Category: Uncategorized

“Parallel parenting is a form or sub-category of joint custody where the court attempts to carve out the incidents of custody, providing each parent with an exclusive domain of responsibility so that one parent has the final say in the case of conflict.  Despite the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Kaplanis (supra), some courts have made parallel parenting orders even in high-conflict cases in circumstances, for example, where a sole custody order might facilitate parental alienation.  The court must still be satisfied that that it is dealing with equally competent parents whose lack of cooperation does not affect the best interests of the child.

In K. (V.) v S. (T.) (supra), Chappel J. discussed the concept of parallel parenting:

77          As noted previously, in recent years, the concept of “parallel parenting” has developed in Family Law practice and in the case-law. This phrase has been used to describe various types of parenting arrangements, and in fact there is some dispute in the academic literature about the precise definition of parallel parenting.  (Hensel v. Hensel 2007 CarswellOnt 7010 (Ont. S.C.J.).   In some circumstances, parties and the courts have used the phrase “parallel parenting” to describe what is essentially a joint custody regime with additional, more specific terms to address particular areas of decision-making. In other cases, parallel parenting is described as a “sub-category of joint custody” which involves granting each party separate, defined areas of parental decision-making authority independent of each other. For ease of reference, I will refer to this latter concept as “divided parallel parenting.” This form of parallel parenting has been described by Rachel Birnbaum and Barbara J. Fidler, as quoted by Smith, J. in Hensel, in the following terms:

Parallel parenting as defined in the social science literature is not a manifestation of joint legal custody in the sense of the parents making major decisions jointly, but rather; parallel parenting involves each parent making the final decision about a different domain. In other words, each parent has sole custody, only over a different domain of decision-making.   (Rachel Birnbaum and Barbara Jo Fidler, “Commentary on Epstein and Madsen’s Joint Custody with a Vengeance: The Emergency of parallel Parenting Orders.”).

78          In other cases, parallel parenting has taken the form of both parents being independently granted the right to make major decisions respecting the child in all major areas of parental authority while the child is with them, without consent from the other parent.   (See Mol v. Mol 1997 CarswellOnt 3693 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Ursic v. Ursic, (2006) 2006 CanLII 18349 (ON CA), 32 R.F.L. (6^th) 23 (Ont C.A.)  I will refer to this as “full parallel parenting” for ease of reference.

79          Parallel parenting arrangements have been resorted to in practice and by trial courts to resolve situations where both parents have been involved with the child and wish to retain decision-making rights, but the conflict between them is such that a joint custody order is not feasible or in the child’s best interests.  (M. (T.J.) v. M. (P.G.), 2002 CarswellOnt 356 (Ont. S.C.J.).  There are many merits to a parallel parenting regime, in appropriate cases. It gives both the child and the parents the benefit of maintaining each parent as a meaningful player in the child’s life, over and above timesharing with the child. The importance of this factor from an emotional standpoint cannot be underestimated where a family is in turmoil because of a breakdown in the parents’ relationship. In addition, by delineating clear areas of decision-making between the parties, parallel parenting has the potential in appropriate cases to disengage the parties and reduce parental conflict.

80          The Ontario Court of Appeal has to date not dealt comprehensively with the concept of parallel parenting. As in the case of joint custody, the jurisprudence on this topic will likely evolve over the years as the Court of Appeal is required to deal with specific fact situations that come before it. Unfortunately, however, some comments made in the Court of Appeal jurisprudence to date have generated uncertainty about the availability of parallel parenting in high conflict situations where joint custody is not a feasible option. This uncertainty is significant, given that in practice, both in negotiated settlements and in courts across the country, parallel parenting has been welcomed as a valuable solution in high conflict cases for achieving solutions that are in the best interests of children.

When the concept emerged, parallel parenting was seen as an appropriate disposition where, notwithstanding the fact that the parents were uncooperative, joint custody was in the best interests of the child.  In M (TJ) v M (PG), (supra) Aston J. stated at paragraph 20:

… “parallel parenting” orders have become a form of joint custody, a sub-category if you will, which does not depend upon co-operative working relationships or even good communication between the parents. The concept (consistent with subsection 20(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act) is that the parents have equal status but exercise the rights and responsibilities associated with “custody” independently of one another. Section 20(7) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c. C.12 provides clear authority for the court to deal separately and specifically with “incidents of custody”. The form of a “parallel parenting” order addresses specific incidents of custody beyond a mere residential schedule for where children will reside on a day-to-day basis.”

            Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 6451 (CanLII) at 508-509

“In this case the parties did not incorporate the terms of the Separation Agreement into a court order. As a result, the issue of spousal support is governed by s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) that states:

…the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

(a)   the length of time the spouses cohabited;

(b)  the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

(c)  any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

The “condition” of a spouse includes such factors as their age, health, needs, obligations, dependants, and their station in life. A spouse’s “means” encompasses all financial resources, capital assets, income from employment, and any other source from which the spouse derives gains or benefits: Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at pp. 440-442; Smith v. Smith, 2012 ONSC 1116, at para. 69.

Section 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act provides that an order concerning spousal support should consider the objectives of spousal support as follows:

An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should

(a)   recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b)  apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c)  relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

(d)     in so far as practicable, promote the economic self- sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

No single objective is paramount. However, trial judges have a significant amount of discretion to determine the weight that should be placed on each objective based on the circumstances of the parties. One of the purposes of spousal support is to relieve economic hardship that results from marriage or its breakdown: Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at pp. 848; Bracklow, at p. 440.

[258]   As stated in Moge, at pp. 848-849:

. . . [T]he purpose of spousal support is to relieve economic hardship that results from “marriage or its breakdown.” Whatever the respective advantages to the parties of a marriage in other areas, the focus of the inquiry when assessing spousal support after the marriage has ended must be the effect of the marriage in either impairing or improving each party’s economic prospects.

This approach is consistent with both modern and traditional conceptions of marriage in as much as marriage is, among other things, an economic unit which generates financial benefits…The Divorce Act reflects the fact that in today’s marital relationships, partners should expect and are entitled to share those financial benefits.

[259] As stated in Moge v. Moge and Bracklow v. Brackow, there are three conceptual bases for entitlement to spousal support.  First, a spousal support obligation may arise on a compensatory basis, in recognition that upon marriage breakdown, there should be an equitable distribution between the parties of the economic consequences of the marriage.  Entitlement can also arise in appropriate circumstances on a contractual or consensual basis, as a result of express or implied agreements between spouses that purport to either create or negate a spousal support obligation.  Finally, entitlement may exist on a non-compensatory basis, as a result of the needs of the spouse. This ground for spousal support establishes that a spouse may be obliged to pay support based on the other spouse’s economic need, even if that need does not arise as a result of the roles adopted during the marriage. This basis for spousal support is founded on the view that “marriage is a relationship involving mutual obligations and interdependence that may be difficult to unravel when the marriage breaks down”: Moge, at pp. 864-865; Bracklow, at pp. 444, 448; C.Z., at para. 241).

[260]   As the court emphasized in Bracklow, at pp. 450-451, “[a]t the end of the day …, courts have an overriding discretion and the exercise of such discretion will depend on the particular facts of each case, having regard to the factors and objectives designated in the Act.”

          D.A.S. v. P.S., 2021 ONSC 7358 (CanLII) at 254-260

“Courts are not bound by parenting terms in domestic contracts although they may give an indication about parental intentions at the time they were entered into. See: C. (M.A.) v. K.(M.), 2009 ONCJ 18; Libbus v. Libbus, 2008 CanLII 53970 (ONSC). They can also be reflective of the status quo – an important best interests consideration. See: B.C.J.B. v. E.-R.R.R., 2020 ONCJ 438.

The court has no jurisdiction to vary a separation agreement about custody. However, under section 56 of the Family Law Act, it can disregard any provision in the agreement and make an order, if it is in the child’s best interests. Paulo v. Yousif 2011 ONCJ 841.

From: P.D. v. M.C., 2020 ONCJ 323:

14      A separation agreement does not have the effect of an order and no material change is required. The court has no authority to vary a separation agreement about custody but can under the Family Law Act disregard any provision in an agreement and make an order if it is in the best interests of the children.

15      The court must consider first and foremost the best interests of children, while being mindful of the importance of parents’ autonomy in making their own arrangements to resolve their parenting issues. Blois v. Gleason, 2009 CanLII 23109 (ON S.C.).”

            M.E. v. K.K., 2022 ONCJ 509 (CanLII) at 136

“A support claimant is presumptively entitled to prospective support from the date of notice that a support claim is being pursued. See: MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 2005 CanLII 13191 (ON CA), 75 O.R. (3d) 175 (C.A.), at para. 22.  The mother issued her application on March 6, 2019. Accordingly, her claim for retroactive support covers the period from January 1, 2017 until March 2019 – 2 years and 2 months.

