Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“The concepts of frivolous and vexatious proceedings were described by the Court of Appeal in Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, 2003 CanLII 7815 (ON CA):

[14]         Black’s Law Dictionary defines “frivolous” as: “Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful”.

[15]      In Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 1979 CanLII 1631 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 at 226, Howland, C.J.O. considered the meaning of “vexatious” under the Vexatious Proceedings Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 481:

The word “vexatious” has not been clearly defined.  Under the Act, the legal proceedings must be vexatious and must also have been instituted without reasonable ground.  In many of the reported decisions the legal proceedings have been held to be vexatious because they were instituted without any reasonable ground.  As a result the proceedings were found to constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.  An example of such proceedings is the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction: Stevenson v. Garnett, [1898] 1 Q.B. 677 at pp. 680-1; Re Langton, [1966] 3 All. E.R.

At para. 17, the court concluded, “What I take from the authorities is that any action for which there is clearly no merit may qualify for classification as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process”.”

Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2020 ONSC 235 (CanLII) at 15-16

“Over the years the Courts have steadfastly refrained from attempting to formulate a general definition of cruelty. As used in ordinary parlance “cruelty” signifies a disposition to inflict suffering; to delight in or exhibit indifference to the pain or misery of others; mercilessness or hard-heartedness as exhibited in action. If in the marriage relationship one spouse by his conduct causes wanton, malicious or unnecessary infliction of pain or suffering upon the body, the feelings or emotions of the other, his conduct may well constitute cruelty which will entitle a petitioner to dissolution of the marriage if in the Court’s opinion, it amounts to physical or mental cruelty “of such a kind as to render intolerable the continued cohabitation of the spouses”. That is the standard which the Courts are to apply, and in the context of s. 3(d) of the Act that standard is expressed in language which must be taken to exclude the qualifications laid down in Russell v. Russell, supra, and in the numerous other cases which have followed and applied the ancient ecclesiastical rule in matrimonial disputes. This is in accordance with the view taken in Zalesky v. Zalesky (1968), 1968 CanLII 612 (MB QB), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 471, 67 W.W.R. 104; Paskiewich v. Paskiewich (1968), 1968 CanLII 678 (BC SC), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 622, and Bonin v. Bonin (1969], 1969 CanLII 851 (NS SC), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 533. The only decision contra is that of Tyrwhitt-Drake, Co. Ct. J., sitting as Local Judge in Delaney v. Delaney (1968), 1968 CanLII 585 (BC SC), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 303, 66 W.W.R. 275. Reference may also be made upon this point to four recent decisions in the New Brunswick Courts: Hawthorne v. Hawthorne (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 803; Maund v. Maund (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 547; Chouinard v. Chouinard (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 582, and Bustin v. Bustin (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 496.

Care must be exercised in applying the standard set forth in s. 3(d) that conduct relied upon to establish cruelty is not a trivial act, but one of a “grave and weighty” nature, and not merely conduct which can be characterized as little more than a manifestation of incompatibility of temperament between the spouses. The whole matrimonial relations must be considered, especially if the cruelty consists of reproaches, complaints, accusations, or constant carping criticism. A question most relevant for consideration is the effect of the conduct complained of upon the mind of the affected spouse. The determination of what constitutes cruelty in a given case must, in the final analysis, depend upon the circumstances of the particular case having due regard to the physical and mental condition of the parties, their character and their attitude towards the marriage relationship.”

Knoll v. Knoll, 1970 CanLII 469 (ON CA)

“The test for on a motion for an extension of time to appeal under r. 3.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is well-settled. The overriding principle is whether the “justice of the case” requires that an extension be given. The court must take into account all relevant considerations, including (a) whether the moving party formed a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time period; (b) the length of, and explanation for, the delay in filing; (c) any prejudice to the responding parties, caused, perpetuated or exacerbated by the delay; and (d) the merits of the proposed appeal: Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131 (CanLII), 114 O.R. (3d) 636 (in Chambers), at para. 15. This court has the inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes and has the express power under s. 140(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, to stay or dismiss a proceeding as an abuse of process: Oelbaum v. Oelbaum, 2011 ONCA 300 (CanLII), 94 R.F.L. (6th) 251, at para. 9.” 

