“In Weber v. Weber, 2020 ONSC 4098, [2020] O.J. No. 2978 at paras. 57-58, the court set out the first part of the test:
The first part of the analysis in determining child support entitlement for adult children requires the court to ascertain whether the child is in fact still under parental charge. The analysis of this issue focuses in part on whether the child remains financially dependent on the parent (Rebenchuk, at para. 25; Thompson v. Ducharme, 2004 MBCA 42 (C.A.), at para. 14; P.(S.) v. P.(R.), 2011 ONCA 336 (C.A.), at para. 31). However, the case-law under both the Divorce Act and similar provincial child support legislation establishes that a child can also be under parental charge if they are unable to manage daily living on their own without direct and consistent care, monitoring and support from their parent (Briard v. Briard, 2010 CarswellBC 119 (S.C.), at para. 16; aff’d 2010 BCCA 431 (C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2010] SCCA No. 435 (S.C.C.); Carpenter v. March, 2012 CarswellNLTD(F) 11, [2012] N.J. No. 184 (Nfld. and Lab. S.C.- Fam. Div.), a para. 7; Senos v. Karcz, 2014 ONCA 459 (C.A.), at para. 6).
In assessing whether an adult child is “unable to obtain the necessaries of life” within the definition of “child of the marriage,” the question is not whether their sources of income and other financial assistance support a sustenance existence, but rather whether they are sufficient to support the child’s reasonable needs having regard for the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child, and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to the child’s support (Briard, at paras. 29-30; Lougheed v. Lougheed, 2007 BCCA 389 (C.A.), at paras. 23 and 25; Moore v. Moore, 2014 BCSC 2210 (S.C.), at para. 103; E.B.L.P. v. J.G.S., 2020 BCPC 18 (P.C.), at para. 50).
The analysis must simply look at whether the adult child’s sources of income meet their reasonable needs. In deciding this, the court should also consider the reasonable expectations of the adult child in light of the means of the parents. In Lewi v. Lewi (2006), 2006 CanLII 15446 (ON CA), 80 O.R. (3d) 321 (CA), at para. 171 the court stated:
It is fundamental that the lifestyle of children should suffer as little as possible as a consequence of their parents separating. If the parents would have paid the educational expenses of the children had they not separated, then, all things being equal, the children should be entitled to expect they would pay them even though the parents have separated.
The “causes” of the inability that are permitted under the Divorce Act
In Weber v. Weber, 2020 ONSC 4098, [2020] O.J. No. 2978, at para. 59, the court set out the second part of the test:
Assuming that the court determines that the adult child is under parental charge and unable to withdraw from that charge or to obtain the necessaries of life, the second part of the entitlement analysis requires the court to determine whether the child’s inability to do so is due to illness, disability, or “other cause.” Section 2(1)(b) of the Divorce Act leaves open the question of what “other cause” would justify an order that a child who is of the age of majority or older remains entitled to child support from a parent, and the case-law establishes that the phrase is to be interpreted broadly (Olson, at para. 14; K.M.R. v. I.W.R., 2020 ABQB 77 (Q.B.), at para. 37).”