Siegel's Family Court Calendar

“The Court’s discretion to choose a child’s school informed by the principles adopted by Justice Spies in Askalam v Taleb, 2012 ONSC 4746, at para. 32:

Where a court is asked to consider whether or not a child should change schools, the following considerations may be drawn from the case law:

(a) In situations of joint custody, the court is most reluctant to dictate where a child should go to school and the parents should be encouraged to resolve this matter amongst themselves. If they cannot agree the best interests of the child will govern.

(b) In the event a parent suggests changing schools, it must be demonstrated the change will be in the best interests of the child.

(c) While each instance is very fact specific, factors which may be taken into account by the court in determining the best interests of the child include assessing any impact on the stability of the child. This may include examining how many years the child has attended his or her current school; whether there is any prospect of one of the parties moving in the near future; where the child was born and raised; whether a move will mean new child care providers or other unsettling features. The court will also look to any decisions that were made by the parents prior to the separation or at the time of separation with respect to schooling. Any problems with the present school will be considered.

In addition to the above principles, the onus is on the parent seeking the change on an interim basis to present “compelling and cogent evidence” that the change of schools is in the child’s best interests given the need for stability in a child’s life.  In Ursic v. Ursic, 2006 CanLII 18349 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 2178, at para. 32, the Ontario Court of Appeal addressed whether it was in the best interests of a 4-year-old who had almost completed junior kindergarten to change schools:

..  I think it is fair to provide that Jacob should continue to go to Northridge Public School unless both parties agree to send him to another school, or unless either parent brings forward compelling and cogent evidence showing a change of schools is in Jacob’s best interest. I would so provide for these reasons: Mr. Reid [a social worker who prepared a parenting plan] recommended that Jacob go to Northridge; Jacob will likely already have formed attachments to the school; and, continuing at the school promotes stability in Jacob’s life. [Emphasis added]”

J.E.S. v. S.S., 2020 ONSC 6064 (CanLII) at 36-37

“In Beckett v. Beckett, 2010 ONSC 2706 (CanLII), [2010] O.J. No. 1957 (S.C.J.), Pazaratz J. considered the issue of the affordability of a costs award at the end of a five day equalization trial.  The parties had shared custody of the children.  In determining costs, he confirmed that “any other matter” in Rule 24(11)(f) included the “affordability and enforceability of a costs order” [paragraph 33].  However, he also confirmed that the real issue is the effect of the costs award on the financial ability of the parties to care for the children.  He noted that, although a costs award would “jeopardize [the Respondent’s] ability to provide for her children”, that “we must not lose sight of the fact that unrecovered legal fees also interfere with the Applicant’s ability to provide for his children during the significant periods of time they are with him” [paragraphs 37 and 38].  Because both parties had almost equal care of the children, he decided that costs would follow the event.

This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in C.A.M., where Rosenberg J.A. stated at paragraph 45 that the costs claimed by the Respondent “was money he had to pay to defend this litigation that would otherwise have been available, at least in part, for the care of the child.”

Accordingly, although the affordability of a costs award is a factor in the awarding of costs, this can work both ways, particularly where the needs of a child or children are in issue.  While costs payable by a custodial parent may be mitigated by the needs of the child in that party’s care, the opposite may apply where a successful party, as in the present case, has custody of the child.  The legal expenses paid by Mr. Polak for his representation at this trial will affect the financial means with which he can bear the costs of the children in his care.  This is particularly so where the child support payable by the Applicant is set at a minimal amount based upon income imputed to the Applicant as in the judgment.

Therefore, even though Mr. Polak may be financially better off than is the Applicant, he also has the burden of financially meeting the children’s needs with little assistance from the Applicant.  He is also obliged to pay spousal support to the Applicant.  Any reduction of costs payable to him would also directly affect his financial ability to meet the children’s needs.

Finally, it must be noted that the means of the unsuccessful party may not be used to shield his or her liability for costs where that party has acted unreasonably:  see Parsons v. Parsons, 2002 CanLII 45521 (ON SC), [2002] O.J. No. 3034 (S.C.J.) at paragraph 12.”

         Polak v. Polak, 2013 ONSC 6243 (CanLII) at 25-29

“Family law litigants are entitled to one settlement conference unless otherwise permitted by the case management judge. They are expected to come to that conference fully compliant with all the Family Law Rules. A settlement conference should not be the forum to dispute and adjudicate upon disclosure issues where there are numerous items in dispute the relevance and proportionality of which can only be determined by a motion. To hold a settlement conference otherwise is a complete waste of the court’s valuable time and the parties’ resources. Either parties come to a settlement conference prepared to discuss settlement confident that they have as much relevant information as obtainable to assist them or they come unprepared. The parties in this case are clearly unprepared. Non-compliance with the above Rules is evidence of that. None of the Rules is permissive.

