Category: Uncategorized

“Ms. Nugent brings an urgent motion on an ex parte basis seeking a temporary without prejudice Order that Mr. Nugent be restrained from depleting his assets and that he preserve his assets.

Ms. Nugent deposes that she learned on Thursday December 8, 2022 that Mr. Nugent had recently taken steps to withdraw $1.25 million dollars from a specific account, which, by agreement, were not to be distributed without her consent. After separation, Mr. Nugent had agreed to put a dual signature requirement on the account, which she says Mr. Nugent has now unilaterally changed without notice to her and without her consent.

Ms. Nugent deposes that she has learned that Mr. Nugent has used the funds in question to pay off two lines of credit, as well as his Mastercard. Her information is that he has also put some of those funds in a term deposit.  Ms. Nugent points out that these transactions were not reflected in Mr. Nugent’s updated financial statement sworn December 5, 2022, for the Med-Arb process.

Ms. Nugent deposes that she is worried that Mr. Nugent will take steps to compromise her family law entitlements. She has not served him with this motion for fear that he will deplete further assets pending the hearing of a motion on notice.

On August 3, 2022, a Court Order was made which confirmed that all issues in the parties’ litigation would be submitted to Mediation-Arbitration with Gerald Sadvari. They entered into a Mediation-Arbitration Agreement on September 28 and 30, 2022. Under that Agreement, all issues in the proceeding are to be mediated, and if necessary, arbitrated.

The Mediation-Arbitration Agreement is entered into under the Family Law Act and the Arbitration Act. The Family Law Rules also apply.

Under section 6 of the Arbitration Act, the court retains jurisdiction to intervene in the conduct of an Arbitration to “assist in conducting” an arbitration, to ensure that arbitrations are conducted in accordance with arbitration agreements, and to prevent unfair or unequal treatment of parties to arbitration agreements.

Under section 8 of the Arbitration Act, the court specifically retains the power to intervene with respect to the preservation of property. That section reads: “The court’s powers with respect to the detention, preservation, and inspection of property, interim injunctions and the appointment of receivers are the same in arbitrations as ion court actions.”

I have considered whether this motion should have been brought before Mr. Sadvari, on notice or otherwise. While the motion could likely be brought ex parte, given the applicability of the Family Law Rules to the any Arbitration under that Agreement, practically speaking that is not helpful. Any Arbitration Award made by Mr. Sadvari would be unlikely to be enforced by financial institutions without having been taken out as a Court Order. Meanwhile, time would pass during which further dissipation could transpire, if that is indeed happening.

In all of the circumstances, the Order sought by Ms. Nugent is, on a temporary and without prejudice basis, appropriate in the circumstances.”

            Nugent v. Nugent, 2022 ONSC 7370 (CanLII) at 1-10

“The only issue before the court was the quantum of child support. Four judges made six different orders that the appellant produce specific financial documentation. He was regularly in breach of these orders and received multiple warnings that his pleadings would be struck. As the motion judge said in her reasons, he had been recently warned that “this was his last chance”.

The remedy was not excessive. Financial disclosure in a family law case is – without doubt – one of the most important obligations. It should be automatic without the need for court intervention. This action was started in 2012. The appellant breached six orders. This court has upheld the use of r.1(8)c of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, in similar circumstances: Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450, 65 R.F.L. (7d) 6; Manchanda v. Thethi, 2016 ONCA 909, 84 R.F.L. (7d) 374, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 29; Peerenboom v. Peerenboom, 2020 ONCA 240, 446 D.L.R. (4d) 418.”

          Sparr v. Downing, 2020 ONCA 793 (CanLII) at 3-4

“A letter rogatory is a request from a judge to the judiciary of a foreign country for the performance of an act which, if done without the sanction of the foreign court, would constitute a violation of that country’s sovereignty. In this case, the request is for production of documents from corporations in Canada.

The decision to grant or refuse a foreign request is a matter of judicial discretion, entitled to deference on appeal: Presbytarian Church of Sudan v. Rybiak, 2006 CanLII 32746 (ON CA), [2006] 275 D.L.R. (4th) 512 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 19. According to this court’s decision in Perlmutter v. Smith, 2020 ONCA 570, 152 O.R. (3d) 185, at para. 31, the appropriate standard of review for the grant of letters rogatory is palpable and overriding error.

The authority to enforce letters rogatory is set out in the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1995, c. C-5, at s. 46(1), as well as in the Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, at s. 60(1). The requirements are:

a)   a foreign court, desirous of obtaining testimony in relation to a pending civil, commercial or criminal matter, has authorized the obtaining of evidence;

b)  the party from whom the evidence is sought is within the jurisdiction of Ontario;

c)  the evidence sought from the Ontario party is in relation to a pending proceeding before the foreign court or tribunal; and

d) the foreign court or tribunal is a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.

