Author: dawi

“Mr. Sherlock does not argue that the time spent by Ms. Mullin’s lawyers was excessive.  He also has not tendered his own lawyers’ Bill of Costs.  As noted in my reasons dated November 10, 2017, when one party attacks another’s costs as excessive, but does not put its own dockets before the court, the attack “is no more than an attack in the air.”  In Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., (2003), Winkler J., then a motion judge, stated:  

The attack on the quantum of costs, insofar as the allegations of excess are concerned, in the present circumstances is no more than an attack in the air.  I note that State Farm has not put the dockets of its counsel before the court in support of its submission. Although such information is not required under Rule 57 in its present form, and the rule enumerates certain factors which would have to be considered in exercising the discretion with respect to the fixing of costs in any event, it might still provide some useful context for the process if the court had before it the bills of all counsel when allegations of excess and “unwarranted over-lawyering” are made.  In that regard, the court is also entitled to consider “any other matter relevant to the question of costs”. (See Rule 57.01(1)(i).  In my view, the relative expenditures, at least in terms of time, by adversaries on opposite sides of a motion, while not conclusive as to the appropriate award of costs, is still, nonetheless, a relevant consideration where there is an allegation of excess in respect of a particular matter: Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2003), 2003 CanLII 43566 (ON SC), ONSC 43566 (CanLII), 64 O.R. (3d) 135, at para. 10 (S.C.), per Winkler J., cited in Springer v. Aird & Berlins LLP (2009), 2009 CanLII 26608 (ON SC), 2009 ONSC 26608 (CanLII), 74 C.C.E.L.(3d) 243 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 10-17. [Emphasis added.]”

Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONSC 6933 (CanLII) at 32

“Section 60 of Ontario’s Evidence Act provides that where a foreign court has commissioned the taking of evidence for a purpose for which a letter of request could be issued under the rules of the Ontario court, the Ontario court may order the examination of the witness before the person appointed, and in the manner directed by the commission; and it can order the production of documents; and it may give directions as to the time and place of the examination and enforce the order as it would a local order. The Canada Evidence Act contains a comparable provision: Borelli v. Tam, [2006] O.J. No. 3714 (S.C.J.).

The enforcement of Letters Rogatory (now called letters of request in Ontario) is based on the principle of comity of nations: Lantheus Medical Imaging Inc. v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2013 ONCA 264 at para. 42; AstraZeneka L.P. v. Wolman, [2009] O.J. No. 5344 at para. 17 (S.C.J.); R. v. Zingre, 1981 CanLII 32 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392 at para. 18. In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 1990 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 at para. 31. Justice La Forest defined comity as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws”. As a matter of comity, the courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction out of mutual deference and respect. A foreign request is given full force and effect unless it is contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction to which the request is directed or otherwise prejudicial to its sovereignty or to its citizens: Lantheus Medical Imaging Inc. v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2013 ONCA 264; Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds v. Buchan, 2007 ONCA 462 (CanLII), [2007] O.J. No. 2492 (C.A.); R. v. Zingre, 1981 CanLII 32 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., 1980 CanLII 192 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 39.

The enforcement of Letters Rogatory is discretionary: Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Rybiak, 2006 CanLII 32746 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 3822 (C.A.). The requesting court’s decision is entitled to considerable deference and the court receiving the request does not sit as an appeal court from the decision of the requesting court: Azcar v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2018 ONSC 4048 at para. 16 (Ont. S.C.J.); Triexe Management Group Inc. v. Fieldturf International Inc., [2005] O.J. No. 4359 at para 21(Ont. S.C.J.).

Nevertheless, although the domestic court considering whether to enforce Letters Rogatory does not function as an appellate court in respect of the foreign requesting court and will give deference to the conclusions of that court, the domestic court must independently reach its own conclusions based on the evidence proffered to determine whether the request complies with the law of the domestic courtAker Biomarine AS v. KGK Synergize Inc., 2013 ONSC 4897 at para. 26; Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds v. Buchan, 2007 ONCA 462 at para. 13; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Rybiak, 2006 CanLII 32746 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 3822 at para. 32 (C.A.); Fecht v. Deloitte & Touche (1996), 1996 CanLII 11782 (ON SC), 28 O.R. (3d) 188 (H.C.J.), aff’d (1997) 1997 CanLII 1799 (ON CA), 32 O.R. (3d) 417 at para. 18 (C.A.).

