Month: October 2023

“The court’s jurisdiction to grant the injunction sought is found in s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. This section is formulated as follows:

101 (1) In the Superior Court of Justice, an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order may be granted or a receiver or receiver and manager may be appointed by an interlocutory order, where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so.

(2) An order under subsection (1) may include such terms as are considered just.

The purpose of the Mareva injunction is to tie up the assets of the defendant, pending any judgment adverse to the defendant, so that they would then be available to for execution in satisfaction of that judgment. It is ordering security before judgment: Chitel v. Rothbart, 1982 CanLII 1956 (ON CA), [1982] O.J. No. 3540, (Ont. C.A.) at para. 30.

A Mareva injunction can be granted post-judgment: Lamont v. Kent, [1999] O.J. No. 277 (Gen. Div.), at para. 8. When granted post-judgment, the relief is described as a Mareva injunction in aid of execution: Coast to Coast Against Cancer v. Sokolowski, 2016 ONSC 170, at para 5.

The purpose of the Mareva injunction post- judgment but before execution is to prohibit the dissipation of assets: Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v Emmott, [2019] EWCA Civ 219 (Eng. C.A.), at para 40.

A Mareva injunction can be granted to protect against avoidance of a costs order: Jet West Ltd. v. Haddican, [1992] 1 All E.R. 545, [1992] 1 W.L.R. 487 (Eng. C.A.), considered in Hilltop Group Ltd. v. Katana, [2002] O.J. No. 4136, (Ont. SCJ), at para 19.

In Lamont, supra, Sachs J. set out the requirements for granting a Mareva injunction in aid of execution, as follows, at para.10:

1. 1. 1. 1. Full and frank disclosure by theplaintiff.
         2. Full and fair particulars of the plaintiff’sclaim.
         3. Assets of the defendant within thejurisdiction.
         4. A risk of removal of those assets by the defendant beforejudgment.
         5. An undertaking by the plaintiff as todamages.”

Da Silva Edgerly v. Edgerly, 2022 ONSC 6170 (CanLII) at 8-13

“Typically, a review under Rule 2.1 is commenced by a party asking the registrar to put a pleading before a judge under Rule 2.1.01 (6) or 2.1.02. A judge reviews the pleading to determine if there is a prima facie case that a proceeding or a motion in a proceeding may be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process and that there may be reason to resort to the summary, written process under Rule 2.1 rather than a regular motion process. See Scaduto v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733 (CanLII).  If the judge is satisfied that Rule 2.1 may apply, then she or he directs the registrar to send notice to the plaintiffs inviting submissions as to why the claim or motion should not be dismissed.

Under Rules 2.1.01 (1) and 2.1.02 (1) the court may commence a review of a claim or a motion in a claim on its own initiative. To avoid multiple reviews of the same pleading, the court should not limit its initial review just to the claims against the party or parties who initiated the process. That is, although a request for a review may be initiated by a single party under Rules 2.1.01 (6) or 2.1.02 (2), if, on the initial review, the court determines that the claim may be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process in whole or in relation to more parties than just those who made the request, the court ought to broaden the inquiry at its own initiative. If it does so, the court should make careful note of the full breadth of review being undertaken in its call for submissions from the plaintiffs.

In my view, while the invitation to commence the Rule 2.1 review process may be made by or on behalf of a limited number of parties, the court ought to consider expanding the scope of the review under Rules 2.1.01 and 2.1.02 to avoid multiplicity and serial requests as has occurred in this case.”

P.Y. v. The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2020 ONSC 6660 (CanLII) at 8-10

“The court’s authority to make retroactive support orders is contained in clause 34 (1) (f) of the Family Law Act. This clause reads as follows:

Powers of court

34      (1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,

…….(f) requiring that support be paid in respect of any period before the date of the order;

Any support claimed after an application is issued is prospective support, not retroactive support. See: Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.).

In Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, the court set out the framework that should be applied for applications to retroactively increase support in paragraph 114 as follows:

a)  The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.

b)   Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.

c)   Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.

d)  The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.

e)   Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

This framework in Colucci addresses a request to retroactively increase the support contained in an order or an agreement. Courts have found that this framework should also be applied, with necessary modifications, for an original request for retroactive support. See: M.A. v. M.E., 2021 ONCJ 555; A.E. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189.

In an original application for retroactive support, there will be no need to meet the threshold requirement of establishing a material change in circumstances, as required in Colucci. The first step will be to determine the presumptive date of retroactivity as described in Colucci. The second step will be to determine if the court should depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors will guide the exercise of that discretion, as described in Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 25. The third step will be to quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the guidelines.

