ONCA, 97 D.L.R. (4^th) 437, at para. 33 (Ont. C.A.).

c.   The onus lies on the person seeking that parenting time be supervised, to show that such supervision is necessary. The greater the restriction on regular parenting time, the more important it is to show why the restriction is necessary: Liu v. Xie, 2021 ONSC 222, at para. 69, Docherty v. Catherwood, 2015 ONSC 5240, para. 38.

Supervised access “is beneficial for children who require gradual reintroduction to a parent, or whose safety requires it until such time as the parent is sufficiently rehabilitated and a child is no longer in danger or physical or emotional harm.” Najjardizaji v. Mehrjerdi, 2004 ONCJ 374 (CanLII), [2004] O.J. No. 5472 (OCJ).

The Courts have taken the view that because supervised access creates an artificial environment, it should not be ordered as a long-term arrangement: Hunt v. Hunt, 2023 ONSC 5411, at para. 43.”

Gerasimopoulos v. Sambirsky, 2024 ONSC 2368 (CanLII) at 25-28

“There are three bases for the entitlement to spousal support, being compensatory support, non-compensatory support and contractual support. Compensatory support is meant to acknowledge the contributions of a spouse to the relationship and any financial opportunities that the spouse has forgone for the sake of the family or other spouse. Generally, compensatory awards are seen where one spouse has sacrificed career opportunities, has made significant contributions to the household, and/or where one spouse has made significant contributions to the other spouse’s career: see Kerr v. Erland, 2014 ONSC 3555. Non-compensatory support is based on the need of the recipient and may include a reduction in the recipient standard of living in comparison to the marital standard of living: see Switzer v. Switzer, 2021 ONSC 5760; Gray v Gray, 2014 ONCA 659, 122 O.R. (3d) 337.”

            Boutin v. Lucitt, 2023 ONSC 2753 (CanLII) at 113

“Kathleen also kept referring back to the original supervision order against Aamir, and cited Aamir’s concession that Kathleen was the child’s primary caregiver.  The child was less than a year old.  This was not so much a concession but a fair description of the bond between mother and her nursing baby.  Kathleen has kept raising this point-in-time concession at the emergency motion to score legal points.  Her reliance on this “primary caregiver” label was essentially a proxy for the presumption of custodial advantage under the discredited “tender years” doctrine: See G.C. v. R.D.P., 2021 ONSC 4206 (CanLII), at para. 97.  In Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, at para. 45, the Supreme Court of Canada cautioned against the use of such presumptions:

To the extent that the proposed presumption would give added weight to the arrangement imposed by the original custody order, it may diminish the weight accorded to the child’s new needs and the ability of each parent to meet them.

The above extract from Gordon described the obvious logic that children’s needs change depending on their stage of development and individual characteristics.  In Hatab v. Abuhatab, 2022 ONSC 1560 (CanLII), at para. 64, this court held that because contact with both parents is the child’s right, the court has a duty to counter a parent’s unreasonable resistance to the other’s parenting time by increasing the opportunities for the child to enjoy the love and support of that other parent.”

          Shipton v. Shipton, 2023 ONSC 2711 (CanLII) at 14-15