Month: January 2023

“Recent case law in connection with vaccinations in general and COVID-19 in particular, stand for the proposition that the Court is permitted to take judicial notice of the ongoing pandemic and the safety of mRNA vaccines.  Saint-Phard v. Saint-Phard, 2021 ONSC 6910; OMS v. KJS, 2021 SKQB 243 and TRB v. KWPB, 2021 ABQB 997. In these cases the courts were presented with significant documentation from publicly accessible government sources to take judicial notice of facts relating to COVID-19 and the PFIzer-BioNTech vaccine.

The information from Ontario Health suggests that there are indeed vaccinated people contracting the Omicron version of COVID-19.  Data from the Public Health Agency of Canada found that Canadians with two doses of the vaccine were 19 times less likely to be hospitalized that those unvaccinated and a booster provides even more protection.”

         L.M. v. C.O., 2022 ONSC 394 (CanLII) at 18-19

“In Gray v. Rizzi, 2016 ONCA 152 (CanLII), the Ontario Court of Appeal addressed the principles to be applied when a support payor moves to retroactively change a support obligation based on a reduction in income as follows at para. 56-59:

First, when applying the adapted D.B.S. principles on a motion to retroactively vary child support, one must always keep in mind the ultimate issue: namely, the best interests of the child: DiFrancesco, at para. 24. As Chappel J. stated, “Ultimately, the goal in addressing child support issues is to ensure that children benefit from the support they are owed when they are owed it, and any incentives for payor parents to be deficient in meeting their child support obligations should be eliminated.”

Next, a court should distinguish cases where a payor seeks relief from payment of arrears based on current inability to pay from those where arrears accumulated due to a change in the payor’s circumstances that affected the payor’s ability to make the child support payments when they came due.

A payor’s request for relief from payment of arrears based on a current inability to pay generally will not result in the rescission or reduction of arrears unless the payor has established, on a balance of probabilities, that he cannot and will not ever be able to pay the arrears. Evidence that the recipient agreed to non-payment of the support is irrelevant, as child support is the right of the child and cannot be bargained away by the recipient parent.

Where, however, the payor demonstrates that a change in circumstances took place during the time that arrears were accumulating which rendered the payor unable to make child support payments for a substantial period of time, the court may provide relief by varying the child support order or rescinding arrears. … [the court] may determine that it is appropriate to retroactively suspend enforcement of the support order during the time when the payor was unable to pay, or decrease the amount of child support owed during that time and reduce or rescind the arrears owing accordingly. [emphasis added]

While there is no fixed formula a court must follow when exercising its discretion in this circumstance, the following factors should guide a court in determining whether to grant retroactive relief, the date of retroactivity, and the quantum of relief:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. The nature of the obligation to support, whether contractual, statutory or judicial;
            2. The ongoing needs of the support recipient and the child;
            3. Whether there is a reasonable excuse for the payor’s delay in applying for relief;
            4. The ongoing financial capacity of the payor and, in particular, his ability to make payments towards the outstanding arrears;
            5. The conduct of the payor, including whether the payor has made any voluntary payments on account of arrears, whether he has cooperated with the support enforcement authorities, and whether he has complied with obligations and requests for financial disclosure from the support recipient. As stated by Chappel J.: “Behaviour that indicates wilful non-compliance with the terms of the order or failure to work cooperatively to address the child support issue is a factor that militates against even partial rescission or reduction of arrears”;
            6. Delay on the part of the support recipient, even a long delay, in enforcing the child support obligation does not, in and of itself, constitute a waiver of the right to claim arrears; and
            7. Any hardship that may be occasioned by a retroactive order reducing arrears or rescinding arrears, or by an order requiring the payment of substantial arrears. As put by Chappel J.: “[I]f a retroactive order reducing child support would result in the child support recipient having to repay money to the child support payor, this may militate against making the order, particularly if the payor has not given the recipient notice of the change in their circumstances, has not provided appropriate disclosure to support their claim for an adjustment to the child support, or has delayed initiating court proceedings to change the order.”[emphasis added]

(See Gray at para. 60.)

