“The grandparents Ms. and Mr. Hameed in this matter in arguing the importance of preserving their relationship with Sydney, presented a number of decisions set out below that emphasized that deference to a parent should only be shown if that parent’s decisions are reasonable. They suggest that Alicia’s actions and decisions in blocking contact with Sydney should be seen as unreasonable.
The grandparents argue that while courts frequently cite Chapman as their legal starting point in a grandparent access case, they often distinguish it and order access, or interpret it as suggested in McLaughlin v. Huehn, 2004 ONCJ 426 (CanLII), 2004 ONCJ 426 (Ont. C.J.) (Quicklaw or CanLII). In that case, McSorley, J. interpreted Chapman to mean that courts are to show deference to parental decisions where such decisions are reasonable. The judge wrote:
27 The case of Chapman v. Chapman and Chapman does not stand for the proposition that the wishes of a parent on the issue of access by a member of the extended family should take precedence over the factors in section 24 of the Act. It is but one factor that must be considered. It is always important to defer to the decisions of parents regarding their children. But deference is only accorded when those decisions are reasonable. When the decision to end all contact between a child who has a positive relationship with grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins and great aunts and grandmothers is made entirely because of hurt feelings from 3 to 5 years ago, then the decision is not reasonable and is no longer entitled to deference.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Simmons v. Simmons, 2016 CarswellNS 1017 (N.S. C.A.) noted that Chapman “has not had the effect of making the parental autonomy model the singular way to proceed in grandparent access cases.” The Court of Appeal noted:
In addition, judicial deference to parental authority can be tempered by the court’s willingness to recognize benefits that extended family bring to a child whose life has been marked by the loss of a parent, such as love, support, and stability. These cases sometimes present best interest factors not apparent in cases with two living parents, including the fact that a child can know his or her deceased parent, including his or her personality, heritage, and culture, through his or her grandparents. See, for example, White v. Matthews, [1997] NS.J. No. 604 (N.S. Fam. Ct.) and Brooks v. Joudrey, 2011 NSFC 5 (CanLII).”