November 17, 2026 – Needs-Based Spousal Support

“Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420, remains a leading authority on the non-compensatory basis for spousal support. The fundamental principles set out in Bracklow were concisely summarized by Chappel, J. in Fyfe v. Jouppien, 2011 ONSC 5462, at para. 48:

          1.    The presumption in marriage is that spouses owe each other a mutual duty of support.  This presumption of mutual support is rebuttable. Parties to a marriage may alter this presumption, either through explicit contracting or through the structuring of their daily affairs, to show disavowal of financial interweaving.
          2.    When a marriage breaks down, the presumption of mutual support no longer applies.
          3.    Marriage does not, in and of itself, automatically entitle a spouse to support.  It is not the bare fact of marriage so much as the relationship that is established and the expectations that may reasonably flow from it that give rise to the obligation of spousal support under the statutes.
          4.    In Bracklow, the Court emphasized the importance of analyzing the nature of the parties’ relationship during the marriage to determine whether there was any evidence as of the separation date to rebut the presumption of mutuality and interdependence in the parties’ relationship.  This analysis must start with a presumption of interdependence between the parties.

In Lazare v. Heitner, 2018 ONSC 3604, at paragraphs 27 and 28, McGee, J. observed that the nature of a spousal relationship may shift or alternate over the course of marriage.  If a spouse is financially dependent when the marriage ends, the Divorce Act requires that spouse to make reasonable efforts to return to independence, or if independence is no longer possible, the highest measure available. Non-compensatory support primarily addresses the financial need of a dependent, lower income earning spouse by asking what amount within the means of the higher earning spouse over what period of time, ought to be paid to support the journey towards financial independence.  In other words, what amount, paid over what period of time will recognize the nature of the failed relationship, relieve resulting economic hardship and promote self-sufficiency?

In Gray v. Gray, 2014 ONCA 659, at para. 27, the Court stated that need, in the context of relieving economic hardship, should be assessed through the lens of viewing marriage as an economic partnership. In determining need, courts ought to be guided in part by the principle that the spouse receiving support is entitled to maintain the standard of living to which he/she was accustomed at the time cohabitation ceased. The analysis must consider the recipient’s ability to support himself/herself, in light of his/her income and reasonable expenses.”

Scheibler v. Scheibler, 2022 ONSC 6472 (CanLII) at 126-128

November 13, 2026 – The Heavy Burden When s. 16.93(2) of the Divorce Act Applies”

“In cases where the s. 16.93(2) burden applies, the presumption is that relocation is in the child’s best interests. The fundamental premise is that where the parent who is the predominant primary caregiver of the child proposes to relocate, it is usually in the child’s best interests to relocate with that parent since this will maintain continuity of care and stability in the child’s life: see D.A. Rollie Thompson, “Legislating About Relocating Bill C-78, N.S. and B.C.”, (2019) 38 Can. Fam. L.Q. 219, at pp. 241-42. This is the logic that justifies requiring the non-relocating parent to rebut the presumption in favour of relocation by showing that the relocation is not in the child’s best interests and should not be permitted.

…

We acknowledge, as the trial judge did, that the crucial question in relocation cases remains whether relocation is in the best interests of the child. We also recognize that the inquiry is highly fact specific and discretionary: Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, at para. 152. However, in circumstances where s. 16.93(2) applies, the presumption is that relocation is in the best interests of the child, subject to the non-relocating parent establishing otherwise. The failure to properly apply that presumption, as occurred here, is an error of law: Shipton v. Shipton, 2024 ONCA 624, 5 R.F.L. (9th) 17, at paras. 70-74. But for this legal error, the trial judge could have reached a different conclusion regarding Mr. Angelillo’s relocation request, which requires this court to set it aside.”

Angelillo v. Mughal, 2025 ONCA 769 (CanLII) at 17 & 20

November 12, 2026 – “Habitually Resident” and Section 22 of the CLRA

“Section 22(1)(a) of the Children’s Law Reform Act provides that this Court shall only exercise its jurisdiction to make a parenting order with respect to a child if the child is habitually resident in Ontario at the commencement of the application or the order.   Notably, the time to consider habitual residence is at the commencement of the application for the order.  Implicitly, this means that conduct following the beginning of the Ontario application is presumptively not relevant to the determination of habitual residence:  see section 22(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act;  see also Los v. Ross ¶ 38. 

Section 22(2) defines the term “habitually resident” as the place where the child resided in whichever of the following circumstances last occurred:

      1.    With both parents.
      2.    If the parents are living separate and apart, with one parent under a separation agreement or with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other or under a court order.
      3.    With a person other than a parent on a permanent basis for a significant period of time.