Effective notice is defined as any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount needs to be renegotiated. All that is required is for the subject to be broached. Once that has been done, the payor can no longer assume that the status quo is fair. See: D.B.S., par. 12

Retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations. See: Michel, par. 25.

Retroactive child support is a debt. There is no reason why it should not be awarded unless there are strong reasons not to do so. See: Michel, par. 132.

Retroactive awards are not exceptional. They can always be avoided by proper payment. See: D.B.S., par. 97.

In Michel, at paragraph 121, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the importance of support payors meeting their support obligations and commented that the neglect or underpayment of support is strongly connected to child poverty and female poverty.”

Mpamugo v. Nyeche-Woluchor, 2022 ONCJ 488 (CanLII) at 49-58

“My general impression is that litigants too often think that the goal is to have a trial, when the goal is to resolve the issues by various means, of which trials are the last option. They need to know that settlement is a valid and the preferred option. The settlement rate is very high. Relatively few cases get to trial. There are various reasons for this. In a case such as this where the issues are financial, once the required disclosure is made in the prescribed forms, unresolved matters can be identified and dealt with and the answers become clearer. The cost/benefit analysis and other considerations militate against continued litigation, and especially trial. I encourage counsel to impress this upon their clients.

As for delay, recent statistics show that a trial in this matter would be months, perhaps even a year or more, away. There is plenty of time before then in which to hold settlement conferences even after a trial date is scheduled.”

            Hakim v. Hakim, 2022 ONSC 6051 (CanLII) at 27-28

“L.M.P v. L.S., 2011 SCC 64 (CanLII), [2011] 3 SCR 775 remains the leading authority for the correct approach to determine whether there has been a change in circumstances which warrants a review of a spousal support order under section 17(1) of the Divorce Act R.S.C., 1985, c.3 (2^nd Supp.)  (‘the Act”). The long established definition of a change in circumstances refers to a “material” change that “if known at the time would likely have resulted in different terms.”   This definition, first found in Willick v Willick, 1994 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670, a child support variation was adopted for variations of spousal support in G.(L)v. B. (G), 1995 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 370. (See L.M.P. at para. 30).

A section 17 variation inquiry begins with the presumption that the existing order’s terms complied with the objectives of the Act when it was made. (See L.M.P.at para. 33). This means the initial focus of the inquiry is on the nature and sufficiency of the change to determine whether the threshold test for a variation consideration has been satisfied by the moving party. The change must be enduring. If the moving party discharges this threshold onus, then the context and magnitude of the change will shape the scope of the inquiry, as well as the remedy. In this sense, L.M.P. guides us away from a rigid approach, which describes the hearing as either de novo or not, towards a more fluid approach regarding the proper scope of the hearing, driven by the unique facts of each case. (See L.M.P.at para. 47).

As noted by the court in L.M.P., a parties’ agreement is not ignored under section 17 but its treatment will be different than in the context of an initial application under section 15(2) because of the different purposes for each provision. (See L.M.P. at para 27).”

            Mckinnon v. Mckinnon, 2022 ONSC 6036 (CanLII) at 23-25

“Sections 5 and 37 of the Trustee Act, RSO 1990 c. T23, specifically allow the court to order that a trustee or personal representative be removed upon any ground upon which the court may remove any other trustee, and appoint a new trustee in substitution.  The relevant parts of these sections read as follows:

5(1) The Superior Court of Justice may make an order for the appointment of a new trustee . . . in substitution for . . . any existing trustee.

37 (1) The Superior Court of Justice may remove a personal representative upon any ground upon which the court may remove any other trustee, and may appoint some other proper person or persons to act in the place of the executor or administrator so removed.

Justice Quinn in Radford v. Wilkins, 2008 CanLII 45548 (ONSC), summarized the relevant factors to be considered when an application is brought to remove a trustee pursuant to the Trustee Act.  Although Quinn J. was dealing with a request to remove an estate trustee in that case, his analysis equally applies in the context of requests to remove any trustee.  He said:

     jurisdiction to remove

[97]   The Superior Court of Justice has inherent jurisdiction to remove trustees: see St. Joseph’s Health Centre v. Dzwiekowski, 2007 CanLII 51347 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 4641 (S.C.J.) at para. 25.