Wilson v. Fatahi-Ghandehari, 2019 CanLII 1036 (ON CA) at 9

“Faced with an appellant’s wilful refusal to honour a spousal support obligation, the court has several options.  One option is to dismiss the appeal for noncompliance with the trial court’s order.  That is the practice of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.  The following passage from the reasons of Lambert J.A. in Elensky v. Elenskaya (1993), 1993 CanLII 1937 (BC CA), 50 R.F.L. (3d) 231 makes good sense: 

In effect, Mr. Elensky is in breach of the order of Madam Justice Gill.  He is in breach because of his own determination of what he is going to pay based on his own assessment of his needs.

In those circumstances, it has been the practice of this Court not to hear appeals unless a convincing explanation is given of the impossibility of compliance with the court order.  No such convincing explanation has been given in this case.  If Mr. Elensky is going to make his own decisions about what to pay without regard to the court order then there is no purpose in this Court striving to achieve the best balancing of the interests of justice for the parties only to find that Mr. Elensky substitutes his views of that balancing for any view we may reach. 

In those circumstances, I would dismiss this appeal.

In Young v. Young (1976), 17 N.S.R. (2d) 375 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court  Appeal Division adopted the same practice.

Another option for the court is to adjourn the appeal until the appellant either pays the arrears or demonstrates that he cannot pay them.  Our court resorted to this option in Parkinson v. Parkinson (1973), 3 O.R. 293, where Gale C.J.O. said:

The Court has come to the conclusion that it ought not to entertain the appellant’s appeal until either the arrears owing by him are paid or we are satisfied that he cannot pay them.  Accordingly, the appeal will be adjourned sine die to permit the appellant to fulfil one or the other of those conditions.

…

A third option for the court is to hear the appeal on its merits, despite the appellant’s wilful default.  The court will be more likely to do this where the amount of arrears is small.  See Ott v. Ott (1982), 1982 CanLII 1872 (ON CA), 39 O.R. (2d) 260 (C.A.).” 

Brophy v. Brophy, 2004 CanLII 25419 (ON CA) at 11-12, 14

“In Ontario, only licensees under the [Law Society] Act are permitted to practice law or provide legal services in Ontario.

Historically, the Act only governed barristers and solicitors and only contained prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law. In 2006, the Act was amended to enable the Society to regulate the profession of paralegals. These changes came into force in 2007. The Act now prohibits both the unlicensed ‘practice of law’ and the unlicensed ‘provision of legal services’.

Section 26.1 sets out the specific prohibitions:        

(1) Subject to subsection (5), no person, other than a licensee whose licence is not suspended, shall practise law in Ontario or provide legal services in Ontario.         

(2) Subject to subsections (6) and (7), no person, other than a licensee whose licence is not suspended, shall hold themself out as, or represent themself to be, a person who may practise law in Ontario or a person who may provide legal services in Ontario.         

(3) No licensee shall practise law in Ontario or provide legal services in Ontario except to the extent permitted by the licensee’s licence.

…

(5) A person who is not a licensee may practise law or provide legal services in Ontario if and to the extent permitted by the by-laws.

Only lawyers may “practice law in Ontario”. According to s. 1(1) of the Act, “a person who is authorized to practise law in Ontario” is “a person who is licensed to practice law in Ontario as a barrister and solicitor and whose license is not suspended” or a person who is not licensed but “is permitted by the by-laws to practise law as a barrister and solicitor in Ontario”. Pursuant to s. 2 of “By-Law 4 – Licensing” made under s. 62 of the Act (“the By-Law”), only those who hold a class “L” licence are entitled to practice law in Ontario as a barrister and solicitor.

‘Providing legal services’ is broader. The Act provides guidance on what constitutes the provision of legal services. In s. 1(5), the Act explains that a person provides legal services “if the person engages in conduct that involves the application of legal principles and legal judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person”. The Act then expands on this definition:

(6) Without limiting the generality of subsection (5), a person provides legal services if the person does any of the following:

1. Gives a person advice with respect to the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of the person or of another person.

2. Selects, drafts, completes or revises, on behalf of a person,

…

vii. a document for use in a proceeding before an adjudicative body.

3. Represents a person in a proceeding before an adjudicative body.

4. Negotiates the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of a person.

(7) Without limiting the generality of paragraph 3 of subsection (6), doing any of the following shall be considered to be representing a person in a proceeding:

1. Determining what documents to serve or file in relation to the proceeding, determining on or with whom to serve or file a document, or determining when, where or how to serve or file a document.

