Month: June 2025

“Sharon claims retroactive spousal support from the date of separation. This amount, on a net of tax basis, Sharon proposes be in the sum of $547,899.50.

Sharon relies on the decision of this Court in Bensky v Bensky, 2012 ONSC 4029 to advance her claim for retroactive support. In Bensky, the Court held:

The obligation to pay support commences from the date of separation. On an interim motion, the court may provide retroactive support to compensate for any deficit. The factors to be considered are the reasonableness of any delay in seeking support, the conduct of the payor, the circumstances of the payee spouse and hardship occasioned by a retroactive award (at para. 32)

Based on the record before me, I do not find that there has been undue delay on the part of Sharon in bringing her claim for support. On the other hand, considering James’ voluntary non characterized monthly payments of $10,000.00 since separation together with the Marriage Contract and the circumstances in which it was signed by Sharon, I cannot attribute blame to James in not voluntarily agreeing to pay spousal support apart from the agreed $100,000 lump sum settlement. I also note that in note that in neither of the cases upon which Sharon relies to advance her claim for retroactive spousal support was the Court faced with an agreement limiting support.

While I acknowledge that Courts have indeed awarded retroactive support on the interim motions, in this instance, I prefer to follow those cases that defer the issue of retroactive support to the trial judge: See for example, Samis (Litigation Guardian of) v. Samis, 2011 ONCJ 273; Brandl v. Rolston, 2012 BCSC 902; Ryan v. Ryan, 2018 ONSC 6468. By definition, interim motions are designed to put in place temporary measures pending settlement or trial. Interim motions are not meant to determine the ultimate issues and they should not because the Court generally has an incomplete and often contradictory record before it without the benefit of cross-examination.”

            Hutton v. Hutton, 2022 ONSC 3918 (CanLII) at 87-90

“Section 15.1 of the Divorce Act states:

Child support order

15.1 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of any or all children of the marriage.

Section 1(d) of the Child Support Guidelines states that the objectives of the guidelines are:

(d) to ensure consistent treatment of parents or spouses and their children who are in similar circumstances.

Pursuant to section 16 of the Child Support Guidelines, the starting point in determining income for support purposes is the payor’s line 150 of their Income Tax Return.

The Child Support Guidelines provide for different methods of determining income when the starting point is not the “fairest determination of that income” (Section 17 of the Child Support Guidelines), does “not fairly reflect all the money available to the parent or spouse” (Section 18 of the Child Support Guidelines) or when a court “imputes such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate (Section 19 of the Child Support Guidelines).”

            E.B. v. G.B.-M., 2024 ONSC 3475 (CanLII) at 272-275

“N. began to attend university in person in the fall of 2021.  That September, he began to live in St. Catherines for eight months of the year.  As a result, Mr. Niro moved to vary the child support for N. based on decisions such as Coghill v. Coghill, 2006 CanLII 28734 (Ont. S.C.) and Liscio v. Avram, 2009 CanLII 43640 (Ont. S.C.).  The approach in those cases was summarized by Price J. in Liscio, at para. 36:

The proper approach, in these circumstances, is the one taken by this Court in Coghill v. Coghill, at paras. 44 to 53. In that case, Justice Wright calculated the child’s expenses during the eight months the child was at university, deducted the contribution the child was able to make from summer earnings, apportioned the net expenses between the parents in proportion to their respective incomes and required them to pay their respective shares directly to the child. He then calculated the table amount of the non-residential parent’s obligation to pay child support for the four summer months, when the child was living with the residential parent, as if the child were a minor, based on the income imputed to the non-residential parent and required him to pay that amount to the residential parent. [Citations omitted.]”

            Craig v. Niro, 2023 ONSC 3792 (CanLII) at 6

“I do not agree with the motion judge’s conclusion that a cohabitation agreement does not apply to the parties after a separation followed by reconciliation unless the agreement expressly provides to the contrary.

