“Social science evidence regarding the effectiveness of reversal of custody orders in cases of alienation is inconclusive: see Nicholas C. Bala and Katie Hunter, “Children Resisting Contact & Parental Alienation: Context, Challenges & Recent Ontario Cases” (2015), Queen’s University Legal Research Paper No. 056, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=2887646>, cited in A.M. v. C.H., 2019 ONCA 764, 32 R.F.L. (8th) 1 (“A.M. v. C.H. (ONCA)”), at para. 76, aff’g 2018 ONSC 6472 (“A.M. v. C.H. (ONSC)”).
As the motion judge in Leelaratna v. Leelaratna, 2018 ONSC 5983, at para. 52, observed, a “large and liberal interpretation of the statutory and regulatory powers conferred upon the courts to make a wide variety of orders with regards to parenting [under ss.16(1) and (6) of the then-in-force Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), and ss. 28 and 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12], including therapeutic orders, is also entirely consistent with the courts’ duty to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children.”
Although courts retain wide discretion in crafting their orders, custody dispositions are, as a practical matter, often limited in cases of parental alienation. Courts may (a) do nothing, and leave the child with the alienating parent; (b) reverse decision-making and primary residence, and place the child with the rejected parent; (c) leave the child with the favoured parent and order therapy and counselling; or (d) provide a neutral, transitional, placement for the child and order therapy, so as to facilitate a placement with the rejected parent at a later date: see A.M. v. C.H. (ONSC), at para. 110.
Where a reversal of decision-making and primary residence has been ordered, courts may order that that the alienating parent have no contact with the child for a minimum period: see M.M.B (V.) v. C.M.V., 2017 ONSC 3991; Foley v. Foley, 2016 ONSC 4925; A.M. v. C.H. (ONSC), aff’d in A.M. v. C.H. (ONCA).”