Month: May 2023

“The trial judge provided no analysis as to whether the award achieved the objectives of spousal support. The objectives for needs-based spousal support (as opposed to compensatory-based) are set out in Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 46:

Following Moge’s broad view of causation in compensatory support and the concomitant acceptance of the availability of non-compensatory support, courts have shown increasing willingness to order support for ill and disabled spouses. Sometimes they have done this as a “transition” to self-sufficiency. But more often, they have frankly stated that the obligation flows from the marriage relationship itself. Collecting cases, Rogerson explains in “Spousal Support After Moge”:

The [more dominant] approach, … particularly in cases of earning capacity permanently limited by age, illness or disability, and the one generally supported by the developing Court of Appeal jurisprudence, has been to award continuing support without regard to the source of the post-divorce need. On this approach, which I earlier referred to as the “basic social obligation” approach, causal connection arguments have been rejected not only in determining entitlement to support, but also in assessing the extent of the obligation. The message coming from the cases adopting this approach appears to be that one takes one’s spouse as one finds him or her, subject to all his or her, weaknesses and limitations with respect to income-earning capacity; and a spouse with higher earning capacity has a basic obligation to make continuing provision for a spouse who is unable to become self-sufficient at the end of the marriage. One is simply not allowed to abandon a spouse to destitution at the end of a marriage if one has financial resources which might assist in relieving the other spouse’s financial circumstances. [Emphasis in original; citations omitted.]

The evidence here was that the appellant’s disability would continue. The trial judge specifically accepted at para. 49 that, “following her diagnosis of Spontaneous Intracranial Hypotension, [the appellant] has been unable to work”. Yet the trial judge ordered spousal support at only the mid-range of the amounts suggested by the SSAG formula, and at the lowest end of duration from the date of separation. There was no explanation as to why the support terminated when the need clearly continued.

As stated by this court in Gray v. Gray, 2014 ONCA 659, 122 O.R. (3d) 337, at para. 49, “[t]he duration of support is also an issue that ought to be contemplated under the SSAG”. For support to terminate there must be a realistic prospect of the spouse being able to become self sufficient: Reisman v. Reisman, 2014 ONCA 109, 118 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 28. This court has upheld an indefinite support order in the case of ongoing need due to disability (Gray) and has overturned a time limit for support for a disabled spouse (Djekic v. Zai, 2015 ONCA 25, 54 R.F.L. (7th) 1, at para. 9).

Here the appellant remains disabled and unable to support herself. She lives on government disability payments. There is no evidence that her situation had changed or will change in the future.

One of the purposes of a spousal support order is to relieve financial hardship; another is for a former spouse to fulfil a basic social obligation to provide support where they are able to do so and the recipient spouse is not. Nothing in the trial judge’s reasons explains how the termination of support after only two-and-a-half years achieves these or other objectives of spousal support.”

         McGuire v. Bator, 2022 ONCA 431 (CanLII) at 27-31

“This motion alleges civil contempt. There are three essential requirements for a finding of civil contempt as set out by Blair J.A., in Prescott-Russell Services for Children and Adults v. G. (N.) et al. (2007), 2006 CanLII 81792 (ON CA), 82 O.R. (3d) 686 (C.A.):

[27] The criteria applicable to a contempt of court conclusion are settled law. A three-pronged test is required. First, the order that was breached must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done. Secondly, the party who disobeys the order must do so deliberately and wilfully. Thirdly, the evidence must show contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubt must clearly be resolved in favour of the person or entity alleged to have breached the order.

Courts should only invoke its contempt powers in the clearest of cases and with the greatest of caution. See R. v. Cohn (1984), 1984 CanLII 43 (ON CA), 48 O.R. (2d) 65 at 76 (C.A.). It is to be used sparingly and as a remedy of last resort where another adequate remedy is not available to seek to enforce this court’s order.

Contempt findings in family law cases should be made only sparingly and as a last resort:  Hefky v. Hefky, 2014 CarswellOnt 2986 (OCA).