Although neither side’s facta nor his or her oral arguments particularly averred to this, the law respecting how the meaning of “habitually resident” in section 22(1)(a) of the Children’s Law Reform Act has been statutorily interpreted, may be currently unsettled.

For example, at ¶ 74-76 of Zafar v. Azeem, Fairburn A.C.J.O. cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16 in interpreting the meaning of habitual residence, even though Zafar v. Azeem was not decided under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention”), but rather under other parts of the Children’s Law Reform Act.  There, she wrote that the question is not simply about asking and answering where the child last lived during what period of time.  While important, so too are a number of other factors, that McLachlin C.J. described in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev as “all relevant links and circumstances”, including parental intention.

The Court in Zafar v. Azeem, was nevertheless influenced by the fact that the child was just three years old, and had spent her entire young life in the mother’s primary care.  The child had yet to develop any connection to school, to community or friends.   In the result, Fairburn A.C.J.O. found that on these facts, determining “parental intent” was key to determining habitual residence, despite the other aspects of the hybrid test in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev.   See also the approach taken by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Los v. Ross ¶ 31. 

Perhaps, but not necessarily in contrast, in Dunmore v. Mehralian, 2023 ONCA 806, on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal the father argued that the motions judge did not consider the “settled intention” of both parties in determining that the child was habitually resident in Ontario.  He argued that the parents did not have a shared intention to move to Toronto when they travelled here.  He argued that they were merely visiting Ontario temporarily, and planned to return to the Middle East: see ¶ 35.

Although the motions judge determined that she did not have to decide that precise issue, and while she noted certain credibility concerns respecting the evidence of both parties, she ultimately preferred the mother’s evidence.  She found that the parties had in fact decided to move to Toronto.  They were not merely temporarily visiting.  The Court of Appeal found that this was a finding of fact, that was entitled to deference.

In the result, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that there was no reviewable error in the motion judge’s factual finding that the parties were residing in Ontario at the relevant time.  The motion judge’s factual finding was sufficient to establish habitual residence for the purposes of section 22(1)(a): see ¶ 37-44.

Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted in Dunmore v. Mehralian on June 13, 2024.  That appeal may very concern the proper interpretation of habitual residence under the Children’s Law Reform Act.

Regardless, section 22(2)(2.) of the Children’s Law Reform Act provides that the determination about where a child is habitually resident does not turn solely on where that child last lived with both parents.  Section 22(2)(2.) of the Children’s Law Reform Act contemplates that the children’s habitual residence may have changed to Ontario if, at the commencement of the application, the parents were living separate and apart, and the children were living “with one parent under a separation agreement or with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other or under a court order”.  As acquiescence has been argued, the legal principles that define it must be set out in order to be applied correctly.

While in some instances, the Ontario Court of Appeal has turned to the jurisprudence interpreting the Hague Convention, to aid or guide the interpretation of the statutory language in the Children’s Law Reform Act (see above), that has not been universally done.  Examples include when the procedure is different as between the Hague Convention and the Children’s Law Reform Act (see again Zafar v. Azeem ¶ 42;  see also Geliedan v. Rawdah, 2020 ONCA 254), or when the statutory language is notably different: see Ojeikere v. Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372 ¶ 51-62.  Still, at ¶ 34 of Geliedan v. Rawdah, when considering the differing processes for return applications under section 40 of the Children’s Law Reform Act distinct from the process under the Hague Convention, the Ontario Court of Appeal nevertheless wrote that considerations taken into account (under the Hague Convention and section 40 of the Children’s Law Reform Act) may overlap.” 

            Pengelly v. Lynas, 2024 ONSC 6269 (CanLII) at 17-27

November 10, 2026 – Test for Partition and Sale of Jointly-Owned Home

“Sections 2 and 3 of the Partition Act state that all joint tenant owners of a property may be compelled to sell the property, and that any person interested in the land may bring an action or make an application for the partition and sale of the land.

A joint tenant has a prima facie right to partition and sale. There is a corresponding obligation on a joint tenant to permit partition and sale: Davis v. Davis, 1953 CanLII 148 (ON CA), [1954] O.R. 23 (C.A.), at p. 29.

Claims made under the Partition Act should not proceed where it can be shown that to do so would prejudice the rights of either spouse under the Family Law Act: Silva v. Silva (1990), 1990 CanLII 6718 (ON CA), 1 O.R. (3d) 436 (C.A.), at p.445. In Silva, the Court of Appeal for Ontario also found that a spouse’s not yet adjudicated claim for division of net family property was not a sufficient reason to delay the sale of the home.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario stated in Latcham v. Latcham (2002), 2002 CanLII 44960 (ON CA), 27 R.F.L. (5th) 358 (Ont. C.A.), at paras.1-3, that the discretion to refuse a joint owner’s request for the sale of land under the Partition Act is narrow. It requires malicious, vexatious or oppressive conduct.

