“Section 94(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, states:
Custody during adjournment
(2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child,
(a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part;
(b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate;
(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; or
(d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of the society, but not be placed in a place of temporary detention, of open or of secure custody.
AND
(4) The court shall not make an order under clause (2) (c) or (d) unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order under clause (2) (a) or (b).
AND
(8) An order made under clause (2) (c) or (d) may contain provisions regarding any person’s right of access to the child on such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate.
At a temporary care and custody hearing, the onus is on the Society to establish on credible and trustworthy evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if a child is returned to the respondent, it is more probable than not that he or she will suffer harm. The onus is on the Society to establish the child cannot be adequately protected by terms and conditions of an interim supervision order: see CAS v L.L. and J.G., 2019 ONSC 853, 20 R.F.L. (8th) 48, at para 32.
A court must choose the order that is the least disruptive placement consistent with adequate protection of the child. The degree of intrusiveness of the Society’s intervention and the interim protection ordered by the court should be proportional to the degree of risk. The Act gives priority to the person who had charge of the child prior to Society intervention: see CAS v L.L. and J.G., 2019 ONSC 853, 20 R.F.L (8th) 48, at para 32.”
Halton Children’s Aid Society v. M.A.R., 2022 ONCJ 420 (CanLII) at 72-74