“In Johanson v. Hinde, 2016 ONCA 430 (CanLII), at para. 1, this court recently emphasized the deferential standard of review owed to factual findings of trial judges in family litigation:
The deferential standard of review of decisions of trial judges on questions of fact, and questions of mixed fact and law, is designed to promote finality and to recognize the importance of trial judges’ appreciation of the facts. If anything, this is more accentuated in family litigation.
Deference was also emphasized in Hersey v. Hersey, 2016 ONCA 494 (CanLII), at para. 12:
Absent an error in principle, a material misapprehension of evidence or an award that is clearly wrong, this court must not overturn a support order because it might have reached a different result or balanced factors differently.
…
The appellant argues that the remedy ordered – termination of support – is unnecessarily harsh. There were other, more appropriate, alternatives open to the motion judge, such as imputing to the appellant the income that she ought to have earned had she returned to the workforce, and reducing ongoing support accordingly. It would have been more appropriate, she argues, to impute income because there is no evidence that she could have become self-sufficient (in the sense that she could have achieved the standard of living enjoyed by the parties at the date of separation) even if she had made reasonable efforts to do so.
The appellant concedes that where there is a lack of effort to achieve self-sufficiency, it can be appropriate to reduce support to incentivize a recipient to make appropriate efforts towards self-sufficiency: Juvatopolos v. Juvatopolos (2004), 2004 CanLII 34843 (ON SC), 9 R.F.L. (6th) 147 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 27, aff’d (2005), 2005 CanLII 35677 (ON CA), 19 R.F.L. (6th) 76 (Ont. C.A.). But she argues that it is too late in the day for her. She is not now capable of supporting herself at the standard of living the family enjoyed during the marriage, no matter what the incentive.
The respondent argues that the motion judge found that to the extent the appellant may suffer financial hardship as a result of termination of support, this is not the result of the marriage or its breakdown, but of her own improvident choices.
The motion judge considered that the appellant is not without significant resources, notwithstanding that the respondent has amassed considerably more. But the motion judge found that the mere fact that there is a disparity between the resources of the appellant and the resources of the respondent does not, in the circumstances of these parties, supply a juristic reason to continue support. I agree that the result appears harsh, given the resources available to the respondent. But the motion judge was entitled to make the order that he did, and there is no basis on which we should interfere with it.”
Choquette v. Choquette, 2019 ONCA 306 (CanLII) at 15 & 26-29