[98]   In addition, the Superior Court of Justice may remove a personal representative “and may appoint some other proper person or persons to act in the place of the executor . . . so removed”: see s. 37(1) of the Trustee Act.

     by whom to be brought

[99]   An application to remove an executor may be made by “any person interested in the estate of the deceased”: see s. 37(3) of the Trustee Act.

     choice of estate trustee not to be lightly interfered with

[100] “The Court should not lightly interfere with the discretion exercised by a person in choosing the person or persons to act as his executors and trustees”: see Re Weil, 1961 CanLII 157 (ON CA), [1961] O.R. 888 at 889 (C.A.).[14]

     clear necessity for removal must be established

[101] Interfering “with the discretion and choice of a person in preparing his last will and testament must be not only well justified but . . . must amount to a case of clear necessity”: see Re Weil, ibid.

     removal must be the only course to follow

[102] Removal of an estate trustee should only occur “on the clearest of evidence that there is no other course to follow”: see Crawford v. Jardine, [1997] O.J. No. 5041 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) at para. 18, citing Re Tempest (1866), L.R. 1 Ch. 485 and Re Owen (1989), 33 E.T.R. 213 at 215 (B.C.S.C.).

     removal to be guided by welfare of beneficiaries

[103] In deciding whether to remove an estate trustee, “the court’s main guide should be the welfare of the beneficiaries”: see Crawford v. Jardine, ibid, citing Letterstedt v. Broers (1884), 9 App. Cas. 371 at 385-387 and Re Anderson (1928), 35 O.W.N. 7 at 8 (H.C.J.).

     non-removal must likely prevent proper execution of trust

[104] “It is not every mistake or neglect of duty on the part of the trustees which will lead to their removal. It must be shown by the applicant that the non-removal of the trustee will likely prevent the trust from being properly executed”: see Crawford v. Jardine, ibid.

[105] “[I]t is not indeed every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees, which will induce Courts of Equity to [remove trustees]. But the acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to shew a want of honesty or a want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity”: see Letterstedt v. Broers, ibid, quoting s. 1289 of Story’s Equity Jurisprudence.

     removal not intended to punish past misconduct

[106] “The authorities are, I believe, consistent in placing the emphasis on the future administration of the estate, and the risks to which it will be exposed if the trustee remains in office. The question is whether the trust estate is likely to be administered properly in accordance with the fiduciary duties of the trustee and with due regard to the interests and welfare of the beneficiaries. The sanction of removal is intended not to punish trustees for past misconduct but rather to protect the assets of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries”: see St. Joseph’s Health Centre v. Dzwiekowski, supra, at para. 28.

[107] But, “past misconduct that is likely to continue will often be sufficient to justify removal . . .”: see St. Joseph’s Health Centre v. Dzwiekowski, supra, at para. 29.

     delay by estate trustee

[108] Where delay is the complaint, the question becomes whether the delay has compromised the estate in any manner and whether it will be repeated.

[109] As well, have the delays been reasonably explained and, if so, should they be excused?

     friction alone not a reason for removal

[111] “. . . friction alone is not itself a reason for the removal of trustees”: see Re Joss (1973), 2 O.R. 128 (H.C.J.) at para. 8, citing Letterstedt v. Broers, ibid.

[112] “The question is whether it would be difficult for the trustee to act with impartiality, not whether, in fact, [the trustee] would or would not do so”: see Re Shaw Co. Ltd, 1922 CanLII 97 (SK QB), [1922] 68 D.L.R. 616 (Sask. K.B.), citing In re Lamb; Ex parte Board of Trade, [1894] 2 Q.B. 805 per Lord Esher, M.R.

[113] Friction between co-estate trustees is likely to warrant the removal of either or both of them because it is prone to impact the decision-making process. However, this is a more remote likelihood where the friction is between a trustee and a truculent beneficiary. Of course, in either case, the friction must be of such a nature or degree that it prevents, or is likely to prevent, the proper administration of the trust.”

            Chartrand v. Ebokem, 2022 ONSC 5990 (CanLII) at 22-23

“In cases where a parent blames the child’s lack of co-operation for their own failure to comply with a court order directing that a child spend specific parenting time with the other parent, judges have repeatedly said that it is a parent’s obligation to do what is reasonable and necessary to secure the child’s compliance. A parent has an obligation to actively require the child to comply with the order by exhortation, reward, and even the threat of discipline, much like a parent would if a child was refusing to attend school. Reasoning with the child has been found to be insufficient and is a breach of the access order. There is a positive obligation on a parent to ensure that a child complies with the order. See: Haywood v. Haywood (2010), 94 R.F.L. (6^th) 396 (Ont. S.C.J.), Stuyt v. Stuyt (2009), 71 R.F.L. (6^th) 441 (Ont. S.C.J.), Geremia v. Harb, 2007 CarswellOnt 446 (Ont. S.C.J.), and Godard v. Godard (2015), 2015 CarswellOnt 11572, 65 R.F.L. (7^th) 265 (Ont. C.A.)