In Perlmutter, this court addressed six factors which must be considered when deciding whether to enforce letters rogatory:

• • • • • Is the evidence sought relevant?
        • Is the evidence sought necessary for trial and will it be adduced at trial if admissible?
        • Is the evidence sought not otherwise obtainable?
        • Is the order sought contrary to public policy?
        • Are the documents sought identified with reasonable specificity?
        • Is the order sought not unduly burdensome, having in mind what the relevant witnesses would be required to do and produce if the action was tried here?

This court also addressed the enforcement of letters rogatory in Actava. In that case, at para. 42, three elements relevant to the enforcement of letters rogatory were identified: (1) comity, (2) public policy of the jurisdiction to which the request is directed, and (3) the absence of prejudice to the sovereignty of the citizens of that jurisdiction. Canadian courts have refused to order testimony for use in foreign proceedings in various situations, including:

• • • • • where a request for production of documents was vague in general;
        • where discovery was sought against a non-party to a litigation in violation of local laws of civil procedure; and
        • where the main purpose of the examination was to serve as a “fishing expedition”.”

Adler v. Deloitte Touche Tohamtsu, 2022 ONCA 855 (CanLII) at 11-15

“On a motion to extend the time to appeal, the overriding principle is whether the justice of the case warrants an extension. Relevant considerations include whether the party requesting the extension formed an intention to appeal within the relevant time period, the length of and explanation for the delay, prejudice to the responding party arising from the delay, and the merits of the proposed appeal: Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, 114 O.R. (3d) 636, at para. 15.”

            Fatahi-Ghandehari v. Wilson, 2022 ONCA 858 (CanLII) at 10

“In cases of family violence, particularly spousal violence, it is crucial that the court consider whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate. A victim of family violence might be unable to co-parent due to the trauma they have experienced or ongoing fear of the perpetrator.   In addition, co-operative arrangements may lead to opportunities for further family violence: see Bell v. Reinhardt, 2021 ONSC 3352, at para. 15.”

            Zychla v. Chuhaniuk, 2022 ONSC 6884 (CanLII) at 31

“In order to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias, the Applicant must show that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through, would conclude that the Arbitrator would not decide the matter fairly. See Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board) 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369.

This principle has been applied in the context of a family law mediation/arbitration process in McClintock v. Karam (2015 ONSC 1024 (CanLII)). In that decision, Gray J. stated (at paragraphs 68 to 70):

[68] As stated by de Grandpre J., one of the considerations is the “special circumstances of the tribunal”. In this case, the tribunal is a mediator/arbitrator, and he has been constituted by agreement. It must be concluded that the parties, in agreeing to mediation/arbitration, would understand the nature of the process of mediation/arbitration. The informed person, in deciding whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, would also understand the nature of the process of mediation/arbitration.

[69] In order to effectively mediate, the person appointed must engage in a process that has a good deal of informality. Mediative techniques include persuading, arguing, cajoling, and, to some extent, predicting. Mediation is a process to secure agreement, if possible. All of those techniques, as well as others, will come into play in trying to secure agreement.

[70] If the mediator/arbitrator must move to the arbitration phase, it cannot be expected that he or she can entirely cleanse the mind of everything learned during the mediation phase, and of every tentative conclusion considered, or even reached, during the mediation phase. However, at a bare minimum the parties are entitled to expect that the mediator/arbitrator will be open to persuasion, and will not have reached firm views or conclusions.”

            Reilly v. Zacharuk, 2017 ONSC 7216 (CanLII) at 67-68

“As the Ontario Court of Appeal set out in Westerhoff v. Gee Estate, 2015 ONCA 206, there are different types of experts who are able to offer opinion evidence. They include litigation experts, participation experts and third-party experts. Third-party experts are irrelevant to my consideration in this case.

Litigation experts are, as Simmons J.A. wrote for the court, “engaged by or on behalf of a party to provide [opinion] evidence in relation to a proceeding” (para. 6). They are required to certify their obligations to the court with a Form 20.1 certificate. Participation experts are what Simmons J.A. described at para. 6 as “witnesses with special expertise who give opinion evidence …who form opinions based on their participation in the underlying events.” That group includes treating physicians. That group does not have to sign a Form 20.1 certificate.”

            Robinson v. Robinson, 2020 ONSC 7533 (CanLII) at 10-11

“On a motion for a stay pending appeal, as held in BTR Global Opportunity Trading Limited v. RBC Dexia Investor Services Trust, 2011 ONCA 620, 283 O.A.C. 321, at para. 16, the overall consideration is whether it is in the interests of justice to grant a stay. In making that determination, the court is to consider the following three factors:

a.    Whether the appeal raises a serious issue;

b.    Whether there will be irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and

c.    Whether the balance of convenience favours granting the stay.”

