Siegel's Family Court Calendar

 “There are two principles at play: the status quo should generally not be disturbed on an interim motion; but the parent who unilaterally creates the status quo should not benefit from the status quo she or he has created.”

Adams v. Nobili, 2011 ONSC 4714 (CanLII) at 22.

“In cases where sexual abuse has been alleged but not confirmed, the court must first consider whether it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it occurred.  But even where the evidence does not support a finding of sexual abuse on a balance of probabilities, the court must go further and consider, on the basis of the whole of the evidence, whether there is a risk of harm to the child if access is given without protection against that risk.  A risk must be more than speculative or simple conjecture (C.B. v. W.B., 2011 ONSC 3027, at paras. 125-137).  In this regard, I adopt the conclusion set out by Justice Ricchetti in C.B. v. W.B., supra, at para. 139:

In conclusion, the court must determine, based on a consideration of the evidence as a whole, the existence and the extent of any “risk of harm” to the child.  It requires the Court, regardless of whether the evidence meets the civil standard of proof, to consider all the evidence and circumstances to assess the existence and the degree of risk to the child of harm (whether because of alleged sexual abuse or some other alleged reason).  The Court’s determination of the existence and degree of risk of harm to the child will fall along a continuum from no risk to a certainty the risk will materialize.  The Court, where there is any possibility the risk may materialize, will also have to consider the degree of harm to the child if the risk materializes.   Where this risk of harm falls along this continuum will determine the weight to be given to this factor.  This is then only one factor in determining what is in the best interests of the child.  The Court must also go on to consider any other risks of harm (and the degree of those risks) to the child and any benefits (and the degree of those benefits) to the child of the proposed order with the ultimate goal being the determination of what order will be in the child’s best interests going forward.”

L v. K., 2015 ONSC 4926 (CanLII) at 35

“Justice Katarynych in Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Samra, 2008 ONCJ 465, 59 R.F.L. (6th) 219 provides an excellent summary of the law of recusal on the basis of judicial bias or lack of impartiality.  The relevant portion of his decision is reproduced below:

18 An allegation of judicial bias is one that counsel should make “only after careful and anxious reflection.” A finding of real or perceived bias is serious business. It calls into question an element of judicial integrity — not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice.

19 When considering the issue of bias in regard to a judge, there is a starting presumption of impartiality; specifically, that judges in their exercise of any judicial duty, will be faithful to that part of their oath of office that requires them to act impartially, which in its essence is a state of mind in which the judge is disinterested in the outcome and is open to persuasion by the evidence and submissions.

20 Bias, on the other hand, denotes a state of mind or attitude that is in some way predisposed to a particular result or that is closed to a particular issue.

21 The criteria for determining when an apprehension of bias arises are those first enunciated in Committee for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369:

…the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information… the test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically — and having thought the matter through — conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the judge], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?

22 It is a test that has been consistently followed in Canada for more than 20 years.

23 There is a two-fold objective element to this test:

• • • • • the person considering the alleged bias must be reasonable; and

• • • • • the apprehension of the bias itself must also be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.

24 Regardless of the precise words used to describe the test, the object of the different formulations is to emphasize that the threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. The grounds advanced for this apprehension must be substantial. The test is not related to the “very sensitive or scrupulous conscience”.

25 The onus of demonstrating real or perceived bias lies with the person who is alleging its existence.

26 The belief of the applicant and his counsel that the applicant would not receive a fair hearing before a particular judge is not the standard against which apprehension of bias is measured. The apprehension of bias must be considered objectively through the eyes of a fully informed, reasonable person who is reacting reasonably in the circumstances.

27 If the applicant is to succeed, the evidence in the motion must rise above the imaginary or conjectural sentiments of the applicant and demonstrate real likelihood or probability of bias.

28 The applicant’s task is to show wrongful or inappropriate declarations showing a state of mind that sways judgment — a predisposition that is so great that the judge is not open to persuasion upon presentation of new evidence or new arguments.

