Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“The order under appeal is an order for sale of the matrimonial home. Although the appellant refers in his factum to the order as an interlocutory order, because the order finally disposes of the issue of whether the matrimonial home should be sold, it is a final order and this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

We are not aware of any statutory provision or precedent that would support the motion judge’s order delegating the court’s authority to approve the sale price at which the matrimonial home should be listed and to accept an offer on the appellant’s behalf. That order should not have been made. Similarly, absent the agreement of both parties, the motion judge’s orders granting rights of first refusal should not have been made. See Martin v. Martin (1992), 1992 CanLII 7402 (ON CA), 8 O.R. (3d) 41 (C.A.)”

 Laurignano v. Laurignano, 2009 ONCA 241 (CanLII) at 2-3

“The trial judge, at para. 21, quoted above, referenced three decisions of this court: Drygala v. Pauli, 2003 CanLII 48241 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 3, 167 O.A.C. 274; Wildman v. Wildman (2006), 2006 CanLII 33540 (ON CA), 82 O.R. (3d) 401, 215 O.A.C. 239; and Writer v. Peroff, [2006] O.J. No. 4567 (S.C.), aff’d [2006] O.J. No. 4061.  In each of these cases, this court upheld a trial judge’s discretionary decision to order costs awarded in a matrimonial proceeding enforceable by the FRO as support.  Indeed, in Drygala, at para. 16, the validity of an order making a costs award at trial enforceable in its entirety by the FRO was specifically affirmed.

However, the validity of an FRO enforcement order per se is not challenged in this case.  There can be no tenable suggestion, and Gregory does not argue, that the courts lack jurisdiction to direct that costs awarded in a matrimonial proceeding be enforceable as support or maintenance by the FRO.  The Act provides otherwise.

The critical question is whether the FRO enforcement mechanism can be triggered by characterizing the costs of a matrimonial proceeding as referable to lump sum spousal support where no claim for spousal support was advanced or adjudicated upon at trial.  None of the cases cited by the trial judge supports that proposition.  To the contrary, in each of Drygala, Wildman and Writer, child and/or spousal support, among other matters, was in issue at trial.  And, in each of these cases, the costs of the underlying proceeding and of the appeal before this court were ordered enforceable by the FRO as support.

Nor do any of the appellate-level cases relied upon by Georgia stand for this proposition.  For example, Sordi v. Sordi, 2010 ONSC 6236 (CanLII), aff’d 2011 ONCA 665 (CanLII), [2011] O.J. No. 4681, cited by Georgia, provides no authority for the approach employed by the trial judge.  In Sordi, this court upheld a trial judge’s order that part of the costs awarded at a matrimonial trial should be enforceable by the FRO as support.  However, the issues at trial included claims for child and spousal support, thus linking the costs award to support.

The relevant authorities, including those mentioned above, confirm that a trial judge’s allocation of costs as relating to support or maintenance for FRO enforcement purposes attracts considerable deference from a reviewing court.  That said, in those authorities cited above where costs were designated enforceable by the FRO as “spousal support”, the costs were incurred in a proceeding in which spousal support was implicated.

I therefore conclude that the trial judge erred in this case by characterizing his costs award as lump sum spousal support for the purpose of invoking enforcement of the award by the FRO.  For the reasons given, this characterization of Georgia’s costs award cannot stand.”

Clark v. Clark, 2014 ONCA 175 (CanLII) at 69-74

“In a case such as this one (not involving a native child or a potential custody order), the decision process on a disposition hearing is as follows:

1. Determine whether the disposition that is in the child’s best interests is return to a party, with or without supervision.  If so, order the return and determine what, if any, terms of supervision are in the child’s best interests and include them in the order.  If not, determine whether the disposition that is in the child’s best interests is society wardship or Crown wardship.  (Section 57.)

2.  If a society wardship order would be in the child’s best interests, but the maximum time for society wardship under section 70 (1) has expired, determine whether an extension under section 70 (4) is available and is in the child’s best interests.  If so, extend the time and make a society wardship order.  If not, make an order for Crown wardship.