            Ncube v. Hassen, 2022 ONCA 840 (CanLII) at 12

“Res judicata, or cause of action estoppel, was recently described by the Court of Appeal in Dosen v. Meloche Monnex Financial Services Inc. (Security National Insurance Company), 2021 ONCA 141.  The four criteria were listed by the Court as follows:

[13]      The motion judge applied the test for cause of action estoppel set out recently by this court in The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. VimpelCom Ltd., 2019 ONCA 354, 145 O.R. (3d) 759, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 284. She stated:

There is a specific test that has to be met to establish this type of estoppel and it has four requirements to it as follows:

There is a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction in a prior action. This is conceded by the responding parties and is not at issue here;

The second requirement is the parties to the subsequent litigation were parties to, or in privy with the parties to the prior action;

The third requirement, the cause of action in the prior action is not separate and distinct and;

Fourthly, the basis of the cause of the action and the subsequent action was argued or could have been argued in the prior action, if the parties had exercised reasonable diligence. [Emphasis in original.] 

All four of these criteria must be satisfied for res judicata to apply.”

            Bacchus v. Munn, 2022 ONSC 6745 (CanLII) at 32-33

“JDR is a court process that is intended to provide separated families with a faster, simpler, less acrimonious and more cost-effective way of resolving family law issues, as compared with a trial. In the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, JDR is currently being offered as a pilot program in certain courts, operating under local Practice Directions. This endorsement arises from the first JDR in the Kitchener Unified Family Court.

A JDR hearing combines initial settlement discussions with the benefit of a decision-making component by the presiding judge about any issues that the parties are not able to resolve on consent.

The process has been designed to be practical and efficient, and to help families craft their own resolutions if at all possible. It is more interactive and less adversarial than a trial. The intention is that the parties, counsel and the judge work together to craft a consent final Order, that day. Because the parties have the benefit of receiving input from the presiding judge about the outstanding issues, most parties resolve their issues themselves without a ruling. Any remaining issues are likely to be narrow, so that the adjudication stage of the hearing is relatively focused.

The JDR process is voluntary, and accessible only where a judge agrees that the case is appropriate. This could be determined at any court attendance, such as a case or settlement conference, trial management conference, or by 14B motion. Initially, the process is being introduced for cases with only a few issues and which are not complex, where credibility is not a significant concern, and where disclosure is complete. Cases that lend themselves will include parenting arrangements, select child support issues, or select property issues.

If a judge gives the “green light”, the parties then file a signed “Consent” document to the court in which they request participation in JDR. That document provides, among other things, that the parties:

a.   commit to keeping their financial disclosure up to date;

b.   agree to provide to the other party and the court a comprehensive settlement proposal in the form of a draft Order, that can be used during the JDR process;

c.   agree to have their case decided without a trial, in an expedited and less formal manner;

d.   waive any right to the strict application of the rules of evidence;

e.   acknowledge that the court may rely on reports prepared by professionals including agents of the OCL, without the attendance of those individuals at the JDR; and

f.   agree and request that the same judge will preside over both portions of the process.

Parties must each serve and file brief affidavits, to which they may attach exhibits. In addition, all statements made during the process, whether during the settlement discussions or the adjudication phase of the hearing, are evidence that may be relied on if the court is required to adjudicate. Parties are sworn in, or affirm, at the outset of the process.

In Kitchener, JDR’s are presently scheduled for a half day, with the afternoon available for the preparation of a brief decision if necessary. Locally, the intention is that between 90 minutes and two hours be allocated to the negotiation phase, during which the judge helps the parties identify their interests, consider options, and reach resolution. The judge may express opinions, and this does not preclude determination of the issues. In fact, this is one of the main benefits of the JDR process. Parties have an opportunity to discuss with the judge who is deciding their case, what that judge’s approach to the issues will be, and to receive guidance regarding the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. Equipped with that information, parties can usually craft their own resolution.

If an adjudication phase becomes necessary, that too would be allocated between 90 minutes and two hours. There is no formal procedure required, but the judge would usually provide each party with an opportunity to supplement the information and evidence already before the court, and give the parties or counsel an opportunity to present their arguments about why the orders requested by the party should be made. The judge may elicit further information directly from the parties and, although there is no formal right of cross-examination, the parties may raise questions that they think would be helpful for the judge to ask the other party before making a final decision.

The process is flexible, so the judge may reallocate the negotiation and adjudication time as she or he finds most helpful to the parties.

To the extent that the court is required to decide some or all of the issues, it is the intention that reasons be brief and focused, and the goal is that whether through settlement or a decision, parties have an “answer” to their issues by the end of the day or shortly thereafter.

The goal is to help the parties achieve resolution efficiently, and the court therefore discourages adjournments. As a significant block of court time has been set aside for the hearing, it should be treated with the same respect as a trial. Parties should be prepared and ready to proceed on all issues to achieve a final completion of their matter on the scheduled day.”

            M.D. v. C.S., 2022 ONSC 6671 (CanLII) at 4-14