In this last regard, the criteria for the enforcement of letter of request from a foreign jurisdiction are: (1) the evidence is relevant; (2) the evidence is necessary and will be adduced at trial or for a pre-trial hearing:
Azcar v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2018 ONSC 4048 at para. 30; Lantheus Medical Imaging Inc. v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2013 ONCA 264 at para. 63, if admissible; (3) the evidence is not otherwise obtainable; (4) the order sought is not contrary to public policy; (5) the documents sought are identified with reasonable specificity; and (6) the order sought is not unduly burdensome, bearing in mind what the witnesses will be required to do, and produce, were the action to be tried: Intelsat USA Sales LLC v. Hyde, 2015 ONSC 5680; Aker Biomarine AS v. KGK Synergize Inc., 2013 ONSC 4897; Lafarge Canada Inc. v. Khan (2008), 2008 CanLII 6869 (ON SC), 89 O.R. (3d) 619 (S.C.J.); Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds v. Buchan, 2007 ONCA 462; MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. Valentini (2006), 2006 CanLII 23922 (ON SC), 81 O.R. (3d) 680 (S.C.J.); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Rybiak, 2006 CanLII 32746 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 3822 (C.A.); Borelli v. Tam, [2006] O.J. No. 3714 (S.C.J.); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Tallisman Energy Inc., 2005 ABQB 920; Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Kroeze, [2003] O.J. No. 4718 (S.C.J.); OptiMight Communications, Inc. v. Innovance, Inc., 2002 CanLII 41417 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 577 (C.A.); King v. KPMG, [2003] O.J. No. 2881 (S.C.J.); Fecht v. Deloitte & Touche (1996), 1996 CanLII 11782 (ON SC), 28 O.R. (3d) 188 (H.C.J.), aff’d (1997) 1997 CanLII 1799 (ON CA), 32 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.); Re Friction Division Products Inc. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (No. 2) (1986), 1986 CanLII 2827 (ON SC), 56 O.R. (2d) 722 (H.C.J.).

These factors are guideposts, not pre-conditions to the enforcement of a letter of request: Lantheus Medical Imaging Inc. v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2013 ONCA 264 at paras. 56-71; Disabatino v. National Gallery of Canada, 2016 ONSC 4656. The factor of the evidence being not otherwise available means that evidence of the same value cannot be obtained other than from the person to be examined: Lantheus Medical Imaging Inc. v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2013 ONCA 264 at para. 64; McFadden Lyon Rouse LLC v. Lookin, 2012 ONSC 2243.

The unwillingness of a witness to testify voluntarily in a foreign proceeding may be taken into account in determining that the evidence would not otherwise be obtainable: Ontario Public Service Employees Union Pension Trust Fund (Trustees of) v. Clark (2005), 2005 CanLII 51027 (ON SC), 77 O.R. (3d) 38 (S.C.J.), affd 2006 CanLII 20839 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 2475 (C.A.).

The public policy test component of responding to a letter of request requires that the court consider whether the request imposes any limitation or infringement on Canadian sovereignty including an assessment of whether granting the request would give extra-territorial authority to foreign laws that violate relevant Canadian laws, would infringe on recognized Canadian moral or legal principles, or  would impose an undue burden on or do prejudice to the individual whose evidence is requested: Lantheus Medical Imaging Inc. v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2013 ONCA 264 at para. 58; Treat America Ltd. v. Nestle Canada Inc., 2011 ONCA 560 at para. 12; France (Republic) v. De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd. (1991), 1991 CanLII 7180 (ON CA), 3 O.R. (3d) 705 at para. 37 (C.A.).

