Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“Courts act with care in determining when it is appropriate to exercise their discretion in favour of setting aside an agreement. This is in large part due to the weight which is placed on private citizens being able to negotiate and make their own arrangements with respect to an agreement, especially when independent legal advice was obtained: Butty v. Butty, 2009 ONCA 852, 99 O.R. (3d) 228 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 50, per curiam [“Butty”]. The Applicant is essentially asking the court to accommodate her change of mind.

In LeVan v. LeVan (2008), 90 O.R. (3d) 1, [2008] O.J. No. 1905, 2008 ONCA 388, at para. 51, the Court of Appeal held that s. 56(4) comprises a two-stage analysis:

a)     Can the party seeking to set aside the agreement demonstrate that one or more of the s. 56(4) circumstances isengaged?

b)     If so, is it appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to set aside the agreement?

The Court of Appeal, in Virc v. Blair, 2014 ONCA 392 (CanLII), 119 O.R. (3d) 721 [“Virc”], set out the approach to be taken by the Court on a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a spouse’s application to set aside a separation agreement. In Virc, the applicant sought to set aside the separation agreement she had entered into with her former husband. She argued that her husband had deliberately and materially misrepresented the value of his interest in a company, with the result that she had received an equalization payment that was substantially less than what she was entitled to. The respondent/husband moved for summary judgment dismissing her claim.

This Ontario Superior Court, in a decision reported at [2012] O.T.C. Uned. 7104, granted the husband’s motion. The motions judge concluded that, even if the values provided by the husband were false, there was no genuine issue for trial because the wife had information that should have caused her to question the husband’s disclosure before she signed the separation agreement. The wife appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered that the wife’s application proceed to trial.

The wife in Virc argued that, besides the non-disclosure, the parties’ inequality of bargaining power resulted in undue influence, that the husband’s eagerness to resolve matters created duress, that the terms regarding child support and the matrimonial home were unconscionable, and that the terms of the agreement should be altered to provide for spousal support.

The Court of Appeal held that assessing whether the agreement complied with the objectives of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2^nd Supp.) respecting spousal support was a genuine issue requiring a trial, and that given the unresolved issues, the allegations of undue influence, duress and unconscionability also should have been determined by a trial judge on a full factual record: Virc, para. 76.

In Virc, the motion judge held, at para. 55, that the fact that the appellant “had information that should have caused her to question” the veracity of the husband’s disclosure precluded any chance of successfully setting aside the agreement, even if the respondent had, in fact, deliberately made false disclosure. In other words, the motion judge determined that the appellant ought to have known that the value her husband attributed to his date of marriage interest in his company was overstated. In making this determination, the motion judge relied on an excerpt from Cheshire & Fifoot.  She wrote, at para. 83 of her reasons:

               Further, where the recipient spouse has a reason to question the information provided, but does not, no misrepresentation or omission could result in the contract being avoided. I refer to Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract, 10th ed., at p. 244, and quoted in Farquar, at para. 35:

Knowledge of the untruth of a representation is a complete bar to relief, since the plaintiff cannot assert that he has been misled by the statement, even if the misstatement was made fraudulently. In such a case, “the misrepresentation and concealment go for just absolutely nothing . . .”.

The Court of Appeal noted that the motion judge had failed to mention that the authors of Cheshire & Fifoot went on to write:

               It must be carefully noticed, however, that relief will not be withheld on his ground except upon clear proof that the plaintiff possessed actual and complete knowledge of the true fact – actual not constructive, complete, not fragmentary. The onus is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff had unequivocal notice of the truth. In particular, the mere fact that a party has been afforded an opportunity to investigate and verify a representation does not deprive him of his right to resist specific performance or to sue for rescission. As Lord Dunedin once said:

No one is entitled to make a statement which on the face of it conveys a false impression and then excuse himself on the ground that the person to whom he made it had available the means of correction. [page  736]

. . . . .

               [I]t is no answer to a suit for relief to say that inspection of the contracts or of the lease or of the bills of costs was expressly invited but was not accepted.

