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“In Caldwell v. Caldwell, 2023 ONSC 7715, the court reviewed the law regarding costs thrown away when a trial is adjourned, at paragraphs 8 and 11 to 13 as follows:

8            The phrase “costs thrown away” refers to a party’s costs for trial preparation which have been wasted and will have to be re-done as a result of the adjournment of the trial: Pittiglio v. Pittiglio, 2015 ONSC 3603 (CanLII) (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 7; Middleton v. Jaggee Transport Ltd., 2014 ONSC 3041 (CanLII) (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 5.

11           Costs thrown away are generally payable on a full recovery basis: Pittiglio, at para. 5; Milone v. Delorme, 2010 ONSC 4162 (CanLII), 2010 CarswellOnt 5535 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 12; Straume v. Battarbee Estate, 2001 CarswellOnt 6225 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 2-3; Middleton, at para. 5. This is because the purpose of such an award of costs is to “indemnify a party for the wasted time for trial preparation arising from the adjournment”: Pittiglio, at para. 6; Legacy Leather International Inc. v. Ward [2007 CarswellOnt 527 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], 2007 CanLII 2357, at para. 9. Such an award is not to punish the party seeking the adjournment, but to indemnify the other party for the wasted time for trial preparation arising from the adjournment: Incandescent Revolution Manufacturing Co. v. Gerling Global General Insurance Co. [1989 CarswellAlta 405 (Alta. Q.B.)], 1989 CanLII 3385, at para. 12; Pittiglio, at para. 6, citing Kalkanis v. Kalkanis, 2014 ONSC 205 (CanLII) (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 3.

12          The court must determine what costs have actually been wasted. This is not an easy task: some witnesses will require little further preparation while some will require much: Straume, at para. 4. It has been described as an “intuitive”, rather than a scientific, process: Pittiglio, at para. 17.

13           An award of costs thrown away can be revisited at the end of the trial to determine if further costs should be awarded: Straume, at para. 37; Middleton, at para. 23; Laudon v. Roberts & Sullivan, 2007 CanLII 10906 (ON SC), at para. 20.

In Pryce v. Pryce, 2019 ONSC 3441, in a highly contested parenting case involving a request to adjourn a six- day trial scheduled to start that day, the court observed that while “much of the preparation will need to be redone in advance of the trial…” there were “tasks that will not be completely wasted, such as preparation of the opening statement, questions for witnesses and draft order.” The costs claimed were reduced from $7,585.71 to $6,102, both amounts inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The above cases relate to costs thrown away arising from the adjournment of contested trials. The principles in these cases should also apply, with any necessary modifications, to costs thrown away when a party prepares for an uncontested trial that does not proceed at the request of the other party.

In determining the appropriate quantum, the court should consider the amount that the unsuccessful party could reasonably have expected to pay in the event of lack of success in the litigation. See: Arthur v. Arthur, 2019 ONSC 938.”

Magalhães de Araújo v. Torres, 2025 ONCJ 164 (CanLII) at 24-27

The principles in the legislation and the jurisprudence make it clear that parenting time shall be determined based upon what is in the best interests of the children.   Following Lang v. Qureshi, 2025 ONSC 585:

a)      Best interests of a child is determined by focusing on the child, not the parent.  The analysis should be centered on the rights of the child, from a child-centred perspective.  See para. 26(c).

b)      Primary consideration is to be given to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.  See para. 27.

c)      A proper consideration is the willingness of each spouse to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse.  See para. 29.

d)      An assessment of the best interests of the child must take into account all of the relevant circumstances with respect to the needs of the child and ability of each parent to meet those needs.  Each child deserves to have a meaningful and consistent relationship with both parents. See para. 30.

e)      The allocation of parenting time must adhere to the principle that “a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child”.  See para. 33.

f)      A child focused approach is required, with an important goal of achieving as much parenting time as possible with each parent, so long as it is consistent with the child’s best interests.  It may end up being equal time.  It may end up being some other division of time.  See para. 33(c).

g)      Frequent and meaningful parenting time is necessary for the formation and continued development of healthy attachments between young children and their parents.  See para. 33(f).

h)      A young child with attachments to both parents needs sufficient contact with both, without prolonged separations to maintain a meaningful and close relationship with them.  See para. 33(g).

i)      The allocation of time must address both quantitative and qualitative considerations.  Parenting time entails more than simply one-on-one parent and child interaction.  It includes parental responsibility and involvement with respect to all aspects of the child’s life – throughout the child’s schedule – including school-related matters, extracurricular activities, and other events.  See para. 33(h).”