29 The presumption of judicial impartiality will only be displaced with cogent evidence that something a judge has done gives rise to actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias — evidence that would cause a reasonable person who understands the contextual issues and the law governing the case to believe that the particular judge would not entertain the various points of view with an open mind.

30 The specific complaints raised by the applicant in support of his recusal motion are to be construed in light of the entire proceedings. Regard must be had to the cumulative effect of all of the relevant factors. See R. v. S. (R.D.), supra. See also R. v. Giroux, supra.

31 Judicial officers should not accede too readily to allegations of actual or appearance of bias. Although it is important that justice be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to the applicant’s suggestions, encourage parties to believe that, by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.”

Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2017 ONSC 4727 (CanLII) at 19.

“The definition of “property” casts a wide net.  It includes a tractor and construction equipment dealership business, as in Poirier v. Poirier, 2005 CanLII 38106 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 4471 (S.C.), where Charbonneau J. said:

Here the dealership represents a real asset which continues not only to provide a lucrative income stream, it also continues to have a real value which can be sold, transferred or otherwise disposed.  I fail to see any unfairness.  Mrs. Poirier has her half of the value of the shares converted into a liquid asset earning interest and Mr. Poirier has his half of the value of the shares invested in a business earning business income.  It is only the parties’ respective incomes, not the divided asset, which are considered for the purpose of fixing spousal support.

The definition of “property” includes a book of business of a self-employed financial advisor:  see Mavis v. Mavis, 2005 CarswellOnt 1649 (S.C.).

The definition of “property” includes a medical practice:  see Forest v. Hill, 1991 CarswellOnt 272 (Gen. Div.).

The definition of “property” includes a real estate commission, even though the transaction closed after the date of separation: see Cosentino v. Cosentino, 2015 ONSC 271.

The Court of Appeal, in Lowe v. Lowe (2006), 2006 CanLII 804 (ON CA), 206 O.A.C. 293, dealt with the question of whether workers compensation payments ought to be included as “property” in the equalization calculation.  The parties were married in 1984 and separated in 2003.  The husband was injured in 1985 and received a permanent disability pension from WSIB in the amount of $221.15 per month for life.  The Court of Appeal began with a review of the proper way to interpret the definition of “property” in the Family Law Act. At paras. 12 – 15 the court said:

The definition of “property” in the FLA, s. 4 is admittedly broad.  It includes, for example, a stream of income derived from a trust: see Brinkos v. Brinkos (1989), 1989 CanLII 4266 (ON CA), 69 O.R. (2d) 225 (Ont. C.A.).  However, the definition of property is not without limits.  In Pallister v. Pallister (1990), 1990 CanLII 12272 (ON SC), 29 R.F.L. (3d) 395 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at 404-405, Misener J. acknowledged the apparently “all-encompassing nature of the definition of ‘property’” but pointed out that as “property in law is simply a right or collection of rights” identified by “no single criterion or even a discrete number of criteria”, interpretation is required to contain the category of property within limits appropriate to achieve the purpose and object of the legislation as a whole:

It seems to me therefore that when the word appears in legislation defined in the broadest possible way, the limits are to be found through a consideration of the scope of that legislation, and the objects it seeks to accomplish.  If the definition of the right or rights as property is consistent with the scheme of the legislation and advances its objects, then it should be so defined.  If either of those attributes is absent, then, unless the right or rights under consideration fall within a category that has been legally recognized as property heretofore, it should not be so defined.

I agree with this approach.  It is consistent with the “modern approach” to statutory interpretation, set out in R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4^th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2002) at p. 1 and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada (see Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at para. 26):

the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

As Misener J. put it at 406, this purposive and contextual method of statutory interpretation allows “the courts to insure [sic] that the broad definition employed is kept within the bounds of the scope of the Act.”  In keeping with the “modern” approach to statutory interpretation, s. 4 should not be read as including any and every interest, even those bearing no relationship to the marriage partnership, simply because that interest is not specifically excluded.  While the scheme of the FLA is to give a broad definition to property and then exclude certain specific types of property, I agree with Misener J. that the definition of property itself must be given meaningful content and that meaningful content imposes limits on the definition of property limits apart from the specific exclusions.  Misener J. held, at 405, that the wife’s monthly benefits from an Armed Forces Disability Pension, found on the facts to amount to a permanent pension, were not “property” within the meaning of s. 4:

The Family Law Act purposely eschews any attempt to equalize all the assets owned at the date of separation. Rather it seeks only to equalize the assets the accumulation of which occurred during the marriage, and then only those assets that can fairly be said to bear some relationship to the partnership that the marriage is said to create.  Accordingly, there is provision in Section 4(1) for the deduction of the value of property owned on the date of the marriage on the ground that that value was acquired prior to the marriage, and in Section 4(2) for the exclusion of property acquired by gift or inheritance after the date of the marriage and for the exclusion of the right to damages for personal injuries suffered after the date of the marriage, on the ground that the acquisition of that property bears no relationship to the marriage partnership.

The disability pension bore no relationship to the marriage partnership but rather arose because of a disability that impeded the recipient’s capacity to earn a livelihood.  It followed, reasoned Misener J., that the stream of benefits to be received post separation should not be capitalized and included as family property for purposes of equalization.  The benefits would be taken into consideration with respect to spousal support, but they fell outside the category of “property” and could be distinguished from a pension earned as part of a spouse’s remuneration during the marriage.

The distinction in Lowe was between income and property.  In this case, the income received by Abitbol PC is based on contracts between Mr. Abitbol and his clients.  Although the amount payable is calculated as a percentage of WSIB benefits received by the clients, the character of the amount payable to Abitbol P.C. does not change.  In this case, the contracts are akin to Accounts Receivable.  They are payable under contract.  They are not uncertain and they are not discretionary.”

Abitbol v. Abitbol, 2020 ONSC 4619 (CanLII) at 24-29

“Section 23 (of the Children’s Law Reform Act) sets out a serious harm exception to the limits on Ontario’s jurisdiction to make custody and access orders established by ss. 22 (jurisdiction) and 41 (enforcement of extra-provincial orders):

Serious harm to child

23 Despite sections 22 and 41, a court may exercise its jurisdiction to make or to vary an order in respect of the custody of or access to a child where,

(a) the child is physically present in Ontario; and

(b) the court is satisfied that the child would, on the balance of probabilities, suffer serious harm if,

(i) the child remains in the custody of the person legally entitled to custody of the child,

(ii) the child is returned to the custody of the person legally entitled to custody of the child, or

(iii) the child is removed from Ontario.

This court has determined that the serious harm analysis under the CLRA is less stringent than the “intolerable situation” test under the Hague Convention. Laskin J.A. came to this conclusion in Ojeikere, at paras. 59-61 because of the different wording used in the CLRA and also:

… because under the preamble to the Convention all signatories accept and are “firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters related to their custody”. Signatories have accepted this principle and its enforcement by their agreement to adhere to their reciprocal obligations under the Convention. In Hague Convention cases Ontario courts can have confidence that whatever jurisdiction decides on a child’s custody it will do so on the basis of the child’s best interests. Ontario courts cannot always have the same confidence in s. 23 cases … Some non-signatory countries may do so; others may not.

In Ojeikere, Laskin J.A. took a holistic approach to the determination of serious harm and concluded that, based on a combination of factors, the children were at risk. He considered: (i) the risk of physical harm; (ii) the risk of psychological harm; (iii) the views of the children; and (iv) the mother’s claim that she would not return to the habitual residence even if the children were required to do so.

Here, the application judge determined that Ontario could not exercise jurisdiction to make custody and access orders because she was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the children would suffer serious harm if returned to Kuwait. In coming to this conclusion, she discounted the children’s evidence on the basis that it was the product of the mother’s inappropriate influence. She made this assessment in the face of uncontradicted evidence from three separate OCL experts that the children’s views were in fact independent. She did not explain why this expert evidence should be rejected. This was an error.

