“A court should be loath to interfere with a pre-existing agreement unless it is convinced that the agreement does not comply substantially with the overall objectives of the Divorce Act: Miglin, at para. 46.
In Miglin, the following is stated regarding the discretion of trial judges to substitute their own view of what is required:
45 … The fact that judicial and societal understandings of spousal support have changed since the release of Pelech [v. Pelech, 1987 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801] and the adoption of admittedly competing factors in s. 15.2(6) does not lead to an unfettered discretion on the part of trial judges to substitute their own view of what is required for what the parties considered mutually acceptable. In this respect, we agree in principle with Wilson J.’s comments in Pelech, supra, at p. 853:
Where parties, instead of resorting to litigation, have acted in a mature and responsible fashion to settle their financial affairs in a final way and their settlement is not vulnerable to attack on any other basis, it should not, in my view, be undermined by courts concluding with the benefit of hindsight that they should have done it differently.”