Author: dawi

“The husband seeks to change, and reduce, the temporary spousal support Order of $6,500 monthly made by Bennett J. less than a year ago on January 28, 2022. That Order was based on a $235,000 yearly income attributed to the husband and upon which amount the husband agreed: the husband wants the amount reduced to $2,419 a month based on the $107,000 income critique prepared by his expert slightly more than two months after the Order was made.

Sections 17(1)(a) and (4.1) of the Divorce Act (“the Act”) provide as follows:

17 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, retroactively or prospectively,

a support order or any provision of one, on application by either or both former spouses

(4.1) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a spousal support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred since the making of the spousal support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order, and, in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration.

In Grass v. Hropak, 2020 ONSC 7803 (CanLII), at para. 87, the case involved (among other things) a motion to vary and reduce a temporary October 2019 support Order made on consent at a case conference. The parties had agreed to use a three-year average (2016 to 2018) for the income of the husband (the payor).  He alleged that his income earned afterwards was, on average, less than that set out in the Order and sought a reduction. The wife resisted the relief for several reasons, two or which are relevant to the motion before this court. She contended that there had not been a material change in the husband’s circumstances and that the reliability of his post-Order income was questionable. In declining to change the spousal support term, Kraft J. noted the court’s approach to variation requests involving temporary Orders.

The courts generally avoid varying interim orders on motions prior to trial unless the circumstances are urgent. Jarvis J., in Pakka v. Nygard 2004 CanLII 5071 (ON SC), stated as follows:

The variation of an interim order is a difficult area. Policy considerations dictate that such applications be discouraged. They increase the stress and uncertainty of the parties and vastly increase the cost of litigation. To echo the words of Wolder J. in Thompson v.  Thompson, [1995] O.J.  No.  2106 (Ct.  J. (Prov. Div)), such that an order should be varied only where the failure vary “would cause the payor to suffer undue hardship or that a continuation of the existing order would be incongruous or absurd.” (Underlining added in the original).

Other cases have used “compelling”, “exceptional” and “rare” to describe the circumstances warranting a variation: see, for example, Thom v. Thom, [2014] O.J. No. 2115, 2014 CarswellOnt 5708; Lusted v. Bogobowicz, 2021 ONSC 269 (CanLII) at paras 24-26. In Mancini v. Mancini, 2020 ONSC 5259 (CanLII), 2020 ONSC 5259 (CanLII) at paras 26-28. the payor sought to vary a temporary Order that had imputed to him, with his consent, a $100,000 income: he claimed that when the Order was made he had not been able to provide adequate financial disclosure and that he was now able to provide disclosure suggesting that his actual income was $40,800 a year. Unlike the self-employed husband in the case before this court, the new evidence about Mr. Mancini’s income was viewed suspiciously because the business in which he was engaged was closely connected to a company operated by family members. His mother had provided an affidavit containing his accounting and income tax information. Smith J. considered the test for variation of temporary spousal support Orders under the Act:

[26] The test for variation of temporary orders was summarized by Justice Chappel in Damaschin-Zamfirescu v. Damaschin-Zamfirescu, (2012) ONSC 6689:

18 The Divorce Act does not specifically address the issue of variation of temporary spousal support orders. Section 17 of the Divorce Act sets out a framework for the variation of support and custody orders, however that section only applies to variation of final spousal support orders made pursuant to section 15.2(1) of the Act.

19 Despite the lack of specific provisions in the Divorce Act regarding variation of temporary orders, the court does have the authority to make changes to temporary spousal support orders in response to developments in the parties’ situations and the availability of more fulsome evidence relevant to the spousal support analysis. The power to vary temporary spousal support orders made under the Act derives from the court’s inherent jurisdiction to amend interlocutory orders. This ability to vary such orders is critical to ensuring fairness and justice as between the parties, given that temporary orders are often imperfect solutions based on very limited and usually untested information. As Sachs, J. stated in Chaitas v. Christopoulos, temporary corollary relief orders are intended to provide “a reasonably acceptable solution to a difficult problem until trial.”