In addition to its role with respect to the enforcement of letters of request, the public policy defence is a factor in determining whether a domestic court should apply foreign law and whether a domestic court should enforce a foreign judgment. In all these contexts, in deference to the foreign court, what is contrary to the public policy of the domestic court is viewed narrowly. As a matter of public policy, where foreign law is applicable, Canadian courts will generally apply the foreign law even if its results are harsher or contrary to domestic law unless the foreign law is not consonant with the domestic system of justice and its fundamental values, which rarely has been established: Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 at paras. 71-77;  Society of Lloyd’s v. Meinzer (2001), 2001 CanLII 8586 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (3d) 688 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. ref’d; United States of America v. Levy, [2002] O.J. No. 2298 (S.C.J.); United States of America v. Ivey (1995), 1995 CanLII 7241 (ON SC), 26 O.R. (3d) 533 (Gen. Div.); Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf (1992), 1992 CanLII 7528 (ON CA), 6 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.); Sigurdson v. Farrow (1981), 1981 CanLII 1062 (AB QB), 15 Alta. L.R. (2d) 180 (Q.B.); Block Bros. Realty Ltd. v. Mollard and Detra Holdings Ltd. (1981), 1981 CalII 504 (BC CA), 27 B.C.L.R. 17 (C.A.); Canadian Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. Matte (1957), 1957 CanLII 155 (SK CA), 9 D.L.R. (2d) 304 (Sask. C.A.); National Surety Co. v. Larsen, 1929 CanLII 265 (BC CA), [1929] 4 D.L.R. 918 (B.C.C.A.).

For the foreign law judgment or order not to be applied or enforced, the foreign law must be contrary to the most basic and fundamental values of the domestic jurisdiction. If foreign law is to be refused effect on public policy grounds, the foreign law must violate some fundamental principle of justice, be repugnant to public or moral interests, or some deep-rooted tradition of the domestic jurisdiction: Society of Lloyd’s v. Meinzer (2001), 2001 CanLII 8586 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (3d) 688 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C. ref’d; United States of America v. Ivey (1995), 1995 CanLII 7241 (ON SC), 26 O.R. (3d) 533 (Gen. Div.). The public policy defence is narrow and it is directed at the concept of repugnant laws and not repugnant facts: Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 at para. 71; Stern Estate v. Solehdin, [2010] O.J. No. 863 at para. 47.”

Glegg v. Glass, 2019 ONSC 6623 (CanLII) at 111-118

“In Guelph (City) v. Super Blue Box Recycling Corp., (2004) 2004 CanLII 34954 (ON SC), 2 C.P.C. (6th) 276, at paras. 74-100, Justice Corbett, summarized various principles regarding the law of privilege which include the following:

•    Solicitor-client privilege is a “fundamental civil and legal right”;

•    The functional purpose of solicitor-client privilege goes to the very heart of the administration of the legal system. All persons, whether natural, corporate, or governmental, must have access to expert legal counsel without fear that this recourse may be used to their detriment;

•    Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in [his or her] capacity as such, the communications relating to the purpose made in confidence by the client are at [its] instance permanently protected from disclosures by [the client] or by the legal advisor; except that the protection be waived;

•   There are limited circumstances where privileged communications may nonetheless be compelled from a party asserting its privilege – waiver, furtherance of unlawful conduct, risk to public safety, wrongful conviction, abrogation by statute;

•   Once it is established that a communication is subject to solicitor-client privilege, the onus rests on the party seeking to overcome the privilege to establish that the communication ought to be compelled from the party asserting the privilege;

•    Privilege may be waived expressly or implicitly. When privilege is waived, the waiver applies to the entire subject-matter of the communications: a party may not “cherry-pick” privileged communications, disclosing what is helpful for that party and claiming privilege over the rest; and

•   Two circumstances may give rise to implicit waiver : (1) waiver by disclosure – once the privileged communication has been disclosed, the privilege that attaches to it is said to be lost; (2) waiver by reliance – by pleading or otherwise relying upon the privileged communication as part of a substantive position taken in the legal proceedings.”