The Court of Appeal in Virc concluded:

               [58] Once the motion judge assumed that there had been deliberate material misrepresentations, she erred in shifting the onus to the appellant to inquire as to the veracity of the respondent’s financial disclosure. In the face of a deliberate material misrepresentation, the onus is not appropriately placed on the recipient spouse. Rather, the burden is on the party disclosing to establish actual knowledge of the falsehood by the recipient. The respondent could point to no authority for the proposition that the suggested duty of a spouse receiving financial disclosure in a matrimonial case, to investigate or test the veracity of the information provided, overtakes deliberate material non-disclosure by the other spouse.

The effect of non-disclosure on the integrity of a Separation Agreement is not limited to instances of deliberate misrepresentation.  It applies equally to circumstances involving deliberate and material non-disclosure.  The Court of Appeal in Virc stated, in part:

[62]     In Butty v. Butty, (2009), 99 O.R. (3d) 228, [2009] O.J. No. 5176, 2009 ONCA 852 this court overturned the trial judge’s determination that the marriage contract should be set aside pursuant to s. 56(4)(a) because the husband had failed to disclose significant assets or debts when the contract was made. … in the case under appeal, the finding of actual knowledge on the part of the appellant is lacking.

[63]     In Quinn [Quinn v Epstein Cole LLP, (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 1, 2008 ONCA 662], this court noted, at para. 4, that a spouse could not resile from the consequences of failing to pursue further disclosure “unless she demonstrated that [the husband’s] financial disclosure was inaccurate, misleading or false.”  In Quinn, unlike the case under appeal, the appellant had no evidence of non-disclosure but maintained that more such evidence might be forthcoming as a result of examinations for discovery.

….

[64]     Next, the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment when relevant factors  that required a determination were left unresolved.

[65]     In Rick v. Brandsema, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 295, [2009] S.C.J. No. 10, 2009 SCC 10, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the implications of the deliberate failure of a spouse to provide all the relevant financial information in negotiations for the division of assets….

[66]     The Supreme Court held that the deliberate failure to make full and honest disclosure of all relevant financial information may render the agreement vulnerable to judicial intervention where the result is a negotiated settlement that is substantially at variance from the objectives of the governing legislation….

[67]     The motion judge erred by making a determination in the absence of a resolution of these key factors….

[Emphasis added, citations added]

This Court followed the Virc approach in Turk v. Turk, 2015 ONSC 5845 [“Turk”], where an order for summary judgment was not granted as the court was not confident that it could make findings of the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the issue of setting aside a separation agreement.”

            Shalaby v. Nafei, 2022 ONSC 5615 (CanLII) at 50-60

“The threshold requirements for expert evidence admissibility are set out in R. v. Mohan, 1994 CanLII 80 (SCC) (relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary Rule and a properly qualified expert). Only the last requirement is disputed in this case. In White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23, the admissibility test evolved to require a two-step analysis; first, the court must apply the Mohan criteria then, second, the court must exercise a discretionary function, balancing the potential risks and benefits of admitting the evidence.  At this second, or “gatekeeping”, stage relevance, necessity, reliability, and absence of bias are helpful factors “in weighing the overall competing considerations in admitting the evidence.”: White Burgess, at para. 54.

In Aldush v. Alani, 2021 ONSC 6410, a parenting case in which the court needed assistance in the understanding of Sharia law, Smith J. outlined the expectations of a proposed expert and the non-exhaustive factors going to the issue of qualifications (citations omitted).

[24]           A properly qualified expert must be able to provide fair, objective and non-partisan assistance to the Court.  The expert’s opinion must be impartial, independent, and absent of any bias.  In terms of independence, the expert’s opinion must be the product of independent and uninfluenced judgment: White Burgess Langille Inman.

[25]           To be found as a properly qualified expert, the Court must be satisfied that the expert has “acquired special or particular knowledge through study or experience in respect of the matters on which he or she undertakes to testify”: R. v. Mohan.

[26]           The words “properly qualified” does not only mean “judicially qualified” but also refers to academic and experiential credentials, as well as registration with a governing body regarding the expertise: Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. F.M.

