Month: November 2024

“In A.M. v. C.H., 2019 ONCA 764, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that the court has jurisdiction to make therapeutic orders, which includes reconciliation therapy. Therein, the court noted:

(a) The Health Care and Consent Act is not a controlling factor when a judge decides whether to make a therapeutic order in a parenting case (para. 47).

(b) Judges have broad authority under sections 16(a) and 16(2) of the Divorce Act and sections 28(1)(a),(b), and (c) of the Children’s Law Reform Act to make orders for counselling or therapy (paras. 49-51).

(c) Under the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Divorce Act, the child’s views and preferences are only one factor among many in determining the child’s best interests. Consequently, a child’s refusal to attend counselling is not necessarily determinative of their best interests (para. 65).

(d) Notwithstanding the court’s jurisdiction to order therapy, in the case of mature adolescents, a tension exists between their strong claims to autonomy and the duty of the court to act protectively. The ‘best interests’ standard must be interpreted in a way that reflects and addresses an adolescent’s evolving capacities for autonomous decision-making. Their wishes should carry greater weight as their maturity increases, and scrutiny of their maturity level should intensify in relation to the severity of the potential consequences of the treatment or its refusal (paras. 66-68)

(e) There are both risks and benefits to making therapeutic orders which should be considered in the context of the unique facts and specific circumstances of each case (paras. 72-74).

In determining whether the court should make an order for reconciliation counselling, the following principles are applicable:

(a) Such orders are to be made sparingly.

(b) At what stage is the therapeutic order sought (motion based on potentially incomplete evidence vs. trial based on full evidentiary record)?

(c) Is the cause for the family dysfunction (whether alienation, alignment or reasonable estrangement) clear based on expert evidence or otherwise? If not, does it matter in light of the type of therapy proposed?

(d) There must be compelling evidence that the therapy will be beneficial to the child.

(e) The request must be adequately supported by a detailed proposal identifying the proposed counselor and what is to be expected.

(f) Are the parents likely to meaningfully engage in counselling despite their initial resistance to the making of the order? Will a strong judicial recommendation compel participation and cooperation by the recalcitrant parent?

(g) Is the child likely to voluntarily engage in counselling therapy?

(h) Resistance to therapy is an important factor but is not the determining factor whether such an order should be made.

(i)  Where a clinical investigation or assessment is underway, no order should be made pending their conclusion.

(j)  Wherever practical, appropriate direction should be given to the counselor/therapist and a report made to the court.

See: Testani v. Haughton, 2016 ONSC 5827 at para. 18;  Leelaratna v. Leelaratna, 2018 ONSC 5983 at para. 69.

This list of considerations overlaps significantly and not surprisingly with the best interests factors outlined at section 24(3) of the CLRA.”

            B.J. v. D.M., 2023 ONCJ 515 (CanLII) at 38-40

“It is not the role of appellate courts to second-guess the weight assigned the items of evidence by the trier: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, para. 23.  In particular, the fact that an alternative factual finding could be reached based on a different ascription of weight by an appellate court does not mean that a palpable and overriding error has been made: Salomon v. Matte-Thompson, 2019 SCC 14 at para. 33.  It is the trier of fact’s discretion to determine what areas of the evidence should be included in their reasons.  The trier is not obliged to reconcile every frailty in the evidence: R. v. Channani, 2020 ONSC 7168, para. 30.  Failure to mention some aspects of the evidence does not constitute an error, if the trier has grappled with the substance of the live issues. R. v. T.C., 2020 ONCA 469 para. 25.

Okafor v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6332 (CanLII) at 36

“The Supreme Court of Canada summarized as follows the principles applicable to a “purchase money resulting trust” in Nishi v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2013 SCC 33 at paras. 1-2 (“Nishi”):

A purchase money resulting trust arises when a person advances funds to contribute to the purchase price of property, but does not take legal title to that property.  Where the person advancing the funds is unrelated to the person taking title, the law presumes that the parties intended for the person who advanced the funds to hold a beneficial interest in the property in proportion to that person’s contribution.  This is called the presumption of resulting trust.