2. Conducting an examination for discovery.

3. Engaging in any other conduct necessary to the conduct of the proceeding.

According to s. 6 of the By-Law, paralegals who hold a valid “P1” licence are entitled to provide various legal services. These include representing parties in proceedings in particular forums, such as Small Claims Court, the Ontario Court of Justice for provincial offences matters, or administrative tribunals. A licensed paralegal may also give a party advice regarding “his, her or its legal interests, rights or responsibilities” with respect to those proceedings.”

Law Society of Ontario v. Harry Kopyto, 2020 ONSC 35 (CanLII) at 9-14

“In the case of Ramsay v. Ramsay, 1999 CanLII 15027 (ON SC), [1999] O.J. No. 4835, Aston J. stated, at paragraph 10:

[…] the “presumption” [in sub rule 24(1)] that success determines entitlement to costs does not mean that a successful party is always entitled to costs, unless that party has “behaved unreasonably” as contemplated under sub-rule 24(4). In my view, the court’s discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act is wider than that and still allows for consideration of the factors expressed by Katarynych J. in Beaumont v. Fransden, supra. There may be an increased emphasis on the outcome or “success” as a factor, but the fact that success is only presumptive under Rule 24(1) invites consideration of other factors. Otherwise, Rule 24(1) would simply read “A successful party is entitled to costs”.

This passage from Ramsay was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in M. (C.A.) v. M (D.), at paragraph 41.

In M. (C.A.) v. M (D.) the Court of Appeal confirmed, at paragraphs 40 – 42, that:

a)  although the Family Law Rules have circumscribed the broad discretion granted by section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act they have not completely removed the trial judge’s discretion;

b)  although the general provision, sub rule 24(1), enacts a “presumption” that the successful party is entitled to costs of the case, it does not require that the successful party is always entitled to costs;

c)  a successful party may not obtain a costs award in his or her favour even in circumstances not falling within sub rule 24(4);

d)  there may be circumstances aside from the unreasonableness of the successful party’s conduct that rebut the presumption; and

e)  the financial situation of the parties can be taken into account in setting the amount of the costs award either under Rule 24 or Rule 18 pursuant to the direction in sub rule 24(11) that the court take into account “any other relevant matter”.”

Bexon v. McCorriston, 2020 ONSC 92 (CanLII) at 19-21

“Before a court can change either a child support or spousal support order it must be satisfied that a material change in circumstances has occurred.  The wife, as the moving party, bears the burden of satisfying the court there has been such a material change in circumstances.

In Willick v Willick, 1994 CalII 28 (SCC) the Supreme Court of Canada defined “material change in circumstances” as a change that, “if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms”. On a motion to change, the court must not look behind the order the moving party seeks to change.  It must proceed on the assumption the order was correct in terms of all the circumstances which existed at the time.  As the court put it in Willick:

Therefore, in a variation proceeding, it must be assumed that, at the time it was made, the original child support order or the previous variation order accurately assessed the needs of the children having regard to the means of the parents.  As such, the correctness of the previous order must not be reviewed during the variation proceeding.

Although Willick was decided before the Child Support Guidelines came into effect, it nevertheless still enunciates the appropriate principles in approaching a variation application.  Therefore, I begin, as I must, with the assumption the Greer order was correct and appropriate in terms of all the circumstances at that time.

Here, the order in question was made in September of 2014.  Thus, the wife must show there has been a material change in circumstances since then.  Even though the order was made on consent, incorporating the parties’ Minutes of Settlement, the test for variation is no different than had it been made after a full hearing.  More recently, the Supreme Court in LMP v LS, 2011 SCC 64 (CanLII) said that to be “material”, a change must be one that first, relates to something that was not either expressly addressed by the parties or that cannot be taken as having been in their contemplation, and second, results in the support provisions no longer being in substantial compliance with the Divorce Act’s objectives.

The threshold variation question is the same, whether or not the support order incorporates an agreement, as is the case here.  That being said, where the parties have reached a final agreement and its terms are incorporated into a court order, the agreement’s terms must be given considerable weight in a later variation application.  The agreement plays a central role in that kind of variation application, and Miglin principles are highly relevant to the process: 2003 SCC 24 (CanLII).  Miglin principles deal with when parties should be held to the terms of an agreement they have signed, or, put another way, when parties may avoid the terms of an agreement they have signed.  I will address these principles later in these reasons when I first deal with the question of a change to spousal support, and then with whether any aspect of child support should be changed.”

