Month: August 2024

“Given that the applicant is also claiming temporary spousal support, an alternate approach of reaching a fair and just determination of quantum of spousal support (since entitlement is conceded) is looking at the parties’ “means and needs”.

In Vermeire v. Bates, 2022 ONSC 1278 at para. 8 and 9, Fowler Byrne J. summarized the law in respect of interim spousal support as follows:

[8]      My authority to award interim spousal support order is found at s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). The factors and objectives that I must consider under ss. 15.2(4) and 15.2(6) do not differentiate between interim and permanent spousal support orders. That being said, in Damaschin-Zamfirescu v. Damaschin-Zamfirescu, 2012 ONSC 6689, at para. 24, Justice Chappel sets out the general principles that apply when dealing with motions for temporary spousal support (citations omitted):

1.                  The party claiming temporary spousal support has the onus of establishing that there is a triable (prima facie) case, both with respect to entitlement and quantum.  The merits of the case in its entirety are to be dealt with at trial.

2.                  In the event that a spousal support claimant cannot establish an arguable case for entitlement to spousal support, the motion for temporary relief should be dismissed, even if the claimant has need and the other party has the ability to pay.

3.                  The court is not required to carry out a complete and detailed inquiry into all aspects and details of the case, or to determine the extent to which either party suffered economic advantage or disadvantage as a result of the relationship or its breakdown.  That task is for the trial judge.

4.                  The primary goal of interim spousal support is to provide income for dependent spouses from the time the proceedings are commenced until the trial. Interim support is meant to be in the nature of a “holding order” to, insomuch as possible, maintain the accustomed lifestyle pending trial.

5.                  Assuming that a triable case exists, interim support is to be based primarily on the motion judge’s assessment of the parties’ means and needs. The objective of encouraging self sufficiency is of less importance.

In Driscoll v. Driscoll, 2009 CanLII 66373 (Ont. S.C.), Justice Lemon adopted the principles for temporary spousal support as set out in the British Columbia case of Robles v. Kohn, 2009 BCSC 1163:

a)      On applications for interim support the applicant’s needs and the respondent’s ability to pay assume greater significance;

b)       An interim support order should be sufficient to allow the applicant to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed prior to separation if the payor’s ability to pay warrants it;

c)      On interim support applications the court does not embark on an in-depth analysis of the parties’ circumstances which is better left to trial. The court achieves rough justice at best;

d)       The courts should not unduly emphasize any one of the statutory considerations above others;

e)      On interim applications the need to achieve economic self-sufficiency is often of less significance;

f)       Interim support should be ordered within the range suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines unless exceptional circumstances indicate otherwise;

g)       Interim support should only be ordered where it can be said a prima facie case for entitlement has been made out;

h)       Where there is a need to resolve contested issues of fact, especially those connected with a threshold issue, such as entitlement, it becomes less advisable to order interim support.”

            Hohmeier v. Caputo, 2022 ONSC 4925 (CanLII) at 39-40

“Section 2(1) of the Divorce Act defines “relocation” as,

relocation means a change in the place of residence of a child of the marriage or a person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility — or who has a pending application for a parenting order — that is likely to have a significant impact on the child’s relationship with

(a) a person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or an application for a parenting order in respect of that child pending; or

(b) a person who has contact with the child under a contact order.

Section 16.9(1) of the Divorce Act provides that a person with parenting time or decision-making responsibility respecting a child of the marriage who intends to effect a relocation must provide at least 60 days’ prior notice of that intention, in a prescribed form, to anyone else who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order.

Pursuant to s. 16.91(1), a person who has given notice pursuant to s. 16.9 and intends to relocate a child is permitted to do so if: a) the court authorizes the relocation; or b) a recipient of the s. 16.9 notice does not object in the prescribed manner within 30 days of receipt of that notice and there is no order prohibiting the relocation.

In determining whether or not a relocation should be authorized, “the crucial question is whether relocation is in the best interests of the child, having regard to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being”, which is a highly fact-specific and discretionary inquiry (see: Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at para. 152).  The court must consider the best interests of the particular child in the particular circumstances of the case (see: Barendregt, at para. 123).