[27]           Factors that can assist the Court in determining if the tendered witness is qualified includes the expert’s formal education, professional qualifications, membership and participation in professional associations, attendance at courses or seminars in the subject matter, experience, teaching and writing in the proposed area, and previous qualification to give opinion evidence: R. v. Pham.

As pointed out in Dulong v. Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., (2006), 80 O.R. 3d 378, it does not matter how the witness acquired the “special” or “peculiar” knowledge about the matter on which they have undertaken to testify so long as they can demonstrate they have acquired that knowledge. As Ducharme J. noted,

[21] When assessing the qualifications of a proposed expert, trial judges regularly consider factors such as the proposed witness’s professional qualifications, her actual experience, her participation or membership in professional associations, the nature and extent of her publications, her involvement in teaching, her involvement in courses or conferences in the field and her efforts to keep current with the literature in the field and whether or not the witness has previously been qualified to testify as an expert in the area.”

          Ierullo v. Ierullo, 2023 ONSC 5390 (CanLII) at 3-5

“As a general rule, a payor spouse is required to pay prejudgment interest on an equalization payment owing to the payee spouse. However, the applicable legislation makes clear that the granting or denial of prejudgment interest is discretionary: Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 130. There are exceptions to the general rule. Exceptions arise “where, for various reasons, the payor spouse cannot realize on the asset giving rise to the equalization payment until after the trial, does not have the use of it prior to trial, the asset generates no income, and the payor spouse has not delayed the case being brought to trial”: Burgess v. Burgess (1995), 1995 CanLII 8950 (ON CA), 24 O.R. (3d) 547 (C.A.), at p. 552; Fielding v. Fielding, 2015 ONCA 901, 129 O.R. (3d) 65, at para. 43.”

          Muraven v. Muraven, 2021 ONCA 657 (CanLII) at 16

“The leading case on the issue of the appointment of amicus curaie in the context of a family law proceeding is Morwald–Benevides v. Benevides, 2019 ONCA 1023. In it, the Ontario Court of Appeal has found that the following principles apply for the appointment of amicas curiae:

[27] First, the assistance of amicus must be essential to the adequate discharge of the judicial functions in the case: CLA, at para. 47. The stakes must be high enough to warrant amicus. This is a circumstantial determination within the trial judge’s discretion.

[28] Second, a party has the right to self-represent: CLA, at para. 51. However, the trial judge is responsible for ensuring that the trial progresses reasonably. There are situations in which the appointment of amicus might be warranted, such as when the self-represented party is ungovernable or contumelious, when the party refuses to participate or disrupts trial proceedings, or when the party is adamant about conducting the case personally but is hopelessly incompetent to do so, risking real injustice: see, e.g., R. v. Imona-Russel (2019), 145 O.R. (3d) 197, [2019] O.J. No. 1607, 2019 ONCA 252; Zomparelli v. Conforti, [2018] O.J. No. 543, 2018 ONSC 610 (S.C.J.).

[29] Third, relatedly, while amicus may assist in the presentation of evidence, amicus cannot control a party’s litigation strategy, and, because amicus does not represent a party, the party may not discharge amicus: Imona-RusseI, at para. 67

[30] Fourth, the authority to appoint amicus should be used sparingly and with caution, in response to specific and exceptional circumstances: CLA, at para. 47. And see O. (C.C.) v. V. (J.J.), [2019] A.J. No. 992, 2019 ABCA 292, 91 Alta. L.R. (6th) 237, at para. 50. This is in part a recognition of the financial exigencies, which is ultimately a political question under our separation of powers doctrine, as CLA noted at paras. 27-31, 83.

[33] Fifth, the trial judge must consider whether he or she can personally provide sufficient guidance to an unrepresented party in the circumstances of the case to permit a fair and orderly trial without the assistance of amicus, even if the party’s case would not be presented quite as effectively as it would be by counsel: Imona-Russel, at para. 69.

[38] Sixth, it will sometimes, though very rarely, be necessary for amicus to assume duties approaching the role of counsel to a party in a family case. While the general role of amicus is to assist the court, the specific duties of amicus may vary. This is a delicate circumstantial question. If such an appointment is to be made and the scope of amicus’s duties mirror the duties of traditional counsel, care must be taken to address the issue of privilege, as in Imona Russel, at para. 89.