3.  If a Crown wardship order is to be made, and a party has sought an access order, determine whether the relationship between the child and the person who would have access is both meaningful and beneficial to the child.  (Section 59 (2.1) (a)).  If not both meaningful and beneficial, dismiss the claim for access.  If so, go to the next step.

4.  Determine whether the access would impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.  (Section 59 (2.1) (b)).  If so, dismiss the claim for access.  If not, go to the next step.

5.  Determine whether an access order is in the child’s best interests.  If not, dismiss the claim for access.  If so, make an access order containing the terms and conditions that are in the child’s best interests.  (Section 58.)”

Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.L. and G.A., 2010 ONSC 1376 (CanLII) at 25

“In sum, the factors that must be considered in determining whether a child has involuntarily withdrawn from parental control include the following:

(a) The onus is on the child to establish the involuntariness of her withdrawal from parental control.

(b) The standard necessary to find that the withdrawal is involuntary looks to eviction or unbearable conditions. But in considering what is unbearable, the court must engage in a contextual analysis of the factors that led to the child’s withdrawal. A broad matrix of factors regarding both parent and child must be considered.

(c) The analysis must look to what is unbearable to the particular child who has withdrawn. What is unbearable for one child may not be for the other. A child and parent’s difficulty coping with each other may be sufficient, depending on the control being exerted and the condition of the child. Similarly, an intolerable breakdown in their communication may also suffice.

(d) Implicit in the analysis is the notion that the control being withdrawn from must be reasonable for the withdrawal to be voluntary. A child’s refusal to follow reasonable parenting limits for purely subjective reasons will likely make the withdrawal voluntary.

(e) The child’s decision must be complete. It must be to, in the words of Clements J. in Haskell v. Letourneau, to “… cut the family bonds and strike out on a life of his own… [to assume] the responsibility of maintaining or supporting himself… to cut himself away from the family unit.”

(f) The complete withdrawal must be from both parents.

(g) In considering whether the withdrawal is voluntary, the court can look to behaviour both before and after the withdrawal.

(h) One relevant aspect of behaviour after the withdrawal is whether the parent has attempted to repair his or her relationship with the child.

(i) Despite the onus placed on the child, the court must be cautious before finding on the facts before it that a child has clearly decided to voluntarily withdraw from reasonable parental control.”

G.(O.) v. G.(R.), 2017 ONCJ 153 (CanLII) at 118

“The appellant argues that his $201 monthly child support obligation should be reduced by the $200 CPP child benefit that arises out of the appellant’s CPP disability.

For several reasons, I agree with the courts that have considered and rejected the argument that the amount of the CPP child benefit should be credited against the child support otherwise owing.  See Wadden v. Wadden, 2000 BCSC 960 (CanLII), [2000] B.C.J. No. 1287 (S.C.); Huey v. Huey (1991), 39 R.F.L. (3d) 14 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Williams v. Williams (1995), 18 R.F.L. (4^th) 129 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Corkum v. Corkum (1997), 1998 CanLII 2691 (NS SC), 36 R.F.L. (4^th) 367 (N.S.S.C.); Griffiths v. Griffiths (1999), 1999 ABQB 193 (CanLII), 45 R.F.L. (4^th) 353 (Alta. Q.B.); Vickers v. Vickers (2001), 2001 NSCA 96 (CanLII), 201 D.L.R. (4^th) 65 (N.S.C.A.); Peterson v. Horan (2006), 2006 SKCA 61 (CanLII), 279 Sask. R. 94 (C.A.).

First, if Parliament had intended to provide an offset of the child benefit against support, it would have provided for that result either in the Federal Child Support Guidelines, S.O.R./97-175 (the Guidelines), or in the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 (the Act).  It did not do so.

Second, the benefit is not income of the appellant in the sense that he redirects it to his son simply as a matter of convenience.  Instead, the Act treats the benefit as that of the child, not that of the contributor. Paragraph 44(1)(e) of the Act specifically provides that “a disabled contributor’s child benefit shall be paid to each child of a disabled contributor…”.  As well, an application for the benefit is not made by the parent, but by the parent “on behalf of” the child.  This is confirmed by s. 75, which provides that the benefit is payable directly to the child, unless the child is a minor, in which case the benefit is paid to the custodial parent.  The appellant has no entitlement to the benefit, he has no control over its payment, it is not taxable in his hands, and it is not included in his income for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation.  Accordingly, it should not be used to reduce the appellant’s obligation to pay support for his child.