The Supreme Court in D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; Laura Jean W. v. Tracy Alfred R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37, outlined the factors that a court should take into account in dealing with retroactive applications. Briefly, there are four points that the court raised:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Whether the recipient spouse has provided a reasonable excuse for his or her delay in applying for support.
            2. The conduct of the payor parent.
            3. The circumstances of the child.
            4. The hardship that the retroactive award may entail.

None of the above factors are decisive or take priority and all should be considered in a global analysis.  In determining whether to make a retroactive award, a court will need to look at all of the relevant circumstances in front of it. The payor’s interest in certainty must be balanced with the need for fairness and flexibility.

Retroactive awards are not exceptional. They can always be avoided by proper payment (D.B.S. par. 97).

The court should not hesitate to find a reasonable excuse for delay in the following circumstances: where the recipient spouse harbored justifiable fears that the payor parent would react vindictively to the application to the detriment of the family; where the recipient lacked the financial or emotional means to bring an application; or where the recipient was given inadequate legal advice (D.B.S., par. 101).

The court should take an expansive view of what constitutes blameworthy behaviour. Blameworthy behaviour is anything that privileges the payor’s own interests over the child’s right to an appropriate amount of support (D.B.S., par. 106). The more material the increase in income, the less likely the payor will be presumed to believe they were meeting their obligations. (D.B.S., par. 108).

Where ordered, an award should generally be retroactive to the date when the recipient gave the payor effective notice of his or her intention to seek an increase in support payments; this date represents a fair balance between certainty and flexibility (D.B.S., par. 5), but where the payor engaged in blameworthy conduct, the date when circumstances changed materially will be the presumptive date of the award. It will then be open to the court to determine the quantum. (D.B.S. par. 134)

Effective notice is defined as any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount needs to be renegotiated. All that is required is for the subject to be broached. Once that has been done, the payor can no longer assume that the status quo is fair (D.B.S., par. 121). In this case, the date of effective notice is the same as the date of formal notice – when the application was issued on March 6, 2019.

It will not always be appropriate for a retroactive award to be ordered. Retroactive awards will not always resonate with the purposes behind the child support regime; this will be so where the child would get no discernible benefit from the award. Retroactive awards may also cause hardship to a payor parent in ways that a prospective award would not. In short, while a free-standing obligation to support one’s children must be recognized, it will not always be appropriate for a court to enforce this obligation once the relevant time period has passed. Unlike prospective awards, retroactive awards can impair the delicate balance between certainty and flexibility in this area of the law. As situations evolve, fairness demands that obligations change to meet them. Yet, when obligations appear to be settled, fairness also demands that they not be gratuitously disrupted. Prospective and retroactive awards are thus very different in this regard. See: D.B.S., pars. 95 and 96); Titova v. Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, par. 37; Baldwin v. Funston, 2007 CarswellOnt 3168 (C.A.)

Courts should attempt to craft the retroactive award in a way that minimizes hardship. Hardship to the payor parent may be mitigated by a judgment which allows for payment of an award in instalments: See: D.B.S., at para. 116; Connelly v. McGouran, 2007 ONCA 578.”

            James v. Hutchinson, 2019 ONCJ 801 (CanLII) at 26-35

“Credibility assessment is not an exact science. In Baker-Warren v. Denault, 2009 NSSC 59 (N.S.S.C.) Forgeron J. noted that,

“It is not always possible to “articulate with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events.”  R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, para. 20.  I further note that “assessing credibility is a difficult and delicate matter that does not always lend itself to precise and complete verbalization.”  R v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, para. 49.”

In Christakos v. De Caires, 2016 ONSC 702 at para. 10,  Nicholson J. adopted as helpful MacDonald J.’s following outline in Re Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283 (CanLII), 269 N.S.R. (3d) 84:

[36] There are many tools for assessing credibility:

a)  The ability to consider inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness’s evidence, which includes internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, inconsistencies between the witness’ testimony and the testimony of other witnesses.

b) The ability to review independent evidence that confirms or contradicts the witness’ testimony.

c)  The ability to assess whether the witness’ testimony is plausible or, as stated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), 1951 CarswellBC 133, it is “in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical [and] informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”, but in doing so I am required not to rely on false or frail assumptions about human behaviour.

d)  It is possible to rely upon the demeanour of the witness, including their sincerity and use of language, but it should be done with caution ( v. Mah, 2002 NSCA 99 (CanLII) [at paras.] 70-75).

e)  Special consideration must be given to the testimony of witnesses who are parties to proceedings; it is important to consider the motive that witnesses may have to fabricate evidence.   v. J.H.2005 CanLII 253 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 39 (OCA) [at paras.] 51-56).

