Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“For the legal system in Iran to qualify as “serious harm”, that harm would have to be clearly established on the evidence. It is not enough to point to differences in the law and suggest that a parent may have different rights in a foreign jurisdiction vis-à-vis Ontario. The serious harm test in s. 23 of the CLRA, which was implemented to protect the safety of children, must not be reduced to a means for Ontario courts to prefer this province’s system of justice over those of foreign jurisdictions under the guise of child safety: See N. v. F., at para 79. Accordingly, the fact that the law in Iran may not be as child-focussed or based on the children’s best interests as it is in Ontario does not equate to the children suffering “serious harm” if the court in Iran has jurisdiction over parenting matters, as contemplated by s.23 of the CLRA.”

Sajjadi v. Forootan, 2025 ONSC 4570 (CanLII) at 42

“Second, the appellant asserts that the trial judge erred by failing to address concerns about the respondents’ reliability, focusing only on their credibility.

I do not accept this submission. A trial judge’s determination to accept a witness’s evidence includes an implicit assessment of its accuracy or reliability. The trial judge is presumed to have correctly applied the law in accepting a witness’s evidence, including the relationship between credibility and reliability: G.F., at para. 82. Assessing reliability is “within the province of the trial judge” who has “the opportunity to hear and observe all of the witnesses”: R. v. Slatter, 2019 ONCA 807, 148 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 118, per Pepall J.A. (dissenting), aff’d 2020 SCC 36. If the trial judge was alive to reliability concerns, considered those concerns, and assessed the witness’s reliability and credibility, the trial judge’s assessment attracts deference: R. v. Sanichar, 2012 ONCA 117, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 500, at para. 82, per Laskin J.A. (dissenting), aff’d, 2013 SCC 4, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 54.”

            Calin v. Calin, 2021 ONCA 558 (CanLII) at 21-22

“An order to strike a party’s pleadings is a drastic remedy that should only be granted in exceptional circumstances and when no other remedy would suffice: Chiaramonte v. Chiaramonte, 2013 ONCA 641, para. 31.   In determining whether to strike the pleadings of non-complaint party, a court must (i) consider the substantial disclosure already made; (ii) itemize what disclosure the party had failed to provide; (iii) make a finding of willful disobedience of the order; and (iv) consider proportionality: Manchanda v. Thethi, 2016 ONCA 909, para. 31.

In any event, regardless of the complexity of a spouse’s financial situation, a repeated failure to comply with an order compelling financial disclosure may, even if there is partial compliance, amount to a deliberate attempt the to frustrate the determination of a spouse’s claims for support and equalization: Mullins, supra.”

Altman v. Altman, 2022 ONSC 4479 (CanLII) at 26-27

“In McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that in family law cases, the two-year limitation period set out in the Ontario Limitations Act, 2002, typically commences on the date of separation.  Justice Rosenberg stated at para. 52:

Generally speaking, a claim of unjust enrichment requires that the defendant retain a benefit without juristic reason in circumstances where the claimant suffers a corresponding deprivation. In other words, the relevant act of the defendant is simply the act of keeping the enrichment (or the omission to pay it back) once the elements of the unjust enrichment claim have crystallized. In the family law context, this may typically occur on the date of separation, when shared assets, including real property, are divided and the possibility therefore arises of one party holding onto more than a fair share.

 Justice Rosenberg further clarified the analysis at para. 54:

I would think that ordinarily the claim should be taken not to have been discovered until the parties have separated and there is no prospect of resumption of cohabitation: see Maddaugh and McCamus, The Law of Restitution, looseleaf, release no. 11 (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2013), at 3:500.30; and Wilson v. Fotsch, [2010] B.C.J. No. 850, 2010 BCCA 226, at para. 10).”

            Mirshahi v. McCarthy et al, 2025 ONSC 4473 (CanLII) at 28-29

“An order that terminates parenting time or requires long-term supervision is rare because it is an extreme remedy. In some cases, such orders are necessary to protect the child.