It is inconceivable that a party who raises serious disclosure shortcomings can make an informed settlement decision or that a lawyer can competently give settlement advice to such a client. A settlement conference is not a disclosure dartboard.

As noted by Kiteley J. in Greco-Wang v. Wang, 2014 ONSC 5366, “[m]embers of the public who are users of civil courts are not entitled to unlimited access to trial judges”. While that observation was made in the context of a Trial Scheduling Conference, it is equally, if not more, pertinent to settlement conference events. Too often serial settlement conference events are permitted in circumstances where there are continuing complaints about inadequate or refused disclosure impacting a party’s ability to make an informed settlement decision. That practice must end.

…

The parties are entitled to one settlement conference unless otherwise ordered. Either they comply with their disclosure obligations, bring a disclosure motion if they are dissatisfied with the other’s disclosure and comply with the Family Law Rules or their day in court will not happen any time in the near future. A settlement conference can serve many purposes. Serialized mediation is not one of them.

         Ni v. Yan, 2020 ONSC 5941 (CanLII) at 8-10 & 12

“As discussed previously, the respondent’s motion was brought ex parte.  The Court of Appeal for Ontario, in a family law case, has made clear that an ex parte motion is to be used only in exigent circumstances, that the party bringing the motion must make full and fair disclosure of all material facts, including facts that may not be helpful to that party, that an ex parte order obtained without full and fair disclosure may be set aside even if the lack of full disclosure was unintended, and that the foregoing principles, well known to lawyers, apply equally to self-represented parties:  see M.(A.) v. M.(J.), 2016 ONCA 644, at paras. 26-30, reproduced below:

ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Did the appeal judge err by upholding the trial judge’s finding that the father obtained an unlawful status quo on the ex parte motion?

(1) Ex Parte Orders

26      Rule 14(12)(c) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, allows a motion to be brought without notice if “there is an immediate danger to the health or safety of a child or of the party making the motion, and the delay involved in serving a notice of motion would probably have serious consequences.” If an ex parte order is made, under rule 14(14) that order must contain a requirement that the matter come back to court, if possible before the same judge, within 14 days or on a date chosen by the court. And under rule 14(15), an order made without notice must be served immediately on all parties affected, together with all documents used on the motion, unless the court orders otherwise.

27      These rules are consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, for other civil matters. An ex parte order is intended to be used only in exigent situations where the delay required to serve the motion would probably have serious consequences, or where the giving of notice by the service itself would probably have serious consequences. A judge hearing an ex parte motion who is not satisfied of the probability of those consequences will decide that the motion cannot proceed ex parte and order that notice be given.

28      Where a motion is brought without notice, the person bringing the motion must make full and fair disclosure of all material facts (rule 39(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure), including facts that may not be helpful to that party’s position. An ex parte order that is obtained without full and fair disclosure, even if the lack of full disclosure was unintended, is subject to being set aside. See for example, Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 2013 ONSC 7368 (Ont. S.C.J.).

29      Notice and the opportunity to be heard are basic tenets of our justice system. Ex parte orders are therefore made only in very limited circumstances. The requirement for full and frank disclosure is essential to allow a court to fairly make a temporary order that will affect the rights of another person in an emergency situation where the court has not heard both sides of the story.

30      That requirement is well-known to lawyers. It applies equally to self-represented parties.

The foregoing discussion in M.(A.) v. M.(J.), supra, also focusses on r. 14(12) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, which deals with circumstances in which an ex parte motion may be brought.  That rule makes clear that an ex parte motion is generally restricted to situations where there is immediate danger of a child’s removal from Ontario, or immediate danger to the health or safety of a child or the party making the motion and where, in those circumstances, any delay in serving the motion would probably have serious consequences.  The respondent’s decision to proceed ex parte did not come within any of the circumstances itemized in r. 14(12).”

            Campbell v. Campbell, 2019 ONSC 5493 (CanLII) at 53-54

“To the extent that one parent argues that access by the other parent must be supervised by a third party, that parent bears the burden of demonstrating that supervision is justified. “Supervision is a great intrusion into the relationship between children and parent, and its continued imposition must be justified”: Young v. Hanson, 2019 ONSC 1245, at para. 32 and cases cited therein.”

         Gray v. Canonico, 2020 ONSC 5885 (CanLII) at 45

“The court has a broad discretion to find value, even in the absence of solid valuation evidence: McLean v. McLean, [2004] O.T.C. 904 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 49, citing Tremblay v. Tremblay, 2002 CarswellOnt 484 (Ont. S.C.J.). In Felte v. Felte (2004), 3 R.F.L. (6th) 37 (Ont. C.A.) the Court of Appeal stated that where the evidence is unsatisfactory and incomplete, a trial judge must use the evidence he or she does have, in attempting to come to a reasonable and fair result.”