20 The test that applies on a Motion to vary a temporary spousal support order has evolved within the parameters of the general principle that parties in matrimonial proceedings should be encouraged to advance their case to trial as soon as possible. Using this foundational principle, the Ontario Court of Appeal determined in Lipson v. Lipson that proceedings to vary interim support orders should not be encouraged. It held that in order to succeed on a Motion to change a temporary spousal support order, a party must establish that there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the previous temporary order was made. Variation proceedings relating to temporary orders should not become the focus of the parties’ litigation. The onus on a party who seeks to vary a temporary spousal support order rather than waiting until trial is a heavy one.

[27] There is a heavy onus on the party seeking to vary a temporary support order, in that the change of circumstances must be substantial since the previous order was made. A substantial change must also be material, meaning that “had it existed at the time…would likely have resulted in a different order (see Colivas v. Colivas, 2016 ONSC 715).

[28] “A party cannot rely on his own failure to provide adequate disclosure to argue that the decision based on inadequate disclosure should be given less deference.” (see Colivas v. Colivas, at par. 29).”

            Sun v. Lo, 2023 ONSC 128 (CanLII) at 15-18

“Family law litigants are accountable for the positions they take in litigation. They have an obligation to assess their cases at the outset and to reassess as the case unfolds, see M.B. v. A.F. 2021 ONCJ 45.”

            S. v. A., 2022 ONSC 55 (CanLII) at 20

“Family disputes are seldom black and white affairs.”

Justice for Children and Youth v. Glegg, 2021 ONSC 8515 (CanLII) at 16

“The applicant is seeking that the Russian Divorce Order, dated January 13, 2020, be set aside.

Pursuant to section 22 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2^nd Supp.):

(1) A divorce granted, on or after the coming into force of this Act, by a competent authority shall be recognized for the purpose of determining the marital status in Canada of any person, if either former spouse was habitually resident in the country or subdivision of the competent authority for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of proceedings for the divorce.

(2) A divorce granted after July 1, 1968 by a competent authority, on the basis of the domicile of the wife in the country or subdivision of the competent authority, determined as if she were unmarried and, if she was a minor, as if she had attained the age of majority, shall be recognized for the purpose of determining the marital status in Canada of any person.

(3) Nothing in this section abrogates or derogates from any other rule of law respecting the recognition of divorces granted otherwise than under this Act.

Section 22(3) of the Divorce Act is interpreted to permit the court to use conflict of law principles and the common law to recognize a foreign divorce: Wilson v. Kovalev, 2016 ONSC 163, 72 R.F.L. (7^th) 362, at para. 9.  A divorce that is granted in a foreign jurisdiction is presumed to be valid.  The onus rests on the applicant to convince the court that the divorce ought to be set aside.

Implications in Ontario if the Russian divorce is valid

Parties who have a foreign divorce that is regarded as valid in Ontario cannot obtain spousal support. The Court of Appeal has also determined that Ontario courts have no jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to deal with spousal support as corollary relief, unless the parties have been divorced under a divorce granted pursuant to the Divorce Act: Okmyansky v. Okmyansky, 2007 ONCA 427, 86 O.R. (3d) 587, at para. 25.”

Vyazemskaya v. Safin, 2022 ONSC 7311 (CanLII) at 14-17

“The courts have shown a marked reluctance to allow employees to deduct business losses from employment income for child support purposes and have frequently refused to deduct the loss from their income (see Proulx v. Proulx 2009 CanLII 19938 (ON SC); Burrell v. Robinson, (2009), 2009 CanLII 33027 (ON SC), 78 R.F.L. (6th) 351 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Luke v. Richards, 2018 ONSC 1695; Hargrove v. Holliday, 2010 ABQB 70; Thomas v. Thomas, 2019 NLCA 32). This is because it would be unreasonable to ask the other parent to assist in financing a business venture by accepting a lesser amount of child support (Boak v. Boak, 1999 CarswellBC 2876 (B.C.S.C.))

