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“Whether a solicitor-client relationship exists is a question of fact. A formal, written retainer agreement is neither necessary nor determinative. The issue is “whether a reasonable person in the position of a party with knowledge of all the facts would reasonably form the belief that the lawyer was acting for a particular party: Trillium Motor World Ltd v General Motors of Canada Ltd, 2015 ONSC 3824 at para 413, citing Jeffers v Calico Compression Systems, 2002 ABQB 72 at para 8.

In determining whether a solicitor-client relationship exists, the following indicia are considered, although not all indicia need be present:

(a) the existence of a contract or retainer;

(b) a file opened by the lawyer;

(c) meetings between the lawyer and the party;

(d) correspondence between the lawyer and the party;

(e) a bill rendered by the lawyer to the party;

(f) a bill paid by the party;

(g) instructions given by the party to the lawyer;

(h) the lawyer acting on the instructions given;

(i) statements made by the lawyer that the lawyer is acting for the party;

(j) a reasonable expectation by the party about the lawyer’s role;

(k) legal advice given;

(l) any legal documents created for the party;

(m) the party’s vested interest in the outcome of the proceeding; and

(n) the belief of other parties to the litigation that the party was represented by the lawyer.

See Jeffers, supra at para 8; Trillium, supra at para 412; Rye & Partners v 1041977 Ontario Inc., [2002] OJ No. 4518 at paras. 13-14.”

          Zarabi-Majd v. Levitt LLP, 2021 ONSC 135 (CanLII) at 33

“With respect to the Ontario Court’s jurisdiction to make a chasing order, the mother relies on Articles 14 and 15 of the [Hague] Convention, which provide that:

“In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognized or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.

The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the making of an order for the return of the child, request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the State of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, where such a decision or determination may be obtained in that State. The Central Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as practicable assist applicants to obtain such a decision or determination.”

The mother also relies on the decision of Thomson v. Thomson, 1994 CanLII 26 (SCC), para 44 whereby the Supreme Court of Canada defined a chasing order as an order “made solely to bolster an application under the Hague Convention.”  The order clarifies for the requested state that it is the requesting state’s opinion that the removal/retention is wrongful.

In her article, The Application of the Convention – From the Practitioner’s Perspective on the Hague Convention, 23 CFLQ 219 (2004), Phyllis Brodkin, provides the following list of reasons for obtaining a chasing order:

a.    A chasing order gives an unequivocal message to the judge hearing the Hague Application in the requested state. Counsel in the requested state will be pleased to be armed with such a declaration, when they ask for the return of the child and it will prevent any undue delay caused by a late request by the requested state for such a declaration;

b.    A chasing order in the home jurisdiction will often satisfy a reluctant judge in the requested state as to the safety of a child’s return. On the other hand, it will delay the return if counsel is forced to obtain such an order as a condition precedent to the return, after the application has been heard;

c.    Seeking a chasing order in the requesting state creates a proceeding in which to obtain custody when the child is returned; and

d.    A chasing order enables the parent seeking the child’s return to obtain an order that will assist in enforcing any return order made for when the child is back in the jurisdiction.”

          Mar v. Wu Wu, 2023 ONSC 281 (CanLII) at 13-15

“Mrs. Sinclair relied heavily on the early case of Reddick v. Reddick, [1997] O.J. NO. 2497 (Gen. Div.) in which surreptitious recordings made by the mother were admitted as the court found that they were relevant, reliable, and they had probative value relating to the best interests of the children.

Since the decision in Reddick, however, the case law has developed to support a more robust general exclusionary discretion wherein the court can exclude surreptitious recordings where the probative value is not outweighed by the significant, presumptive prejudice to the administration of justice:  Sordi v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665; Turk v. Turk, 2015 ONSC 3165; De Giorgio v. De Giorgio, 2020 ONSC 1674; Van Ruyven v. Van Ruyven, 2021 ONSC 5963.

As Sherr J. stated in the oft cited case of Hameed v. Hameed, 2006 ONCJ 274, at para. 13: “The party seeking [to admit surreptitious recordings] should establish a compelling reason for doing so”.

