“Retroactive awards of child support “cannot simply be regarded as exceptional orders to be made in exceptional circumstances” and “while the propriety of a retroactive award should not be presumed, it will not only be found in rare cases”: D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, at para. 5.
As noted by the trial judge, in considering whether to order retroactive child support, “[u]nreasonable delay by the recipient parent in seeking an increase in support will militate against a retroactive award, while blameworthy conduct by the payor parent will have the opposite effect”: D.B.S., at para. 5.
The trial judge noted that the court must also consider the needs and circumstances of the child, and the hardship to the payor of a retroactive award. She stated that retroactive child support must not amount to a wealth transfer, citing Walsh v. Walsh (2004), 2004 CanLII 36110 (ON CA), 69 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.), at para. 16. The trial judge, citing Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 763, at para. 41, stated, “Child support is, of course, the right of a child and is an obligation that exists regardless of the commencement of any proceedings to enforce it.”