In determining the best interests of the child in relocation cases, the court must consider all factors related to the child’s circumstances, including, without limitation:

a.    the child’s views and preferences;

b.    the history of caregiving;

c.    any incidents of family violence;

d.    the reasons for the relocation;

e.    the impact of the relocation on the child;

f.    the amount of parenting time spent with the child and the level of the parties’ involvement in the child’s life;

g.   the existence of a court order, arbitral award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;

h.   the reasonableness of the relocating party’s proposal to vary parenting time, decision-making responsibility, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the applicable travel expenses; and

i.    whether the parties have complied with their respective obligations under statute, a court order, arbitral award or agreement and the likelihood of future compliance,

(see: Barendregt, at paras.153-154).

The court is not to consider how the outcome of the relocation application would affect the parties’ relocation plans – e.g., whether the relocating party would relocate without the child or not relocate at all (see: Barendregt, at paras. 140 and 154).”

            Shearhart v. Shearhart, 2023 ONSC 4931 (CanLII) at 11-16

“General principles established by courts approaching and applying those legislated provisions include the following:

a.  It is not true to say that costs in family proceedings generally should approach full recovery.  Nor are judges deciding matters governed by the Family Law Rules constrained by the “partial indemnity” and “substantial indemnity” scales of costs frequently applied in relation to litigation governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.  To the contrary, no cost scales are mentioned in the Family Law Rules, and those rules provide that a judge may increase or decrease what might otherwise be an appropriate quantum of costs, depending on factors such as the conduct of the parties and the presence or absence of offers to settle.  The Family Law Rules demand flexibility in examining the list of factors set forth in Rule 24(11), without any assumptions about categories of costs and the court fixing costs at some figure between a nominal amount and full recovery, bearing in mind that modern cost rules are designed to foster three fundamental purposes: partial indemnification of successful litigants for the cost of litigation; encouraging settlements; and discouraging and sanctioning inappropriate behaviour by litigants.  Proportionality and reasonableness are the touchstone considerations to be applied in fixing the amount of costs to be awarded.  At the end of the day, cost awards should reflect what the court views as a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful party or parties. See: Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, 2000 CanLII 22584 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 330 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 4; M.(C.A.) v. M.(D.), 2003 CanLII 64334 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 3060 (C.A.), at paragraph 42 Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395 (CanLII), [2009] O.J. No. 1905 (C.A.), at paragraphs 8 and 12; Costa v. Perkins, [2012] O.J. No. 2400 (Div.Ct.), at paragraph 50; Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840, at paragraphs 8-13; and Brennan v. Fournie, 2022 ONSC 1491, at paragraphs 12-13.

b.  It is an error to refuse to award costs to a successful party where the successful party has not behaved unreasonably during the case or success was not divided. See Wylie v. Leclair, 2003 CanLII 49737 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 1938 (C.A.), at paragraph 24.

c.  “Divided success” does not necessarily mean “equal success”, and “some success” may not be enough to have an impact on the appropriate cost determination.  Most family law cases involve multiple issues, and not all issues are equally important, equally time-consuming or equally expensive to determine.  Moreover, while comparative success can be assessed in relation to specific issues, it also can be assessed globally in relation to the whole of a case.  See Scipione v. Del Sordo, 2015 ONSC 5982 (CanLII), [2015] O.J. No. 5130 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 68.

d.  Consideration of settlement offers is relevant not only to possible determination of relative success, but also to an assessment of whether parties have behaved reasonably.  In particular, in looking at reasonableness and unreasonableness, it is necessary to consider any offers to settle which either party has or has not made.  It normally is considered unreasonable behaviour for a party not to make a settlement offer.  See Fisher v. Fisher, [2015] O.J. No. 1532 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 22; and Palod v. MacDonald, [2018] O.J. No. 4180 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 23.

