Month: June 2024

“The status quo will be maintained on an interim parenting motion in the absence of compelling reasons indicative of the necessity of a change to meet the best interests of the child.  This is so whether the existing arrangement is de facto or de jure:  Grant v. Turgeon (2000) 2000 CanLII 22565 (ON SC), 5 R.F.L. (5^th) 326 (Ont.S.C.) at para. 15.

In Coe at para. 25, Justice Pazaratz summarized the principles to be considered when deciding parenting issues on an interim basis.  The factors relevant to this proceeding are as follows:

b.  …the obvious strategic dynamics associated with temporary motions cannot be ignored.   Already, counsel are arguing “status quo” even before they can agree on what the status quoconsists of.  Temporary and even temporary-temporary orders often have long-term implications.  Being fair to the parties as litigants is important.   Being fair to the children is even more important.

d.  Temporary orders are meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be more fully canvassed at subsequent stages in the process – quite often at a trial;

e.  The status quoshould ordinarily be maintained until trial unless there is material evidence that the children’s best interest demands an immediate change;

f.  Courts must be mindful of – and actively discourage – efforts by parents to unilaterally create a new status quothrough manipulation, exaggeration or deception.

(citations omitted).

In Batsinda v Batsinda, Justice Chappel stated that the status quo that is relevant is that which existed just prior to the parties’ separation, except in circumstances where there is clear and unequivocal evidence that the parties agreed to a different decision-making and residence arrangement following the separation. A status quo created by one party unilaterally taking matters into their own hands, without any consent from the other party, does not fall within these principles: 2013 ONSC 7869 at pp 19-2.”

          Grover v. Grover, 2023 ONSC 3607 (CanLII) at 14-16

“The Hague Convention is law in Ontario, pursuant to s. 46(2) of the CLRA. The Hague Convention sets out the rules that apply to the parental wrongful abduction or retention of children across international borders.

The purpose of the Hague Convention, as set out in Article 1, is to enforce custody rights and secure the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained children to their country of habitual residence. A prompt return is intended to achieve speedy adjudication of the merits of a custody or access disputes (as it was formerly known in Ontario) in the forum of a child’s habitual residence. When an application is brought under the Hague Convention, the court is not being asked to determine issues of parenting, but rather in which jurisdiction the parenting issues should be determined.

In an application under the Hague Convention, the first question to be asked is whether there has been a removal or retention of the child from their habitual residence that is considered wrongful. Article 3 of the Hague Convention directs the court to a two-part test:

a)   Is the removal or retention in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person under the law of the state in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

b)    At the time of removal or retention were those rights actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention?

If the requirements under Article 3 are met, Article 12 requires the judge to order the return of the child forthwith, unless certain exceptions apply. These exceptions, under Articles 12, 13, and 20, include:

a)    The application was brought one year or more from the date of wrongful removal or retention, and the judge determines the child is settled in the new environment: Article 12.

b)    The parent seeking return was not exercising custody rights at the time of the removal or retention or consented or subsequently acquiesced to the removal or retention: Article 13(a);

c)     There is grave risk that return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or place the child in an intolerable situation:  Article 13(b);

d)    The child is of sufficient age and maturity and objects to being returned:  Article 13(2); or

e)    The return of the child would not be permitted by fundamental human rights and fundamental freedoms of the requested state: Article 20.

On the facts provided, this court is being asked to find that the child was wrongfully retained. In order to determine if the retention was wrongful, the court must first determine the date of the alleged wrongful retention and then, determine where the child was habitually resident on that date. In this case, if the child was habitually resident in Mexico, then there is no wrongful retention and the Hague Convention has no application. If the habitual residence of the child is Ontario, then the Applicant Mother is able to avail herself of the Hague Convention to request that the child be returned to Ontario where the parties can litigate their parenting rights: Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680, at paras. 21, 24-25; Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398, at para. 36.”

            Routley v. Palomera, 2022 ONSC 3557 (CanLII) at 57-61

“The legislative provision allowing for preservation order to be made is s. 12 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.   The test applicable to the determination of this question was set out in Bronfman v. Bronfman, 2000 CanLII 22710 (ONSC).  In that case, the wife also sought to extend a preservation order she had obtained on an ex parte motion.  The court stated that the test applicable was the same as the one applicable to a request for an injunction, in which the court must consider the following factors:

(1)      the relative strengths of the parties’ positions;

(2)      the balance of convenience; and

(3)      whether irreparable harm may occur if relief is not granted.