In Sweda Farms Ltd. (c.o.b. Best Choice Eggs) v. Ontario Egg
Producers, 2011 ONSC 3650 (CanLII), [2011] O.J. No. 3482, Justice Lauwers (as he then was) summarized the applicable principles and purpose of contempt proceedings:

18    In a civilized society governed by the rule of law, such as ours, people are expected to and do comply with court orders. But in the rare cases that they do not, the court must take action. As Pepall J. stated: “Once an order has been obtained, it is imperative that it be obeyed, that the public understand that it must be obeyed, and that judges have the will and ability to ensure compliance.” There are many other similar expressions of judicial resolve. See, for example, the following statement of Blair J.: “No society which believes in a system of even-handed justice can permit its members to ignore, disobey, or defy its laws and its courts, orders at their whim because in their own particular view it is right to do so.”

19     The nature of the contempt may vary with the context, with slightly different considerations taken into account. Cumming J. noted that the court’s authority over court orders includes orders relating to commercial matters:

The deliberate failure to obey a court order strikes at the very heart of the administration of justice. This includes court orders relating to commercial matters as seen in the case at hand. If someone can simply ignore or finesse his way around a court order it will tend to add uncertainties and risks, with consequential inefficiencies and additional costs, as well as causing unfairness, with consequential inequities and additional costs, to the commercial marketplace. Just as white collar crime is crime, white collar contempt is contempt.

20     I summarize briefly the relevant aspects of the law of civil contempt for failing to comply with a court order. Given the gravity of a finding that a person is in contempt and the exposure to penalties, the court should always exercise prudence and restraint before making such a finding.

21     The order “must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done.” It must be directive and not simply permissive. In terms of compliance, the alleged contemnor must have knowledge of the nature of the terms of the order, and, once having knowledge, must obey the order in letter and spirit with every diligence. A person who is subject to an order should not be permitted to “finesse” it or to “hide behind a restrictive and literal interpretation to circumvent the order and make a mockery of it and of the administration of justice.“

22     The alleged contemnor’s conduct must objectively breach the order. There is also a mental or subjective element, often expressed in the formula that the disobedience must be deliberate and wilful, or wilfully blind, indifferent or reckless. Actionable disobedience includes the deliberate failure of a person to make inquiries in circumstances where suspicion is or should be aroused. Further, “[i]f a party feels that the injunction is over-broad, its recourse is to apply to have the terms narrowed or made more explicit, not to resort to self-help by ignoring some or all of the terms.”

23     There is some subtlety here. An element of the classical formulation is that “any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court.” McIntyre J.A. noted, however, “The word ‘calculated’ as used here is not synonymous with the word ‘intended’. The meaning it bears in this context is found in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘fitted, suited, apt’.” Accordingly, the moving party does not need to prove that the alleged contemnor intended specifically to disobey the order: “The offence consists of the intentional doing of an act which is in fact prohibited by the order.” The alleged contemnor need not be shown to exhibit “any particular aversion, abhorrence or disdain of the judicial system” despite the ordinary meaning of the word “contempt.”

24     The moving party must prove contempt at the highest threshold — that is, beyond a reasonable doubt. The quasi-criminal nature of the accusation engages principles and concepts more familiar in a criminal law context. For example, the onus of proof remains on the moving party throughout; it never shifts. Further, the alleged contemnor is not compelled to testify; but, if he chooses to testify, his evidence is subject to full scrutiny, and the court may draw adverse inferences from his evidence.

…

26     Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the alleged contemnor. A reasonable doubt is not to be an imaginary or frivolous doubt, nor may it be based on sympathy or prejudice. It must be based on reason and common sense, logically derived from the evidence or absence of evidence. But the court recognizes that it is virtually impossible to prove anything to an absolute certainty and the moving party is not required to do so.

(Emphasis added).

As stated above, it is unnecessary to prove that the alleged contemnor intended to put himself or herself in contempt. However, it must be established that he or she deliberately or wilfully or knowingly did some act which was designed to breach of a court order.  See R. v. Perkins (1980), 1980 CanLII 311 (BC CA), 51 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Barker, 1980 ABCA 75 (CanLII), [1980] 4 W.W.R. 202 (Alta. C.A.); and Rivard v. Proc. Gen. du Quebec, 1984 CanLII 2851 (QC CA), [1984] R.D.J. 571 (Que. C.A.). Simply put, one does not need to have the intention to disobey, one must only have the intention to commit an act which is designed to result in the breach of the order. See Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17.