The right of children to participate in matters involving them is fundamental to family law proceedings. Canada has adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child, effectively guaranteeing that their views will be heard. A determination of best interests – which is engaged in all child-related matters – must incorporate the child’s view.”

         M.A.A. v. D.E.M.E., 2020 ONCA 486 (CanLII) at 42-46

“Subrule 19(11) directs a consideration of any legal privilege that might operate to exclude the production sought. The Attawapiskat FN raised privacy concerns for all family members and argued the release of the records would cause prejudice to the parents.  Yet none of the parties squarely addressed the question of legal privilege or provided the court with the applicable law.

A legal privilege aimed at protecting a privacy interest in a communication, document or record is well established in the common law.  Its principles have been considered and elaborated by the Supreme Court of Canada in several contexts. See:  Slavutych v. Baker et al., 1975 CanLII 5, SCC; R v. Gruenke, 1991 Can LII 40 (SCC); A. (L.L. v. B.(A.), 1995 Can LII 52 (SCC); and M.(A.) v. Ryan, 1997 Can LII 403 (SCC)( “Ryan”).

In Slavutych v. Baker et al., supra, the Supreme Court adopts the 4-part Wigmore test to articulate the approach for establishing a case- by- case privilege. The SCC’s expression of this test in Ryan, at para. 20 is as follows:

First, the communication must originate in a confidence. Second, the confidence must be essential to the relationship in which the communication arises. Third, the relationship must be one which should be “sedulously fostered” in the public good. Finally, if all these requirements are met, the court must consider whether the interests served in protecting the communication from disclosure outweigh the interest in getting at the truth and disposing correctly of the litigation.

The court in Ryan sets out a number of principles including:

(1)  The law of privilege must evolve to reflect the social and legal realities of our time. This means the common law of privilege must be developed in accordance with Charter values, such that existing rules are scrutinized to ensure they reflect the values the Charter enshrines. (See paras.  21 – 22)

(2)  Fishing expeditions are not appropriate where there is a compelling privacy interest at stake, even at the discovery stage. (See para. 37)

(3)  It is not essential for the court to examine every document to assess the claimed privilege. (See para. 39); and

(4)  An all or nothing approach to production should be rejected in favour of partial privilege and companion tailor-made production orders that include provisions for redaction, and limiting reproduction and dissemination. (See para. 33)

In G.(L.) v. B.(P)., 1996 Can LII (ONCJ), the court concludes the first branch of the Wigmore test is not satisfied in relation to child protection records, noting the relationship between a parent and the society is not a confidential one. As Brownstone J. puts it at para. 12:

The relationship and dynamic between parents and the society is complex and can oscillate between one of voluntariness, in which guidance, counselling and assistance are sought and provided, to one in which parents co-operate with the society in order to avoid court proceedings, to a highly adversarial one where the society seeks to remove children from their parents. Given this reality, I cannot see how society workers could give a parent any assurance of confidentiality in respect of communications regarding the children, when at any time such information might be relied upon by the society in a protection proceeding. A parent such as the respondent who has been the subject of investigations by the society could not have any reasonable expectation of privacy.”

M.M-A., P.A., M.D. and A.D. v. E.L. v. Kunuwanimano Child and Family Services, Attiwapiskat First Nation, 2020 ONSC 4597 (CanLII) at 35-39

“Where there is a status-quo arrangement, however, courts have been clear that such arrangements should be respected in order to provide stability in the lead-up to a trial. In Coe v. Tope, 2014 ONSC 4002, at para. 25, Justice Pazaratz explained that parenting determinations at temporary motions meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be more fully canvassed at subsequent stages in the process.  Pazaratz J. held that the status quo should ordinarily be maintained until trial unless there is material evidence that the children’s best interests demand an immediate change.