O.S. v. N.S., 2018 ONSC 149 (CanLII) at 65-69

“The test for the granting of a restraining order is whether the moving party has reasonable grounds to fear for their safety or that of a child in their custody. The term “reasonable grounds” makes clear that there must be some objective reason for the fear. But as Dunn J. of the Ontario Court of Justice stated in Khara v. McManus, [2007] O.J. No. 1968 (O.C.J.), at para. 38, the test has a subjective element as well:

It is not necessary for a respondent to have actually committed an act, gesture or words of harassment, to justify a restraining order. It is enough if an applicant has a legitimate fear of such acts being committed. An applicant does not have to have an overwhelming fear that could be understood by almost everyone; the standard for granting an order is not that elevated. However, an applicant’s fear of harassment must not be entirely subjective, comprehended only by the applicant. A restraining order cannot be issued to forestall every perceived fear of insult or possible harm, without compelling facts. There can be fears of a personal or subjective nature, but they must be related to a respondent’s actions or words. A court must be able to connect or associate a respondent’s actions or words with an applicant’s fears.

Further, as Dunn J. pointed out, a restraining order is not simply a response to historical concerns. Any past harassing behavior must have a connection to present acts. As he wrote at para. 34:

If a respondent has committed past acts or words of harassment, they must have some current relationship with an applicant’s present fears. It may not be enough if a respondent was violent to an applicant in the past and the applicant and respondent then had an ongoing subsequent relationship that was, if not harmonious, at least not conflicted. If such an applicant then links the past aggression with possible future aggression, a court will look closely at the intervening period between a respondent’s past harassment, and what an applicant perceives to be his or her present concern.

Restraining orders are not to be made on a pro forma basis. There must be evidence of the need for such an order (Palinka v. Palinka, 2003 CarswellOnt 2944 (S.C.J.)). It is not sufficient to say that no harm will arise if a restraining order is granted (Edwards v. Tronick-Wehring, 2004 ONCJ 309 (O.C.J.)). As Rogerson J. pointed out at para. 36 of Edwards, one reason that a court should be careful about ensuring that restraining orders are granted on appropriate evidence is the potential penalty for a breach. Sub-section 46(2) of the Family Law Act imposes sanctions such as a fine or even imprisonment for a breach of such a restraining order.” 

Chateauvert v. Chateauvert, 2019 ONSC 81 (CanLII) at 42-44

“In Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 2002 CanLII 41868 at paragraphs 56 and 57, the Court of Appeal stated that the onus is on the party requesting imputation of income to establish an evidentiary basis for it and the determination to impute income is always discretionary based on the circumstances of each case.

In the same case, the Court notes:

First, the court should determine whether the spouse in question is intentionally under-employed or unemployed.   In this context, “intentionally” means a voluntary act; i.e., where the parent chooses not to work, or to earn less than he or she can earn.  Existence of such an intention does not require a finding of bad faith, or a specific intent to evade or secure child support.  A parent is intentionally under-employed within the meaning of s.19(1)(a) of the Guidelines if he or she earns less than he or she can earn, having regard to all the circumstances.  He or she is intentionally unemployed, within the meaning of s.19(1)(a) of the Guidelines, when he or she chooses not to work when capable of earning an income.

Second, if the court finds intentional under-employment or unemployment, in the sense required, the court must then determine whether that was and/or is required by virtue of the parent’s reasonable educational needs, the needs of a child, or reasonable health needs.

Third, if the answer to the first stage question is “yes”, and the answer to the second stage question is “no”, the court normally moves on to determination of the income that should be imputed in the circumstances.

The law is clear that using historical income is inappropriate; the only time that a historical approach may be appropriate is where there is no more current information available to the Court; the Court’s task is to determine present income. Whora v. Whora [2016] O.J. No. 2851; Morrissey v. Morrisey [2015] P.E.I.J. no. 51; Meyer v. Content 2014 ONSC 6001 CanLII, [2014] O.J. No. 4992.

The applicant has the burden of persuading the court that the application of section 16 of the Guidelines would not be the fairest determination of that income: Fung v. Lin, 2001 CanLII 28193 (ON SC), [2001] O.J. No. 456 (S.C.J.) at para. 11.

The onus is on the party to establish that the opposing party is intentionally underemployed.  He/she must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made:  Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322 CanLII, [2009] W.D.F.L. 2480 at para. 28.

