December 22, 2020 – Civil Contempt

“The burden of proof in a civil contempt case is the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Bhatnager v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1990 CanLII 120 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 217, 111 N.R. 185, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 84, 44 Admin. L.R. 1, 43 C.P.C. (2d) 213, 12 Imm. L.R. (2d) 81, [1990] S.C.J. No. 62, 1990 CarswellNat 73, at page 224 [S.C.R.].  See also paragraph [221] of Ramcharitar v. Ramcharitar and Jagamsupra, where Justice Wein stated:

[221]         The intention or mental state of the person charged with civil contempt of court, that is the mens rea of the offence, does not require that the defendant intended to disobey or flout an order of the court: “The offence consists of the intentional doing of an act which is in fact prohibited by the order.  The absence of the contumacious intent is a mitigating but not an exculpatory circumstance”  . . .  Wilfulness is required in the sense that the conduct be deliberate and not accidental or unintentional  . . .

The wilful intentional act here is the refusal by the applicant to consistently do what was required by the court for her to do.  At paragraph [234] of Ramcharitar v. Ramcharitar and Jagamsupra, Justice Wein said:

[234]         In the family law environment, with its undertow of feelings, it is too easy for one party to believe that he or she knows right, even after a matter has been determined by the court, and to decide when to ignore the order.

This is clearly the situation in this case where the applicant consistently claimed that she knows right even after this court determined what she had to do, and as a result, the applicant continuously and deliberately decided to ignore the various court orders.  In the often quoted definition of contempt by Lord Chief Justice Russell of Killoween in R. v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36 at 40, 69 L.J.Q.B. 502, 82 L.T. 534, 16 T.L.R. 305, 48 W.R. 474, [1900-3] All E.R. Rep 59, the Lord Chief Justice stated:

Any act done or writing published, calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of court.  That is one class of contempt.  Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or lawful process of the court is a contempt of court.

In Surgeoner v. Surgeoner (1991), 6 C.P.C. (3d) 318, [1992] O.J. No. 299, 1991 CarswellOnt 465 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Justice Robert A. Blair held at paragraphs [5]-[7]:

[5]         No society that believes in a system of even-handed justice can permit its members to ignore, disobey, or defy its laws and its courts’ orders at their whim because in their own particular view, it is right to do so.  A society that countenances such conduct is a society tottering on the precipice of disorder and injustice.

[6]         The need for the sanction of contempt proceedings is of significant importance in the field of family law.  There is an undertow of bitterness and sense of betrayal that often threatens to drown the process and the parties themselves in a sea of anger and “self-rightness.”  In this environment it is all too easy for a spouse to believe that he or she “knows what is right,” even after a matter has been determined by the court, and to decide to ignore, disobey or defy that determination.

[7]         Those who choose to take this tack must know that it will not be tolerated.”

Starzycka v. Wronski, 2005 ONCJ 329 (CanLII) at 14-16