If a retroactive reduction of child support is appropriate in light of these factors and any other relevant considerations, the court must determine the date from which the reduction should take place and the extent of the reduction: See Deneau v. Scott, 2016 ONCJ 300 (CanLII).”

Jackson v. Jackson, 2019 ONSC 448 (CanLII) at 18-20

“Before I turn to the facts and issues, and for the benefit of the profession, I comment on counsel’s use of CaseLines in this case.  The moving parties have uploaded 56 separate documents to CaseLines.  The responding party has uploaded 175 separate documents.  Many of the individually uploaded documents are exhibits to affidavits.  Many cases are also uploaded individually.  Some documents exceed 500 pages.

I appreciate that the use of CaseLines remains relatively new for counsel and the Court.  There are inconsistencies in how it is used.  In every case, materials must be uploaded with a view to ensuring they are usable by the Court.  Justice Dunphy recently commented on this problem which he described as “endemic”: Basaraba v. Bridal Image Inc., 2021 ONSC 8083 at para 26.  The reality for most judges and associate judges is that they cannot scroll through a list of hundreds of documents in CaseLines in search of a specific document, then click in and click out of those documents for the evidence or authorities to which counsel seeks to direct the Court.

When we relied on paper documents, evidence would be in a single motion record, and authorities would be in a single book of authorities (although often with multiple volumes), with appropriate tabs.  In contrast, in this case and others I have heard, hundreds of documents were uploaded. Notably, exhibits were not uploaded with the affidavit and hyperlinked within the affidavit.  They were uploaded individually. To find an exhibit and marry it up with the appropriate affidavit, I was required to search the complete list of documents that were uploaded.  CaseLines allows only two documents to be viewed at the same time.    Documents that exceeded 500 pages would freeze as I scrolled through them.

I am not advocating for a return to paper documents.  CaseLines is a powerful technological tool.  With it, both counsel and the judiciary can take advantage of its many features to save time and resources.  Like me, many of my colleagues seek to maximize its functionality.  But to do so, counsel are required to use CaseLines properly which requires greater effort on their part.

In particular, I direct counsel to a document titled, CaseLines Hearings – Tips for Counsel and Self-represented Parties”, found at: CaseLines Hearings – Tips for Counsel and Self-represented Parties | Superior Court of Justice (ontariocourts.ca).  Tip 5 In this document states:

Affidavits with attached exhibits should be uploaded in one PDF document with hyperlinks from the affidavit to the exhibits for ease of reference.  Similarly, where a Book of Authorities is provided to the court, it should be uploaded as a single PDF document with a table of contents hyperlinked to the cases contained in it.  This will assist the judicial official in easily locating the exhibits and/or caselaw.  A party’s factum can also be linked to caselaw in publicly available on-line sources such as CanLII, where available.

When uploading a document to CaseLines, ensure the document is under 500 pages in length.  This will allow you to avoid issues with your document freezing while scrolling during your hearing.  As such, if a document such as a book of authorities is loner than 500 pages, it should be broken down into Book of Authorities Vol. 1, Book of Authorities Vol 2, etc. to remain under the maximum number of pages.

In addition, when preparing PDF documents, counsel should bookmark the relevant sections, tabs, or exhibits within a PDF document before uploading them to CaseLines.  It is my practice to download from CaseLines the PDF versions of documents.  I know some of my colleagues do as well, but not all.  If the relevant sections are bookmarked, it assists with finding material within a PDF document.  For example, it is of no use to identify in a factum a case found at a tab of a Book of Authorities, if those tabs have not been created by way of bookmarks in the PDF document.

Had these steps been taken by counsel in this case, the time required to dispose of this time-sensitive injunction motion would have been reduced. Other cases similarly waiting for disposition could have been dealt with sooner.  Counsel must accept responsibility in assisting the Court, and the consequent delays on the administration of justice when they fail to do so.”