The presumption can be rebutted by evidence that at the time of the contribution, the person making the contribution intended to make a gift to the person taking title.  While rebutting the presumption requires evidence of the intention of the person who advanced the funds at the time of the advance, after the fact evidence can be admitted so long as the trier of fact is careful to consider the possibility of self-serving changes in intention over time.  [Emphasis in the original.]

When there is no evidence of a gratuitous transfer, the presumption of resulting trust does not apply: see Gill v. Gill, 2022 ONSC 4610 at para. 33.

As stated above, if the presumption of resulting trust applies, it can be rebutted by evidence that at the time of the contribution, the person making the contribution intended to make a gift to the person taking title. There is a gift at law when the evidence demonstrates that, at the time of the transfer, the transferor intended the transferee to hold the beneficial interest in the property being purchased: see Nishi at para. 37.  A contribution to the purchase price without any intention to impose conditions or requirements is a legal gift: see Nishi at para. 31.

The courts have developed a list of relevant factors to consider when determining whether advances from parents to children constitute a loan or a gift.  The following factors have been identified:

a.    whether there are any contemporaneous documents evidencing a loan;

b.    whether the manner of repayment is specified;

c.    whether there is security held for the loan;

d.    whether there are advances to one child and not others, or advances of unequal amounts to various children;

e.    whether there has been any demand for payment before the separation of the parties;

f.     whether there has been any partial repayment; and

g    whether there was any expectation, or likelihood, of repayment.

See Locke v. Locke, 2000 BCSC 1300 at para. 20 and Chao v. Chao, 2017 ONCA 701 at para. 54.”

          Gomes v. Da Silva, 2023 ONSC 6392 (CanLII) at 108-111

“Subrule 24(1) creates a presumption of costs in favour of the successful party. There are two schools of thought regarding the appropriate approach to determination of a litigant’s success.  Some judges have held that settlement offers are the yardstick by which success at trial should be measured: Lawson v. Lawson, 2008 CanLII 23496 (ON SC), at para. 7.  Others have held that success should be measured by comparing the outcome at trial with the relief sought by the parties in the litigation, rather than with the terms of any offers: Lazare v Heitner, 2018 ONSC 4861, at para. 16; Guo v. Li, Li and Zhang, 2020 ONSC 2435, at para. 17.  I agree with the latter approach.

Success should be measured by comparing the positions of the parties on the issues litigated with the orders made.  For the reasons articulated by my colleague Kurz, J. in DeSantis v. Hood, 2021 ONSC 5496, at paras. 40 to 53, I find that offers to settle are not a factor in the determination of success in a proceeding.  As will be explained below, settlement offers are nevertheless an important consideration in assessing both liability for costs and quantum of costs.”

          Saroli v. Saroli, 2021 ONSC 7491 (CanLII) at 7-8

“Based on my review of the caselaw, I conclude that principles including the following must guide this court’s determination of whether an individual may be qualified as a “participant expert” in a family law proceeding:

Under Rule 20.2

a.   A witness with special skill, knowledge, training, or experience who has not been engaged by or on behalf of a party to the litigation may give opinion evidence without complying with the requirements of Rule 20.2 where the opinion is given based on the witness’s observation or on participation in the events at issue and the witness formed the opinion to be given as part of the ordinary exercise of his or her skill, knowledge, training, and experience while observing or participating in such events (Westerhof v Gee Estate, 2015 ONCA 206 at 60; Imeson v. Maryvale(Maryvale Adolescent and Family Services), 2018 ONCA 888 [“Imeson”] at 62; Hoang v Vicentini, 2016 ONCA 723 at 28; and Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 [“Girao”] at 41.

b.   A party does not “engage” an expert to provide opinion evidence simply by calling the expert to testify about an opinion he or she has already formed. Westerhofat 83. The question is not on which party’s behalf the witness testifies, but whether the opinion was formed for the purpose of litigation. Attorney General (Ontario) v 855 Darby Road, Welland, et al, 2017 ONSC 4953 at 29.

c.   Participant experts do not testify because they are being paid a fee to provide an expert’s report as contemplated by Rule 20.2. Rather, they testify because they were involved in underlying events and have generally documented their opinions in notes or summaries made at or about the time of their involvement.