A court’s contempt powers cannot be used to enforce payment terms of an order.  See Rule 26(4) of the Family Law Rules. While the court cannot find a person in contempt of the non-payment of a monetary order, all the circumstances, including repeated disregard for compliance with orders, monetary and otherwise, may lead to an inference being drawn that the alleged contemnor simply disregards the importance of compliance with court orders.

Once having knowledge of the order, the party must obey the order in letter and spirit with every diligence.  See Canada Metal Co. Ltd. et al. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. et al. (No. 2) (1974), 1974 CanLII 835 (ON SC), 4 O.R. (2d) 585 (H.C.) at p. 603, aff’d (1975), 1975 CanLII 544 (ON CA), 11 O.R. (2d) 167 (C.A.) and  iTrade Finance Inc. v Webworx Inc. (2005), 13 C.P.C. (6th) 103, [2005] O.J. No. 1200 at para. 12 (Sup.Ct.).

A person who is subject to an order should not be permitted to “finesse” it (see Sussex Group v. 3933938 Canada Inc., [2003] O.J. No 2906 (Sup. Ct.) or “hide behind a restrictive and literal interpretation to circumvent the order and make a mockery of it and of the administration of justice.” See Zhang v. Chau, (2003), 2003 CanLII 75292 (QC CA), 229 D.L.R. (4^th) 298 at para. 32 (Qc. C.A.), leave to appeal dismissed [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 419.”

            Boutin v. Boutin, 2022 ONSC 3229 (CanLII) at 77-84

“In Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719 (CanLII), [2016] W.D.F.L. 5227 at para. 54, Justice Doyle held—citing Thompson v. Thompson, 2013 ONSC 5500 (CanLII), [2013] O.J. No. 4001—that “[t]here is a duty on the part of the payor to actively seek out reasonable employment opportunities that will maximize their income potential so as to meet the needs of their dependants”.

Parents can take jobs earning less money as long as that choice is reasonable; however, a person’s decision to start a business in which he or she has no experience may be viewed as unreasonable and the court “will not excuse the payor from the support obligations where the party has persisted in un-remunerative employment or pursued unrealistic and unproductive career aspirations”: Charron at paras. 57-62.”:

T.N.F. v. M.J.V.A., 2018 ONSC 3310 (CanLII) at 125-126

“To succeed on a claim for defamation, the plaintiff must prove that:

(i)        The words complained of were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff;

(ii)        The words complained of referred to the plaintiff; and

(iii)        The impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person: Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, at para. 92 (citing Grant, at para. 28 and P.A. Downard, The Law of Libel in Canada (4^th 2018), at paras. 1.2 to 1.14).

A defamatory statement is one that causes the plaintiff “to be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear, dislike, or disesteem”: Vander Zalm v. Times Publishers, 1980 CanLII 389 (B.C.C.A.), at para. 4.

Volpe v. Wong-Tam, 2022 ONSC 3106 (CanLII) at 146-147

“While the Divorce Act does not specifically provide for the interim variation of a final order, the case law that has developed, prior to the most recent amendment, allows for such a variation in the appropriate circumstances. I see nothing in the most recent amendments of the Divorce Act that has altered the provisions regarding variations in any substantial way. Accordingly, the case law that has developed to this point will continue to be of assistance to this court when determining if such a variation is appropriate.  If though, a variation is determined to be appropriate, the new provisions in the Divorce Act regarding the best interests of the child, the avoidance of conflict, and consideration of family violence must be considered when making any order.

In Innocente v. Innocente, 2014 ONSC 7082 (CanLII), Gauthier J. summarized the applicable law as follows:

[45] In those cases where a temporary or interim variation of a final order has been granted, the courts have found what are in my view, exceptional circumstances:

(a) To prevent undue hardship;

(b) Where the failure to make the interim order would be incongruous or absurd; and

(c) Where there is a pressing and immediate urgency.

Justice Pazaratz, in F.K. v. A.K., 2020 ONSC 3726 has provided an excellent review of the legal considerations when faced with a request for to change a final order. He sets out the following:

[48]          To determine a request to change custody, access or parenting order, the court must embark on a two-stage inquiry: Gordon v. Goertz 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.).

