Category: Uncategorized

“I turn to the admissibility of evidence led on behalf of all of the Respondents in the affidavit sworn February 5, 2021. The Applicant appropriately challenges a significant portion of that evidence.  As the regulated form 14A indicates, the affidavit is to include statements of fact and contains this warning:

If you learned a fact from someone else, you must give that person’s name and state that you believe that fact to be true.

That warning reflects Family Law Rule 14(17) and (18) which provide that evidence on a motion may be given by affidavit and, shall, as much as possible, contain only information within the personal knowledge of the deponent. Pursuant to rule 14(19), the affidavit may contain information that the person learned from someone else, but only if the source of the information is identified by name and the affidavit states that the person signing it believes the information is true.”

          Wu v. Di Iorio, 2021 ONSC 2332 (CanLII) at 39-40

“The father’s unwillingness to administer the child’s medication of his own volition, without consultation with the family physician or discussion with the mother, is of concern. In the case of Janjic v Janjic, 2015 ONSC 2880, the court found the father was in denial about his child’s condition and inconsistent in ensuring his child took the prescribed ADHD medication while in his care. The court found that ADHD was a serious condition and parents who are not willing to take positive, proactive steps to treat that condition when they have resources to do so should not have decision making responsibility: Janjic at para 150.

…

The mother has also demonstrated that, upon consultation with medical professionals, she is able to make medical decisions in the best interests of the child and will adhere to the medical treatment prescribed. The jurisprudence supports that decision-making responsibility be granted to the parent who will not only ensure their child obtains the medical treatment and specialized services they need, but will also ensure prescribed treatments are administered: Janjic at para 150; F.B. v C.H., 2021 ONCJ 275, at para. 51(f); and J.P.K. v S.E., 2017 ONCJ 306, at para. 198(n).”

          Robert v. Louisseize, 2022 ONSC 1756 (CanLII) at 67 & 90

“In Goldman v. Kudelya, 2017 ONCA 300, at para. 41, the Ontario Court of Appeal succinctly said:

A continuation of the conflict does not establish a material change in circumstances.”

P.D. v. D.C., 2021 ONSC 2146 (CanLII) at 22

“In considering whether to order retroactive child support, “unreasonable delay by the recipient parent in seeking an increase in support will militate against a retroactive award, while blameworthy conduct by the payor parent will have the opposite effect.” D.B.S. v. S.R.G  2006 SCC 37 (CanLII), [2006] 2 SCR 231 at para. 5. The court is also to consider the needs and circumstances of the child and the hardship to the payor of a retroactive award. Retroactive child support must not amount to a wealth transfer: Walsh v. Walsh (2004), 2004 CanLII 36110 (ON CA), 69 OR (3d) 577 (CA) at para. 16. Child support is, of course, the right of a child and is an obligation that exists regardless of the commencement of any proceedings to enforce it. (Michel v. Graydon, para. 41)”

          Amid v. Jones, 2023 ONSC 1855 (CanLII) at 56

“A gift is a voluntary transfer of property to another without consideration: McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, 106 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 23.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, in Teixeira v. Markgraf Estate, 2017 ONCA 819, 137 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 38, set out the three-part test that a donee must meet to prove a gift. The donee must show (1) an intention to make a gift on the part of the donor, without consideration or expectation of remuneration; (2) acceptance of the gift by the donee; and (3) a sufficient act of delivery or transfer of the property to complete the transaction.

To make a delivery or transfer, the donor must divest himself or herself of all power and control over the property and transfer such control to the donee: McNamee, at para. 25.”

            Doherty v. Doherty, 2023 ONSC 1536 (CanLII) at 31-33

“The threshold question on a motion to change a spousal support order is set out in s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), which provides that before the court makes a variation order the court must satisfy itself that a change in the conditions, means, needs or other circumstances of either spouse has occurred since the making of the order, and in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration.

Both parties agree that s. 17 of the Divorce Act allows the court to vary, rescind or suspend, prospectively or retroactively a support order or any provision thereof.

Where a motion to change is bought to vary a spousal support agreement incorporated into a court order there is a two-step analysis.  First, has there been a material change in circumstances and second, if there has, what variation of the existing order ought to be made in light of those circumstances?  A material change in circumstances is one, which if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms.  To suggest that an agreement was unfair in the first place is inappropriate.  The court is not to second guess the original agreement.  Where an agreement is incorporated into an order it is presumed to comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act: L.M.P. v. L.S., 2011 SCC 64, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775, at paras. 31-33.”