Wojick v. Wojick, 2025 ONSC 1888 (CanLII) at 12

“D.B.S. said the following in relation to the start date for support:

a.   Where ordered, an award should generally be retroactive to the date when the recipient gave the payor effective notice of his or her intention to seek an increase in support payments.  This date represents a fair balance between certainty and flexibility.

b.   An earlier date may be appropriate if there is blameworthy conduct by the payor.

c.   But generally a retroactive award should not commence earlier than three years before formal notice was given.

d.   Effective notice is defined as any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or that a current amount needs to be renegotiated. All that is required is for the subject to be broached. Once that has been done, the payor can no longer assume that the status quo is fair.

e.   But the date of effective notice is not relevant when a payor parent has engaged in blameworthy conduct.

In Michel the Supreme Court suggested that rather than ordering retroactive support back to the date of effective notice, it may now be time to simply start ordering payors to pay what they should have paid, as a matter of course.

a.   Payors have an absolute – not a contingent– obligation to support their children in the amount set out in Child Support Guidelines, pursuant to a now long-standing, well-publicized family law regime.

b.   By now, every parent should understand that the amount of child support you pay is based on the amount of income you earn.   It’s a simple, logical concept.

c.   If the obligation by the payor and the entitlement by the child are both absolute and unconditional, it makes little sense to invite more complication – and litigation – by adding a condition that “mandatory payments” are only “payable” if the recipient does certain specific things to ask.”

            Abumatar v. Hamda, 2021 ONSC 2165 (CanLII) at 59-60

“Section 94(11) of the CYFSA directs that at the interim stage of a case, the Court shall take into consideration the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained.  Section 74(3)(a) also places the child’s views and wishes front and center, in the best interests’ analysis.   Moreover, the first sentence in the preamble to the CYFSA acknowledges that children “are individuals with rights to be respected and voices to be heard”.

However, the right to respect and to be heard is not tantamount to the right to decide.  And despite their additional importance within the statutory scheme, a child’s views and wishes are to be “given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity”.”

Durham Children’s Aid Society v. R.S and S.S, 2023 ONSC 1919 (CanLII) at 151-152

“Three elements must be satisfied in order for an inter vivos gift to be valid: a specific intention to make a gift by the donor, delivery of the gift, and acceptance by the donee:  McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, at para. 43.

The recipient of the gift bears the onus of establishing all three elements of an inter vivos gift:  Carvalho v. Verma, 2024 ONSC 1183, at para. 50.

The Court must engage in a contextual analysis, weighing all the available evidence in order to ascertain, on a balance of probabilities, the donor’s actual intention with respect to making a gift:  Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, at para. 44.

In determining intent, the Court must examine the balance of the evidence to determine what the intention was with respect to the gift. It is specifically the intention of the transferor that is relevant: MacIntyre v. Winter, 2021 ONCA 516, at para. 24.  This requires clear, convincing and cogent evidence that there was an intention to make a gift:  Walker v. Faarsijani, 2021 ONSC 5571, at para. 19.

It is the transferor’s actual intention at the time of transfer that is the critical consideration: Rascal Trucking Ltd. v. Nishi, 2013 SCC 33, at para. 41.”

Hugginson v. Hugginson, 2025 ONSC 1797 (CanLII) at 19-23

“On July 23, 2024, the provincial government enacted Ontario Regulation 300/24 which added Rule 4.05.3 to the Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Family Law Rules incorporate certain aspects of the Rules of Civil Procedure by reference, confirming at Rule 1(7) that reference is to be had to the Rules of Civil Procedure if a matter is not covered under the Family Law Rules.  The portions of Rule 4.03.5 applicable to today’s situation are as follows:

4.05.3 (1) In this rule,

“CaseLines” means the software authorized by the Ministry of the Attorney General for the purposes of this rule and that is available on the internet under the name “CaseLines”.

(2) This rule applies to all or part of any hearing, pre-trial conference or case conference under these rules, except in a proceeding in the Court of Appeal.

(3) A party shall provide the following documents to the court by submitting them to CaseLines in accordance with this rule, if the court requires the party to do so:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Every document the party files or has filed with the court in respect of the hearing or conference.
               2. Subject to subrule (5), any other document in the court file that the party intends to rely on at the hearing or conference and that has not already been submitted to CaseLines by another party.
               3. A compendium containing the excerpted portions of the cases and of the evidence to which the party intends to refer during the hearing or conference.

