Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“This Court has held that RRSP income is “presumptively part of a spouse’s income for child support purposes.” That is because section s. 16 of the Guidelinesprovides that a person’s annual income for child support purposes is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading “Total income” on the T1 tax form. RRSP income is included as part of “Total income” on the T1 tax form: see Fraser v. Fraser, 2013 ONCA 715, 40 R.F.L. (7th) 311, at para. 97.

The inclusion of RRSP proceeds is not mandatory, however, and the court has the discretion in appropriate circumstances to do otherwise. Section 17(1) of the Guidelines provides this flexibility…”

Ludmer v. Ludmer, 2014 ONCA 827 at 22-23

“Toronto does not have a Unified Family Court. The result is that the Ontario Court of Justice and Superior Court of Justice have concurrent jurisdiction on originating issues of custody and access under the Children’s Law Reform Act and child and spousal support under the Family Law Act.  The Superior Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to make custody, access and support orders under the Divorce Act and to make property-related orders, including orders for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home under the Family Law Act. The Ontario Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to hear originating protection applications under the Child and Family Services Act. This is just the starting point in discussing the various jurisdictional issues between the two courts.

This jurisdictional jigsaw often creates confusion and additional costs for counsel and litigants. It also means that counsel and litigants must give serious consideration to what court they will start their case in.

One of the factors that must be considered by a party before a case is started in the Ontario Court of Justice is that the other party may issue an application for divorce in the Superior Court of Justice seeking similar or additional relief. Under both section 27 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and section 36 of the Family Law Act,the commencement of the divorce application stays any proceeding in the Ontario Court of Justice that has not yet been determined, unless on motion, a judge in the Ontario Court of Justice lifts that stay.

There are often good reasons to start a case in the Superior Court of Justice in the face of proceedings started in the Ontario Court of Justice. There may be issues of property or exclusive possession of the matrimonial home that the Ontario Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to deal with. Issues of support and property may be intertwined. In such cases, it will make sense not to split the case and to have one court decide all of the issues.

The reality is that sometimes the decision to start a case in the Superior Court of Justice case while there is an ongoing case in the Ontario Court of Justice has more to do with tactics. It can be done to frustrate the case in the Ontario Court of Justice when a litigant is unhappy with orders being made against them. It is sometimes done merely to frustrate the other party and cause them additional costs. In such cases, the litigant acting in this manner runs the risk of the judge in the Ontario Court of Justice lifting the automatic stay and continuing the case or ordering costs against them. The longer the case has been going on in the Ontario Court of Justice, the greater the risk to such a litigant. See: Hudson v. Hudson, [2006] O.J. No. 3520 (OCJ), per Justice Robert J. Spence.”

Sambasivan v. Pulendrarajah, 2012 ONCJ 711 (CanLII) at 49-53.

“Where there are circumstances of oppression, pressure, or other vulnerabilities and evidence of one party’s exploitation of such vulnerabilities during the negotiation process, with the result that the domestic contract deviates substantially from the legislation, the contract need not be enforced: see Miglin, at paras. 81-83; and Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 44.

…

In determining whether a domestic contract should be set aside pursuant to s. 56(4) of the FLA, the court is to follow a two-step process: see Virc v. Blair et al., 2014 ONCA 392(CanLII), 119 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 52: Step 1. Has the party seeking to set aside the agreement demonstrated that one or more of the s. 56(4) circumstances is engaged?; and Step 2. If so, is it appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to set aside the agreement?”

Tadayon v. Mohtashami, 2015 ONCA 777 at 29 & 33.

“The appellant next argues that the reasoning of the motions judge is fundamentally flawed in that she found that the respondent was not credible and then accepted his evidence as to what his income was. I accept that the motions judge could have provided a better explanation of her reasoning. The motions judge heard eight days of evidence and this court is obliged to defer to her findings of fact. It is worth repeating the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada in Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at para. 12:

There are strong reasons for the significant deference that must be given to trial judges in relation to support orders.  This standard of appellate review recognizes that the discretion involved in making a support order is best exercised by the judge who has heard the parties directly.  It avoids giving parties an incentive to appeal judgments and incur added expenses in the hope that the appeal court will have a different appreciation of the relevant factors and evidence.   This approach promotes finality in family law litigation and recognizes the importance of the appreciation of the facts by the trial judge.  Though an appeal court must intervene when there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error in law, it is not entitled to overturn a support order simply because it would have made a different decision or balanced factors differently.”

