“Although on a temporary motion, courts should be cautious against ordering a disruption to the status quo, that is not to say there is a strict presumption in favour of the status quo. Each case turns on its own particular facts, and in this matter although I considered the status quo, the court is mindful of parties who have imposed a status quo through unilateral decisions and without consulting or obtaining the consent of the other party, as is the case in the matter at bar. In L.M.B. v. F.J.D., 2020 ONCJ 239, at para. 31, Cheung J. writes:
The legal status quo is not a status quo created by one party unilaterally taking matters into their own hands, without any consent from the other party. (See Batsinda v. Batsinda, 2013 ONSC 7899 (CanLII), [2013] O.J. No. 6120 (Ont. S.C.J.), paragraph 28 and Kimpton v. Kimpton, [2002] O.J. 5367 (Ont. S.C.J.), paragraph 1).
In this matter, the court is dealing with a determination of what interim parenting schedule is in the children’s best interests more than two years after the separation. It is undisputed that the children have been in the respondent’s primary care since separation. However, it is clear to the court (and an undisputed fact) that the respondent has “imposed” or “directed” the schedule because she believes that it is in the children’s best interests. In my view, it is inappropriate for the mother to rely on the length of time this imposed schedule has been in place as a reason that it should not be disrupted prior to a trial. This schedule was never arrived at “on consent”. In this situation, continuing to delay a change in residential arrangements until trial is not appropriate: see J.D. v. N.D., 2020 ONSC 7965, at paras 17-23, and Ma.M. v. A.W.M., 2019 ONSC 2128.”