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“The appellant submits that the trial judge erred by placing an onus on her to establish that equal parenting was not in the children’s best interests. She relies on the trial judge’s reference to Folahan v. Folahan, 2013 ONSC 2966, [2013] W.D.F.L. 4357, where the trial judge said that the onus is on a parent to rebut the presumption of equal time. As this court said in Rigillo v. Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 647, 31 R.F.L. (8th) 361, at para. 13, the maximum contact principle does not necessarily require equal parenting time.

The Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) in force at the time of the trial addressed the maximum contact principle:

16(10) In making an order under this section, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact.

The current provision of Divorce Act, is more direct:

16(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

The Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, provided:

20 (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Part, a child’s parents are equally entitled to custody of the child.

The trial judge applied these principles and did not mistake maximum parenting time with equal time. Nor did she place an onus on the appellant to rebut equal parenting time. Her reasons, read as a whole, demonstrate that she was alive to the principle that a child-focused approach to achieving as much parenting time as possible with each parent is the objective of the maximum contact principle. It may end up being equal time. It may not. Each family is different, and the principle is a guide set out to benefit children.”

         Knapp v. Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305 (CanLII) at 30–34

“The finding of contempt was made on April 8, 2016. For reasons that are not apparent from the record, the court has not yet held the sanction hearing. Although the appeal from a finding of contempt is governed by the timelines set out in the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (see Kopaniak v. MacLellan (2002), 2002 CanLII 44919 (ON CA), 212 D.L.R. (4th) 309 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 263), the appeal is usually not heard until the sanction has been imposed. The appeal of the sanction, if one was imposed and is under appeal, is then joined with the contempt appeal. As explained by Sharpe J.A. in Sabourin and Sun Group of Companies v. Laiken, 2011 ONCA 757 (CanLII), 286 O.A.C. 273, at para. 9, a contempt proceeding has only come to a final conclusion once the sanction has been imposed. Until the motion judge has disposed of the motion, including the sanction, the appeal court will not know how serious the motion judge considered the contempt to be or how the judge intended to bring about compliance or punish the contemnor. In the words of Sharpe J.A., “[t]hese are elements integral to the nature and character of the contempt proceeding and essential to an appellate court’s full appreciation of the disposition under appeal”: at para. 9.”

            Ruffolo v. David, 2019 ONCA 385 (CanLII) at 5

“In the hopes of lowering the rhetorical temperature of the future materials of these parties and perhaps those of others who will come before the court, I repeat these essential facts, often stated by my colleagues at all levels of court, but which bear constant repetition:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Evidence regarding a former spouse’s moral failings is rarely relevant to the issues before the court.
            2. Nor are we swayed by rhetoric against the other party that verges on agitprop.
            3. Our decisions are not guided by concerns of marital fidelity. A (non-abusive) partner can be a terrible spouse but a good parent. Everyone is supposed to know this, but all too often I see litigants raise these issues for “context”.
            4. Exaggeration is the enemy of credibility. As it is often said, one never gets a second chance to make a first impression. If that impression, arising from a parties’ materials or argument, is one of embellishment, that impression will colour everything that emanates from that party or their counsel.
            5. Affidavits that read as argument rather than a recitation of facts are not persuasive. They speak to careless drafting.
            6. Similarly, hearsay allegations against the other side which fail to comply with r. 14(18) or (19) are generally ignored, whether judges feel it necessary to explicitly say so or not.
            7. A lawyer’s letter, whatever it says, unless it contains an admission, is not evidence of anything except the fact that it was sent. The fact that a lawyer makes allegations against the other side in a letter is usually of no evidentiary value.
            8. Facts win cases. A pebble of proof is worth a mountain of innuendo or bald allegation.
            9. Relevance matters. If the court is dealing with, say an issue regarding parenting, allegations of a party’s failures regarding collateral issues, say their stinginess or the paucity of their financial disclosure, are irrelevant and counter-productive. They do not reveal the dark soul of the other side or turn the court against the allegedly offending spouse. Rather, they demonstrate that the party or their counsel is unable to focus on the issue at hand. Often those materials backfire leading the court to place greater trust in the other side.
            10. One key to success in family law as in other areas of law is the race to the moral high ground. Courts appreciate those parties and counsel who demonstrate their commitment to that high ground in both the framing and presentation of their case.
            11. While dealing with that moral high ground, many capable counsel advise their clients against “me-too” ism. One side’s failure to obey a court order or produce necessary disclosure does not give licence to the other side to do the same. Just because the materials of one side are incendiary or prolix, that does not mean that the other side is required to respond in kind. Judges are usually aware when a party has crossed the line. Showing that you or your client does not do the same is both the ethical and the smart thing to do.”

