“Mr. Elkind argues that the phrase “are the parents of a child” in s. 29 of the FLA should be interpreted to mean “are the parents of a child on the date of separation.” He argues that because Noa died before the date of separation, they do not meet the definition of spouse. Mr. Elkind also argues that spousal support is intended to address the economic needs of a parent with ongoing responsibility for raising a child and because Ms. Addeo does not have ongoing responsibilities for their daughter, she should not be considered a spouse. I disagree. In my view, Mr. Elkind’s proposed interpretation is inconsistent with both the language and purpose of s. 29 of the FLA.
When interpreting s. 29 of the FLA, I must consider the words of provision “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Montreal (Ville) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62 at paras. 9-12; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para. 21.
Looking first at the language of the definition of spouse in s. 29 of the FLA, it does not limit the definition of spouse to couples who have a child together on the date of separation. It defines people who cohabited “in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the parents of a child” as spouses. It does not say “if they are the parents of a child on the date of separation.” If the Legislature intended to limit the definition of spouse in that way, it would have done so explicitly.
The purpose of the FLA as a whole and the purpose of the support provisions specifically also support an interpretation of s. 29 that includes in the definition of spouse two people who have a child together while cohabiting, regardless of whether the child is alive on the date of separation.”