            Assayag-Shneer v. Shneer, 2021 ONSC 2075 (CanLII) at 18-20

“There is no dispute that the relief requested by the Applicant amounts to a variation of the September Nakonechny Order, which was arrived at on consent of the parties.  Before varying any interim parenting order, the Court must be satisfied of the presence of a material change in circumstances which supports compelling reasons in favour of the variation.  The Respondent relies upon Justice Kurz’s summary of the law in Miranda v. Miranda, 2013 ONSC 4704 (CanLII):

“A party wishing to disturb an interim status quo or vary an interim order faces a strong onus to produce cogent and compelling evidence to show that the physical, mental and moral welfare of a child would be in danger in maintaining the status quo: McCarthy v. Scheibler, 1999 CarswellOnt 3419 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 14. Variation of interim custody and access orders will usually only succeed if a child is at risk, or for some other compelling reasons. There is a presumption in favour of the status quo absent compelling reason to change the status quo: Gusikoski v. Gusikoski, 2001 CarswellSask 323 (Sask. Q.B.) at para. 10. In Green v. Cairns, 2004 CarswellOnt 2322 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 14, Wood J. referred to the well- founded reluctance by courts to vary interim orders on an interim basis and stated that an interim order should only be varied on an interim basis where the evidence establishes “clearly and unequivocally” that the present arrangement is not in a child’s best interests. In Greve v. Brighton, 2011 ONSC 4996 (CanLII), 2011 CarswellOnt 8814 (Ont. S.C.J.), Ricchetti J., after reviewing various authorities, states at para. 24 that on a motion for an interim order to vary an existing interim order, the court should only do so where the moving party has demonstrated a change in circumstances as a result of which there are compelling reasons to vary the interim order to meet the child’s best interests.”

While the overarching concern is always the best interest of the child, the relevant jurisprudence requires the Court to find the presence of new circumstances described as being “material, substantially important or compelling”.”

          Medow v. Medow, 2022 ONSC 1748 (CanLII) at 9-10

“There is, of course, nothing inappropriate about citing academic legal scholarship and much to be gained when it comes to better understanding legal concepts that may be relevant to judicial reasoning. But whether academic commentary or scholarship purports simply to describe the law or to explain it, it is not properly the subject of judicial notice – that is, it cannot be accepted as fact without proof. It is not subject to the sort of constraints that govern the use of evidence in the litigation process, and there is a risk that reliance on it may result in evidence being imported into judicial proceedings indirectly, bypassing the relevant evidentiary safeguards. See the helpful discussion of judicial notice by Brown J.A. in R. v. J.M., 2021 ONCA 150, 154 O.R. (3d) 401, at paras. 29-38.

Academic arguments should be assessed with the same sort of critical detachment as submissions from counsel. To the extent that academic arguments have a normative purpose – to the extent they are concerned with what the law ought to be rather than what it is – they are inherently controversial and properly subject to critique and challenge from other scholars. Their significance and shortcomings cannot be understood without placing them in this context. But whether scholarship is ostensibly descriptive or normative, it is improper to take judicial notice of the facts asserted or the conclusions reached.”

Poorkid Investments Inc. v. Ontario (Solicitor General), 2023 ONCA 172 (CanLII) at 42-43

“The admissibility of government recommendations into evidence is not determinative of the best interests of the child. However, it places the onus on the objecting party to show why the child should not be vaccinated: J.N. v. C.G., at para. 45. It remains open to the opposing party to file competing evidence. However, the competing evidence must be admissible. Opinion evidence is not admissible unless the person offering the opinion is qualified as an expert and the opinion relates to a matter within their expertise: see R. v. Mohan, 1994 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 at pp. 20-25, see also R v. Sekhon, 2014 SCC 15, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 272 at para. 47. The proposed expert also must also be independent and unbiased: J.N. v. C.G., at paras. 12, 17. While in many cases, it will not be feasible or practical for a party to challenge the efficacy of the vaccine with competing expert evidence, an objecting party may, for example, submit a report from a treating family physician that provides evidence related to the circumstances of an individual child. This could include a child’s particular risk for contracting COVID-19.”

          A.V. v. C.V., 2023 ONSC 1634 (CanLII) at 16

“I also do not accept the father’s counsel’s argument that notice was not required. First, it is contradictory for the father and Ms. Del Villano to testify that they did not inform the mother because they thought she already knew from A.L. and then turn around and argue, they did not have to inform her because the legislation did not require them to do so. Second, counsel’s argument that the move to Smith Falls was a “change in residence” rather than a “relocation” does not preclude the legislative requirement for notice. Both terms, as addressed in the CLRA, require a parent who has shared parenting to communicate in advance in writing any intended change in residence and set out the new address. A “relocation” is defined as a move that has significant impact on the child’s relationship with the other parent and requires 60 days’ notice whereas a “change in residence” is considered a move that is not significant. While a change in residence does not require 60 days notice, it requires nonetheless some “advanced” notice in writing: ss. 18(1), 39.1, and 39.3 CLRA; S.C. v. J.C., 2022 ONSC 4146 at para 10.”

          Jacques v. Leblanc, 2023 ONSC 1689 (CanLII) at 96