“I take judicial notice of the significant short-term and long-term negative impacts that a child’s estrangement or alienation from one of his parents can have on that child’s social and emotional development and adjustment, physical, psychological and mental health, as well as on his overall well-being. These negative consequences have been documented in countless court decisions in the past, including in many of those cited above.
I am of the view that most therapeutic orders sought in the context of family law proceedings to assist parents and children resolve their disputes, improve their relationships, manage their stress, and transition to their new family reality in a healthier way will seldom be considered “treatment” under the HCCA. While there is no doubt that individual and family counselling, if successful, will have a significantly positive impact on everyone’s health, their goal will usually be to address stress management strategies and inter-relationship management strategies. As such, such therapeutic interventions will not be “health-related” and, if they are, they will usually pose little or no risk of harm. The risk of harm, particularly to children, will often reside in NOT administering them. This being said, the question as to whether a specific therapeutic intervention is a treatment pursuant to section 2 of the HCCA needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
To the extent that a therapeutic intervention is considered to be a “treatment” to be provided by a “health practitioner” as defined by the HCCA, the parents’ consent will be required before a therapeutic order can be made. This is clearly set out in section 10 of the HCCA. An older or more mature child’s consent will also likely be required (for a detailed analysis of whether and when a child’s consent to treatment is necessary under the HCCA, see Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. M.S., 2018 ONCJ 14 (Ont. C.J.) and L. (N.) v. M. (R.R.)).”
Leelaratna v. Leelaratna, 2018 ONSC 5983 at 65-67