Paragraphs 26 through 31 of Justice Sachs’s decision are instructive.  She says:

… a court will want to consider how likely it is that the plaintiff or petitioner will receive an equalization payment. It will also want to consider the effect that granting, or not granting, such an order will have on the parties. Under s. 12, the agenda is to protect the spouse’s interests under the Family Law Act, so that if a spouse is successful in obtaining relief under that Act, there are assets available to satisfy that relief. Relevant to this exercise is an assessment of the risk of dissipation of the assets in existence prior to trial.”

          Akter Mukta v. Zafor et al., 2023 ONSC 3468 (CanLII) at 16-17

 “The father candidly acknowledged that by having de facto residency of C, and by the mother having no parenting time with C since May 2020, he is in breach of the Order of Justice Moore. However, he claims that he cannot convince his 15 year old son C to act in compliance with Justice Moore’s order. This is not a defence to the mother’s allegation of non-compliance as the father filed no response on the motion, and the father’s submissions at the hearing did not explain what specific steps he has taken to promote compliance with the parenting order of Justice Moore. Compliance with court orders cannot be left up to a child: King v. King, 2016 ONSC 3752, at para. 48.

As well the father needed to have shown what positive steps he took to promote compliance with the Moore Order. In Godard v. Godard, 2015 ONCA 568, at para. 28, the Court of Appeal stated:

As stated by the motion judge, Ontario courts have held consistently that a parent “has some positive obligation to ensure a child who allegedly resists contact with the access parent complies with the access order”: Quaresma v. Bathurst, (2008), O.J. NO. 4734 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para.8. See also Campo v. Campo, 2015 ONSC 1349; Stuyt v. Stuyt, 2009 CanLII 43948 (Ont. S.C.); Stuyt v. Stuyt, 2009 CanLII 43948 (Ont. S.C.); and Hatcher v. Hatcher, 2009 CanLII 14789 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 1343 (Ont. Sup.Ct.).”

Saunderson v. Saunderson, 2022 ONSC 3475 (CanLII) at 12-13

“The motion to set aside the order was brought pursuant to rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules, which provides that the court may, on motion, change an order that:

(e) was made with notice, if an affected party was not present when the order was made because the notice was inadequate or the party was unable, for a reason satisfactory to the court, to be present.

The test for deciding a motion to set aside a default judgment is set out in Mountain View Farms v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194, at paras. 48-49. There are five factors as follows:

(a) whether the motion was brought promptly after the defendant learned of the default judgment;

(b) whether there is a plausible excuse or explanation for the defendant’s default in complying with the Rules;

(c) whether the facts establish that the defendant has an arguable defence on the merits.

(d) the potential prejudice to the moving party should the motion be dismissed, and the potential prejudice to the respondent should the motion be allowed; and

(e) the effect of any order the court might make on the overall integrity of the administration of justice.

These factors are not rigid rules. The court must consider the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court of Appeal held, at para. 51, that the presence of an arguable defence on the merits may justify the court exercising its discretion to set aside the default judgment, even if the other factors are unsatisfied in whole or in part. The respondent need not show that the defence will inevitably succeed but must show that it has an air of reality.”

            Tariq v. Rehman, 2022 ONSC 3525 (CanLII) at 24-26

“It is the husband’s onus to prove his income.  The wife should not have to be playing a game of “catch me if you can” with the husband.  If the husband does not get his disclosure in order, and if this is the evidence that is called at the trial, the husband is at serious risk of having significant adverse inferences drawn against him.  At ¶ 81 of Meade v. Meade, 2002 CanLii 2806 (Ont. S.C.J.), Kiteley J. held that it was incumbent on those who are self-employed to put forward adequate and comprehensive records of income and expenses, which means a package from which the recipient spouse can draw conclusions and the amount of child support can be established.  Where disclosure is inadequate and inferences are to be drawn, they should be favourable to the spouse confronted with the challenge of making sense out of the financial disclosure, and against the spouse who failed to meet his obligation.”

          Edey v. Beccatti, 2023 ONSC 3447 (CanLII) at 98

“Every parent has apprehensions about his or her young child starting school. They enter an environment where parents cannot protect them, whether they arrive on the school bus or in their parent’s vehicle. It is a necessary exercise in trust, to send children to school. Nevertheless, a decision about education has far-reaching implications for the child; it should not be made based on a parent’s anxiety for the child.”