Leitch v. Novac, 2017 ONSC 6888 (CanLII) at 60

“Parents in custody disputes really need to stop taking photographs and videos of one another during access exchanges.

(a) They should stop pretending they’re assisting the court by assembling important evidence.

(b) The obvious reality is that taking videos is a strategic act of aggression and escalation. The situation never improves when people pull out cameras. Usually it gets worse. Indeed, often that appears to be the intention.

(c) Access exchanges in high conflict files are already tough enough for children. Pointing a camera — or multiple cameras — at the interaction merely heightens the child’s unease and worry that something bad is expected to happen. That someone they love is about to misbehave. That one parent is trying to get the other parent in trouble.

(d) Videos recklessly and maliciously transform an ideally brief, benign transition into a horribly unhappy and frightening experience for the helpless child. The unpleasant confrontation may last only minutes. But the emotional devastation for the child can extend for hours, both before and after the exchange.

(e) Talk about spoiling a happy moment. (Again, perhaps that’s the intention.)

How do we stop this epidemic of smartphone nonsense in Family Court?

(a) Presumably parents only take these videos because they think it will help them win their case. They think it will make the other parent look bad.

(b) We need to make it clear to parents that taking videos is not likely to help you win your case. It’s more likely to backfire. To cause the judge to worry about your parental judgment.

(c) Because taking videos raises doubts about how a loving and caring parent could be so insensitive as to place an innocent child in the middle of a needlessly inflamed and volatile situation.

(d) What message is the videographer conveying to the child? “Look how bad your father is!” “I’m going to record this so everyone will see what a horrible mother you have!” “Be careful, the parent you love can’t be trusted!”

(e) Perhaps the more cynical and prophetical message: “Showtime!”

(f) Do children really need to receive such hurtful and destructive messages, at an already tragic time in their lives?

(g) When parents routinely pull out their cameras, ready to “click” at the slightest false move — like gunslingers squaring off at the O.K. Corral — are they doing it out of love for a child? Or hate?

(h) No matter what image they hope to record, it can’t be as harmful to the child as the fear and apprehension automatically instilled as soon as one parent points a camera at the other.

Perhaps we can borrow from social media to coin a term which suitably describes judicial disdain for this type of behaviour:

(a) We’ve all heard of the “SELFIE”: A self-portrait, usually intended to make the subject look good.

(b) How about a “SELFISHIE”: A parent taking a disturbing video to try win in court, oblivious to the emotional trauma they are inflicting on their child.”

Whidden v. Ellwood, 2016 ONSC 6938 (CanLII) at 96-98

“Principles the court would examine in determining interim spousal support motions include:

(a)     The recipient’s needs of a payor’s ability to pay are seen as a greater significance;

(b)     The interim order would attempt to be sufficient to allow the recipient to continue living at a same standard of living prior to separation if the payor’s income ability to pay also allows it;

(c)     The court should not embark on an in depth analysis of a party’s circumstances.  This should be left to trial.  At best, the court achieves a form of rough justice;

(d)     The court would not over or unduly emphasize any one of the statutory conditions as set out above;

(e)     The need to achieve self-sufficiency is often of less significance;

(f)     The interim spousal support amount ordered may be within the range as suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAG”) unless exceptional circumstances indicate a variance from those guidelines;

(g)     Interim support may be ordered when it can be said a prima facie case for entitlement exists; and

(h)     Whether there is a need to resolve uncontested issues of fact, especially those connected with the threshold question such as entitlement, it becomes less than advisable for a court to make an interim order for support.

The above listed is not an exhaustive list but is an indication of what principles the court should look at in determining spousal support on a contextual analysis.”