It is well-established that, at common law, a separation agreement becomes void upon reconciliation of the parties, subject to any clause in the separation agreement overriding the common law rule or which would imply that the intent of the parties was that terms of the separation agreement would be carried out notwithstanding any subsequent reconciliation: see Ernikos v. Ernikos, 2017 ONCA 347, at para. 11; Sydor v. Sydor (2003), 2003 CanLII 17626 (ON CA), 178 O.A.C. 155 (C.A.), para. 22; Bailey v. Bailey (1982), 1982 CanLII 1760 (ON CA), 37 O.R. (2d) 117 (C.A); Bebenek v. Bebenek (1979), 1979 CanLII 1861 (ON CA), 24 O.R. (2d) 385 (C.A.).

I would not extend the common law rule to cohabitation agreements.

The common law rule is ancient. In Nicol v. Nicol (1885), 30 Ch. D. 143, at p. 145, North J. of the Chancery Division explained the rationale for the common law rule that reconciliation brings a separation agreement to an end:

I think it clearly established by numerous authorities (no case in any way conflicting with them), that where a separation arrangement is made pure and simple, that arrangement is for the term of the separation, and for no longer. It comes to an end when the separation ends, not because the fact of reconciliation or recohabitation makes it void, but it dies a natural death. The agreement was to provide for a state of things which has come to an end, the state of things being that the parties were living separate although married. When they live together again as man and wife the state of things is totally different, and the arrangement comes to an end.

The rule was not absolute and depended on an interpretation of the parties’ intentions, as evinced by the whole of the agreement. For example, where a separation agreement had separation for one of its objects but also other matters within its purview, such as settlement of property issues, those aspects of the agreement may continue despite a return to cohabitation. As described by Montague Lush and Walter Hussey Griffith in Law of Husband and Wife within the Jurisdiction of the King’s Bench & Chancery Divisions, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, Limited, 1910), at pp. 461-463:

[I]t is a well-established principle of law that a separation deed properly so called—i.e., a separation deed whose only object is to provide for the parties living apart from one another—is ipso facto put an end to for all future purposes if the parties subsequently become reconciled and return to cohabitation.

This principle is too well known and too plain to require observation. For the very nature and object of the instrument is to provide for a state of circumstances which comes to an end on a cesser of the separation.

…

But a separation deed the primary object of which is to provide for the parties living apart may have also a secondary object—viz., that of effecting a permanent settlement of property to continue not only during the separation but in any event.

…

The question whether a deed is a separation deed which will be avoided upon a return to cohabitation or a post-nuptial settlement which will continue valid notwithstanding a return to cohabitation turns upon the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the deed. [Emphasis added. Internal citations omitted.]

The common law rule dates from a time when views about marriage, cohabitation, separation, and divorce were very different. At one time, separation agreements were considered “contrary to public policy.” To cohabit without the benefit of marriage was “to live in sin.” The courts of equity would not enforce an executory separation agreement, i.e. one entered before the separation, though in contemplation of a future separation. Cohabitation for even a short time after execution of the agreement rendered the deed of separation void: see Law of Husband and Wife, at p. 457.

Today, marriage contracts, cohabitation agreements, and separation agreements are all part of the legislative landscape: Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, ss. 52–54. Parties should be encouraged to enter agreements to define their rights and obligations. Jurisprudential shoals upon which an agreement may founder unnecessarily do not advance that goal.

Notwithstanding the sea change in family law over the past century, the common law reconciliation rule remains a part of Canadian common law and continues to make some sense. Where the raison d’être of the agreement is separation and parties reconcile, the foundation for the separation agreement dissolves. I see no basis to extend this logic so as to void a cohabitation agreement following reconciliation of the parties. Under such circumstances, the reconciled parties have returned to the very state contemplated by the cohabitation agreement.

In Langdon v. Langdon, 2015 MBQB 153, 321 Man. R. (2d) 52, Little J. remarked, in obiter, that he was “far from certain” that reconciliation should affect a cohabitation agreement in the same manner as a separation agreement. He explained, at paras. 138-140:

I do not think it a proper inference or presumption to say that a resumption of cohabitation nullifies [a cohabitation agreement] concerning a property and support regime. Renewed cohabitation in that context is more reflective of an intention to return to a relationship where one’s rights were formerly delineated by the agreement. It does not seem to me to be at all reflective of an intention to enhance one party’s rights or to impose greater obligations on the other, something that will inevitably result when the cohabitation agreement no longer exists.

