“The requirement that a judge give reasons for decision is clear. It is an inherent aspect of the discharge of a judge’s responsibilities. See R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 (CanLII), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, 162 C.C.C. (3d) 298. As Binnie J. noted at para. 24 of Sheppard:
[T]he requirement of reasons is tied to their purpose and the purpose varies with the context. At the trial level, the reasons justify and explain the result. The losing party knows why he or she has lost. Informed consideration can be given to grounds for appeal. Interested members of the public can satisfy themselves that justice has been done, or not, as the case may be.
The need for reasons in the family law context was recently affirmed by this court in Young v. Young (2003), 2003 CanLII 3320 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 112, [2003] O.J. No. 67 (C.A.). At para. 27 of Young, Laskin J.A., writing for the court, states:
The desirability of reasoned reasons in a criminal case rests on three main rationales: public confidence in the administration of the justice system, the importance of telling the losing party the reasons for having lost, and making the right of appeal meaningful. These three rationales also apply to a family law case and are relevant in this case.
I would reiterate the recent comments of this court in R. v. Tzarfin, 2005 CanLII 30045 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 3531, 201 O.A.C. 183 (C.A.), at para. 9:
[A]ppellate courts must not place an impossible burden on busy trial courts. An accused is entitled to adequate reasons, not perfect reasons.
This sentiment applies equally to the reasons of motion judges, including those deciding family law matters. Nonetheless, the appellant has been ordered to pay a substantial sum of money for a substantial period of time and he is entitled to know the basis for such an order.
Bodnar v. Blackman, 2006 CanLII 31803 (ON CA) at 10, 11 & 22