            Hao v. Wang, 2015 ONSC 6989 (CanLII) at 117

“The central objective of the [Hague] Convention to promptly repatriate abducted children to their habitual residence is subject to some limited exceptions. Article 13(b) provides that the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” LaForest J., after reviewing decisions from several jurisdictions, said that:

It has been generally accepted that the Convention mandates a more stringent test than that advanced by the appellant. In brief, although the word “grave” modifies “risk” and not “harm”, this must be read in conjunction with the clause “or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” The use of the word “otherwise” points inescapably to the conclusion that the physical or psychological harm contemplated by the first clause of Article 13(b) is harm to a degree that also amounts to an intolerable situation… In Re A. (A Minor) (Abduction), supra, Nourse L.J., in my view correctly, expressed the approach that should be taken, at p. 372:

… the risk has to be more than an ordinary risk, or something greater than would normally be expected on taking a child away from one parent and passing him to another. I agree … that not only must the risk be a weighty one, but that it must be one of substantial, and not trivial, psychological harm. That, as it seems to me, is the effect of the words ‘or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation’.

This statement is the standard applied in Canada.”

Cannock v. Fleguel, 2008 ONCA 758 (CanLII) at 24-25

“The Family Law Rules do not address the procedure applicable to seeking leave to institute a new proceeding in the face of a [Courts of Justice Act] CJA s. 140(1) vexatious proceeding order. As a result, I issue these directions to the wife regarding her leave application.

Section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, which applies to family litigants who are subject to a vexatious proceedings order, provides that:

•        a person subject to a vexatious proceedings order who seeks leave to institute or continue a proceeding must do so by way of application (s. 140(3));

•         relief that may be sought on a section 140 (3) application is restricted to the granting of leave to institute or continue a proceeding, and rescission of the vexatious proceedings order. No other relief may be sought in the application (s. 140(4)(b); and,

•        the Attorney General is entitled to be heard on the application (s. 140(4)(d)).

Procedural rules governing applications for leave to institute proceedings under CJA section 140 (3) are set out in Rule 38.13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no equivalent rule under the Family Law Rules.  The key provisions of Rule 38(13) of the Rules of Civil Procedure are that:

•        The application shall be made in writing, unless a judge orders otherwise (R. 38.13(2))

•        The application shall be commenced by filing both a notice of application and an  application record (R. 38.13(3))

•         The notice of application, application record and, if applicable, factum, must be served on all parties as well as on the Attorney General of Ontario (R. 38.13(6)), and proof of service must be filed

•         The court shall not make an order under subsection 140(4) of the Courts of Justice Act granting leave to institute or continue a proceeding, or rescinding an order made under CJA s. 140(1), without giving the other parties and the Attorney General of Ontario an opportunity to serve and file a respondent’s application record and factum. (R. 38.13(10))

Rule 1(7) of the Family Law Rules, “Matters Not Covered in Rules”, governs in this case.  It provides:

If these rules do not cover a matter adequately, the court may give directions, and the practice shall be decided by analogy to these rules, by reference to the Courts of Justice Act and the Act governing the case and, if the court considers it appropriate, by reference to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

I set out directions applicable to this case below by analogy to the Rules of Civil Procedure, taking into context the history of the litigants and the oral argument and written materials filed to date.

Directions on Procedure re Rule 140(3) Application

I give the following directions:

(1)     The matter must be commenced by way of application in Form 8, pursuant to Rule 8 of the Family Law Rules.

(2)     Pursuant to CJA s. 140(4)(b), the only relief that can be sought is an order for leave to commence the proceedings identified in the application.  This is not a motion to vary a foreign support order or a motion to register a foreign order, but an application for leave to commence proceedings under CJA s. 140(3).  This falls within the “Other” category on the Form 8, Claim by Applicant, page 4.

(3)      The matter is generally subject to the Family Law Rules unless I specify otherwise.

(4)     The application must be accompanied by an application record, which by analogy to Rule 38.09(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, shall contain:

(a) a table of contents describing each document, including each exhibit, by its nature and date and, in the case of an exhibit, by exhibit number or letter;

(b) a copy of the notice of application;

(c) a copy of all affidavits and other material served by any party for use on the application; and

(e) a copy of any other material in the court file that is necessary for the hearing of the application.”