[37]   There is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness’s testimony in its entirety.  On the contrary, a trier may believe none, part or all of a witness’s evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness’s evidence (See R. v. D.R. [1966] 2 S.C.R. 291 at [para.] 93 and R. v. J.H. supra).  [Emphasis in original.]

In Ouellette v. Udin, 2018 ONSC 4520 at para. 9, Shelston J. described credibility assessment as a “holistic undertaking incapable of precise formulation”. In Al-Sajee v Tawfic, 2019 ONSC 3857 at paras. 41 and 42, Chappel J. described assessing credibility as a complex task and provided a comprehensive summary listing what courts should consider in weighing and assessing the credibility and reliability of witnesses.”

            A.E. v. A.B., 2021 ONSC 7302 (CanLII) at 86-88

“The test for granting and discharging a CPL is set out in s. 103 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43. The applicable principles were recently summarized by Schabas J. in Marmak Holdings Inc. v. Miletta Maplecrete Holdings Ltd. et al., 2019 ONSC 4630, at para. 14 (citations omitted):

The moving party must demonstrate that there is a triable issue with respect to the moving party’s claim to an interest in the Property… The Court must consider all relevant factors between the parties, including whether damages would be a satisfactory remedy, and balance the interests of the parties in exercising its discretion equitably.

See also: 2254069 Ontario Inc. v. Kim, 2017 ONSC 5003, at paras. 20-21.

The threshold is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a triable issue, not whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed: Perruzza v. Spatone, 2010 ONSC 841 at para. 20 (ii). The triable issue must, however, relate to the plaintiff’s interest in land, not simply a right that would lead to an award of damages: Bobbie Mann v. Marcus Chac-Wai, 2017 ONSC 3416, at para. 5. In other words, an interest in land must be a possible remedy at trial based on the evidentiary record on the motion.

The cases confirm that granting a CPL is an equitable remedy: “[T[he governing test is that the Judge must exercise his discretion in equity and look at all of the relative matters between the parties…”: Clock Investments Ltd. v. Hardwood Estates Ltd. et al., 1977 CanLII 1414 (ON SC), 16 O.R. (2d) 671 (Div.Ct.), at para. 10; Perruzza at para. 20 (v) and cases cited therein; 2235209 Ontario Inc. v. Sedona Lifestyles (Rometown) Inc., 2020 ONSC 4008, at para. 70. See also: Bobbie Mann, at para. 5:

Even if the plaintiff has a potential case for a remedy related to an interest in land the court may still refuse the CPL if it would be unjust to order it. The court must consider the equities of granting this form of interim relief.  This is not a mechanical application of a test but an exercise of discretion to achieve a just result.”

Khan v. Taji, 2020 ONSC 6704 (CanLII) at 48-51

“Everyone is entitled to their day in court but once they have had that day, they cannot be permitted to subject other parties to the cost of further proceedings attempting to re-litigate issues that have already been decided.”

Simpson v. The Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 806 (CanLII) at 41

“The court’s jurisdiction to grant the injunction sought is found in s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. This section is formulated as follows:

101 (1) In the Superior Court of Justice, an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order may be granted or a receiver or receiver and manager may be appointed by an interlocutory order, where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so.

(2) An order under subsection (1) may include such terms as are considered just.

The purpose of the Mareva injunction is to tie up the assets of the defendant, pending any judgment adverse to the defendant, so that they would then be available to for execution in satisfaction of that judgment. It is ordering security before judgment: Chitel v. Rothbart, 1982 CanLII 1956 (ON CA), [1982] O.J. No. 3540, (Ont. C.A.) at para. 30.

A Mareva injunction can be granted post-judgment: Lamont v. Kent, [1999] O.J. No. 277 (Gen. Div.), at para. 8. When granted post-judgment, the relief is described as a Mareva injunction in aid of execution: Coast to Coast Against Cancer v. Sokolowski, 2016 ONSC 170, at para 5.