Tremblay v. Daley, 2012 ONCA 780 (CanLII) at 21

“The factors that a court considers in deciding whether to grant an extension of time to appeal are: 1) whether the appellant formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period; 2) the length of the delay and the explanation for it; 3) any prejudice to the respondent; 4) the merits of the appeal, and 5) whether the justice of the case requires that time be extended: Rizzi v. Mavros(2007), 2007 ONCA 350 (CanLII), 85 O.R. (3d) 401 (C.A.), at para. 16. In a case involving children, the justice of the case is reflected in the best interests of the children: Lombardi v. Mehnert, 2009 CanLII 20352 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 1715, 67 R.F.L. (6th) 167 (Ont. S.C.).”

Denomme v. McArthur, 2013 ONCA 694 (CanLII) at 7

“The trial judge held that the respondent had a fifty percent beneficial interest by way of resulting trust in the Kerr Street property.  The appellant attacks the finding of a resulting trust on two bases:  first, that the issue of resulting trust was never pleaded; second, that the trial judge failed to consider the respondent’s motive for putting the company that held title to the property into the appellant’s name.  Finally, the appellant submits that even if there was a resulting trust, the trial judge erred in finding that the respondent had a fifty percent beneficial interest.  We would not give effect to any of these submissions.

It is true that the resulting trust was never pleaded.  However, it is apparent from the transcript of the trial that the parties were well aware that the respondent’s interest in the Kerr Street property was a live issue.  Counsel for the appellant at trial specifically referred to the issue in his questioning of the respondent.

…

We are satisfied that the appellant was not prejudiced by the respondent’s failure to amend the pleadings.  In the circumstances it was open to the trial judge to consider the respondent’s claim for a beneficial interest in the property.  As this court said in Cassidy v. McNeil, (2010), 2010 ONCA 218 (CanLII), 99 O.R. (3d) 81 at para. 42:

Finally, the husband apparently did not advance any argument of prejudice at trial, an argument that could have been accommodated by an adjournment, if one was necessary. The decision not to raise the argument at trial supports the conclusion that the husband suffered no prejudice. In any event, there is no evidence that the husband suffered either surprise or prejudice from any technical deficiency in the wife’s Answer.”

Fratric v. Fratric, 2010 ONCA 761 (CanLII) at 2-4

“This court has observed that it is well-established law that “a solicitor of record has the ostensible authority to bind his or her clients and that opposing counsel are entitled to rely upon that authority in the absence of some indication to the contrary”: Oliveira v. Tarjay Investments Inc.,[2006] O.J. No. 1109, at para. 2 (C.A.), referring to Scherer v. Paletta, [1966] 2 O.R. 524 (C.A.) and Mohammed v. York Fire and Casualty Insurance Co.,[2006] O.J. No. 547, at para. 20 (C.A.).”

Dick v. McKinnon, 2014 ONCA 784 at 4

“Ordinarily a party required to make an equalization payment must make the payment right away.  However, s. 9(1)(c) of the Family Law Act gives the court discretion to order payments in instalments for a period of up to ten years, “if necessary to avoid hardship”.

Mrs. Symmons submits that the trial judge ought to have allowed her to satisfy the equalization payment to Mr. Symmons over a period of seven years.  She points out that she cannot access her survivor benefits now, and may not be able to do so for years.  Thus, it would have been reasonable to allow her to pay in instalments.

There is some merit in Mrs. Symmons submission.  However, we are not satisfied that she has met the statutory standard of “hardship” to justify an order under s. 9.  An important factor in deciding whether equalization should be paid in instalments is whether the payor spouse has funds available to pay a lump sum: Serra v. Serra(2007), 2007 CanLII 2809 (ON SC), 36 R.F.L. (6th) 66, varied on other grounds, Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 105 (CanLII), at para. 158.  Mrs. Symmons has already paid $60,000 of the equalization payment.  She has assets in excess of $300,000 to satisfy the remaining $57,000 payment.  We therefore decline to order instalment payments.”