Third, had Parliament intended the benefit to satisfy all or part of a contributor’s child support obligation, it could have crafted a scheme that provided an increased benefit for a contributor with a dependent child, rather than a separate child benefit.  Had it done so, the quantum of child support would have been calculated on the appellant’s gross income.  This, however, was not the scheme devised by Parliament.  See Vickers, supra, at para. 12.

Fourth, the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2^nd Supp.) mandates that child support orders must be made in accordance with the Guidelines. Support is calculated on the taxpayer’s taxable income, which does not include the child benefit.  The Guidelines do not provide for a reduction of Table support by the amount of the CPP child benefit and do not factor a minor child’s means into consideration, except in certain specific circumstances, none of which was raised in this proceeding.  The trial judge knew that Andrew was approaching the age of majority when his means could become relevant. However, when considered in the context of Andrew’s needs, and the financial circumstances of his parents, his receipt of the CPP child benefit would not operate to reduce the appellant’s child support obligation.”

Sipos v. Sipos, 2007 ONCA 126 (CanLII) at 10-15

“Section 19 of the guidelines permits the court to impute income to the father if it finds that he is earning or capable of earning more income than he claims.

Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children.  In order to meet this obligation, the parties must earn what they are capable of earning.  If they fail to do so, they will be found to be intentionally under-employed. See: Drygala v. Pauli 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 3731(Ont. CA).

In Duffy v. Duffy, 2009 NLCA 48 (CanLII), the court sets out the following principles:

a) The fundamental obligation of a parent to support his or her children takes precedence over the parent’s own interests and choices.

b) A parent will not be permitted to knowingly avoid or diminish, and may not choose to ignore, his or her obligation to support his or her own children.

c) A parent is required to act responsibly when making financial decisions that may affect the level of child support available from that parent.

d) The determination to impute income is discretionary, as the court considers appropriate in the circumstances.

e) A parent will not be excused from his or her child support obligations in furtherance of unrealistic or unproductive career aspirations or interests. Nor will it be acceptable for a parent to choose to work for future rewards to the detriment of the present needs of his or her children, unless the parent establishes the reasonableness of his or her course of action.

The Ontario Court of Appeal in Drygala set out the following three questions which should be answered by a court in considering a request to impute income:

1.   Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?

2. If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs?

3.   If not, what income is appropriately imputed?

The onus is on the party seeking to impute income to the other party to establish that the other party is intentionally unemployed or under-employed.  The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made. See: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322 (CanLII), [2009] O.J. No. 1552. (Ont. C.A.).

The court stated in Drygala that there is no need to find a specific intent to evade child support obligations before income is imputed; the payor is intentionally under-employed if he or she chooses to earn less than what he or she is capable of earning.  The court must look at whether the act is voluntary and reasonable.

Once under-employment is established, the onus shifts to the payor to prove one of the exceptions of reasonableness. When an employment decision results in a significant reduction of child support, it needs to be justified in a compelling way: See: Riel v. Holland, 2003 CanLII 3433 (ON CA), 2003 CanLII 3433 (Ont. C.A.), at paragraph 23. The trial judge must determine whether the educational needs claimed by the payor are reasonable. See: Drygala, supra, paragraph 39. As a general rule, separated parents have an obligation to financially support their children and they cannot avoid that obligation by a self-induced reduction of income. See: Thompson v. Gilchrist, 2012 ONSC 4137 (Canlii) (CanLII); DePace v. Michienzi, 2000 CanLII 22560 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 453, (Ont. Fam. Ct.); Drygala, supra, paragraph 39.