In Burrell, Justice Eberhard disallowed rental loses that the payor had deducted against his employment as a pilot. In paragraph 5, Justice Eberhard wrote:

The respondent father also argued that it would be unfair to disentitle his reliance on these losses since the income he may someday derive from these rental properties will certainly be required to be included. At such time as there may be such income, the cost of earning same may well become relevant but at the moment the rental properties are merely an investment into which he has decided to put his available resources. Once support is determined this court does not dictate how individuals spend their resources. The increase in equity is testament to the good sense of the Respondent Father’s choice. That does not relieve him of the obligation to pay support in accordance with the income available to him.

Justice Eberhard’s reasoning seems to be that, since the payor’s assets will ultimately be enhanced, the deductions against his employment income should not be allowed.

In Richards, Justice Timms concluded that legitimate hard costs – such as mortgage interest, insurance, utilities, and municipal taxes – are acceptable deductions against employment income for the purposes of determining a payor’s income for child support purposes.”

Mastrangelo v. Di Cristofaro, 2019 ONSC 7264 (CanLII) at 98-101

“Generally, any disposition concerning the parenting of a child must be in accordance with the child’s best interests as defined in s. 16 of the Divorce Act.  The provisions in s. 16 which are raised in this motion is the relative ability of the parties to meet the child’s needs, especially for stability (s. 16(1)(a)), the views and preferences of the children (s. 16(1)(e)) and the issue of family violence as raised by the Applicant (s. 16(1)(j)).

However, in the case of the request by the Applicant to change an existing status quo and order in an interim motion, more is necessary.  In addition, the Applicant must meet the high threshold necessary to make an interim change to an existing status quo.  In the present case, the Applicant relies upon the s. 112 report completed by Ms. Vaillencourt for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The law concerning changes in a status quo can be summed up as follows:

a.  The courts have traditionally taken a dim view of any change in a parenting status quo on a temporary motion.  That is because such a motion is brought on unreliable and conflicting affidavit evidence where credibility of parties cannot be determined.  As well, if the status quo does change on an interim motion, there is, of course the risk that the change will be undone at trial, resulting in the children moving twice rather than once, creating instability.

b.  Because of this, the court requires compelling reasons to depart from the status quo prior to the hearing of the motion.  Alternatively, the test has been set out as requiring “exceptional circumstances where immediate action is mandated”:  see Grant v. Turgeon, 2000 CanLII 22565 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 970 (S.C.J.) at para. 17.  Other cases have suggested that there must be some danger to the child remaining in the present status quo:  see Miranda v. Miranda, 2013 ONSC 4704 and Elliott v. Filipova, 2019 ONSC 4506.

c.  In addition, if a party is seeking to change the terms of an existing court order, temporary or otherwise, there must be a change in circumstances prior to making the order:  see the Divorce Act, s. 17(5)and Lonsdale v. Smart, 2018 ONSC 3991 at para. 9.

d.  If a party wishes to rely upon the recommendations in an assessment report or s. 112 investigation in changing the status quo, the court must exercise caution in doing so.  The traditional viewpoint is that an assessment report or an investigation as in the present case is only one piece of evidence to be used at trial and should not be acted upon until the court can assess the weight to give to the report through cross-examination and trial:  see Genovesi v. Genovesi, 1992 CanLII 8562 (ON SC), [1992] O.J. No. 1261 (Gen. Div.), Grant v. Turgeon, supraand JLM v. PDAB, 2012 ONSC 4696 at para. 15-16.

e.  There is authority, however, that the evidencecontained in an assessment report (as opposed to the expert’s recommendations) may be relied upon if it is sufficiently compelling to warrant a change in a status quo or previous order: see Bos v. Bos, [2012] ONSC 3425 and Krasaev v. Krasaev, 2016 ONSC 5951.  In fact, in Krasaev, Douglas J. distinguished between the evidence in the report and the recommendations when he says [at para. 38]: “I note that the caution that applies with respect to the weight to be given to assessment reports at the interim stage of proceedings applies primarily to the conclusions and recommendations of the assessor, rather than the evidence and observations set out in the report.”