The purpose of the Mareva injunction post- judgment but before execution is to prohibit the dissipation of assets: Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v Emmott, [2019] EWCA Civ 219 (Eng. C.A.), at para 40.

A Mareva injunction can be granted to protect against avoidance of a costs order: Jet West Ltd. v. Haddican, [1992] 1 All E.R. 545, [1992] 1 W.L.R. 487 (Eng. C.A.), considered in Hilltop Group Ltd. v. Katana, [2002] O.J. No. 4136, (Ont. SCJ), at para 19.

In Lamont, supra, Sachs J. set out the requirements for granting a Mareva injunction in aid of execution, as follows, at para.10:

1. 1. 1. 1. Full and frank disclosure by theplaintiff.
         2. Full and fair particulars of the plaintiff’sclaim.
         3. Assets of the defendant within thejurisdiction.
         4. A risk of removal of those assets by the defendant beforejudgment.
         5. An undertaking by the plaintiff as todamages.”

Da Silva Edgerly v. Edgerly, 2022 ONSC 6170 (CanLII) at 8-13

“Typically, a review under Rule 2.1 is commenced by a party asking the registrar to put a pleading before a judge under Rule 2.1.01 (6) or 2.1.02. A judge reviews the pleading to determine if there is a prima facie case that a proceeding or a motion in a proceeding may be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process and that there may be reason to resort to the summary, written process under Rule 2.1 rather than a regular motion process. See Scaduto v The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733 (CanLII).  If the judge is satisfied that Rule 2.1 may apply, then she or he directs the registrar to send notice to the plaintiffs inviting submissions as to why the claim or motion should not be dismissed.

Under Rules 2.1.01 (1) and 2.1.02 (1) the court may commence a review of a claim or a motion in a claim on its own initiative. To avoid multiple reviews of the same pleading, the court should not limit its initial review just to the claims against the party or parties who initiated the process. That is, although a request for a review may be initiated by a single party under Rules 2.1.01 (6) or 2.1.02 (2), if, on the initial review, the court determines that the claim may be frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process in whole or in relation to more parties than just those who made the request, the court ought to broaden the inquiry at its own initiative. If it does so, the court should make careful note of the full breadth of review being undertaken in its call for submissions from the plaintiffs.

In my view, while the invitation to commence the Rule 2.1 review process may be made by or on behalf of a limited number of parties, the court ought to consider expanding the scope of the review under Rules 2.1.01 and 2.1.02 to avoid multiplicity and serial requests as has occurred in this case.”

P.Y. v. The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2020 ONSC 6660 (CanLII) at 8-10

“The court’s authority to make retroactive support orders is contained in clause 34 (1) (f) of the Family Law Act. This clause reads as follows:

Powers of court

34      (1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,

…….(f) requiring that support be paid in respect of any period before the date of the order;

Any support claimed after an application is issued is prospective support, not retroactive support. See: Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.).

In Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, the court set out the framework that should be applied for applications to retroactively increase support in paragraph 114 as follows:

a)  The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.

b)   Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.

c)   Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.

d)  The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.

e)   Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

This framework in Colucci addresses a request to retroactively increase the support contained in an order or an agreement. Courts have found that this framework should also be applied, with necessary modifications, for an original request for retroactive support. See: M.A. v. M.E., 2021 ONCJ 555; A.E. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189.

In an original application for retroactive support, there will be no need to meet the threshold requirement of establishing a material change in circumstances, as required in Colucci. The first step will be to determine the presumptive date of retroactivity as described in Colucci. The second step will be to determine if the court should depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors will guide the exercise of that discretion, as described in Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 25. The third step will be to quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the guidelines.

Effective notice is defined as any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount needs to be renegotiated. All that is required is for the subject to be broached. Once that has been done, the payor can no longer assume that the status quo is fair. See: D.B.S., par. 12

Retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations. See: Michel, par. 25.

Retroactive child support is a debt. There is no reason why it should not be awarded unless there are strong reasons not to do so. See: Michel, par. 132.

Retroactive awards are not exceptional. They can always be avoided by proper payment. See: D.B.S., par. 97.

In Michel, at paragraph 121, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the importance of support payors meeting their support obligations and commented that the neglect or underpayment of support is strongly connected to child poverty and female poverty.”

Mpamugo v. Nyeche-Woluchor, 2022 ONCJ 488 (CanLII) at 49-58