 [49]          The first step: There must be a material change in circumstances since the last order was made.

a.    There must be a change in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or the ability of the parents to meet those needs.

b.    The change must materially affect the child.

c.    It must be a change which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. The change must be substantial, continuing and “if known at the time, would likely have resulted in a different order.” L.M.L.P. v. L.S.[2011] SCC 64.

d.    The finding of a material change in circumstances is a prerequisite to an examination of the merits of an application to vary an existing custody or access order.

e.    If there is no material change in circumstances, the inquiry ends. The court would be without jurisdiction to vary the order. Litman v. Sherman, 2008 ONCA 485 (Ont. C.A.).

f.    If there is a material change, the court must move to the second stage and consider the best interests of the child and whether to vary the original order.

 [50]          The second step: 

a.    If a material change in circumstances has been established the court then embarks on a fresh inquiry into the best interests of the child.

b.    In this fresh inquiry, both parties bear the evidentiary burden of demonstrating where the best interests of the child lie. There is no legal presumption in favour of the custodial parent, or in favour of maintaining the existing timesharing arrangements. Bubis v. Jones, 2000 CanLII 22571 (ON SC); Persaud v. Garcia-Persaud2009 ONCA 782; Deslauriers v. Russell, 2016 ONSC 5285; Roloson v. Clyde, 2017 ONSC 3642.

c.    The court must ascertain the child’s best interests from the perspective of the child rather than that of the parents. Parental preferences and rights do not play a role in the analysis, except to the extent that they are necessary to ensure the best interests of the child. Gordon v. Goertz; Young v. Young2003 CanLII 3320 (Ont. CA).

d.    The child should have maximum contact with both parents if it is consistent with the child’s best interests. Gordon v. Goertz; Rigillio v Rigillio2019 ONCA 548 (Ont. CA).

Pazaratz J. then identifies that when a party seeks a temporary variation of a final parenting order, the court is required to conduct an even more stringent analysis. He states at para. 52:

a.    In all instances, courts must exercise caution before changing an existing arrangement which children have become used to.

b.    This is especially the case where the existing parenting arrangement has been determined by way of court order. The starting point is that court orders are presumed to be correct. Montgomery v. Montgomery1992 CanLII 8642 (ON CA); Gordon v. Gordon2015 ONSC 4468 (SCJ); Oickle v. Beland 2012 ONCJ 778 (OCJ).

c.     And the level of required caution is further heightened if the court is being asked to change a final parenting order on a temporary basis. If the general rule is that we are reluctant to change temporary orders pending trial, then it goes without saying that we should be even more reluctant to change final orders pending determination of the issue.

d.    Although counsel did not raise jurisdiction as an issue, I am satisfied the court has the authority to grant a temporary variation of a final order — in the appropriate circumstances. Stokes v. Stokes2014 ONSC 1311 (SCJ); Huliyappa v Menon2012 ONSC 5668 (SCJ); Clements v Merriam 2012 ONCJ 700 (OCJ).

e.     But the evidentiary basis to grant such a temporary variation must be compelling.

f.     The court must start with the aforementioned two-part material change in circumstances analysis.

g.     But for a temporary variation, the court must also assess whether the changed circumstances have created a situation of actual or potential harm, danger, or prejudice for the child; of such nature or magnitude that immediate rectification or correction are required to safeguard the child’s best interests.

h.     The onus on the party seeking a temporary variation is onerous. They must establish that in the current circumstances the existing order results in an untenable or intolerable situation, jeopardizing the child’s physical and/or emotional well-being. They must establish that the situation is so serious and potentially harmful that any delay in addressing the problem is likely to continue or exacerbate actual or potential physical and/or emotional harm for the child.

i.     The court must be satisfied that the child’s best interests require an immediate change – to reduce the detrimental impact of unacceptable negative dynamics or behaviours.

j.    The court must be satisfied that the existing order has come to be demonstrably contrary to the best interests of the child – and that the proposed temporary variation is urgently needed to shield the child from likely future harm.

k.     Implicitly, the court must have a level of confidence that the temporary variation would not only remove the child from a negative situation, but that the proposed new arrangement is so necessary and beneficial that it would be unfair to the child to delay implementation.

l.     And given the qualitative difference between untested affidavit materials on a motion compared with a more thorough evidentiary analysis at a trial or oral hearing, the court must be satisfied – on a balance of probabilities – that a clear and compelling need to make an immediate change has been established.

m.     On a temporary motion, the status quo will have a strong gravitational pull – until the moment when the court determines that a child is in peril. After that, priority switches to rescuing and protecting the child. And the pace of correction is directly related to the magnitude of the child’s current exposure to harm.”