In De Giorgio, MacKinnon J. referred to an article written by Professor Martha Shaffer which speaks to the wide-ranging impact that the admission of this evidence can have on the parties, their children and the administration of justice as a whole:

12      Building on Professor Rollie Thompson’s statement of three core purposes in modern family law: (1) to assure the best interests of the child; (2) to reduce conflict; and (3) maintain, restructure and encourage family relationships, Professor Shaffer argues that systemic prejudice will always be present in relation to the admission of surreptitiously obtained evidence in family cases, since its admission “undermines the goals and core values of family law” and, “to use language borrowed from the Charter context, the admission of surreptitiously obtained evidence brings the administration of justice into disrepute.” In her article, Professor Shaffer elaborates that:

• • • • • • the violation of privacy inherent in these acts is more likely to increase conflict and to reduce the prospect that the parties will be able to work together in the future;
          • surreptitious recording of third-party professionals gives rise to systemic prejudice from the chilling effect admission may have on professionals involved in family disputes; and
          • admitting evidence obtained through deceitful practices sends the wrong message by appearing to reward the behaviour and to condone deceit.

13      Professor Shaffer then discusses case specific forms of prejudice that can arise, both in the form of harm to the expediency of the trial or harm to one of the parties, or to a child. She identifies some examples:

• • • • • • large volume of surreptitiously obtained material that unnecessarily prolong the case, in and out of court, with added costs to parties;
          • infliction of emotional trauma to a parent or child; and
          • potential detriment to specific relationships in the family.

14      Professor Shaffer’s review of the case law supports her conclusion that the combination of case specific prejudice and negative systemic prejudice results in the need for a higher probative value of surreptitiously obtained evidence for it to offset the prejudicial effects.

The basic test for admitting this evidence has not changed.  Rather, since the decision in Reddick, the court has placed a greater emphasis and weight on the presumptive, significant prejudice that must be overcome by a party seeking to admit surreptitious recordings.  See Scarlett v. Farrell, 2014 ONCJ 517.

I concur with Kurz J. when he states:  the “presumption cannot be rebutted short of evidence disclosing serious misconduct by a parent, significant risk to a child’s safety or security, or a threat to another interest central to the need to do justice between the parties and the children”:  Van Ruyven, at para. 41.

This presumption is arguably and appropriately even more difficult to rebut when the recordings are of professionals working with the family.  I also concur with Zisman J. in L.R. v. Children’s Aid Society, 2020 ONCJ 22 (OCJ), aff’d at 2020 ONSC 4341 (Div. Crt.) when she held:

[53]        The systematic harm to the administration of justice and to the family law system in general of permitting a party to secretly record a third party professional who is attempting to help a child and parents far outweighs any probative value that the admission of such evidence could possibly provide.

See also:  Fattali v. Fattali 1996 CanLII 7272 (ON SC), [1996] O.J. No. 1207 (Gen. Div.); F.(J.) v. C.(V.), (2008), 2000 CanLII 22521 (ON SC), 8 R.F.L. (5^th) 45 (Ont. SCJ).”

          Wilson v. Sinclair, 2021 ONSC 8345 (CanLII) at 14-20

“The father also relies on Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709 (Ont.C.A.), where the court dismissed an appeal from an order granting the mother temporary custody of two  children until further order of the court to permit the mother to enroll the children in the “Family Bridges” program, said order being based on the father’s conduct that included failure to participate in court-ordered parenting time with the mother and efforts to sabotage or actively undermine court-ordered therapy; at the time of the appeal decision the children were ages 12 and 15.

Before a court can find parental alienation, it is necessary to examine whether there has been “realistic estrangement” and whether a rejected parent’s behaviour is a contributing factor to a damaged parent-child relationship; even where a favoured parent engages in problematic behaviour, a child may not be “alienated” where there are independent reasons to explain the child’s feelings.  The foregoing is set out in the following trial decisions relied on by the OCL: W.A.C. v. C.V.F., 2022 ONSC 2539 (Ont.S.C.J.) at para. 509; and Supple (Cashman) v. Cashman, 2014 ONSC 3581 (Ont.S.C.J.) at paras. 3, 18, 23.”

            C.T. v. M.M.M., 2023 ONSC 7247 (CanLII) at 81-82

“Ms. Girao also seeks a fee allowance as a self-represented person, for herself and her husband, in the amount of nearly $800,000, calculated at $150 per hour, including their time in court at the trial and on the hearing of the appeal.

The principles for awarding fee allowances to self-represented litigants were set out by Rouleau J.A. in Benarroch v. Fred Tayar & Associates P.C., 2019 ONCA 228, following Fong v. Chan (1999), 1999 CanLII 2052 (ON CA), 46 O.R. (3d) 330, [1999] O.J. No. 4600 (Ont. C.A.), per Sharpe J.A. At para. 26 of Fong, Sharpe J.A. set out two conditions that must be met if a self-represented litigant is to be awarded a fee allowance. Fees should only be awarded to those lay litigants who can demonstrate that they:

a)   devoted time and effort to do the work ordinarily done by a lawyerretained to conduct the litigation; and

b)   as a result, incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity.”

