“In this case the parties did not incorporate the terms of the Separation Agreement into a court order. As a result, the issue of spousal support is governed by s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) that states:
…the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including
(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;
(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and
(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.
The “condition” of a spouse includes such factors as their age, health, needs, obligations, dependants, and their station in life. A spouse’s “means” encompasses all financial resources, capital assets, income from employment, and any other source from which the spouse derives gains or benefits: Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at pp. 440-442; Smith v. Smith, 2012 ONSC 1116, at para. 69.
Section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act provides that an order concerning spousal support should consider the objectives of spousal support as follows:
An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should
(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;
(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and
(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self- sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.
No single objective is paramount. However, trial judges have a significant amount of discretion to determine the weight that should be placed on each objective based on the circumstances of the parties. One of the purposes of spousal support is to relieve economic hardship that results from marriage or its breakdown: Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at pp. 848; Bracklow, at p. 440.
[258] As stated in Moge, at pp. 848-849:
. . . [T]he purpose of spousal support is to relieve economic hardship that results from “marriage or its breakdown.” Whatever the respective advantages to the parties of a marriage in other areas, the focus of the inquiry when assessing spousal support after the marriage has ended must be the effect of the marriage in either impairing or improving each party’s economic prospects.
This approach is consistent with both modern and traditional conceptions of marriage in as much as marriage is, among other things, an economic unit which generates financial benefits…The Divorce Act reflects the fact that in today’s marital relationships, partners should expect and are entitled to share those financial benefits.
[259] As stated in Moge v. Moge and Bracklow v. Brackow, there are three conceptual bases for entitlement to spousal support. First, a spousal support obligation may arise on a compensatory basis, in recognition that upon marriage breakdown, there should be an equitable distribution between the parties of the economic consequences of the marriage. Entitlement can also arise in appropriate circumstances on a contractual or consensual basis, as a result of express or implied agreements between spouses that purport to either create or negate a spousal support obligation. Finally, entitlement may exist on a non-compensatory basis, as a result of the needs of the spouse. This ground for spousal support establishes that a spouse may be obliged to pay support based on the other spouse’s economic need, even if that need does not arise as a result of the roles adopted during the marriage. This basis for spousal support is founded on the view that “marriage is a relationship involving mutual obligations and interdependence that may be difficult to unravel when the marriage breaks down”: Moge, at pp. 864-865; Bracklow, at pp. 444, 448; C.Z., at para. 241).
[260] As the court emphasized in Bracklow, at pp. 450-451, “[a]t the end of the day …, courts have an overriding discretion and the exercise of such discretion will depend on the particular facts of each case, having regard to the factors and objectives designated in the Act.”