The law does not accept that a 13-year-old’s views about access are determinative. It is not acceptable for a party to say that there has been (little or) no access because their 13-year-old child is choosing not to see the other parent. Parents governed by access orders cannot simply leave access up to the children. See: McClintock v. Karam, 2017 ONSC 6633 at paras 38 and 39.

In other words, children have a voice in family court proceedings, but not a veto. Their views and preferences are just one factor considered in the assessment of what parenting plan is ultimately in their best interest. See Section 24 (2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act.”

          Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2019 ONSC 6158 (CanLII) at 13-15

“The necessity that there be a finding of a material change in circumstances as a prerequisite to an examination of the merits of an application to vary an existing custody or access order was recently confirmed by Pazaratz J. in F.K. v. A.K., 2020 ONSC 3726, and by Ryan Bell J. in Joachim v. Joachim, 2021 ONSC 8584 at para. 34.

Where a party seeks a change in support provisions, the test for material change is less than one for changes in custody or parenting, but it is still a significant one:  Pustai v. Pustai, 2018 ONCA 785; L.M.P. v. L.S., 2011 SCC 64.

…

Both parties make accusations against the other respecting their ability to communicate in Brody’s best interests.  Unfortunately, this is not a novel issue.  Their antagonism pre-existed the agreed Minutes of Settlement which were crystallized in the Order of Gordon J.

Each has presented a blizzard of affidavits trading insults and constituting a catalog of petty grievances against the other, recounting a dispiriting parade of minor incidents, such as the acrimony about a wart on Brody’s toe, or an earache, or a birthday cake.

These do not amount to a material change in circumstances.  None justify an alteration in the arrangements previously agreed to by the parties and prescribed on consent in the Order of July 11, 2019.  I do not accept the contention of the applicant that there has been a material change in circumstances due to the respondent’s inability to meet Brody’s needs in a timely and effective manner as a result of her animosity towards the applicant, and that this was not foreseen at the time that the parties signed Final Minutes of Settlement and obtained the Order on consent.  Both parties have engaged in a “tit-for-tat” series of recriminations.  An absence of maturity on the part of both parties, or a desire of one to control the other, does not warrant a finding of a material change in circumstances or a variation in the Order.”

            Stevenson v. Hargreaves, 2022 ONSC 5971 (CanLII) at 11-12, 14-16

“Section 4(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act, RS.O. 1990, c. S.26. provides:

Subject to subsection (3) and to sections 5 and 6, a will is not valid unless,

(a) at its end it is signed by the testator or by some other person in his or her presence and by his or her direction;

(b) the testator makes or acknowledges the signature in the presence of two or more attesting witnesses present at the same time; and

(c) two or more of the attesting witnesses subscribe the will in the presence of the testator.

To meet the requirements of s. 4(2) of the Succession Law Reform Act, the onus is on the propounder of the will – Barbara – to establish that Larry signed the will in the presence of the two witnesses, Brenda and Joy, who were present at the same time, and that the witnesses then signed in Larry’s presence: Vout v. Hay, at para. 19: 1995 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 876.

Medical evidence can be relied upon with respect to the validity of the execution of a will: see Sware v. Welda Estate, at paras. 16, 36, and 54: 1999 ABQB 79.”

            Riddle v. Nielsen, 2022 ONSC 5895 (CanLII) at 11-13

“In the recent decision of Stewart and Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2020 ONSC 4850, Justice Shelston of this court made the following statement: “Family law litigants are responsible and accountable for the positions they take in the litigation.”

I agree.  Subject to the rare exception, a party to a family law case must be held responsible for the costs of the decisions and position they take in that litigation.  Responsibility for the positions taken are one thing, however.  The time and resources the other party expends for which costs are claimed are another.

In Moon v. Sher, 2004 CanLII 39005 (Ont. C.A.), Borins J.A. wrote that where a lawyer expends four times the work to achieve a result than what might be seen as reasonable, that is between the lawyer and the client.  However, it would not be reasonable to expect the unsuccessful party to pay those costs, nor would it be reasonable for that party to expect to pay (at para. 33).”

            Capar v. Vujnovic, 2022 ONSC 5920 (CanLII) at 14-16