         Parekh et al v. Schecter et al, 2022 ONSC 302 (CanLII) at 3-9

“The applicant’s second argument is that a material change in circumstance is not required to vary a temporary without prejudice order. I was not directed to any authority that spoke to variation under s. 25(1) of the Family Law Act in these circumstances, however, I take guidance from those spousal support cases where the court looked at the question of whether a material change is needed to vary temporary without prejudice orders. See D. (E.) v. D. (D.), [2012] O.J. No. 5586, 2012 ONSC 6689, 2012 CarswellOnt 14841 (S.C.J.) and Kahsai v. Hagos, [2015] O.J. No. 3337, 2015 ONSC 3900, supp. reasons [2015] O.J. No. 4764, 2015 ONSC 5756 (S.C.J.) where the court held that the moving party was not required to meet the substantial change in circumstances test. I adopt that approach here. I also agree with and adopt the words of Price J. in Ceho v. Ceho, [2015] O.J. No. 4505, 2015 ONSC 5285 (S.C.J.), at para. 86 where he said, “The very expression ‘without prejudice’ is intended to preserve the position of each party. It would be rendered meaningless if the temporary temporary order, in fact, prejudiced the party who consented to it, by imposing on that party a higher threshold of proof in the future, and requiring him or her to prove a material change of circumstances.” Although Ceho was a custody case and the order in question was a temporary without prejudice consent order that the court regarded as a temporary temporary order, I find the words of Price J. equally applicable to the situation here. Each party had their reasons for consenting to the terms of Smith J.’s order, all of which were temporary and said to be without prejudice. If proof of material change is required at this stage of a proceeding, I fear it would dampen the usefulness of temporary without prejudice orders as important interim settlement tools that allow the parties to move forward with their case and their lives.”

         Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2021 ONSC 274 (CanLII) at 26

“In the case of A.M. v. C.H., 2018 ONSC 6472, Nicholson J. reviewed some of the relevant considerations when assessing the credibility of a witness commencing at para 88:

[88]   In Christakos v. De Caires, 2016 ONSC 702, 2016 CarswellOnt 1433, at para. 10, I summarized some aspects of the credibility assessment as set out in Re Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283 (CanLII), 269 N.S.R. (2d) 84, at paras. 36-37:

                    There are many tools for assessing credibility:

a) The ability to consider inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness’ evidence, which includes internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, inconsistencies between the witness’ testimony and the testimony of other witnesses.

b) The ability to review independent evidence that confirms or contradicts the witness’ testimony.

c) The ability to assess whether the witness’ testimony is plausible or, as stated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), 1951 CarswellBC 133, it is “in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical [and] informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”, but in doing so I am required not to rely on false or frail assumptions about human behaviour.

d) It is possible to rely upon the demeanour of the witness, including their sincerity and use of language, but it should be done with caution ( v. Mah, 2002 NSCA 99 (CanLII) [at paras.] 70-75).

e) Special consideration must be given to the testimony of witnesses who are parties to proceedings; it is important to consider the motive that witnesses may have to fabricate evidence.  v. J.H.,2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No.39 (OCA) [at paras.] 51-56).  There is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness’ testimony in its entirety. On the contrary, a trier may believe none, part or all of a witness’ evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness’ evidence. (See R. v. D.R.1996 CanLII 207 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291 at [para.] 93 and R. v. J.H. supra). [Emphasis omitted.]”

         Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 2022 ONSC 158 (CanLII) at 42

“Section 19(1)(a) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 permits the court to impute additional income where a spouse is intentionally underemployed:

19 (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:

(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse;

This section was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.). The trial judge referred to Drygala v. Pauli and correctly observed that in order to find intentional underemployment and impute income to a parent, there is no need to find a specific intent to evade child support obligations. He also noted that in order for parents to meet the legal obligation to support their children, they must earn what they are capable of earning.

There is no requirement of bad faith or intention to evade support obligations inherent in intentional underemployment: Drygala v. Pauli, at paras. 24-37. The reasons for underemployment are irrelevant. If a parent is earning less than she or he could be, he or she is intentionally underemployed.”