d.   As a corollary, the opinionof a participant expert is not formed for the purpose of the litigation. The opinion is formed in the ordinary exercise of the professional’s duties.

e.   There is a distinction between “treatment opinions”, which involve making a diagnosis, formulating a treatment plan and making a prognosis, and opinions for the purpose of assisting the court at trial, and “litigation opinions”, which are based on consideration of information from a variety of sources for the purpose of assisting the court at trial. Westerhof, at 72.

f.   Where participant experts are permitted to testify, typically the opinions sought to be introduced are found in the clinician’s notes and records or in reports prepared for the purpose of consultation. Imeson, at 61. This does not mean that the proposed participant expert may testify about anythingin his or her reports. Imeson at 75. Particular caution must be exercised regarding opinion evidence going to the question of causation. Imeson at 90, 100; Westerhof at 115.

g.   While there is no longer a general rule barring opinion evidence on the “ultimate issue”, the court must apply the criteria of necessity and cost-benefit in relation to evidence dealing with the ultimate issue. Hoangat 62.

h.   Once admitted, the scope of the evidence of a participant expert is limited to his or her observation of or participation in the subject matter in issue in the litigation, and his or her roles and involvement. He or she may also testify to the opinions that went to the exercise of his or her judgment. This is because the opinions are formed while participating in events and as part of the ordinary exercise of expertise.  Roher v The Queen, 2017 TCC 55 at 33 and 42 citing Westerhofat 67-70. See also Davies v The Corporation of the Municipality of Clarington, 2016 ONSC 1079 at 36 and 37.

i.   Because a participant expert’s opinion is restricted to his or her “observation of or participation in the events at issue”, broader evidence about others “as a group”, will go beyond the scope of the permissible evidence, as it is not based on that observation of participation in or treatment of the individual(s) in question (Imeson, at 74). In Imeson, for example, the mental health clinician was found to have strayed outside the permissible scope as a participant expert he testified as to the “problems typical of survivors of childhood sexual abuse” as opposed to about Mr. Imeson, specifically. See para. 74. In that event, a participant expert’s exemption from the requirements of Rule 20.2(2) is lost. The court must take great care to ensure that opinion evidence exceeding that scope is not elicited by counsel or accepted by the court (Imeson 7,at 58);

j.   The evidence of treating physicians, pediatricians, and therapists is often found to be admissible as participant expertise. See for example: CCAS of Toronto v. T.T.L. and S.S., 2019 ONCJ 530 at 285, 286 (mother’s psychotherapist permitted to testify as participant expert, as to observations, mother’s diagnosis, prognosis, mother’s mental health and ability to parent); J.K.L.D. v.  W.J.A. 2020 ONCJ 335 at 91(report of mother’s physician admitted as that of a participant expert); CAS of Toronto v S.M.T., 2018 ONCJ 540 (children’s pediatrician found to be a participant expert, not being a “puppet” or hired gun of the Society.” See para 91). See also Marchand v. The Public General Hospital Society of Chatham(2000), 2000 CanLII 16946 (ON CA), 51 O.R. (3d) 97 as quoted in Westerhof). Such evidence is often admitted without challenge “because these witnesses are essentially ‘witnesses of fact’ to the extent that they testify to the facts of their involvement, as well as ‘opinions that went into the exercise of their judgment’.” Roher at 29, 30.

k.   It is notthe case that any physician or therapist retained or engaged by a children’s aid Society can be qualified only as a litigation expert. Where the evidence of such proffered witnesses is relevant and reliable and within his or her expertise, and where the individual was not retained for the purpose of litigation but rather to provide treatment or services to the child (or, I would add, to a parent), that person may be qualified as a participant expert. See Jewish Child and Family Service v K.S., 2015 ONCJ 246 at 154, 155.  That parents participate in assessments provided by Society-retained physicians or psychologists to provide background information may also be relevant (see para 157).