It seems to me that if there is to be an inference or a presumption at all it ought to be (barring other evidence of intention) that the resumption of cohabitation returns you to the position you held in the relationship to which you have now chosen to return. Presuming the termination of the cohabitation agreement on resumption of cohabitation could lead to strategic separations and reconciliations designed to nullify cohabitation agreements. It also results in a policy requiring redocumentation on resumption of cohabitation.

I do not regard the first as good policy; the second is impracticable and is not in keeping with the way people typically lead their lives.

I agree with the views expressed in these passages, although I would not go so far as to say there is a presumption in favour of the cohabitation agreement’s continued validity following reconciliation. The applicability of a cohabitation agreement to the circumstances of the parties will depend on the interpretation of that agreement and the light it sheds on the intentions of the parties.”

          Krebs v. Cote, 2021 ONCA 657 (CanLII) at 13-22

“In F.S. v. N.J. and T.S., 2024 ONCJ 199, [2024] O.J. No. 1792, Sherr J. summarized the current state of grandparent contact following a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

I agree (and adopt) Sherr J.’s interpretation of the law, as follows:

[68] Grandparents do not have a legal right of contact with their grandchildren. The onus is on the grandparents to show contact is in the children’s best interests. The starting presumption is that deference should be given to a parent’s decision whether to award a grandparent access to a child. See: Chapman v. Chapman, 2001 CanLII 24015 (ONCA).

[69] It is always important to defer to the decisions of parents regarding their children. However, deference is only accorded when those decisions are reasonable, and they are acting in the child’s bests interests. See: McLaughlin v. Huehn, 2004 ONCJ 426; Bennett v. MacFarlane, 2021 ONSC 3700; Arbuzova v. Scriver et al, 2024 ONSC 832.

[70] In Giansante v. DiChiara 2005 CanLII 26446 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 3184 (SCJ), the court reviewed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Chapman, and held that deference should generally be given to a custodial parent’s decision regarding access unless the following three questions are answered in the affirmative:

One: Does a positive grandparent-grandchild relationship already exist?

Two: Does the parent’s decision imperil this relationship?

Three: Has the parent acted arbitrarily?

[71] The Ontario Court of Appeal in B.F. v. A.N., 2024 ONCA 94 set out that there is now a two-part test to determine contact cases. The three questions posed in Giansante are now the first part of the test to determine if the court will defer to the parent’s wishes.

[72] The court in B.F. stated that if the court determines it will not defer to the parent’s wishes, the second part of the test requires a best interests analysis taking into account many factors, including the following: the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with the grandparent and the history of the child’s care; the child’s needs, her special needs; the grandparent’s willingness and ability to meet the child’s needs; their willingness and ability to co-operate with the child’s parent and other caregivers; the child’s cultural, linguistic, and religious upbringing; and any criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure relevant to the safety of the child.

[73] In Capone v. Pirri, 2018 ONSC 6541, the court considered that to be a positive relationship, there must exist something more than an occasional pleasant experience with the child. The grandparent and grandchild relationship must consist of a close bond with strong emotional ties, deserving of preservation in order to displace the principle of parental autonomy. The court held that the legal threshold of a positive relationship for the court to consider superseding its deference to a parent is “necessarily a high one”.

[74] In Torabi v. Patterson, 2016 ONCJ 210, Justice Marvin Kurz set out the following factors in determining whether the court should defer to the parent’s decision:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. There must generally be a substantial pre-existing relationship between the relative and child. Strong loving and nurturing ties must exist between them based on time spent together that enhances the emotional well-being of the child.
                  2. That relationship must be a constructive one for the child in the sense that it is worth preserving. If relations between the parties are too poisoned, a previously positive relationship may not be capable of preservation.
                  3. The determination must include consideration of the age of the child and the time since the child last saw the relative.
                  4. A fourth factor may apply in the exceptional circumstance of a young child who has lost a parent. In that event, the existence of a strong pre-existing relationship may not be necessary when the relative(s) of the lost parent applies for access.

