“In Skinner v. Skinner, the Court described the following principles respecting the variation of a consent order citing the Supreme Court of Canada in L.M.P. v. L.S. (paras. 172 to 174):
(a) The Court must be satisfied that there has been a change of circumstance since the making of the prior order (or in this case the Agreement);
(b) The “change of circumstances” must be “material” meaning that “if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms”;
(c) The focus is on the prior order (or in this case the Agreement) and the circumstances in which it was made;
(d) The Court should not depart from it lightly. The test is whether any given change “would likely have resulted in different terms”;
(e) What will amount to a material change will depend on the actual circumstances of the parties at the time of the order; and,
(f) The subsequent conduct of the parties may provide an indication.
L.M.P. v. L.S also stands for the general provision that where there is a material change in circumstances clause in an agreement, the Court must examine the terms of the separation agreement and the circumstances of the parties at the time of the agreement to determine what amounts to a material change.”