Lavie v. Lavie, 2018 ONCA 10 at 23-24 & 26

“Counsel for mother argues that the court requires a trial in order to make a fair and just determination of the issues. He relies on Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316 (CanLII), a decision which directs courts of first instance to proceed with caution when entertaining a motion for summary judgment in a child protection matter, having regard to the fact that child protection litigation engages the Charter rights of both parents and the children. (See para 65).

In summarizing and clarifying the approach that courts should take to summary judgment in child protection proceedings Benotto J.A. sets out the following at paragraph 80;

1. Hryniak’s fairness principles for summary judgment must be applied recognizing the distinctive features of a child protection proceeding. In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial the court must exercise caution and apply the objectives of the CYFSA including the best interests of the child.
2. The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment. Although, r. 16(4.1) sets out the obligation of the respondent to the motion to provide “in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” this does not shift the ultimate burden of proof. Even if the respondent’s evidence does not establish a genuine issue for trial, the court must still be satisfied on the evidence before it that the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.
3. The court must conduct a careful screening of the evidence to eliminate inadmissible evidence. The court should not give weight to evidence on a summary judgment motion that would be inadmissible at trial.
4. Judicial assistance must be provided for self-represented litigants. In particular, judges must engage in managing the matter and must provide assistance in accordance with the principles set out in the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) (online) established by the Canadian Judicial Council.
5. The special considerations that apply to Indigenous children must be part of every decision involving Indigenous children.

In Kawartha, one of the issues was whether and when the court may order access to a child in extended society care, under the newly formulated provisions in the CYFSA. The court concluded that the change in the legislation was not just about semantics but represents a significant shift in the approach to access in extended care. In elaborating on the change in relation to the burden of proof in such an inquiry, the court clarifies that the burden is no longer on the person requesting access to demonstrate that the relationship is beneficial and meaningful to the child and will in no way impair the child’s future adoption opportunities. The court concludes that it is no longer the case that a parent who puts forward no evidence will not gain access. I do not take this interpretation to mean that in other contexts, under this legislative scheme, a responding parent need not put forward any evidence in support of their position.

The burden of proof rests with the party who moves for summary judgment. (See Sanzone v. Schechter, 2016 ONCA 566 (CanLII) at para.30.) Under Rule 16(4) of the Family Law Rules the moving party must “set out specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.” The party must satisfy the judge that it is in the interest of justice that the case be decided summarily asking the appropriate questions. (See Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 at para.48.)

Rule 16 (4.1) then dictates how a party who wishes to resist summary judgment is to respond, as follows:

In response to the affidavit or other evidence served by the party making the motion, the party responding to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

In Sweda v. Egg Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 1200 (CanLII), 242 A.C.W.S. (3d) 794, affirmed 2014 ONCA 878 (CanLII), Corbett J. confirmed the continued applicability of the rules requiring the responding party to “put its best foot forward” or “lead trumps or risk losing”. Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch, 2011 ONCA 764 (CanLII) at para 56: Bhakhri, v. Valentin, 2012 CarswellOnt 6667 (S.C.J.), para. 7; Pizza v. Gillespie (1990), 1990 CanLII 4023 (ON SC). The judge is entitled to assume that the parties have put before her or him all of the evidence that they would be able to adduce at trial. See T. Hamilton and Son Roofing Inc. v. Markham (City), 2018 ONSC 2665 (CanLII) at para. 30.”

Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society v. J.B. et al., 2020 ONSC 448 (CanLII) at 91-96

“The Supreme Court of Canada stated the following in Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, commencing at para. 10:

[10]   In D.B.S., this Court endorsed certain important principles governing orders for child support (including retroactive child support) that merit restating here:

–         Child support is the right of the child, which right cannot be bargained away by the parents, and survives the breakdown of the relationship of the child’s parents (para. 38);

–         Child support should, as much as possible, provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together (para. 38);

–         The child support owed will vary based upon the income of the payor parent, and is not confined to furnishing the “necessities of life” (paras. 38‑45).