[75] Acting arbitrarily, under the test set out in Giansante, means to make decisions about contact that are based on considerations other than the best interests of the child. As stated in that case, “this is consistent with section 24(1) of the Act which provides that decisions about access must be based on the best interests of the child.” See: Giansante, paragraph 27.

[76] The determination of whether the parent is acting reasonably in denying contact must be approached from the standpoint of the child’s best interests. See: Arbuzova, supra, par. 26.

[77] In Simmons v. Simmons, 2016 CarswellNS 1017 (NSCA), the court wrote at paragraph 41:

In addition, judicial deference to parental authority can be tempered by the court’s willingness to recognize benefits that extended family bring to a child whose life has been marked by the loss of a parent, such as love, support, and stability. These cases sometimes present best interest factors not apparent in cases with two living parents, including the fact that a child can know his or her deceased parent, including his or her personality, heritage, and culture, through his or her grandparents. See, for example, White v. Matthews, [1997] NS.J. No. 604 (N.S. Fam. Ct.) and Brooks v. Joudrey, 2011 NSFC 5.

[78] In Ninkovic v. Utjesinovic, 2019 ONSC 558, Justice Lene Madsen drew a parallel with the unavailability of a parent who was in jail to a child having lost a parent, in assessing whether the court should defer to a parent’s decision not to permit contact.

[79] Justice Madsen also set out the following factors to consider in engaging with the best interests analysis in the second part of the test at paragraphs 72 to 74 of her decision in Ninkovic:

In considering, at the second stage, whether access to the grandparent is in the best interests of the child, an important consideration is the extent to which this would cause anxiety and stress for the parent, which in turn could have a deleterious impact on the child. For example in Barber v. Mangal, 2009 ONCJ 631, Justice Brownstone found that the intensity of the conflict between the parents and the grandmother seeking access was such that any access would be extremely stressful for the parents and “given their personalities, there is a very real and substantial risk that such stress would be visited upon the child.” See para. 17. At the same time, animosity does not necessarily preclude an access order. See para. 18.

See also MacDonald v. MacDonald, CanLII 15444 in which Justice Pazaratz found that the “level of conflict between the applicant and the respondent is so overwhelming that any future contact will invariably result in the children and their family experiencing more upset, commotion, and grief,” and dismissed the grandmother’s request for access to her daughter’s children.

A further consideration is whether an access order would destabilize the family unit. See Blackburn v. Fortin, 2006 CarswellOnt 3458. In that case, Justice Smith declined to grant access to a grandmother where significant tension existed between the grandmother and mother, the grandmother often imposed unsolicited views on proper child-rearing, and the grandmother had made a heavy-handed attempt to change the parents’ decision regarding schooling. The court found that access could destabilize the family unit.”

          Kirshenblatt v. Kirshenblatt, 2024 ONSC 2896 (CanLII) at 142-143

“In closing, we would underline the fact that the standard of review from orders resolving financial disputes in family law, which, as this appeal illustrates, is highly fact specific, is deferential: Lesko v. Lesko, 2021 ONCA 369, 57 R.F.L. (8th) 305, at para. 5, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 290. As the Supreme Court stated in Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at para. 12, an appeal court should only intervene “when there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error in law”.”

          Zhao v. Xiao, 2023 ONCA 453 (CanLII) at 20

“If a respondent to a family law application is challenging jurisdiction under the Divorce Act, the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, or the CLRA, they should serve a motion in response to the application (similar to a motion under rule 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure), and then seek directions under the Family Law Rules and the practice directions for a hearing of their motion. In doing so, they can avoid the issues presented by this case, where the burden of proof and the scope of the jurisdiction issues aren’t clearly delineated, causing delay and increased costs. If the respondent is delaying doing so, the applicant has remedies under rule 10(5) or can seek directions itself.”

          Kalra v. Bhatia, 2024 ONSC 3565 (CanLII) at 9

“S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.), 2006 SCC 37 (“DBS”), is the leading case on “retroactive” child support – the enforceability and quantification of support that was neither paid nor claimed when it was supposedly due.