In Jennings v. Garrett (2004), 2004 CanLII 17126 (ON SC), 5 R.F.L. (6th) 319 (Ont. S.C.), Justice Blishen provided a list of the factors that have led courts to terminate access. Most of these factors are also relevant to the question of long-term supervision. At para. 135, the Court states:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Long term harassment and harmful behaviours towards the custodial parent causing that parent and the child stress and or fear. See M. (B.P.) v. M. (B.L.D.E.), supra; Stewart v. Bachan, [2003] O.J. No. 433 (Ont. C.J.); Studley v. O’Laughlin, [2000] N.S.J. No. 210 (N.S. Fam. Ct.); Dixon v. Hinsley, 2001 CanLII 38986 (ON CJ), [2001] O.J. No. 3707 (Ont. C.J.).
            2. History of violence; unpredictable, uncontrollable behaviour; alcohol, drug abuse which has been witnessed by the child and/or presents a risk to the child’s safety and well being. See Jafari v. Dadar, supra; Maxwell v. Maxwell, [1986] N.B.J. No. 769 (N.B. Q.B.); Abdo v. Abdo(1993), 1993 CanLII 3124 (NS CA), 126 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (N.S. C.A.); Studley v. O’Laughlin, supra.
            3. Extreme parental alienation which has resulted in changes of custody and, at times, no access orders to the former custodial parent. See Tremblay v. Tremblay(1987), 1987 CanLII 147 (AB KB), 10 R.F.L. (3d) 166 (Alta. Q.B.); Reeves v. Reeves, [2001] O.J. No. 308 (Ont. S.C.J.).
            4. Ongoing severe denigration of the other parent. See Frost v. Allen, [1995] M.J. No. 111 (Man. Q.B.); Gorgichuk v. Gorgichuk, supra.
            5. Lack of relationship or attachment between noncustodial parent and child. See Studley v. O’Laughlin, supra; M. (B.P.) v. M. (B.L.D.E.), supra.
            6. Neglect or abuse to a child on the access visits. See Maxwell v. Maxwell, supra.
            7. Older children’s wishes and preferences to terminate access. See Gorgichuk v. Gorgichuk, supra; Frost v. Allen, supra; Dixon v. Hinsley, supra; Pavao v. Pavao, [2000] O.J. No. 1010 (Ont. C.J.).

[Emphasis added.]”

            N.S. v. A.N.S., 2021 ONSC 5283 (CanLII) at 407-408

“The current statutory scheme governing default hearings is found in section 41 of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act (the Act) and rule 30 of the Family Law Rules (FLR). The Director may initiate the default proceeding. The Director prepares a statement of arrears. The payor files a financial statement and, if so inclined, a default dispute. The payor is usually asked to provide proof of income. The court may hear oral testimony, direct the production of other relevant documentation and add parties to the default proceedings. See: Fischer v. Ontario (Family Responsibility Office), 2008 ONCA 825, paragraph 17.

At the hearing, the amount of arrears owed and the payor’s ability to pay are the central issues. Subsection 41 (9) of the Act puts the onus on the payor, as follows:

                           Presumptions at hearing

(9)  At the default hearing, unless the contrary is shown, the payor shall be presumed to have the ability to pay the arrears and to make subsequent payments under the order, and the statement of arrears prepared and served by the Director shall be presumed to be correct as to arrears accruing while the order is filed in the Director’s office.

Subsection 41 (10) of the Act sets out the powers of the court on a default hearing as follows:

                  Powers of court

(10)  The court may, unless it is satisfied that the payor is unable for valid reasons to pay the arrears or to make subsequent payments under the order, order that the payor,

(a) pay all or part of the arrears by such periodic or lump sum payments as the court considers just, but an order for partial payment does not rescind any unpaid arrears;

(b) discharge the arrears in full by a specified date;

(c) comply with the order to the extent of the payor’s ability to pay;

(d) make a motion to change the support order;

(e) provide security in such form as the court directs for the arrears and subsequent payment;

(f) report periodically to the court, the Director or a person specified in the order;

(g) provide to the court, the Director or a person specified in the order particulars of any future change of address or employment as soon as they occur;

(h) be imprisoned continuously or intermittently until the period specified in the order, which shall not be more than 180 days, has expired, or until the arrears are paid, whichever is sooner; and

(i) on default in any payment ordered under this subsection, be imprisoned continuously or intermittently until the period specified in the order, which shall not be more than 180 days, has expired, or until the payment is made, whichever is sooner.

Subsection 41 (11) of the Act states:

No effect on accruing of arrears or other means of enforcement

(11)  An order under subsection (10) does not affect the accruing of arrears, nor does it limit or otherwise affect any other means of enforcing the support order.