Gatekeeping under White Burgess

l.   The court retains its gatekeeper function in relation to opinion evidence of participant experts. Therefore, even where a person meets the definition of a participant expert under the Family Law Rules, the court could exclude all or part of the opinion of a participant expert or rule that all or part of such evidence is not admissible. (Westerhof, at 64)

m.   White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co,2015 SCC 23 [“White Burgess”] establishes a two-part framework for the admissibility of expert evidence. That framework applies both in the context of litigation experts as well as participant experts. See Westerhof (para 64), Imeson at 64; Hoang at 31; Girao at 39.

n.   In summary, the White Burgessframework can be set out as follows:

i.   First Stage, Determination of threshold admissibility: a consideration of whether the evidence is:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Logically relevant
                           2. Necessary to assist the trier of fact
                           3. Not subject to any other exclusionary rule
                           4. The expert must be properly qualified, including the requirement that he or she be willing and able to provide evidence that is impartial, independent, and unbiased;
                           5. In the case of novel or contested science, the underlying science must be reliable.

ii.    Second Stage: The judge balances the potential risks and benefits of admitting the evidence in order to decide whether the potential benefits justify the risks. At this stage the judge considers:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.       Legal relevance
                           2.       Necessity
                           3.       Reliability
                           4.       Absence of bias
                           5.       Consumption of time and cost.

See White Burgess at 24.

o.   “Properly qualified” in the context of a proposed participant expert, does notrequire the execution of a certificate of expert’s duty as would be required of a litigation expert. Westerhof at 81.

p.   In considering whether there is an absence of bias, the issue is the nature and extent of the proposed expert’s connection with the litigation. The question is whether the relationship results in the expert being unable or unwilling to carry out his or her primary duty to the court to provide fair, non-partisan, objective assistance. White Burgess at 48, 50.

q.   It will be “quite rare” for the court to exclude evidence at the first stage of White Burgessdue to lack of impartiality based on professional relationship between the proposed expert and the party. Anything less than clear unwillingness or inability to provide the court with fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence should not lead to its exclusion but would instead go to weight. White Burgess at 49.

r.   The court’s role as a gatekeeper does not end with granting permission to the proposed expert to testify. The gatekeeping role continues throughout the testimony of the proffered expert, and the court must be vigilant at all times to consider the importance of guarding against the dangers of inappropriate opinion evidence.”

Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region, 2021 ONSC 8582 (CanLII) at 26

“The motion judge concluded that there was no evidence of a trust of any sort (express, resulting, or constructive) with respect to either property. In any event, he also concluded that Rosetta lacked standing to pursue the trust claims against Lisa. He dismissed Rosetta’s claims against Lisa.

The motion judge adopted the reasoning in Morris v. Nicolaidis, 2021 ONSC 2957, at para. 38, where McGee J. states:

A claim that a third person holds property in trust for a non-titled spouse, or that a non-titled spouse has a beneficial interest in property, or a monetary claim arising from the acquisition, maintenance or use of that property can only arise from the personal, direct deprivation of the non-titled spouse. An equalization claim is, at best, an indirect legal interest. It is therefore insufficient to confer standing to a person to make a trust claim on behalf of a non-titled spouse or former spouse.

…

In my view, Morris accurately sets out the law. A person does not have standing to advance a trust claim on behalf of a former spouse for equalization purposes. In so concluding, I adopt the reasoning of McGee J. in Morris, at paras. 32-33 and 36-40:

At the heart of this motion is an interesting question. Can a person advance a trust claim on behalf of a former spouse in order to increase that spouse’s net family property and consequently, benefit the person’s claim for, or defense to an equalization payment?

A claim for a constructive trust is a claim in equity that is privately held. It is not a public interest claim. The common law principle relating to private interest standing states that “one cannot sue upon an interest that one does not have.” (Watson, McKay & McGowan, Ontario Civil Procedure, at §11 Standing to Sue).

…

Can an equalization claim create a direct personal legal interest that confers standing to make a trust claim on behalf of a spouse or a former spouse?

I find that it cannot. An equalization payment cannot change the titled or beneficial ownership of property between spouses. The equalization scheme in Ontario is not based upon a division of property, but rather, it recognizes a spouse’s non-financial contributions to a marriage by equalizing the increase in value in each party’s net family property between the date of marriage and the date of separation, subject to variation per section 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

A claim that a third person holds property in trust for a non-titled spouse, or that a non-titled spouse has a beneficial interest in property, or a monetary claim arising from the acquisition, maintenance or use of that property can only arise from the personal, direct deprivation of the non-titled spouse. An equalization claim is, at best, an indirect legal interest. It is therefore insufficient to confer standing to a person to make a trust claim on behalf of a non-titled spouse or former spouse.