        Tone v. Tone, 2021 ONSC 3747 (CanLII) at 20-23

“In McBennett v Danis 2021 ONSC 3610, the court described “family violence” under the recent amendments to the Children’s Law Reform Act as follows:

1. 1. 1. 1. 85.  The definition of family violence specifically recognizes that conduct that may not constitute a criminal offence can constitute family violence for Family Law purposes.  The examples of conduct that constitute family violence is expansive, but it is non-exhaustive.   The broad definition recognizes the many insidious forms that domestic violence can take other than physical violence and accords each equal weight in the best interests assessment….
            86.   The broad definition of family violence and the specific inclusion of this factor as a mandatory consideration in determining the best interests of children recognize the profound effects that all forms of family violence can have on children.  These consequences can be both direct, if a child is exposed to the family violence, or indirect, if the victimized parent’s physical, emotional and psychological well-being are compromised, since these consequences in turn often negatively impact their ability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs.”

         Bhadauria v. Cote, 2022 ONSC 3088 (CanLII) at 35

“…the fact that the parties agreed not to terminate the support does not prevent a party from returning to court where there is a change in circumstances such as to warrant a variation including the possibility of ending support altogether. As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in L.M.P v. L.S., 2011 SCC 64 (CanLII), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775, a consent order is always open to variation in the event that a material change in circumstances so warrants. The majority of the Court in L.M.P. stated, at para. 41:

But even where an agreement incorporated into an order includes a term providing that it is final, the court’s jurisdiction under s. 17 cannot be ousted …. A provision indicating that the order is final merely states the obvious: the order of the court is final subject to s. 17 of the Divorce Act. Courts will always apply the Willick [v. Willick, 1994 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670] inquiry to determine if a material change of circumstances exists. [Citations omitted; emphasis in original.]

In L.M.P., the majority of the Court characterized the “Willick inquiry” as follows, at para. 32:

That “change of circumstances”, the majority of the Court concluded in Willick, had to be a “material” one, meaning a change that, “if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms” (p. 688). G. (L.) [v. B. (G.), 1995 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 370] confirmed that this threshold also applies to spousal support variations.”

            Pustai v. Pustai, 2014 ONCA 422 at 18-19

“In Akagi v. Synergy Group (2000) Inc, 2015 ONCA 368 the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that the mandate of a receiver appointed under section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act can in appropriate cases include an investigation.   As Blair J.A. stated:

Indeed, whether it is labelled an “investigative” receivership or not, there is much to be said in favour of such a tool, in my view – when it is utilized in appropriate circumstances and with appropriate restraints. Clearly, there are situations where the appointment of a receiver to investigate the affairs of a debtor or to review certain transactions – including even, in proper circumstances, the affairs of and transactions concerning related non-parties – will be a proper exercise of the court’s just and convenient authority under section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act: Agaki, at para. 66”

         Randhawa v. Randhawa, 2021 ONSC 3643 (CanLII) at 50

“Case law provides two different approaches to the nature of an RESP; one view is that it is property and the other is that it is the product of a trust relationship. I will consider the husband’s argument based on both approaches.

In C.S.M. v. W.S.L., 2015 BCPC 252, the court described the nature of an RESP, at para. 17, as follows:

17      The Canada Revenue Agency defines an RESP as a contract between an individual (the subscriber) and a person or organization (the promoter). The subscriber names one or more beneficiaries and the promoter agrees to pay educational assistance payments to the beneficiary who pays income tax on the payments. If the payments are not made to the beneficiary the promoter pays the subscriber. There is a reversionary interest vested in the subscriber.

From this analysis, it may be concluded that the RESP is property and belongs to the parent in whose name it is registered. The exception to this would arise if the other parent can make a trust claim in relation to the RESP.

