“[in A.C.V.P. v. A.M.T., 2019 ONSC 1559, Justice Gordon discussed the importance status quo, a factor relevant to my analysis as well:
258 Status quo is always a relevant consideration, perhaps less so with the passage of time. Parents are presumed to have equal status and neither has the right to make unilateral changes, absent special circumstances, agreement or court order. See: Rifai v. Green, 2014 ONSC 1377 (Ont. S.C.J.). A.C.V.P. did act unilaterally at the time of separation and commencement of litigation. The circumstances had not changed prior to these events. But he was successful in obtaining the initial court order for custody in November 2014.
259 Status quo is neither a rigid concept nor a short term living arrangement. Rather, it is the regime in place during the relationship and prior to separation. It assists the court by examining how parenting has worked in the past and the benefit or detriment to the children. The status quo, however, is but one factor to consider in the circumstances of the case and within the framework of the best interests of the children test. See: Moggey v. Moggey (1990), 1990 CanLII 7339 (SK QB), 28 R.F.L. (3d) 416 (Sask. Q.B.); Sodhi v. Sodhi, 2002 CarswellOnt 1050 (Ont. C.A.)], 2002 CanLII 41503; Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 6451 (Ont. S.C.J.); Gebert v. Wilson, 2015 SKCA 139 (Sask. C.A.); and K.R. v. J.K., 2018 SKCA 35 (Sask. C.A.).
260 Following separation, parents must be allowed a reasonable period of time to establish a new parenting regime. I remain of the view, a status quo cannot be manufactured by a delay in the court process: See: White v. Richardson (2005), 2005 CanLII 14148 (ON SC), 18 R.F.L. (6th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.). However, it must be recognized that the passage of time can result in the establishment of a new status quo. See: Gebert v. Wilson, supra.
261 During the relationship, the family resided together in the matrimonial home. Each parent had child care duties. A.M.T., however, was the primary parent in day to day matters, arranging health care and activities and in homeschooling. The role of A.C.V.P. was secondary given his employment, providing child care subject to availability.
262 The situation changed on separation. From May to November 2014, A.C.V.P.’s role diminished. He became an access parent with limited child care responsibilities. A further change, dramatic in nature, occurred in November 2014. A.C.V.P. became the primary parent by court order. A.M.T.’s role was reduced significantly, now only seeing the children on a limited basis.
263 The passage of time, despite being unnecessary and unreasonable, must be considered from the children’s perspective. Both parties are responsible for the delay. In this regard, I am not persuaded the status quo during the relationship is determinative. Nor do I conclude a new status quo was created. Nevertheless, the four plus years in the care of A.C.V.P. is a factor under section 24 (2) (c).”