         Alsawwah v. Afifi, 2020 ONSC 2883 (CanLII) at 108

“It is frequently observed that assessing costs is not a simple mechanical exercise of tallying hours and applying an hourly rate: Delillis v. Delillis and Delillis, 2005 CanLII 36447 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 4345 (Ont. S.C.). I agree with A.J. Goodman J. who, in Miziolek v. Miziolek and Miziolek, 2018 ONSC 4372 observed that;

[32] There must be practical and reasonable limits to the amounts awarded for costs and those amounts should bear some reasonable connection to the amount that should reasonably have been contemplated.  I note that it is not necessary for me to have to go through the hours, or disbursements, line by line, in order to determine what the appropriate costs are.  Nor is the court to second-guess the amount of time claimed unless it is clearly excessive or overreaching.  I must consider what is reasonable in the circumstances, and all the relevant factors.  However, when appropriate and necessary, a court ought to analyze the Bill of Costs in order to satisfy itself as to the reasonableness of the fees and expenses submitted for consideration.”

Reynolds v. McCormack, 2020 ONSC 2813 (CanLII) at 7

“The Applicant Grandmother’s claim is grounded in s. 21(3) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, which provides that any person, including a grandparent, may apply to a court for a contact order with respect to a child.  “Contact” is defined as “the time a child spends in the care of a person other than the child’s parent, whether or not the child is physically with the person during that time”.

Section 24 of the CLRA directs the Court, when considering or making a contact order, to consider only the best interests of the child.   In doing so, the Court is to consider all factors relating to the circumstances of the child, but to give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

Section 24(3) enumerates several other factors that Courts should consider when assessing the best interests of a child.  The significance and weight placed on any given factor varies from case to case, as each case turns on its own particular facts. The only issue is the best interests of the child in the context of those particular facts: Gordon v. Goetz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27.

In Chapman v. Chapman, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized parental autonomy to make decisions in the best interests of their children in the following terms:

In the absence of any evidence that the parents are behaving in a way which demonstrates an inability to act in accordance with the best interests of their children, their right to make decisions and judgments on their children’s behalf should be respected, including decisions about whom they see, how often, and under what circumstances they see them: 2001 CanLII 24015 (ON CA), [2001] O.J. No. 705 at para 21. [Emphasis added]

The Court of Appeal also recognized that loving and nurturing relationships with extended family members are generally important to children because they serve to enhance the emotional well-being of children. As such, where those relationships are interfered with arbitrarily, Courts may intervene to ensure the continuity of the relationships.

In Torabi v. Patterson, Justice Marvin Kurz summarized the factors to be considered by the Court when assessing whether the relationship between a child and a relative seeking contact is a positive one as follows:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. There must generally be a substantial pre-existing relationship between the relative and child.  Strong loving and nurturing ties must exist between them based on time spent together that enhances the emotional well-being of the child.
            2. That relationship must be a constructive one for the child in the sense that it is worth preserving. If relations between the parties are too poisoned, a previously positive relationship may not be capable of preservation.
            3. The determination must include consideration of the age of the child and the time since the child last saw the relative.
            4. A fourth factor may apply in the exceptional circumstance of a young child who has lost a parent. In that event, the existence of a strong pre-existing relationship may not be necessary when the relative(s) of the lost parent applies for access: 2016 ONCJ 210 at para 74.”

Debassige v. King, 2022 ONCJ 210 (CanLII) at 14-19

“The issuance of an order for the sale of a jointly held property under sections 2 and 3 of the Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4, is governed by the following principles:

1. 1. 1. 1. A court is required to compel the partition and sale of a jointly held property unless the opposing party has shown that there is malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct on the part of the moving party in relation to the sale itself: Marchese v. Marchese, 2019 ONCA 116, para. 5
         2. There is some overlap in the scope of the terms “malicious” or “malice”, “vexatious”, and “oppressive”.  “Malice” arises when a step is taken for an improper purpose including spite, ill-will, vengeance, or to gain a private collateral advantage. A step may be viewed as “vexatious” when it is taken to harass or oppress others rather than to assert a legitimate right.   The sale of a matrimonial home is “oppressive” when the co-tenant that opposes the sale will suffer serious hardship if the matrimonial home is sold: MacDonald v. MacDonald(1976), 1976 CanLII 845 (ON SC), 14 O.R. (2d) 249 (Div. Ct.), at p. 254.
         3. Additional considerations apply when a spouse seeks an order for the sale of a matrimonial home prior to the final determination of the spouses’ claims under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990. c. F.3, (“FLA”).  In such case, an application under the Partition Actshould not proceed when the opposing spouse shows that the sale would prejudice the rights of a spouse under the FLA or a court order (see Silva v. Silva (1990), 1990 CanLII 6718 (ON CA), 1 O.R. (3d) 436 (C.A.), at p. 445; Martin v. Martin (1992), 1992 CanLII 7402 (ON CA), 8 O.R. (3d) 41 (C.A.), at para. 26 or, at the very least, that the opposing spouse’s arguable claims under the FLA would be prejudiced (see Binkley v. Binkley, [1988] O.J. No. 414 (C.A.), at para. 3; Gibson v. Duncan, 2013 ONSC 5377, at paras. 20-23).
         4. The court does not have jurisdiction to impose a right of first refusal or force parties into the buyout of a property:  see Gertley v. Gertley, 2022 ONSC 1750, para. 13; Laurignano v. Laurignano, 2009 ONCA 241, 65 R.F.L.(6th) 15”

Sanvictores v. Sanvictores, 2022 ONSC 2673 (CanLII) at 13

“The trial judge considered the issue of “so-called” double-dipping and the Supreme Court’s statement in Boston v. Boston, 2001 SCC 43 (CanLII), 2001 SSC 43, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 413 that where practicable, the court should focus on the portion of the payor’s income and assets which have not been a part of the equalization or division of matrimonial assets when the payee spouse’s continuing need for support is shown.  In Boston, that meant focussing on the portion of the pension that was earned following the date of separation and not included in the equalization of net family property (at para. 64).