          Girao v. Cunningham, 2021 ONCA 18 (CanLII) at 8-9

“The husband seeks to change, and reduce, the temporary spousal support Order of $6,500 monthly made by Bennett J. less than a year ago on January 28, 2022. That Order was based on a $235,000 yearly income attributed to the husband and upon which amount the husband agreed: the husband wants the amount reduced to $2,419 a month based on the $107,000 income critique prepared by his expert slightly more than two months after the Order was made.

Sections 17(1)(a) and (4.1) of the Divorce Act (“the Act”) provide as follows:

17 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, retroactively or prospectively,

a support order or any provision of one, on application by either or both former spouses

(4.1) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a spousal support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred since the making of the spousal support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order, and, in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration.

In Grass v. Hropak, 2020 ONSC 7803 (CanLII), at para. 87, the case involved (among other things) a motion to vary and reduce a temporary October 2019 support Order made on consent at a case conference. The parties had agreed to use a three-year average (2016 to 2018) for the income of the husband (the payor).  He alleged that his income earned afterwards was, on average, less than that set out in the Order and sought a reduction. The wife resisted the relief for several reasons, two or which are relevant to the motion before this court. She contended that there had not been a material change in the husband’s circumstances and that the reliability of his post-Order income was questionable. In declining to change the spousal support term, Kraft J. noted the court’s approach to variation requests involving temporary Orders.

The courts generally avoid varying interim orders on motions prior to trial unless the circumstances are urgent. Jarvis J., in Pakka v. Nygard 2004 CanLII 5071 (ON SC), stated as follows:

The variation of an interim order is a difficult area. Policy considerations dictate that such applications be discouraged. They increase the stress and uncertainty of the parties and vastly increase the cost of litigation. To echo the words of Wolder J. in Thompson v.  Thompson, [1995] O.J.  No.  2106 (Ct.  J. (Prov. Div)), such that an order should be varied only where the failure vary “would cause the payor to suffer undue hardship or that a continuation of the existing order would be incongruous or absurd.” (Underlining added in the original).

Other cases have used “compelling”, “exceptional” and “rare” to describe the circumstances warranting a variation: see, for example, Thom v. Thom, [2014] O.J. No. 2115, 2014 CarswellOnt 5708; Lusted v. Bogobowicz, 2021 ONSC 269 (CanLII) at paras 24-26. In Mancini v. Mancini, 2020 ONSC 5259 (CanLII), 2020 ONSC 5259 (CanLII) at paras 26-28. the payor sought to vary a temporary Order that had imputed to him, with his consent, a $100,000 income: he claimed that when the Order was made he had not been able to provide adequate financial disclosure and that he was now able to provide disclosure suggesting that his actual income was $40,800 a year. Unlike the self-employed husband in the case before this court, the new evidence about Mr. Mancini’s income was viewed suspiciously because the business in which he was engaged was closely connected to a company operated by family members. His mother had provided an affidavit containing his accounting and income tax information. Smith J. considered the test for variation of temporary spousal support Orders under the Act:

[26] The test for variation of temporary orders was summarized by Justice Chappel in Damaschin-Zamfirescu v. Damaschin-Zamfirescu, (2012) ONSC 6689:

18 The Divorce Act does not specifically address the issue of variation of temporary spousal support orders. Section 17 of the Divorce Act sets out a framework for the variation of support and custody orders, however that section only applies to variation of final spousal support orders made pursuant to section 15.2(1) of the Act.

19 Despite the lack of specific provisions in the Divorce Act regarding variation of temporary orders, the court does have the authority to make changes to temporary spousal support orders in response to developments in the parties’ situations and the availability of more fulsome evidence relevant to the spousal support analysis. The power to vary temporary spousal support orders made under the Act derives from the court’s inherent jurisdiction to amend interlocutory orders. This ability to vary such orders is critical to ensuring fairness and justice as between the parties, given that temporary orders are often imperfect solutions based on very limited and usually untested information. As Sachs, J. stated in Chaitas v. Christopoulos, temporary corollary relief orders are intended to provide “a reasonably acceptable solution to a difficult problem until trial.”

20 The test that applies on a Motion to vary a temporary spousal support order has evolved within the parameters of the general principle that parties in matrimonial proceedings should be encouraged to advance their case to trial as soon as possible. Using this foundational principle, the Ontario Court of Appeal determined in Lipson v. Lipson that proceedings to vary interim support orders should not be encouraged. It held that in order to succeed on a Motion to change a temporary spousal support order, a party must establish that there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the previous temporary order was made. Variation proceedings relating to temporary orders should not become the focus of the parties’ litigation. The onus on a party who seeks to vary a temporary spousal support order rather than waiting until trial is a heavy one.