          Kivi v. Smith, 2023 ONSC 3407 (CanLII) at 20

“Our case law is clear that without a clear error of law or misperception of the facts, there is no basis for this court to interfere with a judge’s decision whether to grant an adjournment: see e.g. Khimji v. Danani (2004), 2004 CanLII 12037 (ON CA), 69 O.R. (3d) 790 (C.A.), at para. 14 (per Laskin J.A. dissenting, but not on this point). This is especially the case in family law matters where motion and trial judges’ case management role is so crucial to the process.”

            Holly v. Greco, 2019 ONCA 464 (CanLII) at 9

“Like any applicant seeking a retroactive variation under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, a payor seeking a downward retroactive change must first show a past change in circumstances, as required under s. 17(4). Section 14 of the Guidelines lists situations constituting a change in circumstances for the purpose of s. 17(4) of the Divorce Act, including the coming into force of the Guidelines (s. 14(c)). A change in circumstances could also include a change that, if known at the time, would probably have resulted in different terms, such as a drop in income (Guidelines, s. 14(a); Willick v. Willick, 1994 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670, at p. 688; Gray, at para. 39).

The onus is on the party seeking a retroactive decrease to show a change in circumstances (Punzo v. Punzo, 2016 ONCA 957, 90 R.F.L. (7th) 304, at para. 26; Templeton, at para. 33). In some cases that may be relatively straightforward: for example, establishing that the children are no longer legally entitled to support because they are no longer children of the marriage.

Most commonly, the retroactive variation claim will be based on a material change in income. To meet the threshold, a decrease in income must be significant and have some degree of continuity, and it must be real and not one of choice (Willick, at pp. 687-88; Earle v. Earle, 1999 CanLII 6914 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 27; MacCarthy v. MacCarthy, 2015 BCCA 496, 380 B.C.A.C. 102, at para. 58, citing Earle; L.M.P. v. L.S., 2011 SCC 64, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775, at para. 33; Gray, at para. 39; Brown v. Brown, 2010 NBCA 5, 353 N.B.R. (2d) 323 (“Brown”), at para. 2; Templeton, at para. 35). Trivial or short-lived changes are insufficient to justify a variation (Templeton, at para. 35). In this way, the threshold inquiry preserves some sense of certainty and predictability for the parties and the child, while allowing some flexibility in response to changes in the payor’s income.

The payor must have disclosed sufficient reliable evidence for the court to determine when and how far their income fell, and to ascertain whether the change was significant, long lasting, and not one of choice. A decision to retroactively decrease support can only be made based on “reliable, accurate and complete information” (Earle, at para. 28). The payor cannot ask the court to make findings on income that are contrary to the recipient’s interests “while at the same time shielding information that is relevant to the determination of their income behind a protective wall” (Templeton, at para. 67; see also Tougher v. Tougher, 1999 ABQB 552, at paras. 14-15 (CanLII); Terry, at para. 9).

Of course, a payor whose income was originally imputed because of an initial lack of disclosure cannot later claim that a change in circumstances occurs when he or she subsequently produces proper documentation showing the imputation was higher than the table amount for their actual income. The payor cannot rely on their own late disclosure as a change in circumstances to ground a variation order (Gray, at paras. 33-34). This would “defeat the purpose of imputing income in the first place” and act as “a disincentive for payors to participate in the initial court process” (Trang v. Trang, 2013 ONSC 1980, 29 R.F.L. (7th) 364, at para. 53).”

            Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 (CanLII) at 59-63

“It is not an error, in my view, for a court to consider a biological tie in itself in evaluating a child’s best interests under this act, even though courts should be reluctant to superimpose the factor onto a statute when a legislature has omitted it, since courts and legislatures have progressively moved away from biological ties. Nevertheless, courts have considerable discretion in identifying and weighing the factors that are relevant in a given case (Van de Perre, at paras. 11-13, citing Hickey, at paras. 10 and 12). As a result, a court may conclude the evidence supports assigning weight to a biological tie if it can make the link to a child’s best interests. That said, a biological tie in itself should generally carry minimal weight for several reasons.

First, too great an emphasis on biological ties may lead some decision makers to give effect to the parent’s claims over the child’s best interests. Parental preferences should not usurp the focus on the child’s interests. As Wilson J. wrote in Racine v. Woods, 1983 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 173, at p. 185: “. . . a child is not a chattel in which its parents have a proprietary interest; it is a human being to whom they owe serious obligations.”