The court in Drygala expands on what is required to determine if the educational needs of a payor are reasonable in paragraphs 40 and 41 as follows:

[40] But, s. 19 (1) (a) speaks not only to the reasonableness of the spouse’s educational needs. It also dictates that the trial judge determine what is required by virtue of those educational needs. The spouse has the burden of demonstrating that unemployment or under-employment is required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs. How many courses must be taken and when? How much time must be devoted in and out of the classroom to ensure continuation in the program? Are the academic demands such that the spouse is excused from pursuing part-time work? Could the program be completed over a longer period with the spouse taking fewer courses so that the spouse could obtain part-time employment? If the rigours of the program preclude part-time employment during the regular academic school year, is summer employment reasonably expected? Can the spouse take co-operative courses as part of the program and earn some income in that way? These are the types of considerations that go into determining what level of under- employment is required by the reasonable educational needs of a spouse.

[41] The burden of proof is upon the spouse pursuing education as he or she is the person with access to the requisite information. The spouse is in the best position to know the particular requirements and demands of his or her educational program. He [page721] or she will have information about the hours of study necessary to fulfill such requirements, including the appropriate preparation time. He or she is in the best position to show whether part-time employment can be reasonably obtained in light of these educational requirements.

It is not reasonable for a payor to return to school and not pay support, unless it is justified by a sufficient increase in earning ability that will benefit the children (see my comments in Carter v. Spracklin, 2012 ONCJ 193 (CanLII), [2012] O.J. No. 1533 (OCJ)).

The third question in Drygala v. Pauli, supra, is: “If there is no reasonable excuse for the payor’s under-employment, what income should properly be imputed in the circumstances?” The court must have regard to the payor’s capacity to earn income in light of such factors as employment history, age, education, skills, health, available employment opportunities and the standard of living earned during the parties’ relationship.  The court looks at the amount of income the party could earn if he or she worked to capacity. See: Lawson v. Lawson, 2006 CanLII 26573 (ON CA), 2006 CanLII 26573 (Ont. C.A.).

The court will usually draw an adverse inference against a party for his or her failure to comply with their disclosure obligations as provided for in section 21 of the guidelines and impute income. See: Smith v. Pellegrini, 2008 CanLII 46927 (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 3616, (Ont. S.C.); Maimone v. Maimone, 2009 CanLII 25981 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 2140, (Ont. S.C.).

A person’s lifestyle can provide the criteria for imputing income.  See: Aitken v. Aitken [2003] O.J. No. 2780 (SCJ); Jonas v. Jonas [2002] O.J. No. 2117 (SCJ); Price v. Reid, 2013 ONCJ 373 (CanLII).

Where a party receives regular gifts from his or her parent, the court may impute the amount of those gifts as income for support purposes:  See: Marrello v. Marrello, 2016 ONSC 835 (CanLII), citing Bak v. Dobell 2007 ONCA 304 (CanLII) at paragraph 75 and Korman v. Korman, 2015 ONCA 578 (CanLII), at paragraphs 47-51, 62-65 and 67.”

Ffrench v. Williams, 2016 ONCJ 105 (CanLII) at 35-47

“To allow a party who ignores his or her financial disclosure obligations to later satisfy the requirement and argue that the late disclosure constitutes a material change in circumstances would eviscerate the financial disclosure regime.”

Gray v. Rizzi, 2016 ONCA 152 at 34

“In the words of Lord Denning M.R. in Burgess v. Rawnsley, [1975] 3 All E.R. 142, [1975] Ch. 429 (Eng. C.A.), at p. 146 All E.R.: “Nowadays everyone starts with the judgment of Page Wood V-C in Williams v. Hensman“. This is likewise true of Canadian courts, which have long recognized the vice-chancellor’s statement as the starting point for assessing severance of a joint tenancy: see, e.g., Clark v. Clark (1890), 17 S.C.R. 376, [1890] S.C.J. No. 13, at p. 383 S.C.R. (Gwynne J., dissenting); Ginn v. Armstrong, 1969 CanLII 830 (BC SC), [1969] B.C.J. No. 400, 3 D.L.R. (3d) 285 (S.C.), at p. 286 D.L.R.; Walters and Walters (Re) (1977), 1977 CanLII 1835 (ON SC), 16 O.R. (2d) 702, [1977] O.J. No. 1731 (H.C.J.), at p. 705 O.R., affd (1978), 1978 CanLII 1691 (ON CA), 17 O.R (2d) 592n, [1978] O.J. No. 3214 (C.A.); Sorensen’s Estate v. Sorensen, 1977 CanLII 1648 (AB CA), [1977] A.J. No. 742, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 26 (C.A.), at p. 32 D.L.R.; Tompkins Estate v. Tompkins, 1993 CanLII 1119 (BC CA), [1993] B.C.J. No. 445, 99 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (C.A.), at pp. 196-99 D.L.R. [See Note 5 below]