[27] There is a heavy onus on the party seeking to vary a temporary support order, in that the change of circumstances must be substantial since the previous order was made. A substantial change must also be material, meaning that “had it existed at the time…would likely have resulted in a different order (see Colivas v. Colivas, 2016 ONSC 715).

[28] “A party cannot rely on his own failure to provide adequate disclosure to argue that the decision based on inadequate disclosure should be given less deference.” (see Colivas v. Colivas, at par. 29).”

            Sun v. Lo, 2023 ONSC 128 (CanLII) at 15-18

“Family law litigants are accountable for the positions they take in litigation. They have an obligation to assess their cases at the outset and to reassess as the case unfolds, see M.B. v. A.F. 2021 ONCJ 45.”

            S. v. A., 2022 ONSC 55 (CanLII) at 20

“Family disputes are seldom black and white affairs.”

Justice for Children and Youth v. Glegg, 2021 ONSC 8515 (CanLII) at 16

“The applicant is seeking that the Russian Divorce Order, dated January 13, 2020, be set aside.

Pursuant to section 22 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2^nd Supp.):

(1) A divorce granted, on or after the coming into force of this Act, by a competent authority shall be recognized for the purpose of determining the marital status in Canada of any person, if either former spouse was habitually resident in the country or subdivision of the competent authority for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of proceedings for the divorce.

(2) A divorce granted after July 1, 1968 by a competent authority, on the basis of the domicile of the wife in the country or subdivision of the competent authority, determined as if she were unmarried and, if she was a minor, as if she had attained the age of majority, shall be recognized for the purpose of determining the marital status in Canada of any person.

(3) Nothing in this section abrogates or derogates from any other rule of law respecting the recognition of divorces granted otherwise than under this Act.

Section 22(3) of the Divorce Act is interpreted to permit the court to use conflict of law principles and the common law to recognize a foreign divorce: Wilson v. Kovalev, 2016 ONSC 163, 72 R.F.L. (7^th) 362, at para. 9.  A divorce that is granted in a foreign jurisdiction is presumed to be valid.  The onus rests on the applicant to convince the court that the divorce ought to be set aside.

Implications in Ontario if the Russian divorce is valid

Parties who have a foreign divorce that is regarded as valid in Ontario cannot obtain spousal support. The Court of Appeal has also determined that Ontario courts have no jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to deal with spousal support as corollary relief, unless the parties have been divorced under a divorce granted pursuant to the Divorce Act: Okmyansky v. Okmyansky, 2007 ONCA 427, 86 O.R. (3d) 587, at para. 25.”

Vyazemskaya v. Safin, 2022 ONSC 7311 (CanLII) at 14-17

“The courts have shown a marked reluctance to allow employees to deduct business losses from employment income for child support purposes and have frequently refused to deduct the loss from their income (see Proulx v. Proulx 2009 CanLII 19938 (ON SC); Burrell v. Robinson, (2009), 2009 CanLII 33027 (ON SC), 78 R.F.L. (6th) 351 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Luke v. Richards, 2018 ONSC 1695; Hargrove v. Holliday, 2010 ABQB 70; Thomas v. Thomas, 2019 NLCA 32). This is because it would be unreasonable to ask the other parent to assist in financing a business venture by accepting a lesser amount of child support (Boak v. Boak, 1999 CarswellBC 2876 (B.C.S.C.))

In Burrell, Justice Eberhard disallowed rental loses that the payor had deducted against his employment as a pilot. In paragraph 5, Justice Eberhard wrote:

The respondent father also argued that it would be unfair to disentitle his reliance on these losses since the income he may someday derive from these rental properties will certainly be required to be included. At such time as there may be such income, the cost of earning same may well become relevant but at the moment the rental properties are merely an investment into which he has decided to put his available resources. Once support is determined this court does not dictate how individuals spend their resources. The increase in equity is testament to the good sense of the Respondent Father’s choice. That does not relieve him of the obligation to pay support in accordance with the income available to him.

Justice Eberhard’s reasoning seems to be that, since the payor’s assets will ultimately be enhanced, the deductions against his employment income should not be allowed.

In Richards, Justice Timms concluded that legitimate hard costs – such as mortgage interest, insurance, utilities, and municipal taxes – are acceptable deductions against employment income for the purposes of determining a payor’s income for child support purposes.”

Mastrangelo v. Di Cristofaro, 2019 ONSC 7264 (CanLII) at 98-101