Shah v. Shah, 2018 ONSC 5784 (CanLII) at 85

“A party cannot establish a new habitual residence by surreptitiously removing the child to another country.  A relocation by self-help will not establish jurisdiction: Carter v. Brooks (1990), 30 R.F.L. (3d) 52 (Ont. C.A.).  However, where the other parent consents to the move, or takes no steps when made aware of the move, either agrees or acquiesces in the child moving, as provided in section 22(2)(b), a new habitual residence is created: A.M. v. D.L., 2019 ONCJ 155 (CanLII) at 44-45.”

         Z.A. v. A.A., 2019 ONSC 5601 (CanLII) at 33

“A trial judge’s findings of fact, including credibility assessments, are entitled to substantial deference on appeal “especially in family law cases”: Rados v. Rados, 2019 ONCA 627, 30 R.F.L. (8th) 374, at para. 23. Moreover, the imputation of income for support purposes is a discretionary and fact-specific exercise: Bak v. Dobell, 2007 ONCA 304, 86 O.R. (3d) 196, at para. 73, aff’d in Korman v. Korman, 2015 ONCA 578, 126 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 49 and 51.”

         Levin v. Levin, 2020 ONCA 604 (CanLII) at 12

“Numerous cases since the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic have recognized that parenting and access rights must be exercised in a manner that follows the protective precautions contained within public health directives. The jurisprudence that has developed since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic may be summarized as follows:

i.     There is a presumption that all court orders, including existing parenting arrangements and schedules, should be complied with. This reflects the principle that meaningful personal contact with both parents is in the best interests of the child.

ii.     While there is a presumption that existing parenting arrangements and schedules should continue, both custodial and access parents and members of their households are obliged to strictly adhere to COVID-19 safety protocols, including social distancing, hand washing, use of face masks and compliance with all public safety measures. They must also ensure that their children comply with these protocols while in their care.

iii.     A parent concerned about the other parent’s adherence to COVID-19 safety protocols cannot unilaterally deny the other parent’s court ordered access or parenting time, but must bring a motion to seek a variation. The parent initiating such a motion is required to provide specific evidence or examples of behavior or plans by the other parent which are inconsistent with COVID-19 protocols.

iv.     The parent responding to such a motion will be required to provide specific and absolute reassurance that COVID-19 safety measures will be meticulously adhered to – including social distancing; use of disinfectants; compliance with public safety directives; etc.

v.     Both parents will be required to provide very specific and realistic proposals which fully address all COVID-19 considerations, in a child-focused manner.

vi.     A parent cannot unilaterally impose on the other parent conditions in addition to the safety precautions required by government and public health officials. If one parent is of the view that additional precautions are required, and the other parent does not agree to follow them, the parent seeking to impose additional requirements must bring a motion to request the court to add such conditions to the parenting schedule. Any such motion must be accompanied by medical evidence to support the request.

See: Ribeiro v. Wright, 2020 ONSC 1829, at paras. 7-21; Almadi v. Kalashi, 2020 ONSC 2047, at paras. 7-8; Skinner v. Skinner, 2020 ONSC 3226, at para. 35.

Finally, the courts have recognized that some circumstances may exist where parenting arrangements and schedules will have to be altered as a result of one parent’s refusal or inability to comply with government mandated COVID-19 safety protocols. In Ribeiro, Pazaratz J. stated, at paras. 13-14:

In some cases, a parent’s personal risk factors (through employment or associations, for example) may require controls with respect to their direct contact with a child.

And sadly, in some cases a parent’s lifestyle or behaviour in the face of COVID-19 (for example, failing to comply with social distancing; or failing to take reasonable health-precautions) may raise sufficient concerns about parental judgment that direct parent-child contact will have to be reconsidered.  There will be zero tolerance for any parent who recklessly exposes a child (or members of the child’s household) to any COVID-19 risk.”

         J.F. v. L.K., 2020 ONSC 5766 (CanLII) at 20-22

“Both parties in this motion agree that the court is generally very cautious in granting an interim order seeking a change in mobility or relocation given the summary nature of interim motions. The reported Ontario case of Plumley v. Plumley, (1999), 1999 CanLII 13990 (ON SC), makes the following statement at paragraph 7:

It appears to me that the following factors are or ought to be important in deciding the mobility issue on an interim basis:

1)  A court will be more reluctant to upset the status quo on an interim basis and permit the move when there is a genuine issue for trial.

2)  There can be compelling circumstances that might dictate that a judge ought to allow the move.  For example, the move may result in a financial benefit to the family unit, which will be lost if the matter awaits a trial or the best interests of the children might dictate that they commence school at a new location.

3)  Although there may be a genuine issue for trial, the move may be permitted on an interim basis if there is a strong probability that the custodial parent’s position will prevail at a trial.”

         Tower v. Lebrun, 2020 ONSC 5723 (CanLII) at 16