Symmons v. Symmons, 2012 ONCA 747 (CanLII) at 37-39

“The respondent submits that an order to post security for costs is justified under r. 61.06 which governs security for costs on appeal:

(1) In an appeal where it appears that,

(a) there is good reason to believe that the appeal is frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant has insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal;

…

a judge of the appellate court, on motion by the respondent, may make such order for security for costs of the proceeding and of the appeal as is just.

…

(2) If an appellant fails to comply with an order under subrule (1), a judge of the appellate court on motion may dismiss the appeal.

For such an order to be granted, the motion judge must: (a) have good reason to believe the appeal has no merit and is therefore frivolous and vexatious, and (b) have good reason to believe the appellant has insufficient assets in Ontario to cover the costs of the appeal: Schmidt v. Toronto-Dominion Bank(1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.). As this court observed in Schmidt, at para. 16:

A judge hearing a motion for security for costs may reach the tentative conclusion that an appeal appears to be so devoid of merit as to give “good reason to believe that the appeal is frivolous and vexatious” without being satisfied that the appeal is actually totally devoid of merit.”

Froehlich-Fivey v. Fivey, 2016 ONCA 833 at 10-11

“[S]4(2).6 of the FLA operates as an exception to the general rule and allows spouses to agree to exclude certain property from the NFP calculation. The issue in this case is whether the parties agreed to exclude the Maher payment from the wife’s NFP, as they had in Khanis. The trial judge erred in law by not reviewing the Maher to determine whether the spouses had actually made such an agreement.

As noted, the Maher in this case contains no express agreement that the Maher payment is to be excluded from the wife’s NFP. Moreover, there is no basis for inferring the parties intended to exclude it. The objective contractual intentions of the parties are to be determined at the time when the contract is made: Davidson v. Allelix Inc. (1991), 1991 CanLII 7091 (ON CA), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 542 at 547 (C.A.), [1991] O.J. No. 2230, at para. 16; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., 1998 CanLII 791 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 129, at para. 54; Family Insurance Corp. v. Lombard Canada Ltd., 2002 SCC 48 (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 695, at para. 36; and Dumbrell v. Regional Group of Cos., 2007 ONCA 59 (CanLII), at paras. 48 and 53. Here, at the time they executed the Maher in Iran, the parties evidently contemplated their continued life in Iran. The Maher, for example, contemplated that the husband could take a second wife. It also required the husband to grant the wife a power of attorney so she could initiate a divorce if he defaulted on any of the prescribed behavioural requirements. There is no basis in this case to infer that the parties contemplated their mutual obligations under Ontario’s FLA.

Absent any evidence of an objective intention at the time of contract to treat the Maher differently, the Maher payment must be treated under the FLA like any other payment obligation between the spouses.

Counsel for the wife submitted that all transactions between spouses, irrespective of any domestic contract, should be excluded from NFP. Counsel submitted it is pointless to include transactions between spouses because they have no net effect on equalization. I reject this submission for three reasons. First, there is simply no provision in the FLA that excludes transactions between spouses. On the contrary, bona fide inter-spousal debts must be included in NFP: Burke (Public Trustee of) v. Burke Estate, [1994] O.J. No. 1342 (Gen. Div.), at paras. 37-40, 1994 CanLII 7442 (ON SC), 1994 CanLII 7442, at paras. 38-41; and Long v. Long, 1989 CarswellOnt 2687 (H.C.), at paras. 15-17. Second, because of the effect of the deeming provision in s. 4(5), transactions between spouses may affect the equalization payment where a spouse’s net assets would otherwise be negative. Transferred assets that fluctuate in value could also make a difference. Third, excluding transactions between spouses would be inconsistent with the separate property regime under the FLA, which continues during a marriage and terminates only on the triggering of the valuation date. As Feldman J.A. said in Stone v. Stone(2001), 2001 CanLII 24110 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (3d) 491 (C.A.), at para. 26:

The nature of the property regime established as between spouses under the Family Law Act was clearly described by Cory J. in Rawluk v. Rawluk … Spouses each own their separate property throughout the marriage. However, upon the happening of one of the five triggering events, there is a valuation date.

[Underlining added. Citations omitted.]

The wife’s submission that the Maher payment should be considered akin to a dowry also does not assist her. A dowry from the husband would be included as part of NFP since only gifts given by third parties after the date of marriage are excluded: FLA, s. 4(2)1.”

Bakhshi v. Hosseinzadeh, 2017 ONCA 838 (CanLII) at 32-36.