Second, King v. Low concluded that a child’s bond is a consideration that should prevail over the “empty formula” of a biological tie (para. 104). King v. Low’s statement that a biological parent’s claims should not be “lightly” set aside must be read in the adoption context in which it arose and alongside the Court’s ultimate emphasis on the child’s bond (para. 101). King v. Low implies that biological parents’ claims must not be “lightly” set aside only because a biological tie is a presumed proxy for the parent with whom a child has the closest emotional or psychological bond. A child will frequently have a strong attachment to a biological parent as they are generally among the persons most involved in the child’s care. Yet this does not confer significant weight to a biological tie in itself. It is the biological parent’s caregiving role that fosters a child’s psychological and emotional attachment, not the biological tie itself.

There is “no magic to the parental tie” (Young, at p. 38, per L’Heureux‑Dubé J., dissenting in the result). The very need for child protection legislation underscores that a biological connection is no guarantee against harm to a child. On the other hand, a child can be equally attached to persons who are not their biological parents and those persons can be equally capable of meeting the child’s needs, as this case and King v. Low illustrate. Thus, King v. Low does not give significant weight to a biological tie in itself, but treats it as a presumed proxy for a child’s strongest bond.

Since biological ties are a presumed proxy for a bond, any advantages that favour the biological parent will usually be captured and subsumed within the broader inquiry into a child’s best interests. In particular, if the biological parent is closer to the child, and better able to meet the child’s needs, this will be reflected in a wider range of relevant factors, like the child’s relationship to the parent, the views and preferences of the child, and the ability to meet the child’s needs, including the child’s safety, security, and well-being (Wilton, Joseph and Train, at § 6:1). To the extent a parent relies on biology for considerations related to the child’s culture, race or heritage, it may be addressed within those factors.

Third, the benefit of a biological tie itself may be intangible and difficult to articulate (British Columbia Birth Registration No. 99-00733, Re, 2000 BCCA 109, 73 B.C.L.R. (3d) 22, at para. 117). This makes it difficult to prioritize it over other best interests factors that are more concrete. For example, in this case, the decisive factor was which parent was more likely to foster W.D.’s relationship with the other parent. This factor clearly benefits the child: it ensures the child is placed with the parent who will best promote the child’s emotional and psychological relationship with the other parent. In comparison, the benefit of the father’s biological tie itself is harder to identify. Further, any benefit from a connection to a biological parent, such as a “sense of security” in knowing one’s “roots”, as the majority of the Court of Appeal put it, may be achieved through access and parenting time rather than custody (para. 111).

As well, the importance of biological ties may diminish as children are increasingly raised in families where those ties do not define a child’s family relationships. Family institutions have “undergone a profound evolution” and changing social conditions, as noted, have diminished the significance of biological ties (Young, at p. 43; King v. Low, at p. 97). Change and evolution continues today. Contemporary shifts in parenting and family composition may undermine the relevance of biological ties.

Finally, as in this case, courts should be cautious in preferring one biological tie over another absent evidence that one is more beneficial than another. This Court has moved away from stereotyped and formulaic solutions like the “tender years” doctrine (Young, at p. 43; A.C., at para. 92). Unsupported generalizations about, as in this case, the caregiving capacity of a biological father versus a grandmother, or vice versa, are similarly inappropriate. Comparing the closeness or degree of biological connection is a tricky, reductionist and unreliable predictor of who may best care for a child. It fails to take into account how often other family members assume care for children whose biological parents cannot act as caregivers as a result of addictions, mental health issues, criminal behavior, or other challenges. It also overlooks that a custody dispute that is superficially between two biological parents may frequently draw in several family members, as a parent’s extended family may also assist in care and feel invested in seeing a custody claim succeed. Here, not only did the grandmother step up to assist her daughter to care for W.D., but the father’s parents also help him with W.D.

For these reasons, I disagree with the majority of the Court of Appeal that biology must be a tie-breaker when two parties are otherwise equal under this legislation. A court is not obliged to turn to biology and engage in a fraught determination of who may be a closer blood relative. While biological ties may be relevant in a given case, they will generally carry minimal weight in the assessment of a child’s best interests.”

            B.J.T. v. J.D., 2022 SCC 24 (CanLII) at 101-109