[39] Finally, the order appointing amicus must be clear, detailed and precise in specifying the scope of amicus’s duties. The activities of amicus must be actively monitored by the trial judge to prevent mission creep, so that amicus stays well within the defined limits.”

            G.S. v. S.B., 2022 ONSC 5383 (CanLII) at 14

“In the decision of Beardsley v. Horvath, 2022 ONSC 3430 (Ont. S.C.), Summers J. sets out a comprehensive analysis of the law regarding costs of settled cases. She notes the following in paras. 10-12:

(i)   The caselaw has developed since the decision in Blank v. Micallef (2009), 75 R.F.L. (6th) 308, 2009 CanLII 60668 (Ont. S.C.), where the court held that costs of a settled case should not be awarded absent compelling circumstances.

(ii)   Citing the cases of Scipione v. Scipione, 2015 ONSC 5982, 68 R.F.L. (7th) 66 (Ont. S.C.), Ball v. Ball, 2014 ONSC 5754, 52 R.F.L. (7th) 244 (Ont. S.C.), and A.C. v. G.K., 2015 ONCJ 399, 64 R.F.L. (7^th) 496, Summers J. identifies some general principles that have emerged:

i.   It is not uncommon for the court to receive last minute settlements which resolve all issues other than costs.

ii.   Parties are always encouraged to settle; even at the last moments of a motion or trial – if signing minutes of settlement will jeopardize a litigant’s ability to seek costs, it will create a disincentive for settlement.

iii.   There is a presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs pursuant to r. 24(10)); a party’s behaviour may be a relevant factor. If a court can assess success and reasonableness, costs may be awarded even when there has been a settlement. This is often the case where there is an extensive record with supporting documentation.

iv.   If a party brings a motion asking to change almost everything, and, at the last minute, signs a consent which changes almost nothing, it may not be difficult for a judge to determine success.

v.   “Success” is assessed by comparing the terms of the order made against the relief requested in the pleadings and, where applicable, against the terms of an offer to settle.

vi.   When a case is determined by a settlement rather than a judicial decision, a court often does not have the information and evidence required to assess who was “successful” or the degree of that success. Sometimes the issues are so numerous and the results so different from either party’s offer that “success”cannot be measured. For example, in Page v. Desabrais, 2012 ONSC 6875 (Ont. S.C.) at para. 42, a multi-issue case, the court compared the offers of the parties throughout the proceeding and found it “simply impossible…to declare one party more successful than the other.”

vii.  Sometimes, however, a court is able to assess what represents “success” after a settlement is reached. In Kearley v. Renfro, 2012 ONSC 5391 (Ont. S.C.), the only issue before the court on a motion was the residency of three children; the mother agreed on the day scheduled for the motion and settlement conference that the children would go into their father’s care immediately. The court found that the father was substantially successful, and awarded him costs.”

            Beaudoin v. Stevens, 2023 ONSC 5265 (CanLII) at 19

“The Hague Convention is “aimed at enforcing custody rights and securing the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained children to their country of habitual residence”: Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398, at para. 24. A return order is not a custody determination, but only an order to restore the status quo, and return the child to the jurisdiction which is most appropriate for the determination of custody and access issues: Balev, at para. 24.

The test for when the Hague Convention applies is set out in Article 3. It provides that the removal or retention of a child is considered wrongful where it breaches the custodial rights of the left behind parent in the State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or wrongful retention. Said custodial rights can include joint custodial rights, and can arise from law, a decision, or an agreement that has legal effect: Andegiorgis v. Giorgis, 2018 ONCJ 965, at para. 21. And Balev, at para. 28.”