The court noted, at para. 2, that such “retroactive” awards are not truly retroactive:

They do not hold parents to a legal standard that did not exist at the relevant time.  But they are “retroactive” in the sense that they are not being made on a go-forward basis: the parents who owe support (the “payor parents”) are being ordered to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before.

Beginning at para. 80 of DBS, the court discussed the awarding of retroactive child support in the absence of an existing court order for child support, the situation in the present case.  The court noted that “absent special circumstances (e.g., hardship or ad hoc sharing of expenses with the custodial parent), it becomes unreasonable for the non-custodial parent to believe he was acquitting himself of his obligations toward his children.  The non-custodial parent’s interest in certainty is generally not a very compelling one”.  At para. 83, the court in DBS appropriately referred to such orders as “retroactive original orders.””

          Abraham v. Levesque, 2024 ONSC 3534 (CanLII) at 49-51

“Orders for security for costs are an exercise in judicial discretion based on circumstances specified by section 24(13) of the Family Law Rules which reads as follows:

ORDER FOR SECURITY FOR COSTS

(13) A judge may, on motion, make an order for security for costs that is just, based on one or more of the following factors:

1. 1. 1. 1. 1.    A party ordinarily resides outside Ontario.
            2.    A party has an order against the other party for costs that remains unpaid, in the same case or another case.
            3.    A party is a corporation and there is good reason to believe it does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs.
            4.    There is good reason to believe that the case is a waste of time or a nuisance and that the party does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs.
            5.    A statute entitles the party to security for costs.  O. Reg.114/99, r. 24(13).

In Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2015 ONSC 3684 (S.C.J.), Pazaratz J. noted the purpose of an order for security of costs is to protect a party from nuisance or irresponsible litigation, conducted without regard to the merits of the case or the costs likely to be incurred.   It requires the court to apply the following analysis:

a.   The initial onus is on the party seeking security for costs to show that the other party falls within one of the enumerated grounds.

b.   If the onus is met, the court has discretion to grant or refuse an order for security.

c.   If the court orders security, it has wide discretion as to the quantum and means of payment of the order.  Clark v Clark2014 ONCA 175 (CanLII).

d.   The order must be “just” and be based on one or more of the factors listed in subrule 24(13).  Hodgins v Buddhu[2013] O.J. No. 1261 (OCJ).

Orders for security for costs are a blunt instrument. They are not intended to act as a roadblock to genuine claims: Izyuk v. Bilousov, supra, at para. 37. They should be used sparingly and carefully because they may well have the effect of barring a party from access to the court process for a proper review of existing orders – something, for example, to which a party is entitled respecting child support orders if there has been a change in circumstances. See: Gauthier v. Gauthier, 2019 ONCA 722.

In most instances the merits of a case should not be determined by a party’s inability to post security for costs.  Bragg v. Bruyere, 2007 ONCJ 515.  But litigants should not be permitted to use the court as a playground.  Court proceedings are expensive, time consuming, and disruptive. They should not be launched frivolously or without due regard to the impact on the responding party. McGraw v Samra, 2004 ONCJ 164 (CanLII), [2004] O.J. No. 3610 (OCJ).

The mere satisfaction of the criteria in Rule 24(13) is not sufficient to merit an order for security for costs.  It must also be just to make the order and generally in family law proceedings courts do not wish to see proceedings determined on their merits by an inability to post security for costs. Hodgin v. Buddhu, [2013] O.J. No.1262 (O.C.J.)

When proceeding under Rule 24(13) the opposing party need only prove that there is “good reason to believe” the action is a waste of time or is a nuisance. In the case of Wreggbo v. Vinton, 2013 ONCJ 250, 2013 CarswellOnt 5833, Justice Katarynych stated at paragraph 11:

In relation to the latter basis, the subrule allows either a showing of good reason to believe that there is either nuisance afoot or a wasting of the court’s time.   As a matter of common sense, a nuisance claim is one so devoid of merit that it is a waste of the court’s time.  It wholly undercuts the primary objective of the Rules to allow a “nuisance claim” that is by its nature a waste of time, to go forward to trial with a security for costs order “hobbling” the trial court, as Superior Court Justice Quinn characterized the dilemma in the Stefureak case. See Stefureak v. Chambers, 2005 Canlii 7890 (ON SC). [emphasis omitted]