In Mott v. Green, 2020 ONSC 3761, Bondy J. summarized the case law on status quo parenting arrangements as follows (at paras. 38-39):

[38] The best interests of the children are to be considered in the context of the litigation. The issue before me is interim custody or residency. “[A]ny temporary order granted is always intended only to stabilize separated parties’ circumstances until trial, when a full and complete consideration can be conducted…” (see Sellick v. Bollert, 2004 CanLII 18894 (ON SC), [2004] O.J. No. 2022, 4 R.F.L. (6th) 185, at para. 16). “Stability is a primary need for children caught in the throes of matrimonial dispute and the de facto custody of children ought not to be disturbed pendente lite, unless there is some compelling reason why in the interests of the children” (see Donley v. Donley, [2008] O.J. No. 3445, 51 R.F.L. (6th) 164, at para. 91; Kimpton v. Kimpton, [2002] O.J. No. 5367; Dyment v. Dyment, 1969 CanLII 544 (ON SC), [1969] 2 O.R. 631; Papp v. Papp, 1969 CanLII 219 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 331 at pp. 344-5; and Lancaster v. Lancaster (1992), 1992 CanLII 14032 (NS CA), 38 R.F.L. (3d) 373).

[39] “In interim custody and access cases, the status quo is ordinarily maintained until trial unless there is material evidence that the best interests of the children require a change” (see: Madill v. Madill, 2014 ONSC 7227, [2014] O.J. No. 5952, at para. 31; Grant v. Turgeon (2000), 2000 CanLII 22565 (ON SC), 5 R.F.L. (5th) 326 (Ont. S.C.); Kimpton v. Kimpton; and Easton v. McAvoy, 2005 ONCJ 319). The onus is on the party seeking to disturb a status quo arrangement with respect to the custody of children” (see Donley v. Donley, para. 91, and Norland v. Norland, [2006] O.J. No. 5126, 2006 CarswellOnt 8253).”

Al Tamimi v. Ramnarine, 2020 ONSC 4558 (CanLII) at 36-37

“Therefore, a court must first apply trust principles to determine ownership before turning to the exclusions listed in s. 4(2) [of the Family Law Act]. This is supported by the language of s. 4(2), which provides: “The value of the following property that a spouse owns on the valuation date does not form part of the spouse’s net family property . . .” (emphasis added). A spouse cannot exclude property that is beneficially owned by someone else.

It must be stated that, in the vast majority of cases, any unjust enrichment that arises as the result of a marriage will be fully addressed through the operation of the equalization provisions under the Family Law Act; the spouse who legally owns an asset will ordinarily share half its value with the other spouse as a result of the equalization provisions under the Act. However, a fair and contextual reading of the equalization and net family property provisions of the Family Law Act ensures that married spouses are not deprived of equitable remedies they would otherwise have available to them because, as noted above, ownership issues — equitable or otherwise — are to be determined before the net equalization payment exercise is undertaken.”

            McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533 (CanLII) at 65-66

“Persons who are married or intend to marry may agree regarding their rights and obligations during and after the marriage in a marriage contract, which is one form of domestic contract: Family Law Act, s. 52.

A domestic contract prevails over the Act unless the Act provides otherwise: s. 2(10). A number of provisions of the Family Law Act permit a court to set aside all or part of a marriage contract, two of which are relevant to this appeal.

First, in the context of an application for spousal support, s. 33(4) gives the court the power to set aside a provision in a marriage contract that waives or reduces the right to support in three enumerated situations, including where the provision results in unconscionable circumstances.

Second, s. 56(4) allows a court to set aside an entire marriage contract or any provision in it, on application. That provision states:

56(4) A court may, on application, set aside a domestic contract or a provision in it,

(a)   if a party failed to disclose to the other significant assets, or significant debts or other liabilities, existing when the domestic contract was made;

(b)   if a party did not understand the nature or consequences of the domestic contract; or

(c)   otherwise in accordance with the law of contract.

There is no limitation period provided in the Family Law Act for setting aside all or part of a domestic contract under s. 56(4), although that section specifically contemplates a court application for such relief. There is also no limitation provided for setting aside a spousal support provision of a marriage contract under s. 33(4), but that determination is made as part of a spousal support application for which there is no limitation period, as provided in s. 16(1)(c) of the Limitations Act.