Justice McGee summarized the test to be met by the resisting party to defeat a motion for partition and sale in a family law context in Goldman v. Kudeyla, 2011 ONSC 2718, 5 R.F.L. (7th) 149, at para. 18:

To make a pre-trial order for the sale of a matrimonial home the court must first determine whether the resisting party has established a prima facie case that he or she is entitled to a competing interest under the Family Law Act.  If not, then the right to sale prevails.  If so, then the motion for sale is denied unless the selling party can demonstrate that the sale would not prejudice the rights of the resisting party.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario has defined a “prima facie” case as evidence made by a party which, if believed, establishes the claim being made: Peel Law Association v. Pieters, 2013 ONCA 396, 116 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 65.

The court may transfer a party’s interest in the matrimonial home in full or partial satisfaction of an equalization or spousal support payment under s.9(1)(d)(i) of the Family Law Act.  If the party opposing the sale establishes a prima facie case for this type of claim, this circumstance may impact a substantial right sufficient to postpone the sale of jointly held property prior to trial: Chaudry v. Chaudry, 2012 ONSC 2149, 19 R.F.L. (7th) 478, at para. 25.

Timing can be a relevant consideration in dealing with a motion for sale at a temporary stage. The availability of a trial within a short period might reduce the pressure for an immediate sale: Goldman, at para. 19.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario has confirmed that prejudice to the parties must be considered before an order for partition and sale is made: Punit v. Punit, 2014 ONCA 252, 43 R.F.L. (7th) 84, at para. 21. In Punit, at paras. 22-23, the order of the motions judge for partition and sale of the matrimonial home was set aside because:

a)   There was a trial date in the very near future;

b)   There was no evidence that the moving party required funds from the house for living expenses; and

c)   The expenses of maintaining the home were being met by the responding spouse.”

Caringi v. Caringi et al, 2025 ONSC 6268 (CanLII) at 24-32

November 9, 2026 – Standing to Bring Retroactive Child Support Claims

“Bruce’s specific objection to the amended pleading in this case is that the claim for retroactive child support for NRL is “untenable in law” because NRL is no longer a “child of the marriage”. It is therefore necessary to briefly review the legal principles relevant to this issue.

Section 2(1) of the Divorce Act defines a “child of the marriage” as follows:

a child of two spouses or former spouses, who, at the material time,

(a)      is under the age of majority and who is not withdrawn from their charge, or

(b)     is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessary necessaries of life. (emphasis added)

In DBS v. SRG, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the “material time” for purposes of seeking retroactive child support awards is the time at which the application is made. In other words, DBS holds that courts have jurisdiction to make original orders for child support only where, at the time of the application, the child beneficiary is still a “child of the marriage”. The Supreme Court observed that limiting jurisdiction to make child support orders in this manner reflects the principle that adults (i.e. those over the age of majority and not dependent) are not the type of persons for whom Parliament envisaged child support orders being made. In the Court’s view, child support is for children of the marriage, not adults who used to have that status.

In its recent decision in Michel v. Graydon, the Supreme Court expressed a willingness to reconsider this aspect of DBS. In her concurring judgement in Michel v. Graydon, Martin J. expressed the view that the “jurisdictional bar” on original orders for child support established by DBS has led to divided and confused jurisprudence and undermined the Divorce Act’s objectives of clarity, certainty and consistency. In Martin J.’s view, the “deleterious effects on access to justice and the relationship between child support underpayment and poverty canvassed above reveal the profound unfairness visited upon children and their custodians by this bar.”

The majority judgement of Brown J. recognized that unjust results can flow from imposing impediments that prevent otherwise deserving parents from seeking retroactive child support. He therefore agreed with Martin J. that the Court’s interpretation in DBS of the “material time” for purposes of determining jurisdiction to order retroactive child support under the Divorce Act might merit reconsideration. However Brown J. was also the view that deliberations on this issue would benefit from fulsome submissions directly on point. Because the appeal in Michel v. Graydon could be decided on the basis of provincial legislation alone, Brown J. found it unnecessary to undertake any such reconsideration of DBS at this time.