e.  In considering party behaviour in the determination of cost awards, courts also have emphasized, (as they have in the context of substantive determinations), the fundamental importance of parties making honest and complete financial disclosure.  Where a party fails to comply with his or her “cornerstone” obligations in that regard, effectively forcing an opposing party to embark on litigation to obtain such disclosure, such inadequate financial disclosure usually entails cost sanctions, (e.g., awards sometimes approaching full recovery, even in cases falling short of “bad faith”), as an appropriate means of discouraging such behaviour.  See, for example: Rondelet v. Neff, 2011 ONCJ 407 (CanLII), [2011] O.J. No. 3911 (O.C.J.), at paragraph 21; and Benzeroul v. Issa, [2017] O.J. No. 5385 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 32(d).

f.   Although a comparison of the time devoted to a matter by each party forms part of the inquiry into reasonableness of the amount claimed, it should be remembered that opposing counsel are not expected or required to spend the same amount of time on a case, that the determination of costs is not a purely mathematical exercise, and that the overriding principle is reasonableness.  See Fielding v. Fielding, 2014 ONSC 100 (CanLII), [2014] O.J. No. 38 (S.C.J.), at paragraphs 24-25, affirmed 2015 ONCA 901.

g.  The financial means of the unsuccessful party may be a relevant matter for consideration in the exercise of a court’s discretion regarding costs in the family law context.  In particular, in certain cases it may be appropriate, in the exercise of the court’s overriding discretion, to reduce the quantum of costs that a party will have to pay because of their financial condition.  However, the principle does not apply in reverse.  In particular, there is no principle relating to costs that requires wealthier individuals to pay more for costs for the same step in a proceeding than less wealthy ones. See M.(C.A.) v. M.(D.), supra, at paragraph 43; and Beaver v. Hill, supra, at paragraph 18.”

Baker v. Baker, 2023 ONSC 4860 (CanLII) at 10

“Section 56(4) of the FLA sets out when a domestic contract can be set aside.  The court may set aside a domestic contract or a provision in it if a party failed to disclose to the other, significant assets, debts or other liabilities existing when the domestic contract was made; if a party did not understand the nature or consequences of the contract; or otherwise in accordance with the law of contract.

Courts have discretion in setting aside Minutes of Settlement. The most common factors for consideration are whether there had been a concealment of assets or material misrepresentation; whether there had been duress, or unconscionable circumstances; whether the petitioning party neglected to pursue full legal disclosures; whether the petitioning party moved expeditiously to have the agreement set aside; whether the petitioning party received substantial benefits under the agreement; whether the other party had fulfilled his or her obligations under the agreement; and whether the non-disclosure was a material inducement to entering the agreement. In other words, how important was the non-disclosed information to the negotiation? See Dochuk v. Dochuk (1999), 1999 CanLII 14971 (ON SC), 44 R.F.L. (4^th) 97 (Ont. Div. Ct.), at para. 17.

In determining whether a contract should be set aside, the court must first consider whether the party seeking such can demonstrate one or more of the circumstances outlined in s. 56(4) and if so, whether it is appropriate to set aside the agreement: see LeVan v. LeVan, 2008 ONCA 388, [2015] O.J. No. 4883. In Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 2004 SCC 22, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550, the Supreme Court of Canada held that courts should respect private agreements reached between spouses.

The burden is on the party seeking to set aside the agreement, in this case the mother, to bring herself within one of the paragraphs of s. 56(4) and then to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to set aside the agreement: see LeVan; see also Dougherty v. Dougherty, 2008 ONCA 302, 89 O.R. (3d) 760.”

            Armstrong v. Armstrong, 2021 ONSC 5774 (CanLII) at 10-13

“Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court may strike out all or part of a pleading on the basis that it (a) may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action, (b) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (c) is an abuse of process.

In B. (A.) v. Halton Children’s Aid Society, 2016 ONSC 6195, Master Pope, at para. 29, set out the principles that apply on a motion under rule 25.11 to strike out a pleading. These principles include that the court must read the pleading in context with a generous eye and only strike it out if it is plain and obvious that the pleading must fail at trial. The moving party has a heavy burden, and motions under rule 25.11 should only be granted in the clearest of cases.