Subsection 41 (17) of the Act reads:

Imprisonment does not discharge arrears

(17)  Imprisonment of a payor under clause (10) (h) or (i) does not discharge arrears under an order.”

Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Burke, 2025 ONCJ 402 (CanLII) at 47-51

“Section 12 of the Guidelines provides that “the court may require in the order for the support of a child that the amount payable under the order be paid or secured, or paid and secured, in the manner specified in the order” (emphasis added).

Section 34(1)(k) of the Family Law Act states that this Court has the jurisdiction and power to order a charge against real property to secure support by “requiring the securing of payment under the order, by a charge on property or otherwise”. The Court of Appeal has confirmed the courts’ ability to make a charging order in Mwanri v. Mwanri, 2015 ONCA 843.

In the circumstances of this case where the Respondent has made it abundantly clear that he has no intention of paying child support and where he is taking action to move his assets and his life to Costa Rica, it is proper to order a lien against the Respondent’s property in Honey Harbour to secure the payment of the retroactive child support.”

                        Beaudoin v. Stevens, 2023 ONSC 4401 (CanLII) at 95-97

“The Respondent has been in receipt of a disability pension from the Canada Pension Plan for some time. A portion of that pension was for the benefit of S. while in her care as a minor. After S. turned 18 on October 19, 2022, he was able to receive it directly. The Applicant calculates that the Respondent received $9,373.32 “on behalf of S.” prior to him receiving it directly after his 18^th birthday. The Applicant seeks an order requiring the Respondent to pay this amount to S.

The Respondent’s position is that there is absolutely no requirement in law that she do so.  She relies both upon Schedule I of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (“FCSG”)’s (which defines in paragraph 6 what is included in income for the purposes of the formula) and the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Sipos v. Sipos, 2007 ONA 126, in support of the proposition that the benefit did not form part of her income for child support purposes prior to it being provided directly to S.

With this proposition, I agree. The Respondent will not be required to provide $9,373.32 to S. as reimbursement for the benefit she received on behalf of S. while he was a minor.”

Levesque v. Sorel, 2023 ONSC 4376 (CanLII) at 27-29

“As to the question of whether the plaintiff has been defamed by the defendant, in my view, the legal test has been met and defamation has been established.  In Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, the Supreme Court of Canada has set out the test for defamation as follows,

A plaintiff in a defamation action is required to prove three things to obtain judgment and an award of damages:

(1)               That the impugned words were defamatory in the sense they would tend to lower the plaintiffs reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person;

(2)               That the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and

(3)               That the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff.

(Grant v. Torstar Corp., supra, at para. 28)”

Robinson v. Niganobe, 2023 ONSC 4281 (CanLII) at 24

“The Arbitration Act provides the following under the general heading “Conduct of Arbitration”:

Equality and fairness

19 (1) In an arbitration, the parties shall be treated equally and fairly.

(2) Each party shall be given an opportunity to present a case and to respond to the other parties’ cases. 1991, c. 17, s. 19 (2).

The appeal judge erred in law by finding a violation of s. 19. I say this for four reasons:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. the proceedings were fair;
            2. the father acquiesced in the notice with respect to mobility;
            3. the appeal judge ignored the best interests of the children; and
            4. the appeal judge’s interpretation of s. 19 of the Arbitration Act establishes a new duty for arbitrators that would fundamentally change the arbitration process and undermine arbitral independence and impartiality.

…

The appeal judge’s interpretation of s. 19 of the Arbitration Act places a new and unreasonable burden on an arbitrator in family law proceedings. When parties are represented, it does not fall to the arbitrator to move to the role of advocate. Such a move would undermine the required independence and impartiality of an arbitrator.

There is no evidence that the arbitrator did not treat the parties equally and fairly. There is no evidence that the father did not have an opportunity to present and respond to the case. As I have already explained, he was represented by counsel and did not object to the mobility issue being determined. The situation was urgent, and the arbitrator had a duty to consider the children’s welfare as paramount. Recall that the arbitrator had been involved with the family for many years.

The appeal judge placed an obligation on the arbitrator to depart from his role as independent adjudicator and move to the role of advocate. This would compromise his independence and potentially breach his duty of impartiality. Section 19 does not require the arbitrator to descend into the arena and become an advocate or advance a party’s case.”

          Petersoo v. Petersoo, 2019 ONCA 624 (CanLII) at 39-40, 51-53