In reviewing the weight to be given to that evidence, Bos v. Bos, supra offers some guidance.  Mitrow J. suggested that Genovesi should not prevent the court from reviewing evidence contained in an investigative report, stating [at para. 23] that

…although the general principle enunciated in Genovesi continues to be well founded, it is not so rigid and inflexible as to prevent a court on a motion to give some consideration to the content of an assessment report where that assessment report provides some additional probative evidence to assist the court, particularly where the court is making an order which is not a substantive departure from an existing order or status quo.”

            Miller v. Miller, 2022 ONSC 7237 (CanLII) at 23-26

“The status-quo, and avoiding reckless creation of a new status-quo, are important considerations at the interim stage: Cosentino v. Cosentino, 2016 ONSC 5621 (CanLII) at paras. 16 and 17.

It is a long-standing legal principle that absent evidence of material change and that an immediate change is required, the status-quo is ordinarily to be maintained until trial: Niel v. Niel, 1976 CanLII 1925 (ON CA), 28 R.F.L. 257 (Ont. C.A.), Grant v. Turgeon, 2000 CanLII 22565 (ON SC), 5 R.F.L. (5^th) 326 (Ont. S.C.J.); Kimpton v. Kimpton, 2002 CarswellOnt 5030 (Ont. S.C.J.).

In making an interim order, a court should generally maintain the status-quo in the absence of important reasons suggesting that change is necessary in the child’s best interests: McEachern v. McEachern (1994) 1994 CanLII 7379 (ON SC), 5 RFL (4^th) 115.

To disturb the status-quo, there must be compelling evidence to show the welfare of the child would be in danger in maintaining the status quo, namely the evidence must clearly and unequivocally establish that the status-quo is not in the child’s best interests: Miranda v. Miranda, 2013 ONSC 4704 (CanLII), para. 26.

The rationale for this principle lies in the fact that there is a concern for fairness to the parties and a concern for the best interests of the child.  Generally, it is not in the best interests of a child to change the residential arrangements if there is a possibility of yet another change because of a pending trial: Copeland v. Perreault 2007 ONCJ 217 (CanLII), [2007] O.J. No.1889 (O.C.J.) at para. 49.

It is generally not in the best interests of a child to disturb a status-quo on a temporary basis pending trial without compelling reasons. Those compelling reasons usually include an assessment report from a private assessor or the Office of the Children’s Lawyer recommending an immediate change in residence; an indication that the children are doing poorly under a particular regime; serious mental health issues in connection with one of the parents; and drug or alcohol addiction on the part of one of the parents. As well, it must be demonstrable that one or more children are doing very poorly as a result of the parenting regime: Shotton v. Switzer, 2014 ONSC 843 (CanLII).

Children should not be needlessly disrupted by a parent unilaterally creating a new status-quo through manipulation or deliberate acts:  Izyuk v. Bilousov 2011 ONSC 6451 (SCJ); Nyari v. Velasco 2008 ONCJ 272 (OCJ).”

            Sayeau v. Buttle, 2022 ONSC 7246 (CanLII) at 14-20

“Several Ontario cases speak to surreptitious recordings by parents in family law proceedings creating opportunities for further conflict and mistrust. They cite strong policy arguments against admitting surreptitious recordings into evidence. They have been fully set out by Kurz J. in Van Ruyvern v. Van Ruyven, 2021 ONSC 5963, 62 RFL (8th) 451, at paras. 30 to 43. In this case, the parties will have years to co-parent L together and do not need ammunition to fuel further distrust. As stated aptly by Kurz J. at para. 40 in Van Ruyvern,

…routinely allowing our courts to reward a party’s attempt to secretly spy on the other by admitting the fruits of that conduct into evidence contributes to the corrosiveness of matrimonial litigation. That approach must be discouraged.”