In Renzone v. Onyx Homes Inc., 2020 ONSC 7722, Master Josefo, at para. 15, held that it is settled law that referring to settlement offers or discussions which are subject to settlement privilege are subject to being struck as scandalous, frivolous or vexatious given that such communications are inadmissible.”

Stronach v. Belinda Stronach in her Personal Capacity and as Trustee of the Andrew Stronach 445 Family Trust, 2021 ONSC 5758 (CanLII) at 15-17

“Pursuant to ss. 2 and 3 of the Partition Act, all joint tenants or tenants in common and all parties interested in any land in Ontario may be compelled to make or suffer partition or sale of the land, or any part thereof, whether the estate is legal and equitable or equitable only. Any person interested in land in Ontario may seek an Order for the sale of the land under the directions of the court if such sale is considered by the court to be more advantageous to the parties interested.

The Partition Act provides a prima facie right to a joint tenant or tenant in common to partition or sale of lands. There is a corresponding obligation on the other owner to permit partition or sale.

The court should compel such partition or sale if no sufficient reason appears why such an order should not be made: Davis v. Davis, 1953 CanLII 148 (ON CA), [1954] 1 D.L.R. 827 (C.A.), at p. 830.

The discretion to refuse partition should only be granted in circumstances of malice, oppression, or vexatious intent: Greenbanktree Power Corp. v. Coinamatic Canada Inc. (2004), 2004 CanLII 48652 (ON CA), 75 O.R. (3d) 478 (C.A.), at para. 1, and Latcham v. Latcham (2002), 2002 CanLII 44960 (ON CA), 27 R.F.L. (5th) 358 (Ont. C.A.).

The case law generally favours an order for partition or sale of a home by a co-tenant unless the opposing party can demonstrate prejudice. The onus is generally on the party resisting the sale to show prejudice. Prejudice has been defined as conduct by the moving party seeking the sale that is malicious, vexatious, or oppressive. That type of conduct is characterized by bad faith involving some sort of hidden agenda or purpose connected to the requirement for a sale of the property: Crews v. Bradford, 2018 ONSC 6413, at para. 15; Akman v. Burshtein, [2009] O.J. No. 1499 (S.C.), at para. 38.

Personal hardship or inconvenience is not a sufficient reason to refuse an order granting partition or sale: Davis v. Davis; Akman v. Burshtein, at para. 58.”

         Pal v. Pal, 2023 ONSC 4659 (CanLII) at 37-42

“Financial disclosure in a family law case is – without doubt – one of the most important obligations.

The fundamental requirement for all family law proceedings is that each party must, soon after the proceeding is commenced, make complete and accurate financial disclosure. See Rule 13 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99. This Rule also provides that each party has a continuing obligation to update their financial information, correct any erroneous information, and provide any omitted financial information as soon as it becomes known or is available.

Complete and accurate financial disclosure is fundamental to ensure that the parties can engage in fair and informed discussions to enable them to reach an equitable and enforceable resolution of their family law dispute or, where necessary, to ensure each party has all relevant and accurate financial information to place before a court so that the court can make an informed, fair, and equitable judicial determination on the financial issues.

Court involvement should not be required to ensure complete and accurate financial information is disclosed. See Sparr v. Downing, 2020 ONCA 793, para. 4.

Where such complete and accurate financial disclosure is not forthcoming or is substantially delayed, the opposing party is seriously prejudiced in its claims such as, where child support is at issue, where spousal support is at issue, and equalization of family property is at issue. This failure to make complete and accurate disclosure leads to lengthy and unnecessarily complex family law proceedings, unreasonable positions, many unnecessary motions, high conflict situations and, sometimes, parties resorting to self-help remedies rather than waiting for the court to enforce compliance with the Rules and/or court orders.

The failure to make complete and accurate financial disclosure often causes the financially disadvantaged party to become self-represented, usually because the refusal to make complete and accurate financial disclosure is the litigation strategy of the party with superior financial resources.

The failure to make complete and accurate financial disclosure has been described as a “cancer” in family law proceedings. See Michel v. Graydon (2020), 2020 SCC 24 (CanLII), 45 R.F.L. (8th) 1 (S.C.C.) at para. 33.