(4) Subject to subrule (5), the documents listed in subrule (3) must be submitted to CaseLines by the following deadline:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. In the case of the hearing of a motion or application where the party is required to give the registrar a confirmation of motion (Form 37B) or confirmation of application (Form 38B), the deadline is 2 p.m. three days before the hearing date, unless the court orders otherwise.
               2. In any other case, the deadline is five days before the date of the hearing or conference, unless the court orders otherwise.

…

(8) The party shall ensure that every document that the party submits to CaseLines is identical to that document as contained in the court file, subject to any modifications required by this rule or the court.

…

(11) For greater certainty, submitting documents to CaseLines does not amount to the filing or service of those documents under these rules.

Here, again maintaining the exception for costs-related materials, I note that Father uploaded a Financial Statement and an updated Form 35.1 Affidavit to Case Center yesterday.

Case Center has been in use for almost three years.  At no time were parties permitted to upload materials without ensuring their proper service and filing.  As Justice Piccoli wrote in the unreported case of Dragomir v. Lucuta, Court File No. FC-10-FS-44165-003, heard at Kitchener on November 11, 2024.:

We have long been taking a lenient approach to issues with materials out of compassion for litigants and counsel and in an attempt to ensure access to justice.  However, as former Senior Family Judge Czutrin famously reminded us, “what we permit, we promote.”

In that case, Her Honour struck the motion from the list, requiring all materials to be properly filed and uploaded to Case Center before a fresh hearing date could be arranged.

It is not the Court’s responsibility either to pursue counsel to ensure that they have properly filed materials referenced in their Confirmations or to act in a secretarial capacity on the hearing date and correct administrative errors.  The only reasonable exception is for materials related to the issue of costs, which would normally be reviewed only at the conclusion of the motion hearing.

Therefore, these motions proceed with argument only on the above-listed documents which have actually been served and filed.”

Demetriou v. Jamali, 2025 ONSC 1683 (CanLII) at 6-11

“Parties are entitled to enter into contracts to arrange their affairs as they see fit. Courts are to respect the abilities of parties to make their own decisions and organize their own affairs: Hartshorne, at para. 36. Domestic contracts should generally be encouraged by the courts: Anderson v. Anderson, 2023 SCC 13, 481 D.L.R. (4^th) 1, at para. 33. There are, of course, circumstances in which a court will not enforce a contract. Courts must be alive to the particular vulnerabilities that that can undermine the fairness of a domestic contract negotiated during a separation: Anderson, at paras. 3, 34.

The concept of unconscionability in family law is broader than in the commercial context. The question is whether there are any circumstances of oppression, pressure, or vulnerabilities being exploited during the negotiation process that resulted in an agreement that deviates substantially from legislation: Rick v. Brandzema, 2009 SCC 10, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 44. The courts have used the language of taking advantage of or preying on a weaker party’s vulnerability when assessing unconscionability in a family law context: Rosen v. Rosen (1994), 1994 CanLII 2769 (ON CA), 18 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), at p. 645; Toscano, at paras. 63-68.”

          Albaum v. Albaum, 2024 ONSC 1595 (CanLII) at 83-84

A child’s parents are equally entitled to decision-making responsibility: s. 20(1) of the CLRA.

The court must ensure that any decision-making regime supports the best interests of the child. “Section 24 of the CLRA endorses a child-centered approach in determining parenting orders”: Mougoui v. Sekkat, 2025 ONSC 303 at para. 21 citing Young v Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 62-63, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; Knapp v Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305, at para. 34.

Children with special needs require decision-making plans that take in account “the extent of the parties’ involvement in addressing those needs and their willingness to consider reasonable recommendations from knowledgeable and experienced professionals”: Duclos v. Davis, 2018 ONSC 6088 (S.C.J.), at para. 36(d); Keown v. Procee, 2014 ONSC 7314 (S.C.J.), at paras. 20-25; S.A.P. v. D.M.P, 2020 ABQB 811 (Q.B.), at paras. 20-22.

Though neither party has asked for it, the following principles would determine whether to make an order for joint parenting:

a.   There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them;

b.   Joint decision-making cannot be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication;

c.   The fitness of both parents does not mandate joint parenting;

d.   The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not precluee an order for joint decision-making responsibility;

e.   No matter how detailed the custody order there will always be gaps and unexpected situations, and when they arise, they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis; and

f.   The younger the child, the more important parental communication is.

Kaplanis v Kaplanis, 2005 CanLII 1625 (ON CA).”

          Clarke v. Denyes, 2025 ONSC 1894 (CanLII) at 113-116

“One of the purposes of costs is to change behaviour.

The justice system is a precious public resource.  Access to the justice system by individuals must be balanced with the need to ensure that the resource is available for all those who need it.  This is one of the purposes of Rule 2.