Dworakowski v. Dworakowski, 2022 ONSC 7209 (CanLII) at 36

“L.M.P. v. L.S., 2011 SCC 64 (CanLII), [2011] 3 SCR 775 remains the leading authority for the correct approach to determine whether there has been a change in circumstances which warrants a review of a spousal support order under section 17(1) the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3 (2^nd Supp.), (“the Act “). The long established definition of a change in circumstances refers to a “material” change that “if known at the time would likely have resulted in different terms.”   This definition, first found in Willick v. Willick, 1994 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670, a child support variation, was adopted for variations of spousal support in G. (L.) v, B. (G), 1995 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 370. (See L.M.P. at para. 30).

The two sets of reasons in L.M.P., which concur in the result, diverge on the question of how the principles enunciated in Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24 (CanLII), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303 factor into the analysis. The approach in the majority opinion hones in on the differences between the legislative provisions applicable to initial applications for support, such as in Miglin, and those at play in the variation context. The majority conclude that the Miglin analysis, conducted under section 15(2) of the Act should not be imported into the analysis for variations under section 17. (See L.M.P. at paras. 22 to 28).

A section 17 variation inquiry begins with the presumption that the existing order’s terms complied with the objectives of the Act when it was made. (See L.M.P. at para. 33).  This means the initial focus is on the nature and sufficiency of the change to determine whether the threshold test for a variation consideration has been satisfied by the moving party. The change must be enduring. (See L.M.P. at para. 35) If the moving party discharges this threshold onus, then the context and magnitude of the change will shape the scope of the inquiry, as well as the remedy. In this sense, L.M.P. guides us away from a rigid approach, which describes the hearing as either de novo or not, towards a more fluid approach regarding the proper scope of the hearing, driven by the unique facts of each case.  (See L.M.P. at para. 47).

Kim argues that the principles in Hickey v. Prince, 2015 ONSC 5596 (Div. Ct.)  apply to bar this review on the basis that early retirement is not material change in circumstances. In Hickey, the Divisional Court allowed an appeal where the motion judge erred in finding that the husband’s voluntary early retirement on a full pension constituted a material change in his income. The court held that the motion judge failed to consider the husband’s income earning capacity and his overall wealth in determining whether there was a material change in his condition, means, and other circumstances. The court concluded he was in good health and had the ability to continue to earn more than enough for the continuation of the wife’s existing support. In short, the Divisional Court concluded there was no material change in income earning capacity. The facts here are different as they relate to the threshold question.

As noted by the court in L.M.P., a parties’ agreement is not ignored under section 15(2) or section 17 but its treatment will be different because of the different purposes for each provision. (See L.M.P. at para. 27). Here the parties’ Minutes of Settlement were incorporated into a final order, subjecting their terms to the narrower scope of review under section 17.  Paragraph 3 of the final consent order reads as follows: “The spousal support payable by the Respondent is subject to review in the event of a material change in circumstance, and a material change in circumstance may [emphasis added] include but not be limited to the retirement of the husband.”

The plain meaning of this provision is that the parties contemplated that Rick’s retirement might entitle him to trigger a review of the support obligation. Notably there is no reference to Kim’s retirement even though she was working full-time when the Minutes were formulated. It matters that the order has language which specifically contemplates Rick’s retirement. Given that there is no stipulated age of retirement in this provision and that Rick has, in fact, retired and is moving permanently to Mexico, I find that his circumstances have changed in a material way within the meaning of section 17.  His new place of residence alone constitutes a material change in circumstances since he is moving to a jurisdiction which has no reciprocal support enforcement mechanism with Canada. This effectively deprives Kim of the benefit of an operative term in their current order, namely the ability to enforce it through the Family Responsibility Office.

