Month: January 2025

“In A.C.V.P. v. A.M.T., 2019 ONSC 1559, at paras. 259-260, the court discussed the concept of status quo:

Status quo is neither a rigid concept nor a short-term living arrangement. Rather, it is the regime in place during the relationship and prior to separation. It assists the court by examining how parenting has worked in the past and the benefit or detriment to the children. The status quo, however, is but one factor to consider in the circumstances of the case and within the framework of the best interests of the children test. See: Moggey v. Moggey, (1990) 1990 CanLII 7339 (SK QB), 28 R.F.L. (3d) 416 (SK QB), 28 R.F.L. (3d) 416 (Sask.Q.B.); Sodhi v. Sodhi, 2002 CanLII 41503 (Ont.C.A.); Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 6451; Gerbert v. Wilson, 2015 SKCA 139; and K.R. v. J.K., 2018 SKCA 35.

Following separation, parents must be allowed a reasonable period of time to establish a new parenting regime. I remain of the view, a status quo cannot be manufactured by a delay in the court process: See: White v. Richardson (2005), 2005 CanLII 14148 (ON SC), 18 R.F.L. (6th) 229 (Ont.S.C.J.). However, it must be recognized that the passage of time can result in the establishment of a new status quo. See: Gebert v. Wilson, supra.”

          A.P. v. L.K., 2021 ONSC 150 (CanLII) at 211

“When income is imputed to make the original support order, the Supreme Court stated in Colucci at para. 63:

         [63] Of course, a payor whose income was originally imputed because of an initial lack of disclosure cannot later claim that a change in circumstances occurs when he or she subsequently produces proper documentation showing the imputation was higher than the table amount for their actual income. The payor cannot rely on their own late disclosure as a change in circumstances to ground a variation order (Gray, at paras. 33-34). This would “defeat the purpose of imputing income in the first place” and act as “a disincentive for payors to participate in the initial court process” (Trang v. Trang, 2013 ONSC 1980, 29 R.F.L. (7th) 364, at para. 53).”

Tyndall v. Tyndall, 2022 ONSC 131 (CanLII) at 67

“With respect to the appellant’s first ground of appeal, the video recording made by the appellant confirmed the respondent’s acknowledgement that he had signed the August 2 Document. However, the purpose of the formal requirements in s. 55(1) of the FLA is not just to “provide proof that [a document] was in fact signed by the parties”, but also to “ensure a measure of formality in the execution of a domestic contract”, and to “avoid ‘kitchen table’ agreements”: Gallacher, at para. 24 (citations omitted). As Pepall J.A. explained in Virc v. Blair, 2014 ONCA 392, 119 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 78:

The purpose of this provision is in part to provide some assurance that the parties were deliberate in reaching their agreement and understood the obligations being imposed: see A. Swan & J. Adamski, Canadian Contract Law, 3rd ed. [Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2012], at para. 5.50.”

              El Rassi-Wright v. Arnold, 2024 ONCA 2 (CanLII) at 14