“The appellant submits that the trial judge erred by placing an onus on her to establish that equal parenting was not in the children’s best interests. She relies on the trial judge’s reference to Folahan v. Folahan, 2013 ONSC 2966, [2013] W.D.F.L. 4357, where the trial judge said that the onus is on a parent to rebut the presumption of equal time. As this court said in Rigillo v. Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 647, 31 R.F.L. (8th) 361, at para. 13, the maximum contact principle does not necessarily require equal parenting time.
The Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) in force at the time of the trial addressed the maximum contact principle:
16(10) In making an order under this section, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact.
The current provision of Divorce Act, is more direct:
16(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
The Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, provided:
20 (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Part, a child’s parents are equally entitled to custody of the child.
The trial judge applied these principles and did not mistake maximum parenting time with equal time. Nor did she place an onus on the appellant to rebut equal parenting time. Her reasons, read as a whole, demonstrate that she was alive to the principle that a child-focused approach to achieving as much parenting time as possible with each parent is the objective of the maximum contact principle. It may end up being equal time. It may not. Each family is different, and the principle is a guide set out to benefit children.”