That said, an affirmative answer to the question of whether the moving party has met the threshold test does not necessarily translate into an increase, decrease, suspension or termination of the obligation. It merely opens the door to further inquiry and a consideration of what order is required now, having regard to the objectives of section 17(7) of the Act.”

Lepoidevin v. Lepoidevin, 2019 ONSC 7434 (CanLII) at 4-10

“The duty of honest performance in contract, formulated in Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494, applies to all contracts and requires that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract. In determining whether dishonesty is connected to a given contract, the relevant question is whether a right under that contract was exercised, or an obligation under that contract was performed, dishonestly. While the duty of honest performance is not to be equated with a positive obligation of disclosure, in circumstances where a contracting party lies to or knowingly misleads another, a lack of a positive obligation of disclosure does not preclude an obligation to correct a false impression created through that party’s own actions.

The organizing principle of good faith recognized in Bhasin is not a free‑standing rule, but instead manifests itself through existing good faith doctrines. While the duty of honest performance and the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith are distinct, like each of the different manifestations of the organizing principle, they should not be thought of as disconnected from one another. The duty of honest performance shares a common methodology with the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith by fixing on the wrongful exercise of a contractual prerogative. Each of the specific legal doctrines derived from the organizing principle rest on a requirement of justice that a contracting party have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of their counterparty. They need not subvert their own interests to those of the counterparty by acting as a fiduciary or in a selfless manner. This requirement of justice reflects the notion that the bargain, the rights and obligations agreed to, is the first source of fairness between parties to a contract. Those rights and obligations must be exercised and performed honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily where recognized by law.

The duty of honesty as contractual doctrine has a limiting function on the exercise of an otherwise complete and clear right since the duty, irrespective of the intention of the parties, applies to the performance of all contracts, and by extension, to all contractual obligations and rights. Instead of constraining the decision to terminate in and of itself, the duty of honest performance attracts damages where the manner in which the right was exercised was dishonest. This focus on the manner in which the termination right was exercised should not be confused with whether the right could be exercised. No contractual right, including a termination right, can be exercised dishonestly and, as such, contrary to the requirements of good faith.

The requirements of honesty in performance can go further than prohibiting outright lies. Whether or not a party has knowingly misled its counterparty is a highly fact‑specific determination, and can include lies, half‑truths, omissions, and even silence, depending on the circumstances. One can mislead through action, by saying something directly to its counterparty, or through inaction, by failing to correct a misapprehension caused by one’s own misleading conduct.

The duty of honest performance is a contract law doctrine, not a tort and therefore a nexus with the contractual relationship is required. A breach must be directly linked to the performance of the contract. The framework for abuse of rights in Quebec is useful to illustrate the required direct link between dishonesty and performance from Bhasin. Authorities from Quebec serve as persuasive authority and comparison between the common law and civil law as they evolve in Canada is a particularly useful and familiar exercise for the Court. Like in the Quebec civil law, no contractual right may be exercised dishonestly and therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith. The direct link exists when the party performs their obligation or exercises their right under the contract dishonestly. While the duty of honest performance has similarities with civil fraud and estoppel, it is not subsumed by them. Unlike estoppel and civil fraud, the duty of honest performance does not require a defendant to intend that the plaintiff rely on their representation or false statement.

The duty of honest performance attracts damages according to the ordinary contractual measure. The ordinary approach is to award contractual damages corresponding to the expectation interest. That is, damages should put the injured party in the position that it would have been in had the duty been performed. Although reliance damages, which are the ordinary measure of damages in tort, and expectation damages will be the same in many if not most cases, they are conceptually distinct, and there is no basis to hold that a breach of the duty of honest performance should in general be compensated by way of reliance damages.”

            C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, 2020 SCC 45 (CanLII) (headnote)