Where a party is permitted to disregard financial disclosure orders, the confidence of the public in the administration of justice is undermined.

It brings the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Courts must address cases where a party deliberately fails or refuses to make complete and accurate financial disclosure, in a manner that strongly reaffirms rules must be followed or there will be consequences – serious consequences.  This is necessary to ensure that the offending party and other parties in other proceedings are deterred from engaging or continuing to engage in such conduct and to ensure that the offending party does not benefit from their misconduct. See Itrade Finance Inc. v. Webworx Inc. 2005 CanLII 24776 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 3492 at para. 20 (ON S.C.).”

            Boutin v. Boutin, 2022 ONSC 4776 (CanLII) at 1-10

“All children of separated parents are entitled to child support until they are no longer defined as a “child of the marriage.” Section 2(1) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) which applies to all cases in Canada where the parents were legally married and divorcing or have divorced, provides that a “child of the marriage” includes:

a child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time, […] (b) is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability, or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessities of life;

Section 15.1(1) of the Divorce Act, provides, in part:

A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of any or all children of the marriage.

It is possible from a plain reading of the Act to find that an adult who does not have a disability and is not enrolled in post-secondary is still a “child of the marriage” entitled to child support because they are unable to withdraw from their parents charge, or unable to obtain the necessities of life, by reason of an “other cause” (see Nkwazi v. Nkwazi, 2014 SKCA 61, 438 Sask. R. 185, at para. 23). In my view, there is a growing, but limited, precedent for the provision of child support in these types of circumstances. In order to determine this, the court must go through a two-stage analysis including:

(a) Is the adult child able to withdraw from their parents charge or obtain the necessities of life, i.e., the court must make a finding of whether the adult child can or cannot obtain an income to meet their reasonable needs; and

(b) Is the “cause” of the inability to withdraw permitted under the Divorce Act, i.e., is the cause of that inability a social/economic factor (such as the cost of living and delayed adulthood, or a difficult transition in their life).

The onus of proof would lie with the party seeking the provision of child support, who would have to prove that the child is/was unable to withdraw from parental control and is eligible for support. The nature and amount of evidence will vary with the case but becomes greater as the adult child grows older (see Titova v. Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, [2012 O.J. No. 5808, at para. 43).”

            Brun v. Fernandez, 2023 ONSC 4787 (CanLII) at 8-10

“Eighth, with respect to his pension, RRSP and LIRA, Mr. Pierre has chosen a notional tax rate of 26.9% while Ms. Pierre has chosen one for him of 24.7%. In a report dated July 24, 2017, Guy Martel noted that the former would be Mr. Pierre’s notional tax rate at a retirement age of 65, while the later would be his rate at a retirement age of 60. In Van Delst v. Hronowsky, 2021 ONSC 2353, I noted at paragraph 35 that the proposition that the normal retirement age of a PSSA plan member may travel with the pension valuation and not necessarily with the determination of disposition costs is supported by Knight v. Knight, 2018 ONSC 3294, wherein Justice Nelson indicated at paragraph 55 that “notional disposition costs may be deducted from a spouse’s net family property if there is satisfactory evidence of a likely disposition date and it is clear that such costs will be inevitable when the owner disposes of the assets or is deemed to have disposed of them.” (Underlining is original). Like Ms. Van Delst in that case, Mr. Pierre testified that he absolutely intends to work until age 65, and he submits that his notional tax rate at retirement should be as of age 65. I found in Van Delst that the wife’s notional tax rate at age 65 was acceptable despite that FLV was calculated on a normal retirement age of 60. However, I distinguish that case on the basis that the rate had already been used in my April 2019 judgment for other of the wife’s post-retirement assets and not overturned by the Court of Appeal, notwithstanding the ordered recalculation. Logically, however, if Mr. Martel has calculated the disposition rates based on the value of all of Mr. Pierre’s projected income at ages 60 and 65, the rate should correlate to those values. The notional disposition rate for Mr. Pierre’s assets in the Comparative NFP will, therefore, be 24.7%.”