            Thompson v. Thompson, 2022 ONSC 5474 (CanLII) at 45-46

“Child support obligations arise upon a child’s birth or the separation of their parents. Retroactive awards are a recognized way to enforce such pre-existing, free-standing obligations and to recover monies owed but yet unpaid. Such a debt is a continuing obligation which does not evaporate or fade into history upon a child’s 18th or 19th birthday or their graduation from university. Under s. 152 of the (British Columbia’s) Family Law Act, a debt exists if the child qualified as a beneficiary at the time the support was due, irrespective of their status at the moment of the application. This reading not only accords with the text, legislative scheme, and purpose of s. 152, it enhances access to justice, reinforces that child support is the right of the child and the responsibility of the parents, encourages the payment of child support, acknowledges that there are many reasons why a parent may delay making an application, and recognizes how the underpayment of child support leads to hardship and contributes to the feminization of poverty. In short, allowing recipient parents to make claims for historical child support is in the best interests of children and promotes equality and access to justice for all.”

          Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 (CanLII) at 41

“The mother submitted that the father’s claim for costs is too high because he is on legal aid. The case law is well settled that the receipt of legal aid is not a factor in determining costs. See: Ramcharitar v. Ramcharitar (2002), 2002 CanLII 53246 (ON SC), 62 O.R. (3d) 107 (S.C.J.); Alvarez v. Smith, 2008 CanLII 10047 (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 941 (SCJ); Loncar v. Pendlebury, 2015 ONSC 4673; S.G. v. A.S., 2015 ONSC 1882.”

          Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 488 (CanLII) at 11

“In Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2015 ONSC 3684, as adopted by the Divisional Court in Sabijan v Sabijan, 2021 ONSC 7605, Justice Pazaratz stated when considering whether to order security for costs, the court must turn its mind to the following:

a)        The initial onus is on the party seeking security for costs to show that the other party falls within one of the enumerated grounds.

b)        If the onus is met, the court has discretion to grant or refuse an order for security.

c)        If the court orders security, it has wide discretion as to the quantum and means of payment of the order.

d)        The order must be “just” and be based on one or more of the factors listed in subrule 24(13).

(Citations omitted).

In this case, the Estate is situated outside of Ontario – in British Columbia.  Accordingly, if there is a cost order levied against the Estate, it has no assets in this province from which Garcia could collect.

Given that the first prong of the test has been satisfied, I do not need to consider whether the Estate’s claims are a “waste of time or a nuisance” in order to proceed.

When deciding whether to exercise my discretion, I have considered the following principles:

a)        Orders for security for costs are a blunt instrument. They are not intended to act as a roadblock to genuine claims. They should be used sparingly and carefully because they may well have the effect of barring a party from access to the court process for a proper review of existing orders:  Gauthier v. Gauthier, 2019 ONCA 722 at para.  8; Izyukat para. 37;

b)        It can be inferred that an analysis under this section will include some consideration of the merits of the case, and whether it is a nuisance:  Peters v. Peters et al, 2018 ONSC 7550 at paras. 38-39;

c)        The purpose of security for costs is to protect a party from nuisance or irresponsible litigation, conducted without regard to the merits of the case or the costs likely to be incurred:  Izyukat para. 36.

d)        It is not the intention of any rule governing procedure in the court to deny access to the court by a person who has a genuineclaim and is unable to satisfy … an outstanding order for security for costs due to circumstances beyond his control:  McGraw v. Samra, 2004 ONCJ 164 at para. 23, as adopted in Pigeault v. Pigeault, 2009 CarswellOnt 1558 at para. 19;

e)        The Family Law Rules, read as a whole, yield the unmistakable intention of the Rules Committee that litigants not be permitted to use the court as a playground.  This rule is but one remedy to stop a case in its tracks until a party veering outside of the rules brings him or herself into line with them.  It is a control on a blithe pursuit of another person in the courts without attention to the merits of the pursuit and the legal costs likely to be incurred by the respondent to defend the case.  It is a remedy built on the principle that court proceedings are expensive and time consuming and not to be launched frivolously or without due regard to the impact on the responding party: McGrawat para. 24, as adopted by LW v. AW, 2011 ONSC 7596 at para. 15;

f)         Cases must be dealt with justly, which means ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties, that it saves time and expense, that it is dealt with in a way that is appropriate to its importance and complexity and using the appropriate court resources:  r. 2(2) and r. 2(3) of theFamily Law Rules.”