Further, the court in Wreggbo noted that whether an order for security for costs is “just” in any particular case is an objective determination, based on the record before the court, set in the context of the procedural law established by the Rules and the substantial law governing the claims for which the security is sought (para.11). The court stated that whether a claim has merit is not a litigant’s “take my word for it” type of consideration but rather that:

[13]  Merit is unfolded – or not – in the quality of the disclosure of information provided about the claim to the other party.  It is an information sharing that, as part of a party’s “just dealing” responsibility, positions the other party to make a responsibly informed response to the claim.  It is an information-sharing that flows into the judicial conferencing process, as a matter of “just dealing” to inform the court’s opinion on the merits of competing claims, and the means by which the parties make visible their attempt to work with the case management judge to meet the primary objective of the Rules.

[14]      Withholding of information reasonably needed by the other party or the court itself to take a responsible stance on the likely merits of any particular claim is unjust, within the meaning of the Rules.

[15]      It skids the claim into the mischief zone. Once in the mischief zone, it is nuisance and wastes not just the court’s time and resources, but also the time and resources of the other party.

….

[20]        So it is that the state of information disclosure between the parties and to the case management court over the course of the litigation is relevant to the adjudication of a security for costs motion. The underlying question is whether the claim needs a trial.”

Krzewina v. Beaumont, 2021 ONCJ 351 (CanLII) at 24-30

“At the outset of trial, Vahid amended his pleading to seek a declaration that two documents he signed acknowledging that Halime is entitled to ownership of the Ellis Property were domestic contracts that must be set aside pursuant to ss. 56(4)(a) and 56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, and/or by reason of undue influence, duress, and unconscionability. Vahid’s counsel argued that if these agreements are set aside, then there would have to be a reference on the issue of equalization with respect to the Ellis Property with financial statements, etc. Halime consented to this amendment, preserving her right to argue that this claim was statute barred.

As well, in closing submissions, Vahid raised for the first time that the parties were engaged in a joint family enterprise whereby they agreed to share the Ellis Property (while still contesting any entitlement by Halime to the Deerfield Property). When I pressed his counsel about the illogic of this singular claim over the Ellis Property by way of joint family enterprise, his alternative argument was that the joint family enterprise could also include the Deerfield Property. When I pressed him still based upon the case law and the evidence before me that there were multiple properties held solely by Vahid not shared with Halime, as a third alternative argument, Vahid’s counsel argued that all properties that each party accumulated over the course of the relationship could be taken into account as part of a joint family enterprise. This would ultimately necessitate further productions, the exchange of financial statements, discovery and then a further proceeding to address the issue of the distribution of such assets.

None of this was ever pleaded despite the amendments at the outset of trial. This was never mentioned in the Trial Management Report nor at the case management conference I held the Friday before the trial commenced.

As I will explain, the late notice of this claim is unfair. Had this been pleaded from the outset, this action could have been pursued by Halime differently. She could have requested and been entitled to disclosure of documentation regarding all of the properties that each of the parties accumulated during their relationship and then ended up with at the end of the relationship. There could have been discovery on this issue to address whether Halime or Vahid unfairly ended up with a disproportionate share of any accumulated assets, a factor that is central in the case law concerning joint family enterprise relied upon by Vahid.

There are many criticisms one could make about Vahid’s approach, including that it constitutes trial by ambush. After seven years of litigation and a trial, the idea that Vahid should get another kick at the can and another hearing to address a late-breaking joint family enterprise theory is also an abuse of process. The courts do not have the time nor the resources to provide these two parties with another hearing because Vahid has now finally recognized, as will be seen, that both his claim and defence herein are highly problematic and that he needs a new theory. And he sought to do this, again, without having provided any information about his own financial circumstances and the various properties that he held outright during the relationship that Halime has never shared in nor made any claims to.”

          Aghdasi v. Asiyaban, 2024 ONSC 3472 (CanLII) at 6-10