            Pierre v. Pierre, 2021 ONSC 5650 (CanLII) at 98

“Whether assets in an RESP are the property of the subscriber or are held in trust for a beneficiary has not been consistently answered in the caselaw: See Kira Domratchev, “Is an RESP a Trust? …And So What If It Is?” (May 2021) 40 Est. Tr. & Pensions J. 257; Charles Wagner & Mari Maimets, “Litigation and RESPs”, 20^th Annual Estates and Trusts Summit, October 16, 2017.

Before briefly reviewing the case law, I will describe the features of an RESP:

• • The basic framework for an RESP is established under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th Supp.) (“ITA”).
  • An RESP is a contract between an individual (“the subscriber”) and an organization (“the promoter”) designed to help parents, family, and friends to save towards a beneficiary’s post-secondary education: Canada Revenue Agency, Information Circular No. IC93-3R2, Registered Education Savings Plans, May 4, 2016 (“CRA Circular”), page 2; ITA, s. 146.1 (1).
  • Under the contract, the subscriber names one or more beneficiaries and agrees to make contributions for them, and the promoter agrees to pay educational assistance payments to the beneficiaries. The subscriber’s contributions are not deductible from their income tax.
  • Aside from helping a child finance their cost of post-secondary education, the benefits of an RESP are that: (1) taxes on income earned on contributions are deferred until the income is withdrawn, and (2) federal government grants are paid on contributions made to an RESP.

• • Various government grants and incentives are available. A basic Canada Education Savings Grant (“CESG”) of 20% on the first $2,500 of annual RESP contributions is paid into the RESP under the Canada Education Savings Act, S.C. 2004, c. 26(“CESA”).
  • An RESP is a vehicle designed for individuals to accumulate income for post-secondary education.
  • The only permissible payments out of an RESP are:

o   Subject to the terms and conditions of the RESP, the promoter can return contributions to the subscriber or to the beneficiary at any time.

o   Educational Assistance Payments (which does include a refund of contributions but does include the RESP’s accumulated investment earnings (earnings on the money saved in the RESP) and CESGs) can be paid to or for the beneficiary student to help finance the cost of post-secondary education if the student is enrolled in a post-secondary educational institution or other qualifying educational program or if the beneficiary student is at least 16 years old and is enrolled in a specified educational program.

o   Accumulated income payments (“AIPs”), which are investment earnings that accumulate on contributions made to a RESP and on amounts paid under the CESA, can be paid to a subscriber if the beneficiary is 21 years old and is not pursuing post-secondary education and the plan has been in existence for at least ten years. AIPs must be included in the subscriber’s income for the year the payments are received. The payments are subject to a 20% additional tax on top of the regular tax rate payable on the subscriber’s income. The subscriber can reduce or eliminate this additional tax by contributing the AIPs to his or her RRSP or to a spousal RRSP up to a maximum of $50,000.00.

o   Repayment of amounts under the CESA: See section 11 of the Canada Education Savings Regulation, S.O.R./2005-151.

o   Payments to a designated educational institution and payments to a trust to accommodate transfer of property between RESPs.

• • Any amount received by a taxpayer in satisfaction of a subscriber’s interest under an RESP must be included in computing the taxpayer’s income except:

o   Any amount received in satisfaction of a right to a refund of payments under the plan: ITA, ss. 146.1 (7.1)(b), 146.1 (7.2)(b)(ii).

o   Any amount received by a taxpayer under a court order or agreement relating to a division of property between the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s spouse or common-law partner in settlement of rights arising out of, or on the breakdown of, their marriage or common-law partnership: ITA, ss. 146.1 (7.11)(b), 146.1 (7.2)(b)(iii).

• • The subscriber of a plan can change the named beneficiary under an RESP if the terms of the plan allow: CRA Circular, paras. 74-75.

• • If a subscriber dies, their estate may continue the RESP or name another individual as an alternate subscriber. The terms of the RESP and provincial law will dictate what happens to the RESP: CRA Circular, para. 8.”

            Labatte v. Labatte, 2022 ONSC 4787 (CanLII) at 44-45