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“I would essentially adopt as the elements of the action for intrusion upon seclusion the Restatement (Second) of Torts (2010) formulation which, for the sake of convenience, I repeat here:

One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the invasion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

The key features of this cause of action are, first, that the defendant’s conduct must be intentional, within which I would include reckless; second, that the defendant must have invaded, without lawful justification, the plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns; and third, that a reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish. However, proof of harm to a recognized economic interest is not an element of the cause of action. I return below to the question of damages, but state here that I believe it important to emphasize that given the intangible nature of the interest protected, damages for intrusion upon seclusion will ordinarily be measured by a modest conventional sum.

These elements make it clear that recognizing this cause of action will not open the floodgates. A claim for intrusion upon seclusion will arise only for deliberate and significant invasions of personal privacy. Claims from individuals who are sensitive or unusually concerned about their privacy are excluded: it is only intrusions into matters such as one’s financial or health records, sexual practises and orientation, employment, diary or private correspondence that, viewed objectively on the reasonable person standard, can be described as highly offensive.”

Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (CanLII) at 70-72

“TheFLAis a detailed statutory scheme for resolving issues arising out of marital breakdown. Section 10(1) provides for the determination of questions of title between married spouses. This includes consideration of any beneficial interests in property arising pursuant to the imposition of a remedial constructive trust:

A person may apply to the court for the determination of a question between that person and his or her spouse or former spouse as to the ownership or right to possession of particular property, other than a question arising out of an equalization of net family properties under section 5.

In Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, Cory J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, relied on s. 10(1) of the Family Law Act, 1986(which is identical to s. 10(1) of the current Act) to confirm that the statutory scheme for the equalization of spouses’ property on marriage breakdown does not completely supersede the remedial constructive trust. Before property can be equalized under the Family Law Act, a court must first determine the “net family property” of each spouse. This exercise requires first that all questions of title be settled.”

Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14 at 46-47

“Section 17(1) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, C.3, as amended, permits the court to vary a support order where there has been a change in circumstances.  The jurisprudence is clear that courts are reluctant to interfere with support orders and will not do so unless the reasons disclose an error in principle or a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or unless the order is clearly wrong.  Because of the fact-based and discretionary nature of such an order, judges are to be given considerable deference by appellate courts when such decisions are reviewed.  Their discretion is to be exercised, however, in accordance with the four objectives set out in s. 17(7) – which are designed to reflect the principle that the economic consequences of marriage and of separation and divorce are to be equitably shared between the former spouses – namely that the variation order should:

a)  recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the former spouse arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

b)  apportion between the former spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

c)  relieve any economic hardship of the former spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

d)  in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each former spouse within a reasonable period of time.

See Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at paras. 10-11.

Moreover, the change in circumstances must be material and not trivial or insignificant: Hickey, at paras. 14 and 20-22; Willick v. Willick, 1994 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670.  In Willick, at p. 688, Sopinka J. said:

In deciding whether the conditions for variation exist, it is common ground that the change must be a material change of circumstances.  This means a change, such that, if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms.  The corollary to this is that if the matter which is relied on as constituting a change was known at the relevant time it cannot be relied on as the basis for variation. [Emphasis added.]”

Burley v. Burley, 2009 ONCA 2 (CanLII) at 10-12

“There is a considerable body of case law that deals with the intersection of family and immigration law when a party in a family law case is subject to deportation.  The law was recently summarized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in paragraphs [23]-[28] of J.H. v. F.A., 2009 ONCA 17 (CanLII), 306 D.L.R. (4th) 496, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 123, [2009] O.J. No. 88, 2009 Cars­well­Ont 85, as follows:

	[23]          The purpose of non-removal orders under the CLRA is not to frustrate the deportation of persons who have been ordered removed from Canada pursuant to the relevant immigration legislation but to prevent parents from removing children from the jurisdiction in contested family law proceedings: see Wozniak v. Brunton and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (No. 2), 2004 CanLII 19764 (ON SC), 2004 CanLII 19764, 1 R.F.L. (6th) 429, [2004] O.J. No. 939, [2004] O.T.C. 240, 2004 Cars­well­Ont 943 (Ont. Fam. Ct.), at para. [23]; Varvara v. Constantino, [2005] O.J. No. 861, 2005 Cars­well­Ont 10505 (Ont. S.C.), at para. [33].  It is not open to applicants scheduled to be removed by federal immigration authorities to use the family courts to stay in Ontario “under the guise of determining [the] best interests of a child”: Augustin v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P) and Leonty (27 February 2008), Toronto 07/FA/014805 (Ont. S.C.), at para. [9].
	[24]          In this case, there was no family law dispute with respect to incidents of custody between the parents.  One child’s father had not participated in the proceedings at all.  The other had no desire for custody.  There was no suggestion that any of the parties had any interest in removing children from Ontario.  The relevant paragraphs of the order were aimed not at the parents of the child but at the respondent Ministers pending the outcome of the [humanitarian and compassionate] application.  The CLRA should not be used to frustrate the IRPA.  The IRPA and related legislation is the forum in which to address immigration and related claims.
	[25]          In any event, even if the motions judge’s order was restored, recent jurisprudence from the Federal Court of Appeal, the court charged with the primary responsibility of interpreting the IRPA, indicates that the CLRA order would not affect a s. 50(a) statutory stay of the removal order.  In Idahosa v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FCA 418 (CanLII), 385 N.R. 134, 307 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 130, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1800, 2008 Cars­well­Nat 4895 (Fed. C.A.), Appeal Justice John M. Evans, on behalf of a unanimous court, held at para. [59]:
		Paragraph 50(a) does not apply to a provincial court’s order awarding custody to a parent of Canadian-born children for the purpose of delaying or preventing the enforcement of a removal order against the parent, when there is no lisrespecting custody that is unrelated to the removal.
	[26]          In coming to this conclusion, Justice Evans held that the IRPA provides opportunities for the consideration of the best interests of the children of those subject to deportation.  He also stated at para [54]:
		While great weight must be given to the best interests of children in administrative decision-making, they do not necessarily outweigh all other considerations: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 243 N.R. 22, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 14 Admin. L.R. (3d) 173, 1 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), 1999 CanLII 699, [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, 1999 Cars­well­Nat 1125 at para 75; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General for Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4 (CanLII), 315 N.R. 201, 183 O.A.C. 1, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 115 C.R.R. (2d) 88, 46 R.F.L. (5th) 1, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 16 C.R. (6th) 203, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 2004 Cars­well­Ont 252, at para 10.  The denial of Ms Idahosa’s H & C application is not under review in this appeal.
	[27]          I agree with and would apply this analysis to the consideration of whether the non-removal order should have been made in the circumstances of this case.  The reasoning in Idahosa is consistent with the Ontario cases which indicate that non-removal orders under the CLRA should not be granted for the purpose of frustrating removal orders in immigration proceedings.
	[28]          Furthermore, as the appeal judge observed, it is open to the appellant to make an application in the Federal Court for a stay of removal pending the determination of her H&C application.  This is the appropriate forum for consideration and weighing of the various competing interests.” N.E.C. v. A.A.A.,2010 ONCJ 54 (CanLII) at 51.

“The court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction may be applied to rescue a child in danger or to bridge a legislative gap.”

A.A. v. B.B.,2007 ONCA 2 (CanLII) at 27

“In ascertaining whether unjust enrichment exists, the court considers whether a benefit should be retained. As noted by McLachlin J. in Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada, 1992 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 762, 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140 at para. 41: [page 798]

At the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment, whether expressed in terms of the traditional categories of recovery or general principle, lies the notion of restoration of a benefit which justice does not permit one to retain. (Emphasis added)

It is not until the end of the relationship or an application is made to the court for relief that the court ascertains whether justice does not permit the benefit to be retained.”