            Gonos v. Hadzipetros, 2017 ONSC 6773 (CanLII) at 13-18

“Creating a favourable status quo through falsehood and misrepresentation is not just a matter of litigation strategy:  It is often tantamount to child abuse.   It goes to the heart of “best interests” considerations; Parental judgment; The ability to sacrifice self-interest for the sake of the child; Awareness of the child’s need to have maximum contact with both parents.

If past behaviour is a predictor of the future, assessors and courts have an obligation to address – and seriously sanction – common and predictable strategic behaviours intended to create an inappropriate status quo.”

            Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 6451 (CanLII) at 418-419

“The appellant, Michael Finley Lawrence Blair, appeals from the March 20, 2017 order of Jarvis J. dismissing the appellant’s dispute of the garnishment of his pension benefits paid through the vehicle of a Retirement Compensation Arrangement (the “RCA”) contractually negotiated between a trustee and his former employer (a company owned and controlled by the appellant).

The appellant principally argues that his RCA is exempt from garnishment due to the provisions of the Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 (the “PBA”).  In the alternative, he argues that the garnishment of his RCA is limited to 50 percent under either the Wages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W.1 or the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Act, S.O. 1996, c. 31.  We would dismiss the appeal on all of these bases.

Subsection 66(1) of the PBA protects from garnishment money payable under a “pension plan” as defined in the PBA.   No protection is provided if the plan does not fall within the definition.

Section 1 of the PBA defines “pension plan” as a plan organized and administered to provide pensions for employees, but excludes some pension arrangements, as well as “any other prescribed type of plan”.

“Prescribed” is defined in s. 1 of the PBA as meaning prescribed by the regulations.

Subsection 47(3) of the PBA’s General Regulation 909, R.R.O. 1990, states that a RCA as defined in s. 248(1) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) is exempted from the application of the PBA and its regulations.

A senior trust officer for Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, who administers the RCA trust of which the appellant is the only beneficiary, confirmed that the appellant’s plan is such a RCA. The appellant also admits that it is a RCA.

As the appellant’s plan is a RCA, the appellant cannot benefit from the provisions of the PBA to protect his RCA from garnishment.

Nor are payments made through the RCA wages as defined by s. 1 of the Wages Act.  Therefore provisions in the Wages Act restricting the percentage that can be seized do not apply.  Also, because the garnishment is pursued in execution of a judgment for an equalization payment, provisions restricting the amount that can be garnished for support under the Wages Act or by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Act are inapplicable.”

            Virc v. Blair, 2017 ONCA 849 (CanLII) at 1-9

“The Court of Appeal of Newfoundland, in Duffy v. Duffy, 2009 NLCA 48 (CanLII) summarized a number of general principles regarding the application of the Child Support Guidelines at para. 35:

1.      The fundamental obligation of a parent to support his or her children takes precedence over the parent’s own interests and choices.

2.       A parent will not be permitted to knowingly avoid or diminish, and not choose to ignore his or her obligation to support his or her children.

3.       A parent is required to act responsibility when making financial decisions that may affect the level of child support available from that parent.

4.      Imputing income to a parent on the basis that the parent is “intentionally under-employed or unemployed” does not incorporate a requirement for proof of bad faith. “Intentionally” in this context clarifies that the provision does not apply to situations beyond the parent’s control.

5.       The determination to impute income is discretionary, as the court considers appropriate in the circumstances.

6.      Where a parent is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, the court may exercise its discretion not to impute income where that parent establishes the reasonableness of his or her decision.

7.      A parent will not be excused from his or her child support obligations in furtherance of unrealistic or unproductive career aspirations or interests. Nor will it be acceptable for a parent to choose to work for future rewards to the detriment of the present needs of his or her children, unless the parent establishes the reasonableness of his or her course of action.

8.      A parent must provide proper and full disclosure of financial information. Failure to do so may result in the court drawing an adverse inference and imputing income.”

D’Angelo v. Barrett, 2014 ONSC 6429 (CanLII) at 60.