–         Retroactive awards are not truly “retroactive”, since they merely hold payors to the legal obligation they always had to pay support commensurate with their income (para. 2);

–         Retroactive awards are not confined to “exceptional circumstances” or “rare cases” (para. 5); and

–         In determining whether to make a retroactive award, the payor parent’s interest in certainty in his/her obligations must be balanced with the need for “fairness and . . . flexibility”. A court should consider whether the recipient parent’s delay in seeking retroactive support was reasonable in the circumstances, the conduct of the payor parent, the circumstances of the child, and the hardship the retroactive award might entail (para. 133).

The Supreme Court went on to state at para 32:

[32]   Retroactive child support awards will commonly be appropriate where payor parents fail to disclose increases in their income. Again, D.B.S. is instructive: “a payor parent who knowingly avoids or diminishes his/her support obligation to his/her children should not be allowed to profit from such conduct” (para. 107). And where the strategy for avoiding child support obligations takes the form of inadequate or delayed disclosure of income, the effect on the child support regime is especially pernicious. This is because the methodology adopted by the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97‑175, which are expressly incorporated in the FLA, results in information asymmetry. Apart from shared parenting arrangements, the Guidelines calculate child support payments solely from the payor parent’s income. At any given point in time, therefore, the payor parent has the information required to determine the appropriate amount of child support owing, while the recipient parent may not. Quite simply, the payor parent is the one who holds the cards. While an application‑based regime places responsibility on both parents in relation to child support (D.B.S., at para. 56), the practical reality is that, without adequate disclosure, the recipient parent will not be well‑positioned to marshall the case for variation.

…

The Supreme Court stated in Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, stated commencing at para. 4:

[4] The applicable framework must give effect to the objectives and provisions of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (“Guidelines”), particularly the core objective of safeguarding the child’s right to a “fair standard of support” (s. 1). Retroactive variation applications also require courts to weigh the certainty and predictability provided by an existing court order against the need for flexibility in a system that ties support to fluctuating payor income. The framework set out below balances these interests in a way that incentivizes payment of the right amount of child support when it is due and the timely disclosure of financial information — the linchpin of a just and effective family law system. Rules which create perverse incentives to ignore or postpone parental support obligations are to be firmly rejected in favour of legal standards designed with the fundamental purposes of child support in mind.

In Colucci, para. 34 the Supreme Court went on to state:

[34] The enactment of the Guidelines in 1997 marked a paradigm shift in Canadian child support law away from a need-based approach to one which clearly established the child’s entitlement to support commensurate with the payor’s income (D.B.S., at paras. 42-45). The Guidelines rest on the principle that “spouses have a joint financial obligation to maintain the children of the marriage in accordance with their relative abilities to contribute to the performance of that obligation” (Divorce Act, s. 26.1(2)). Section 3 of the Guidelines provides that the amount of child support is presumptively determined in accordance with the applicable table in Schedule I. Putting aside shared custody arrangements, the tables generally allow parents and courts to calculate the amount of child support owing based on just two numbers: the payor’s income, and the number of children to be supported…”

          Tyndall v. Tyndall, 2022 ONSC 131 (CanLII) at 61-62, 64-65

“Please, Please, Please…don’t use a police station for parenting exchanges.

If you think mere proximity to the cop shop will make unruly adults behave – or protect children from emotional harm – you should have sat in on any one of the 22 days of this nasty trial.

This was a motion to change a consent final order.  Except, clearly the parents never really regarded the order as final.  More like an interlude in a never-ending high-conflict war.  A strategic pause while they assembled better evidence for inevitable motions and cross-motions.

They love their son and hate each other.

They really love their son.

And really hate each other.

We delude ourselves if we think court orders will ever overcome such powerful and conflicting emotions.

1. 1. 1.    All we can really do is try to separate the good from the bad.
      2.    Promote more opportunities for the love.
      3.    And eliminate anyopportunities for the hate.

But routinely sending combative parents with their anguished children to a police station is an abdication of responsibility.