Even trust claims between married persons are exceptional because “[i]n the vast majority of cases any unjust enrichment that arises as a result of the marriage will be fully addressed through the operation of the equalization provisions of the Family Law Act,” see Martin v. Sansome, [2014 ONCA 14, 118 O.R. (3d) 522, at para. 64.] Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Hoy envisions in Martin, supra, that it will be a rare case in which monetary damages for unjust enrichment cannot be adequately addressed by an equalization payment; and in those cases, a variation of share per section 5(6) of the Family Law Act, should be invoked before consideration of a trust claim.

Although not in evidence here, there may be a situation in which a meritorious trust claim is not advanced by a non-titled spouse. In such a case, the other spouse cannot step into the non-titled spouse’s shoes and advance the claim himself because he has no direct personal legal interest in the trust claim; but he could seek to vary the equalization between he and the non-titled spouse if the resulting payment is found to be unconscionable per section 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

In summary, a non-titled spouse cannot assert a trust claim against a third party on behalf of a spouse for equalization purposes.”

          Karatzoglou v. Commisso, 2023 ONCA 738 (CanLII) at 9-10, 24-25

“Within Ms. Cobbina’s helpful summary of the relevant law applying to s. 56(4) and attempts to set aside domestic agreements (virtually all of which is apt and most of which I will not repeat here), she cites McGee J.’s insightful and helpful summary of the principles guiding the analysis in Harnett v. Harnett, 2014 ONSC 359 (at paras 87-94).

Citing various authorities, Her Honour notes:

(a)   As a general rule, courts will uphold the terms of a valid enforceable domestic contract;

(b)   It is desirable that parties settle their own affairs…and courts are generally loathe to set aside domestic contracts;

(c)   Parties are expected to use due diligence in ascertaining the facts underlying their agreements. A party cannot fail to ask the correct questions and then rely on a lack of disclosure;

(d)   A domestic contract will be set aside when a party was unable to protect his or herself. Such cases are generally predicated upon a finding that one party has preyed upon the other or acted in a manner to deprive the other of the ability to understand the circumstances of the agreement;

(e)   The court is less likely to interfere when the party seeking to set aside the agreement is not the victim of the other, but rather his or her own failure to self-protect. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Mundinger v. Mundinger… says that the court will step in to “protect him, not against his own folly or carelessness, but against being taken advantage of by those in a position to do so because of their position”;

(f)   The court must not look at which party made the better bargain but rather, to whether one party took advantage of their ability to make a better bargain. In that taking of advantage is to be found the possibility of unconscionability;

(g)   The test for unconscionability is not weighing the end result, but rather the taking advantage of any party due to the unequal positions of the parties;

(h)   The onus is on the party seeking to set aside the domestic contract to demonstrate that at least one of the circumstances set out in subsection 56(4) has been met; then the court must determine whether the circumstances complained of justify the exercise of the courts discretion in favour of setting aside the contract. It is a discretionary exercise.”

Singh v. Khalill, 2023 ONSC 6324 (CanLII) at 57-58

“At the close of the trial, the mother asked the court to order, as part of the final divorce order, the father to provide the mother with a religious divorce within 90 days of this decision. The mother did not give me any legal authority to make such an order. The only evidence at trial that pertains to this request was that the parties are Muslim, and the mother’s religion is very important to her. There was no evidence at trial that the mother had requested a religious divorce from the father or that the father had refused to provide it.