Roseneck v. Gowling, 2002 CanLII 45128 (ON CA) at 28-29 

“Ultimately, courts are tasked with determining if a material change of circumstances has occurred so as to justify a variation of a s. 15.2 order under s. 17.  The analysis is always grounded in the actual circumstances of the parties and the terms of the s. 15.2 order; what meaning a court will give any general statement of finality found in an order will be a question to be resolved on that basis.  As we have explained, in some situations, the agreement incorporated into the order may help shape what is meant by a “material change of circumstances”.  Where a s. 15.2 order deals with a specific change, it assists courts by answering the Willick inquiry through its terms.  Conversely, when the order is general, or simply purports to be final, these less specific terms provide less assistance to courts in answering the Willick inquiry.  Sometimes, in such cases, the circumstances of the parties may be such that courts will give little weight to a general statement of finality and conclude that a material change exists.  However, at other times, in such cases, the circumstances of the parties may also be such that the courts will give effect to a general statement of finality and conclude that a material change does not exist.”

L.M.P. v. L.S., [2011] 3 SCR 775, 2011 SCC 64 (CanLII) at 42

“I do not think any useful purpose is served by attempting to categorize the types of circumstances in which a vesting order may issue in family law proceedings. The court has a broad discretion, and whether such an order will or will not be granted will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. I agree with the appellants that the onus is on the person seeking such an order to establish that it is appropriate. As a vesting order — in the family law context, at least — is in the nature of an enforcement order, the court will need to be satisfied (as the trial judge was here) that the previous conduct of the person obliged to pay, and his or her reasonably anticipated future behaviour, indicate that the payment order will not likely be complied with in the absence of more intrusive provisions: see Kennedy v. Sinclair, 2001 CanLII 28208 (ON SC), [2001] O.J. No. 1837, 18 R.F.L. (5th) 91 (S.C.J.), affd 2003 CanLII 57393 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 2678, 42 R.F.L. (5th) 46 (C.A.). Thus, the spouse seeking the vesting order will have already established a payment liability on the part of the other spouse and the amount of that liability, and will need to persuade the court that the vesting order is necessary to ensure compliance with the obligation.

In addition, the court should be satisfied that there is some reasonable relationship between the value of the asset to be transferred and the amount of the targeted spouse’s liability and, of course, that the interests of any competing execution creditors or encumbrancers with exigible claims against the specific property in question are not an impediment to the granting of a vesting order. However, I would not go so far as to say — as argued by the appellants — that the onus to satisfy the court on these matters is at all times on the person seeking the order…”

Lynch v. Segal, 2006 CanLII 42240 (ON CA) at 32-33

“The granting of PJI is discretionary. This court confirmed in Burgess v. Burgess(1995), 1995 CanLII 8950 (ON CA), 24 O.R. (3d) 547 (C.A.) at 552, that PJI is discretionary and may not be awarded where “the payor spouse cannot realize on the asset giving rise to the equalization payment until after the trial, does not have the use of it prior to trial [and] the asset generates no income”

Fielding v. Fielding, 2015 ONCA 901 at 43

“Many proponents of the deemed selfsufficiency model effectively elevate it to the preeminent objective in determining the right to, quantum and duration of spousal support.  In my opinion, this approach is not consonant with proper principles of statutory interpretation.  The objective of selfsufficiency is only one of several objectives enumerated in the section and, given the manner in which Parliament has set out those objectives, I see no indication that any one is to be given priority.  Parliament, in my opinion, intended that support reflect the diverse dynamics of many unique marital relationships.  Osborne J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal made this point in Linton v. Linton (1990), 1990 CanLII 2597 (ON CA), 1 O.R. (3d) 1, at p. 27:

In not attaching any particular priority to the factors to be considered and the objectives sought to be achieved in making a spousal support order, it seems to me that Parliament recognized the great diversity of marriages and the need for judges to deal with support entitlement and quantum on a case by case basis.

It is also imperative to realize that the objective of selfsufficiency is tempered by the caveat that it is to be made a goal only “in so far as practicable”.  This qualification militates against the kind of “sink or swim” stance upon which the deemed selfsufficiency model is premised.  (See Bailey, supra, at p. 633, and Droit de la famille — 623, [1989] R.D.F. 196 (Que. C.A.), at pp. 2012.).” 

Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC)