Month: August 2018

“The mother filed a Government of Canada “Explore Careers – Wage Report” for lawyers.  That report discloses “wages” for lawyers, broken down by region, including Regina, Saskatchewan where the father currently lives and practises law.

According to that report, the low, median and high annual wagesfor lawyers in Regina are $55,182, $116,172 and $221,058, respectively.

Based on this report, the mother asks the court to impute income to the father in the amount of $50,000, being approximately the low end of that wage report, in recognition that this is father’s first year of practising as a lawyer.

In Caine v. Ferguson, 2012 ONCJ 139 (CanLII), Justice Stanley B. Sherr addressed the weight to be given to such survey reports.  At paragraph 32 of Justice Sherr’s reasons, he stated [my emphasis]:

In Rodrigues v. De Sousa, 2008 ONCJ 807 (CanLII), 69 R.F.L. (6th) 449, [2008] O.J. No. 4541, 2009 Cars­well­Ont 8979 (Ont. C.J.), I relied on the case of Scholes v. Scholes, 2003 CanLII 2349 (ON SC), 2003 CanLII 2349, 125 A.C.W.S. (3d) 313, [2003] O.J. No. 3432, 2003 Cars­well­Ont 3299 (Ont. S.C.) and permitted the introduction of reports from Ontario Job Futures and Statistics Canada as evidence of income levels for a payor in the insurance industry.  In these cases, the reports came directly from provincial and federal governments and had some indicia of reliability.  However, citing Isakhani v. Al-Saggaf, 2007 ONCA 539 (CanLII), 226 O.A.C. 184, 40 R.F.L. (6th) 284, [2007] O.J. No. 2922, 2007 Cars­well­Ont 4805 (Ont. C.A.), I expressed the need to exercise considerable caution in how much weight the court could attach to such documents as they were unsworn third-party statements that could not be tested by cross-examination.  In the specific circumstances of the payor in Rodrigues v. De Sousa, I did not apply the wage range set out in the government publications.”

Jahan v. Chowdhury, 2016 ONCJ 503 (CanLII) at 75-78

“The scheme of the [Family Law Act] does not support the proposition that an application judge can simply redistribute properties among the parties. To interpret the Act in this way would be inconsistent with its overall scheme, which gives a judge only a very limited power to distribute properties in the circumstances set out in s. 9. That is, section 9 gives the court the power to transfer properties only “if appropriate to satisfy an obligation imposed by the order [for the equalization of net family properties]”. In other words, the transfer power under section 9 is specificallyconnected to the satisfaction of the order for the equalization of net family properties rather than a generaltransfer power for the settlement of disputes arising from marital breakdown.

To a similar effect is the recent decision of this court in Thibodeau v. Thibodeau, 2011 ONCA 110 (CanLII), 104 O.R. (3d) 161. In that case, Blair J.A. endorsed this interpretation of the legislative scheme of the Family Law Act, albeit in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. As explained by Blair J.A. at para. 37, “[s]eparating spouses are not entitled to receive a division of property. … An equalization paymentis the chosen legislative default position”. He continued, at paras. 39 and 40, by observing that the enhanced remedies available under s. 9(1)can give rise to proprietary rights if the record justifies such an exception in the equalization payment regime, but only if a “real need” is shown.

Trial courts have consistently adopted this interpretation. One example is  Zadegan v. Zadegan, [2002] O.J. No. 2190 (S.C.J.), in which, after referring to the fact that the parties had provided her with proposals as to how their real properties might be distributed, J. Mackinnon J. held as follows, at paras. 90-92:

90      In this way, both parties have, in effect, asked the court to redistribute their assets, in order to achieve what each of them regards as the proper outcome. In my view, this is not the type of order that the court can make under the Family Law Act. That Act does not direct the court to redistribute assets in order to make an equal distribution. See Berdette v. Berdette(1991), 1991 CanLII 7061 (ON CA), 3 O.R. (3d) 513 (C.A.). Rather, it directs the court to determine the net family property of each spouse. Then, if one spouse’s net family property is less than that of the other, s. 5(1) provides for equalization. … [T]he powers of the court to give effect to the equalization are set out in s. 9(1):

…

91      Thus, while s. 9(1)(d) permits the court to transfer property in order to satisfy an obligation imposed by the order, this is not the same thing as rearranging ownership of assets. …

92      Accordingly, the court could order the transfer of an asset between the parties in order to satisfy an equalization payment, or part of it, but cannot order the transfer of various assets between the parties in order to bring about an equitable distribution of assets.

 

 Buttar v. Buttar, 2013 ONCA 517 (CanLII) at 53-55

“Following argument of this motion, counsel for the mother twice delivered a letter to me making further submissions. This was improper. Rule 1.09 provides that when a proceeding is pending before the court, no party to the proceeding and no party’s lawyer shall communicate about the proceeding with a judge, directly or indirectly unless all the parties consent in advance to the out of court communication or the court directs otherwise. I have disregarded the further submissions in coming to my decision in this matter.”

Timleck v. Beltrano, 2014 ONCA 585 at 28.

“Longstanding case law decided under the Fraudulent Conveyances Acthas addressed the issue of who is a “creditor or other” for the purpose of s. 2. In Hopkinson v. Westerman(1919), 45 O.L.R. 208 at p. 211, 48 D.L.R. 597 (C.A.), the court held that “others” extended to persons who, though not judgment creditors, had pending actions in which they were sure to recover damages. In that case, the person who transferred the land was a defendant in a tort action. In Bell v. Williamson, 1945 CanLII 95 (ON CA), [1945] O.R. 844, [1946] 1 D.L.R. 372 (C.A.), the court similarly held that the claimant need not be a judgment creditor at the time of the conveyance, but a person may fall within the words “or others” even if the person has, at the time of the impugned transaction, only a claim for unliquidated damages in contract or in tort. Robertson C.J.O. stated at p. 848 O.R.:

I do not doubt for a moment that a transaction may be null and void within s. 2of The Fraudulent Conveyances Act, although the plaintiff who brings the action attacking it may, at the time of the transaction, and even when action is brought attacking it, have had nothing more than a claim for unliquidated damages in contract or in tort. The effect of the words “or others” following the word “creditors” is to give to such persons a right of action to have a transaction set aside as null and void as against them, if made with the required intent. . . .

This interpretation of the phrase “creditors or others” has been applied many times including in the family law context: See for example: Shephard v. Shephard(1925), 56 O.L.R. 556, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 897 (C.A.); Ferguson v. Lastewka, 1946 CanLII 96 (ON SC), [1946] O.R. 577, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 531 (H.C.J.); Oliver v. McLaughlin(1893), 24 O.R. 41 (Q.B.); Murdoch v. Murdoch(1976), 1976 CanLII 260 (AB QB), 26 R.F.L. 1, 1 A.R. 378 (T.D.);Chan v. Chan, [1993] B.C.J. No. 442 (S.C.); and Lepore v. Lepore, [1998] O.J. No. 733 (Dist. Ct.), affd by Ontario Court of Appeal (October 22, 1990).

Therefore, in order for a spouse to qualify as a person who is intended to be protected from conveyances of property made with intent to defeat her interest, she must have had an existing claim against her husband at the time of the impugned conveyances, that is a right which she could have asserted in an action.”

Stone v. Stone, 2001 CanLII 24110 (ON CA) at 23-25

“The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis 2005 CanLII 1625 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 275 sets out the following principles in determining whether a joint custody order is appropriate:

1. There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.
2. It can’t be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication.
3. Just because both parents are fit does not mean that joint custody should be ordered.
4. The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint custody.
5. No matter how detailed the custody order there will always be gaps and unexpected situations, and when they arise they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis.
6. The younger the child, the more important communication is.

Joint custody should not be ordered where there is poor communication and the parties fundamentally disagree on too many issues affecting the child’s best interests. See: Graham v. Butto, 2008 ONCA 260 (CanLII); Roy v. Roy2006 Canlii 2006 CanLII 15619 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 1872 (Ont. C.A.).

Courts do not expect communication between separated parties to be easy or comfortable, or free of conflict. A standard of perfection is not required, and is obviously not achievable. See: Griffiths v. Griffiths 2005 ONCJ 235 (CanLII), 2005 CarswellOnt 3209 (OCJ). The issue is whether a reasonable measure of communication and cooperation is in place, and is achievable in the future, so that the best interests of the child can be ensured on an ongoing basis. See:Warcop v. Warcop, 2009 CanLII 6423 (ON SC), 2009 CanLII 6423 (Ont. SCJ.).

Where a conflict between parents (such as an inability to communicate effectively) is primarily the fault of oneparent, that parent should not be able to use the conflict as justification to oppose a joint or shared parenting order. To do so allows an obdurate parent to engineer a result in his or her favour.  However, where the conflict is extreme and there is substantial blame to be leveled against both parents, a joint or shared custody approach is not appropriate. See: Geremia v. Harb 2008 CanLII 19764 (ON SC), 2008 Canlii 19764 (Ont. S.C).

In recent years, there has been more willingness to grant joint custody where such an order is necessary to preserve the balance of power between the parents, especially where one parent has been primarily responsible for the conflictual relationship:  See:  Garrow v. Woycheshen, 2008 ONCJ 686 (CanLII), 2008 ONCJ 686, (Ont. C.J.); Hsiung v. Tsioutsioulas, 2011 ONCJ 517 (CanLII).”

G.T.B. v. Z.B.B.,2014 ONCJ 382 (CanLII) at 23-27

“Although a child’s wishes, particularly the wishes of a child of S.’s age, should certainly be considered by a court prior to making an access order, once the court has determined that access is in the child’s best interests a parent cannot leave the decision to comply with the access order up to the child. As stated by the motion judge, Ontario courts have held consistently that a parent “has some positive obligation to ensure a child who allegedly resists contact with the access parent complies with the access order: Quaresma v. Bathurst, (2008), O.J. NO. 4734 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para.8. See also Campo v. Campo, 2015 ONSC 1349; Stuyt v. Stuyt, 2009 CanLII 43948 (Ont. S.C.); Stuyt v. Stuyt, 2009 CanLII 43948 (Ont. S.C.); and Hatcher v. Hatcher, [2009] O.J. No. 1343 (Ont. Sup.Ct.).”

Godard v. Godard, 2015 ONCA 568 at 28