However, as the trial judge noted, at para. 57 of Boston, the Supreme Court differentiates pension income from business income or income from an investment:

Pension income is obviously different from business income or income from an investment.  See T. Walker, “Double Dipping:  Can a Pension Be Both Property and Income?”, in Best of Money & Family Law, vol. 9, No. 12, 1994, in which the author argues that pensions should not be treated as other assets subject to equalization consideration.  When a pension produces income the asset is being liquidated. The same capital that was equalized is being converted into an income stream.  By contrast, when a business or investment is producing income, that income can be spent without affecting the asset itself.  In fact, the business or asset may continue to increase in value.  The value of the business or investment can be equalized, but neither is depleted solely by producing income.

In my view, the trial judge correctly held that double recovery of the kind contemplated in Boston is not a concern in a case such as this where the assets involved in the equalization are not liquidating assets or special assets of the nature of a pension.”

         Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349 (CanLII) at 132-134

“To be clear, disclosure is not transactional. It is obligatory for every party in a family law matter, irrespective of whether there is a case before the court or the other party’s disclosure efforts. Disclosure is automatic, immediate and ongoing. It must be proportionate to the importance and complexity of a case, reasonable in scope and provided in an intelligible format and timely way. It is the most basic of family law obligations, the casual observance or disregard of which strikes at the heart of the administration of family justice. It is far better for a party to err in favour of broader rather than more restrictive disclosure. Time and again, courts have emphasized, even noted as was done when this case was set for trial, that non-disclosure may negatively impact the court’s assessment of a party’s credibility.”

         Jayawickrema v. Jayawickrema, 2020 ONSC 2492 (CanLII) at 27

“The jurisprudence is clear in confirming that retained counsel may bind their clients to the settlement of litigation by means of exchanged correspondence: Geropoulos v. Geropoulos (1982), 1982 CanLII 2020 (ON CA) at pp 768 – 769 (hereinafter Geropoulos).  There are clear public policy reasons why a strict application of s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act is unwarranted in such matters: Geropoulos, quoted in this endorsement at paragraph 21 below.

In contrast, pre-litigation agreements are domestic contracts governed by s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act, which provides:

A domestic contract and an agreement to amend or rescind a domestic contract are unenforceable unless made in writing, signed by the parties and witnessed.

Numerous cases have found that the strict requirements of s. 55(1) may be relaxed, but not disregarded completely, for example where:

a.    two educated and sophisticated parties, who had received independent legal advice, signed a domestic contract but only one signature was witnessed: Gallacherv. Friesen, 2014 ONCA 399 (CanLII);

b.    a witness was not present at signing but gave uncontradicted evidence that the signatory had confirmed signing the agreement: Gamblev Longpre, 2016 ONSC 3499 (CanLII);

c.    a domestic contract was drawn up and signed by one of the parties who accepted its benefit and then sought to overturn it; Virc v. Blair, 2014 ONCA 392 (CanLII);

d.    a domestic contract was drawn up by one party, who then resiled from it and refused to sign it after the other party and his witness had done so: Pastoor v. Pastoor, 2007 CanLII 28331 (ON SC), hereinafter Pastoor.”

         Greve v. Shaw, 2022 ONSC 2598 (CanLII) at 16-18

“Conversion of an offer to settle into a court order is a discretionary remedy: see Milos v. Zagas (1998), 1998 CanLII 7119 (ON CA), 38 O.R. (3d) 218 (C.A.), at para. 15; Magnotta v. Yu, 2021 ONCA 185, at paras. 26-27.

This court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a discretionary order refusing to enforce a final settlement pursuant to r. 18(13)(a) motion under the Rules: Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 6(1)(b). This is because a decision refusing to enforce a settlement agreement is final: Capital Gains Income Streams Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., 2007 ONCA 497, 87 O.R. (3d) 443, at para. 17.

Exercise of this discretion attracts deference. Where the relevant factors disclosed by the evidence are considered, “an appellate court will not generally interfere with the motion judge’s decision to grant, or not grant, judgment in accordance with an accepted offer,” Milos, at para. 19. In the family law context, this court has recognized that significant deference is owed, particularly in matters relating to support orders: Ballanger v. Ballanger, 2020 ONCA 626, at para. 22.”

         Dowdall v. Dowdall, 2021 ONCA 260 (CanLII) at 19-21