…

In the Ontario case of McConnell v. McConnell, 2015 ONSC 2243, the court held, at para. 118, that an RESP is not property belonging to or in the possession of either spouse. The RESP is the product of a trust relationship (para. 122). The RESP is a trust fund held by a trustee who is to administer it on behalf of the children who are the beneficiaries (para. 122). Under this analysis, the RESP funds no longer belong to the parent/subscriber but are impressed with a trust in favour of the child/beneficiary. Therefore, the wife is not at liberty under the terms of the trust to withdraw the funds from the RESP to give to the husband. They are to be used for the child’s education. See also Elias v. Elias, 2018 ONSC 3466.”

         N.L. v. X.C., 2022 ONSC 2891 (CanLII) at 56-58, 62

“The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the principles applicable to setting aside a marriage contract in LeVan v. LeVan, 2008 ONCA 388. At para. 50, the court observed:

Section 56(4) of the FLA was designed to address and codify prior concerns maintained by the courts that both parties fully understood their rights under the law when contracting with their spouses. It has been characterized as the “judicial oversight” provision of marriage agreements: Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 2004 SCC 22 (CanLII), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550 at paragraph 14. The provision is of such significance that, in accordance with s. 56(7), it cannot be waived by the parties.

The authors of Ontario Family Law Practice 2021, Volume 1, (Coats, Steinberg, Perkins, Lenkinski and James), LexisNexis Canada, Toronto, note at p. 1565 in their annotation to s. 56 of the Act:

… the doctrine of unconscionability is imported into s. 56(4) as part of the law of contract. This doctrine focuses on the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract.

In addition, s. 33(4) of the Act gives the court jurisdiction to set aside provision for support or waiver of support in a domestic contract if the results of the provision are unconscionable.

As the court explained at para. 51 of LeVan, there is a two-part analysis with respect to whether an agreement should be set aside pursuant to s. 56(4). First, the burden is on the party seeking to set aside the agreement to show that one or more of the circumstances enumerated in this section apply. Second, the court must determine whether to exercise its discretion to set aside the agreement.

At para. 52 of LeVan, the Court of Appeal approved of the conclusion of Madam Justice Mesbur in Patrick v. Patrick [citation omitted] that “parties are not permitted to contract out of the obligation to disclose.”

The court in LeVan, at para. 52, emphasized that in order to contract out of the Family Law Act by means of a marriage contract, parties must have a clear understanding of their rights and obligations under the Act if there were no marriage contract. It described financial disclosure as critical to this process.

The court in LeVan also commented on the importance of financial disclosure and independent legal advice for parties entering into domestic contracts, citing Dubin v. Dubin [citation omitted] at para. 53:

… knowing assets and liabilities at the date of the agreement is fundamental to an eventual calculation of net family property. A party needs to know what asset base might potentially grow, in order to determine what he or she is being asked to give up in the agreement. Coupled with financial disclosure is the notion of understanding legal rights and obligations under the legislative scheme. This second notion carries with it the concept of independent legal advice. Thus, a party must know what assets and liabilities exist at the date of the contract and must understand the general legislative scheme in order to know what he or she is giving up in the proposed agreement.

The trial judge in LeVan relied on Demchuk v. Demchuk (1986) 1986 CanLII 6295 (ON SC), 1 R.F.L. (3d) 176 (Ont. H.C.J.) to conclude that financial disclosure includes disclosure of the value of assets: para. 57. The Court of Appeal decided LeVan on other grounds and did not comment on that conclusion.

However, in Gibbons v. Mulock, 2018 ONSC 4352, at para. 16, the parties’ net worth statements were exchanged as part of the negotiation of a marriage contract. In my view, it is not sufficient to simply disclose the nature of a party’s asset without disclosing its value. To do so may be misleading.

Exchanges of sworn financial statements or statements of net worth are a starting point for understanding what each party gains or loses up upon entering into a marriage contract. They constitute a base line from which future gains or losses may be calculated should the agreement or a portion of the agreement be set aside. Indeed, without a disclosure of value, it may be impossible to accurately calculate the value of debts and assets at the date of marriage in the event that the contract is set aside.”

         Pringle v. Pringle, 2021 ONSC 3677 (CanLII) at 19-28