The three modes of severance referred to in Williams v. Hensman have come to be known as the “three rules”: see Burgess, at pp. 152-53 All E.R.; Robichaud v. Watson (1983), 1983 CanLII 1701 (ON SC), 42 O.R. (2d) 38, [1983] O.J. No. 3046 (H.C.J.), at p. 44 O.R.; Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2010), at pp. 342 and 345. The three rules may be summarized as follows: [page252] Rule 1: unilaterally acting on one’s own share, such as selling or encumbering it; Rule 2: a mutual agreement between the co-owners to sever the joint tenancy; and Rule 3: any course of dealing sufficient to intimate that the interests of all were mutually treated as constituting a tenancy in common.

The apposite rule in the present case is rule 3, or the course of dealing rule. As explained by Professor Ziff in Principles of Property Law, at p. 345, severance under this rule operates in equity. Rule 3 operates so as to prevent a party from asserting a right of survivorship where doing so would not do justice between the parties. In the words of Professor Ziff, at p. 345, “the best way to regard matters is to say that equity will intervene to estop the parties, because of their conduct, from attempting to assert a right of survivorship”. What is determinative under this rule is the expression of intention by the co-owners as evidenced by their conduct: see Robichaud, at p. 45 O.R.

Rule 3 governs cases where there is no explicit agreement between the co-owners to sever a joint tenancy. In contrast, rule 2 is engaged where a mutual agreement to sever is claimed to exist. This distinction between rule 2 and rule 3 is significant. What follows from this distinction is that the proof of intention contemplated by rule 3 does not require proof of an explicit intention, communicated by each owner to the other(s), to sever the joint tenancy. If such proof were required, then rule 3 would be rendered redundant because a communicated common intention would be tantamount to an agreement. Instead, the mutuality for the purposes of rule 3 is to be inferred from the course of dealing between the parties and does not require evidence of an agreement.”

Hansen Estate v. Hansen, 2012 ONCA 112 (CanLII) at 33-36

“In the Ontario Court of Appeal decision of El Feky v. Tohamy, 2010 ONCA 647 (CanLII), Rosenberg J.A. sets out the meaning of good faith at para. 34 as follows:

[34] A more appropriate explanation for the meaning of good faith in this context is found in the decision of Mendes da Costa U.F.C.J. in Hart v. Hart (1990), 27 R.F.L. (3d) 419 at p. 432:

Section 2(8)(b)enshrines in legislative form the concept of “good faith”. As is not infrequently the case, these words are not defined in the Act, and I do not believe that it would be either possible or useful to attempt to catalogue the possibilities that they embrace. However, I must attribute to these words their “plain meaning according to the understanding and practices of the times.”: Cash v. George Dundas Realty Ltd. (1973), 1973 CanLII 40 (ON CA), 1 O.R. (2d) 241, 248 (C.A.). I believe, to establish “good faith”, it must be shown that the moving party acted honestly and with no ulterior motive. It does not seem to me that the Legislature, anticipating the general newsworthy nature of the family property provisions of the Act, intended that a mere failure to make enquiries should necessarily negate “good faith”, provided that the absence of enquiry does not constitute wilful blindness or does not otherwise, in all the circumstances, fall below community expectations. As I have stated, my assessment of the evidence is that the wife was ignorant of her rights under the Act, and I believe that her state of mind was one of blameless ignorance. I am satisfied that the delay in issue was delay incurred in good faith within the meaning of section 2(8)(b).”

Freire v. Freire, 2017 ONSC 1188 (CanLII) at 54

“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the Society is properly exercising its statutory duty and acting in the best interest of the child.  Time is an important consideration in the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 and a child is not to be kept in limbo while a parent having difficulties attempts to straighten out her life.”

Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. V.L., 2007 ONCA 113 (CanLII) at 14