1. 1. 1.    It’s like assembling a bomb every week and driving it to the fire hall.
      2.    Sure, it’s nice to know first responders will be on the scene if there’s an explosion.
      3.    But why set the stage for predictable disaster?
      4.    Wouldn’t it make more sense to defuse the bomb ahead of time?  To keep volatile ingredients – volatile parents– as far apart as possible?

The “safety” rationale for police station exchanges is dubious at best.

1. 1. 1. The police aren’t equipped for this type of service.  The station is not a child-friendly environment.
      2. They don’t know you’re coming.
      3. They don’t want you there.
      4. They don’t know anything about you, or what to watch for.
      5. Generally, they’re so busy with other duties, they may not notice who’s doing what.
      6. At any given time, there may not even be a police officer anywhere in sight.

And if we’re choosing a location intended to intimidate adults – what about scaring the kids?

1. 1. 1. By the time high conflict couples make it to family court, their children have already been exposed to far too much chaos and upset.
      2. Many have experienced significant family violence (with its recently expanded definition).
      3. Painful memories of officers attending their home for family trouble calls may be triggered by the dramatic and hyper-stimulating stationhouse environment (the police cars, the uniforms, the guns, the crackling radios, the commotion, the people in crisis).
      4. We can’t undo the unhappiness these children experienced pre-separation.   But why perpetuate the trauma by exposing them to more negativity and upset in the strange and frightening environment of a police station lobby?
      5. These are emotionally vulnerable children who need rescue from parental conflict.  Not a ringside seat.

What message do police station exchanges convey to the innocent child?

1. 1. 1. That the trouble’s not over?
      2. That their world isn’t safe yet?
      3. That they still need to worry?
      4. That someone they love is dangerous or can’t be trusted?
      5. That something bad could happen every time their parents meet?
      6. That officers with weapons might have to intervene?
      7. That one of their parents might get taken away or hurt or punished?
      8. That every transition between parents will be anxiety-producing?
      9. How is a fragile young mind supposed to process so much upsetting information?

Candidly, far too little thought goes into selecting a police station for pick-ups and drop-offs.  It’s a simplistic, convenient default position.

1. 1. 1. It’s an option if you can’t think of anything else.
      2. It’s always open.  You don’t have to re-arrange your schedule
      3. It’s free.
      4. It’s quick.
      5. There’s no waiting list. It’s available instantly and for as long as you want.
      6. There’s no paperwork or pre-arrangement.
      7. There’s usually free parking or bus service.
      8. It requires little effort and not much parental insight or discipline.
      9. It’s open even during the pandemic.
      10. It checks off a lot of boxes for adults.

But how is any of this child-focused?

1. 1. 1. We are constantly told that the best interests of the child must always prevail over adult preference and convenience.
      2. Why then do we gravitate toward this obviously terrible option, simply because adults lack the creativity or commitment to work at better solutions?
      3. Should children suffer just because parents won’t put more effort into solving the problems they created?

As soon as police station exchanges are proposed, the response should be obvious:

1. 1. 1. If the level of conflict is so great that these parents need armed guards to keep the peace, they shouldn’t be having face-to-face contact anywhere.
      2. Even if actualmisconduct is averted, children who have been exposed to family violence will likely experience heightened anxiety whenever they see their parents together.  The presence of police officers isn’t calming.  To the contrary, it reinforces the child’s perception of imminent danger.

Why am I starting this judgment with such a strong warning?  Because this trial could have been avoided – and a four-year-old boy could have had a much happier life – if only the parents had selected an exchange location better than Hamilton Police Station 30.”

            K.M. v. J.R., 2022 ONSC 111 (CanLII) at 1-15

“Family law litigants are responsible not only for their litigation positions, but also for the financial consequences to both parties of funding those positions. A former spouse who engages in “win at all costs” litigation chooses to be as answerable for the resulting litigation fees to the other side as for one’s own fees.”

            S. v. A., 2022 ONSC 55 (CanLII) at 74