Family law litigants are responsible for and accountable for the positions they take in the litigation: Heuss v. Sarkos, 2004 CarswellOnt 3317, 2004 OCJ 141, 132 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1112 (Ont. Ct.); Peers v. Poupore, 2008 ONCJ 615 (CanLII), 2008 O.N.C.J. 615 (CanLII) (Ont. Ct.), para. 62.

The decision respecting liability is ultimately a discretionary one that must be informed by the overall conduct of the parties and all of the circumstances and dynamics of the case.  One of the most important functions of costs is to ensure that litigants conduct themselves in a manner that upholds the integrity of our justice system as a whole.  A careful consideration of the conduct of the parties is therefore a key component to the costs analysis.  The court has an obligation to ensure that litigation is not utilized as a tool to harass parties, and that the resources of the justice system are not unduly drained by unmeritorious claims: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONSC 3352 (CanLII) (Ont. Sup. Ct.), para 38.

Parties to litigation must understand that court proceedings are expensive, time-consuming and stressful for all concerned.  They are not designed to give individual litigants a forum for carrying on in whatever manner they may choose, oblivious to the impact of that conduct on the other side and, perhaps most importantly, for the purposes of this case, oblivious to the mounting costs of the litigation: Heuss v. Sarkos, supra, 2004, (Ont. Ct.), para. 20.

Matrimonial litigation is an occasion for sober consideration and thoughtfulness rather than intemperate behaviour: Heuss v. Sarkos, supra, 2004, (Ont. Ct.), para. 20.

Rule 24 (5) provides criteria for determining the reasonableness of a party’s behaviour in a case (a factor in determining quantum, Rule 24 (12)).  It reads as follows:

DECISION ON REASONABLENESS

i.    (5)  In deciding whether a party has behaved reasonably or unreasonably, the court shall examine,

(a)   the party’s behaviour in relation to the issues from the time they arose, including whether the party made an offer to settle;

(b)  the reasonableness of any offer the party made; and

(c)   any offer the party withdrew or failed to accept.

A finding of bad faith is not a condition precedent to full recovery of costs by the other side under the Family Law Rules: Osmar v. Osmar, 2000 CanLII 20380 (ON SC), 2000 CarswellOnt 2343, 2000 CarswellOnt 2343, [2000] W.D.F.L. 660, [2000] O.J. No. 2504, [2000] O.T.C. 979, 8 R.F.L. (5th) 387, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 137 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), para. 11.  The court need not find that bad faith or other special circumstances exist to make a costs award approaching substantial or full recovery: Sordi  v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665 (CanLII), 2011 ONCA 665 (Ont. C.A.), para. 21; Beaver v. Hill, supra, 2018, (Ont. Sup. Ct.), para 41.

When awarded on a full recovery scale, costs can serve to express the court’s disapproval of unreasonable conduct during the litigation: Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, 2002 CanLII 45005 (ON CA), 2002 CarswellOnt 2263, 2002 C.L.L.C. 210-027, 17 C.C.E.L. (3d) 207, 161 O.A.C. 302, 60 O.R. (3d) 474, 215 D.L.R. (4th) 31 (Ont. C.A.), para 76.

The unreasonable conduct of a litigant is a factor in both the awarding of costs and in fixing the amount of costs.

It must be made clear to family law litigants that there is no right to a day in court, or at least, that the right to a day in court is tempered with the requirement that the parties take a clear-headed look at their case before insisting on their day in court.  The court must sanction this behaviour clearly, or it will invite more of this behaviour.”

          Nelson v. Davidson, 2023 ONCJ 418 (CanLII) at 17-27

The decision to impute income as part of the calculation of support is discretionary. The only limitation to that discretion is that there must be some evidentiary basis for the amount of income imputed: Monahan-Joudrey v. Joudrey, 2012 ONSC 5984, at para. 21; see also Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, 65 R.F.L. (6th) 17, at paras. 27-28; and Staples v. Callender, 2010 NSCA 49, 85 R.F.L. (6th) 236, at paras. 21-22.

The imputation of income for support purposes is a finding of fact made by the trial judge: Pirner v. Pirner (2005), 2005 CanLII 44166 (ON CA), 22 R.F.L. (6th) 291 (Ont. C.A), at para. 20. It is not an exact science, and this court has repeatedly upheld a trial judge’s findings that “fairly reflect” the parties’ financial circumstances per ss. 15-18 of the Guidelines: see Mason, at para. 154; Ludmer v. Ludmer, 2014 ONCA 827, 52 R.F.L. (7th) 17, at para. 25.”

          Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200 (CanLII) at 108-109