Because the Family Law Act is silent as to the limitation period that applies to an application to set aside a marriage contract or a provision in it, one must look to the Limitations Act to determine which provisions of that Act, if any, apply. In this respect, I do not share my colleague’s view that the provision establishing the limitation period for seeking equalization should be read to also apply to an application to set aside a marriage contract under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act. The fact that the Family Law Act does not provide a limitation period for an application to set aside a marriage contract under s. 56(4) is, in my view, a clear legislative signal that the Limitations Act is to apply.

…

I conclude that a proceeding under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act comes within s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act. There is no limitation period for bringing the proceeding for a declaration setting aside a marriage contract, whether as a stand-alone matter or if the proceeding also claims other family law relief. The other relief remains subject to the applicable limitation periods, including the residual discretion of a family court to grant extensions of time under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act. In this case, those limitation periods are six years for the husband’s equalization claim, and there is no limitation period for his spousal support claim.

This result also works seamlessly within the limitation structure of the Family Law Act, because it does not add a new, shorter limitation period of two years, which would disrupt the longer time spouses have been given to resolve their affairs. It does not interfere with the philosophy of the Act, which is to give more generous time periods for separating spouses to resolve their claims for equalization and spousal support.”

         Kyle v. Atwill, 2020 ONCA 476 (CanLII) at 33-38 & 57-58

“Section 5(6) of the Family Law Act (“the Act”) permits the court to adjust a presumptive equalization of spouses’ net family properties in exceptional circumstances.

5(6) The court may award a spouse an amount that is more or less than half the difference between the net family properties if the court is of the opinion that equalizing the net family properties would be unconscionable, having regard to,

(a) a spouse’s failure to disclose to the other spouse debts or other liabilities existing at the date of the marriage;

(b) the fact that debts or other liabilities claimed in reduction of a spouse’s net family property were incurred recklessly or in bad faith;

(c) the part of a spouse’s net family property that consists of gifts made by the other spouse;

(d) a spouse’s intentional or reckless depletion of his or her net family property;

(e) the fact that the amount a spouse would otherwise receive under subsection (1), (2) or (3) is disproportionately large in relation to a period of cohabitation that is less than five years;

(f) the fact that one spouse has incurred a disproportionately larger amount of debts or other liabilities than the other spouse for the support of the family;

(g) a written agreement between the spouses that is not a domestic contract; or

(h) any other circumstance relating to the acquisition, disposition, preservation, maintenance or improvement of property.  R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 5 (6).

Only sections 5(6) (e) and (h) are relevant to this matter.

Cohabitation less than five years (s. 5(6)(e))

Three findings are needed before the court may exercise its discretion under this provision:

(a)  That the parties cohabited for less than five years;

(b) That the presumptive amount to be paid is disproportionately large in    relation to the period of cohabitation;

(c)  That equalizing the net family property would be unconscionable.

There is no factual dispute that the parties cohabited for less than five years and slightly more than three years: there was no evidence that they cohabited before marriage.

As for whether an equalization payment is disproportionately large, there is no formulaic consensus in the case law. Typically, proportionality under this provision is co-related to the nature of the property giving rise to the equalization payment as in the case of a matrimonial home brought by one party to the marriage and for which no deduction is allowed if owned on the valuation date (Gomez v. McHale): 2016 ONCA 318 CanLII and, more broadly, financial contributions to the marriage by each party. Spousal misconduct should not be relevant.

…

In Serra the court held that once the “unconscionability” threshold is crossed, a court should exercise its discretion fairly and equitably according to the circumstances of the case: 2009 ONCA 105 at 71. Where s. 5(6)(e) has been found to apply, a mathematical formula, such as prorating the presumptive equalization payment to the period of cohabitation less than five years “may be helpful in some cases” but should not displace a broader consideration of the factors linking the parties’ marital contributions to the property giving rise to the equalization payment: Gomez v. McHale, at 12.”

Jayawickrema v. Jayawickrema, 2020 ONSC 4444 (CanLII) at 8-12 & 19