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that payors must not arrange their financial affairs to prefer their own interests over those of their children. (Citation omitted). Further, a parent will not be permitted to knowingly avoid or diminish his or her obligation to support his or her children. Wilson v. Wilson, 2011 ONCJ 103 CanLII at 20.

In Wilson v. Wilson, supra, the Court stated as follows with respect to padding back certain business expenses:

…. the Guidelines expressly provide in section 19(2) that the determination of whether an expense is reasonably deducted from a payor’s income is not governed by whether it is properly deducted for income tax purposes.  Common expenses that may legitimately be deducted for income tax purposes, but personally benefit the payor to the detriment of his or her children include expenses for car, home office, travel and entertainment.

A self-employed person has the onus of clearly demonstrating the basis of his or her net income. As stated in Wilson, supra, this includes demonstrating that the deductions from gross income should be considered in the calculation of income for support purposes.

Such payors have an inherent obligation to put forward not only adequate but comprehensive records of income and expenses, from which the recipient can draw conclusions and the amount of child support can be established…The onus rests upon the parent seeking to deduct expenses from income to provide meaningful supporting documentation in respect to these deductions, failing which an adverse inference may be drawn.” Wilson, supra at 22, citing Whelan v. O’Connor, 2006 CanLII 13554 (ON SC), 2006 CarswellOnt 2581; Meade v. Meade, 2002 CanLII 2806 (ON SC), 2002 CarswellOnt 2670; and Orser v. Grant, 2000 CarswellOnt 13554.

Of course, it is difficult for a party seeking to impute income to get to the first step, laying the evidentiary foundation, where the party against whom income is sought to be imputed makes little or no financial disclosure to the court:  Di Bratto v. Sebastiao, 2015 ONSC 1996, at para. 179.”

Atis v. Atis, 2019 ONSC 7553 (CanLII) at 109-118

“The legal and factual considerations applicable to a secure treatment application were recently reviewed by Justice Starr in McMaster Children’s Hospital, Dr. Jennifer Couturier and L.R.U and J.U 2019 ONCJ 496.  In that matter, the court summarized the key guiding principles in such an application at paragraphs 14, 18 and 26:

14.      Secure treatment is a highly intrusive procedure that engages children’s section 7 rights under the Charter. The Legislature has recognized this by placing the secure treatment provisions in a special part of the Act entitled “Extraordinary Measures” and by highlighting at section 158 of the CYFSA that secure treatment programs impose continuous restriction on a child’s liberty.

 

18.      It recognition of the highly intrusive nature of this type of order and to ensure that this procedure complies with the Charter and the principles of fundamental justice, both the CYFSA and jurisprudence recognize that long-term secure treatment orders can only be made if the strict criteria are met.

 

26.      Taking all of the foregoing into account along with the guiding principles this Court summarized at paragraph 20 of its’ decision in an Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences v. C. S., supra, the following emerge as the key guiding principles with respect to how the court is to safeguard against the arbitrary loss of a young person’s liberty in the context of the secure treatment applications, be the applications of first instance or applications to extend the committal:

 

1.  The loss of a young person’s liberty is a very serious matter. Decisions that have the potential of resulting in such a loss are not to be made arbitrarily;

2.  an order committing a child to secure treatment is to be considered as a remedy of last resort;

3.  the applicant bears the onus to demonstrate why the young person should be(or continue to be) committed to a secure program against the child’s wishes;

4.  to fulfil its own as the applicant must:

a.  adduce clear, logical, and convincing evidence establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that each and every one of the five criteria have been met;

b.  direct evidence from a psychiatrist whose opinion evidence resulted in the child’s admission;

5.  the court cannot make a ruling on the basis of a summary procedure. It is the applicant’s obligation to lead oral evidence and the child is entitled to test that evidence.

6.  The evidentiary standard on such applications is that the evidence must be trialworthy. It is not permissible to lead or rely on inadmissible hearsay or on hearsay opinion evidence given only in written form;

7.  the court is required to review the evidence with respect to each criteria carefully and exhaustively; and be satisfied that the preponderance of the evidence with respect to each of the criteria, supports a finding that the particular criteria has been established;

8.  the court may only make an order committing, or extending the committal, where it is satisfied that all of the criteria in sub section 164(1) (secure treatment applications) and ss.167(1) (extension applications) have been met;

9.  the court retains the jurisdiction to decline to make a committal order, even in cases were all of the criteria have been met.”

Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. G.L., 2019 ONSC 7528 (CanLII) at 7