          Jurrius v. Garcia, 2022 ONSC 6983 (CanLII) at 16-19

“Broad J., in the recent decision of Dauber v. Dauber, 2021 ONSC 5489, summarized the law with respect to the guiding principles on the choice of school. In that decision, at paras. 14 and 15, he quoted from Piper v. Hare, 2021 ONSC 2139, which quoted Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712, as follows:

[15]  The general principles guiding the court in deciding where a child shall attend school when the parties disagree were very usefully set out by Audet, J. in Thomas v. Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712 (S.C.J.) at para. 37 as follows:

The decision as to the choice of school that a child should attend, when the parents disagree, is ultimately a matter of judicial discretion. However, a number of general principles have emerged from the caselaw to assist the decision-maker in making the decision in the child’s best interests. They can be summarized as follows:

a.   Sub-section 28(1)(b) of the Children’s Law Reform Actspecifically empowers the court to determine any matter incidental to custody rights. The issue of a child’s enrollment in a school program must be considered as being incidental to or ancillary to the rights of custody (Deschenes v. Medwayosh, 2016 ONCJ 567 (Ont. C.J.));

b.   It is implicit that a parent’s plan for the child’s education, and his or her capacity and commitment to carry out the plan are important elements affecting a child’s best interests. In developing a child’s educational plan, the unique needs, circumstances, aptitudes and attributes of the child, must be taken into account (Bandas v. Demirdache,2013 ONCJ 679 (Ont. C.J.));

c.    When considering school placement, one factor to be considered is the ability of the parent to assist the child with homework and the degree to which the parent can participate in the child’s educational program (Deschenes v. Medwayosh, 2016 ONCJ 567 (Ont. C.J.));

d.    The emphasis must be placed on the interests of the child, and not on the interests or rights of the parents (Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] S.C.J. No. 52 (S.C.C.);

e.   The importance of a school placement or educational program will promote and maintain a child’s cultural and linguistic heritage (Perron v. Perron, 2012 ONCA 811 (Ont. C.A.);

f.     Factors which may be taken into account by the court in determining the best interests of the child include assessing any impact on the stability of the child. This may include examining whether there is any prospect of one of the parties moving in the near future; where the child was born and raised; whether a move will mean new childcare providers or other unsettling features (Askalan v. Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746 (Ont. S.C.J.);

g.   The court will also look to any decisions that were made by the parents prior to the separation or at the time of separation with respect to schooling (Askalan v. Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746 (Ont. S.C.J.);

h.    Any problems with the proposed schools will be considered (Askalan v. Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746 (Ont. S.C.J.);

i.      A decision as to the choice of school should be made on its own merits and based, in part, on the resources that each school offered in relation to a child’s needs, rather than on their proximity to the residence of one parent or the other, or the convenience that his attendance at the nearest school would entail (Wilson v. Wilson, 2015 ONSC 479 (Ont. S.C.J.));

j.   Third-party ranking systems, such as the Fraser Institute’s, should not factor into a Court’s decision. These systems of ranking do not take into consideration the best interest of the particular child in a family law context (Wilson v. Wilson, 2015 ONSC 479 (Ont. S.C.J.));

k.     If an aspect of a child’s life, such as school placement, is to be disrupted by an order of the court, there must be good reason for the court to do so. Thus, before a court will order a child to transfer schools, there must be convincing evidence that a change of schools is in the child’s best interests (Perron v. Perron, 2012 ONCA 811 (Ont. C.A.);

l.     Custodial parents should be entrusted with making the decision as to which school children should attend. When a sole custodial parent has always acted in the best interest of a child, there should be no reason to doubt that this parent will act in the best interest of the child when deciding on a school (Adams v. Adams, 2016 ONCJ 431 (Ont. C.J.));

m.   Those cases are very fact-driven. The courts are not pronouncing on what is best for all children in a general sense but rather deciding what is in the best interests of this child before the court (Deschenes v. Medwayosh, 2016 ONCJ 567 (Ont. C.J.)).

In addition, Askalan v. Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746, set out other factors, namely assessing any impact on the stability of the child and examining how many years the child has attended his or her current school.”

            Denomme v. Denomme, 2022 ONSC 5205 (CanLII) at 42-43