In the result, while the jurisdictional limitation on ordering retroactive child support for adult children established in DBS has by no means been overruled, all nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada have expressed doubts over the correctness of the limitation and indicated an openness to reconsidering the issue. Thus, in light of Michel and Graydon, there are now serious questions as to whether DBS’s holding that child support can only be ordered for support beneficiaries who are still “children of the marriage” remains settled law.”

            Pennington v. Pennington, 2021 ONSC 7371 (CanLII) at 16-21

November 6, 2026 – Powers of Attorney for Property and Powers of Attorney for Personal Care

“The capacity requirements to give a Power of Attorney for Property are set out in s. 8(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30 (the “SDA”):

(a) knows what kind of property he or she has and its approximate value;

(b)  is aware of obligations owed to his or her dependents;

(c)   knows that the attorney will be able to do on the person’s behalf anything in respect of property that the person could do if capable, except make a will, subject to the restrictions set out in the power of attorney;

(d)  knows that the attorney must account for his or her dealings with the person’s property;

(e)  knows that he or she may, if capable, revoke the continuing power of attorney;

(f)   appreciates that unless the attorney manages the property prudently, its value may decline; and

(g) appreciates the possibility that the attorney could misuse the authority given to him or her.

The capacity requirements to give a Power of Attorney for Personal Care are set out in s. 47(1) of the SDA:

(a)   has the ability to understand whether the proposed attorney has a genuine concern for the person’s welfare; and

(b)   appreciates that the person may need to have the proposed attorney make decisions for the person.

Suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation of the POAs, the capacity of the grantor, or undue influence shift the burden of proof to the grantee: Stewart v. Zawadzinski, 2023 ONSC 387, 87 E.T.R. (4th) 99, at para. 44, citing Nguyen-Crawford v. Nguyen, 2010 ONSC 6836 (CanLII), 2010 ONSC 6826, 71 E.T.R. (3d) 55, at para. 85.”

Lewicki v. Bascus et al., 2025 ONSC 6224 (CanLII) at 53-55

November 5, 2026 – Valid Components of a Gift

“The essential components of a valid gift are: a) an intention to make a gift; b) acceptance by the donee of the gift; and c) a sufficient act of delivery or transfer of the property to complete the transactions: McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533 (CanLII), 2011 ONSC 533, 106 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 25.

Where a transfer of property is gratuitous between a parent and adult children, there is a presumption of resulting trust. The onus is on the recipient adult children to rebut the presumption. They must prove the donor’s intention to make the gift on a balance of probabilities: Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795, at paras. 43-44.

In Foley v. McIntyre, 2015 ONCA 382, 125 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 26, the Ontario Court of Appeal explained the application of the resulting trust principle as follows in the context of gratuitous transfers by parents to their adult children:

Equity presumes bargains, not gifts. Thus, when a parent gratuitously transfers property to an adult child, the law presumes that the child holds the property on a resulting trust for the parent: Pecore v. Pecore, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795, [2007] S.C.J. No. 17, 2007 SCC 17, at para. 36. The onus shifts to the adult child to rebut the presumption by proving the contrary intent on a balance of probabilities: Sawdon Estate v. Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Canada (2014), 119 O.R. (3d) 81, [2014] O.J. No. 573, 2014 ONCA 101, at paras. 56-57; Mroz (Litigation guardian of) v. Mroz (2015), 125 O.R. (3d) 105, [2015] O.J. No. 1284, 2015 ONCA 171, at para. 72. The trial judge must begin her inquiry with the presumption and then weigh all the evidence in an attempt to determine the parent’s actual intent at the time of the transfer: Pecore, at para. 44; Sawdon, at para. 57; Mroz, at para. 72.”

Strauss v. Wright, 2021 ONSC 5411 (CanLII) at 43-45

November 4, 2026 – Property Issues Before Spousal Support

“In his Reasons, the Arbitrator stated, at paragraph 3.8, that he addresses each of the issues in separate sections, but that they are in no order of priority or importance.  Nonetheless, in paragraph 13.1, the Arbitrator states, “Having dealt with the financial support for Abbey and for the children, the next important issue to determine, surrounds the division of property.”

The Arbitrator’s approach is an error in law.  When determining support under s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), the court is to look at the party’s means, which includes all pecuniary assets.  The amount of equalization to which a party is entitled, and the impact of any income-generating potential associated with the assets retained by the parties, will affect a support analysis: Greenglass v. Greenglass, 2010 ONCA 675 at paras. 40-42; Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25 at para. 29.

Accordingly, issues of property should be determined first.  It also eliminates the risk that a payee’s ability to become economically independent is considered twice:  Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 2004 SCC 22 at para. 56.”

            Le v. Nguyen, 2022 ONSC 6265 (CanLII) at 38-40