I find that the court does not have jurisdiction to make such an order at this time and dismiss this claim for the following reasons:

a.   The mother has not included a claim for a religious divorce in her pleadings. It is not in her Answer. While this is not necessarily fatal to her request, the fact that I did not have any evidence that the father was on notice that she was seeking such an order from the court means that I cannot find that, despite not being in her pleadings, it is otherwise just and in accordance with the court’s primary objective under Rule 2 to allow this claim to be raised at the end of the trial.

b.   The mother has not given me any authority in support of the court having jurisdiction to make the requested order.

c.   The process provided for under s. 21.1 of the Divorce Actaddresses removing barriers to remarriage, but that process has not been followed here. Under s.21.1, the court has discretion to refuse to hear a party who fails to eliminate barriers to the remarriage of the spouse entitled to a divorce in Canada (see Zargarian-Tala v. Bayat-Mokhtari, 2019 BCSC 448; Salehi v. Tawoosi, 2016 ONSC 54; Schiewitz v. Shiewitz, 2018 ONSC 3864). Usually, the s.21.1 process is initiated well before trial because the remedy provided under the Divorce Act is to strike pleadings if the barriers are not removed, not to make an order requiring a party to grant a religious divorce.

d.    Even if I were to attempt to use s.21.1 to grant some similar order to the one sought, the mother has not provided evidence at the trial of the barriers to remarriage or steps taken to obtain a religious divorce or the information otherwise required under s.21.1.

My decision not to make an order requiring the father to grant the mother a religious divorce should not be seen as condoning any refusal by the father to do so. To the extent that the father seeks relief in the future under the Divorce Act, such as on a motion to change, the mother may wish to attempt to use s.21.1 of the Divorce Act at that time. However, I am not deciding the issue of the application of section 21.1 to variation proceedings.”

            Sablani v. Sablani, 2023 ONSC 6288 (CanLII) at 13-14

“Section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act R.S.O. 1990, c.C.43, permits a judge to order that a person may not institute any further proceeding in any court except by leave if the Court is satisfied that the person has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court or conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner.

The purpose of s. 140(1) of the CJA is to prevent abuse of the court’s process. This is particularly relevant in family law matters where a party may continue to initiate repeated court proceedings as a form of harassment of a former spouse or partner.”

          Hart v. Fullarton, 2020 ONSC 6804 (CanLII) at 77-78

“Section 46 of the Family Law Act states the following:

46 (1) On application, the court may make an interim or final restraining Order against a person described in subsection (2) if the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody.  2009, c. 11, s. 35.

(2) A restraining Order under subsection (1) may be made against,

(a) a spouse or former spouse of the applicant; or

(b) a person other than a spouse or former spouse of the applicant, if the person is cohabiting with the applicant or has cohabited with the applicant for any period of time.  2009, c. 11, s. 35.

(3) A restraining Order made under subsection (1) shall be in the form prescribed by the rules of court and may contain one or more of the following provisions, as the court considers appropriate:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Restraining the respondent, in whole or in part, from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with the applicant or any child in the applicant’s lawful custody.
            2. Restraining the respondent from coming within a specified distance of one or more locations.
            3. Specifying one or more exceptions to the provisions described in paragraphs 1 and 2.
            4. Any other provision that the court considers appropriate.  2009, c. 11, s. 35.

To obtain a restraining Order, the Mother must satisfy me that there are reasonable grounds for her to fear for her own physical or psychological safety or for the safety of the children: Docherty v. Melo, 2016 ONSC 7579 (Ont. S.C.J.). The standard of proof is lower than the criminal standards to charge, prosecute or convict, and is lower than the civil standard of a balance of probabilities: L.A.B. v. J.A.S., 2020 ONSC 3376 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 23. However, a restraining Order cannot be imposed lightly given the respondent’s liberty interest and the potential for imprisonment if the Order is breached: Stave v. Chartrand, 2004 ONCJ 79 (Ont. C.J.), at para. 19: See JK v RK, 2021 ONSC 1136, at para 29.

So, while the court must assess the applicant’s subjective fear, it must only grant the Order where that fear has a “legitimate basis”: Fuda v. Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154 (CanLII), 2011 CarswellOnt 146 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 31-32. While the Mother need not establish that the Father has harassed or harmed her, I must be able to connect or associate the Father’s actions or words with the Mother’s fears: Khara v. McManus, 2007 ONCJ 223 (Ont. C.J.), at para 33: See JK v RK, supra, at para. 30.”

            Daleman v. Daleman, 2021 ONSC 7193 (CanLII) at 133-135